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THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES
1783-1917

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

1783-1917

By S. E. MORISON, M.A.

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Professor of American History in the
University of Oxford; Professor of
History in Harvard University

VOL. II



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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOT-NOTES

Amer. Hist. Rev. *The American Historical Review.* (30 vols.)

Channing, U.S. Edward Channing, *History of the United States.*
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XXXIII

THE COTTON KINGDOM

1820-50

I. *An Expanding Realm*

COTTON was king in almost every aspect of Southern life from 1815 to 1861 ; and the principal bulwark of his throne was slavery. Almost sixty per cent of the slaves in the United States, in 1850, were employed in growing cotton.¹ Like rice, sugar, and tobacco, it was a plantation crop, requiring continuous attention of a sort that the most ignorant negroes were well able to perform. In 1820 the cotton crop of one hundred and sixty million pounds was already the most valuable Southern interest. Meeting a constantly increasing demand, it rose to twice as much in 1830, and more than doubled in the next decade. By 1850 it had passed a thousand million pounds ; and the crop of 1860 was almost twenty-three hundred million pounds in weight, making two-thirds of the total exports of the United States ² in value.

This enormous increase in production was not occasioned by any radical improvement in method, but by a rapid extension of the cotton-growing area. Somewhat as a Tartar horde moved across Asia, eating the fat of the land and leaving devastation behind, so the cotton planters advanced from South Carolina and Georgia across the ' black belts ' and Indian cessions ³ of Alabama and Mississippi, occupied the great valley up to Memphis, pushed up the Red River of Louisiana

¹ J. D. B. De Bow, *Statistical View of the United States* (1854), p. 94.

² U. B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery*, p. 211 ; the tables are in M. B. Hammond, *Cotton Industry*, appendix.

³ See i. 323, 407, and maps of the black belts in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xi. 810 ; *Chronicles of America*, xxvii. 4.

to the Indian Territory, and passed the boundary of Mexico into Texas. On the march King Cotton acquired new subjects: moneyed immigrants from the North, or ambitious yeomen who purchased a slave or two on credit, and with good luck became magnates. But for the most part the pioneers of the South-West disliked the planters, who in turn accused the poor-white 'crackers' and 'hill-billies' of exchanging moonshine whisky with the slaves for stolen goods. In every region fit for cotton, the richest lands were absorbed by plantations during the first generation of settlement. Hunter folk moved westward, yeomen farmers took to the hills or to the pine-barrens, and a shiftless and vagabond class of 'pore white trash', afflicted with the hookworm disease and despised alike by master and slave, closed in on the gullied hillsides and abandoned fields. Some of the best minds of the South endeavoured to arrest this process by scientific methods of agriculture; but so long as good land remained plentiful and cheap, whether within the United States or adjacent under a feeble sovereignty, the cotton planters preferred their own ways.¹

Sugar planters of Louisiana and the tobacco planters of Kentucky were allies of the cotton kingdom; the border slave States were tributary provinces, supplying labour, food, and mules; and much of the plantation revenue found its way to the Northern centres of banking and manufacturing. North Carolina, a State where little cotton was grown, remained an enclave of antique republicanism in the new monarchy; western Virginia and the mountainous regions of Kentucky and Tennessee were Northern salients. Kentucky had the most

¹ Abandoned farms later became as common in New England as in the South, and for the same reason: western competition. Slavery merely hastened the process by the opportunity it afforded for large-scale exploitation; and there were no industries in the South to take up the slack.

varied agriculture of any of the slave States; her people were a fine blend of the old West with the older Virginia. Eastern Virginia could no longer profitably employ her dense slave population on depleted land, and many a tobacco or wheat plantation was maintained only through the sale of surplus negroes. Her economic decrepitude was a spiritual loss to the nation. The Old Dominion squirearchy, which once had led the progressive thought and statesmanship of the United States, now devoted itself to sustaining a hopeless cause.

2. Typical Cotton Plantations

Cotton plantations differed greatly both in size and character, and the greater planters differed from the less as an Irish gentleman of the time from an Irish peasant.¹ Absenteeism was frequent in the lower South, although hardly the rule outside the bottom lands between Vicksburg and New Orleans. Many a show plantation of the older South, where visitors were received with lavish hospitality and impressed with the happy life of devoted blacks, was supported by *latifundia*

¹ The following statistics roughly indicate the social classes in the South as a whole (including the District of Columbia), and in the cotton States (South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas), in 1850:

	<i>All Slave States.</i>	<i>Cotton States.</i>
Number of slaveholding families	347,525	154,391
Number of families owning 1 to 9 slaves	255,258	104,956
Number of families owning 10 to 49 slaves	84,328	43,299
Number of families owning 50 or more slaves	7,939	6,144
White population	6,242,418	2,137,284
Free negro population	238,187	34,485
Slave population	3,204,077	1,808,768

Century of Population Growth, p. 136; J. D. B. De Bow, *Statistical View of the U.S.* (1854), pp. 45, 63, 82, 95, 99. Slaveholding families are counted more than once if they owned slaves in different counties.

in the newer South. One of the better sort in Mississippi, described by Olmsted, covered several square miles. The mansion house, which the owner had not seen for two years, was four miles distant from the nearest white neighbour. The cleared portion, about fourteen hundred acres, was tilled by a plough-gang of thirty men and a larger hoe-gang, mainly women, who were encouraged by a black driver with whip in hand. Enough maize and pork were usually raised to keep the cattle and the 135 slaves, who included three mechanics, two seamstresses, four teamsters and cattle-tenders, a midwife, and a nurse who had charge of a pickaninny crèche. The overseer maintained a pack of hounds to hunt runaways. He kept the field hands working from sun to sun, but gave them most of Saturday as well as Sunday off, except in the picking season. They cut their fuel in the master's woods, and were allowed to make boards for sale in their free time.¹ Everywhere in the South slave families were given allotments on which they could raise greens and poultry to eke out the rations of maize and pork, or even cotton for sale to the master.

A 'middle-class plantation', which did not produce enough surplus to enable the owner to travel or reside elsewhere, would have four hundred to one thousand acres under cultivation, and ten to fifty slaves. A planter of this class might be a younger son, a self-made pioneer, an ex-overseer, or a professional man, using his plantation as an extra source of income, or to enhance his dignity in the community. In few instances did he enjoy comforts or amenities superior to those of the poorest sort of farmers in the North: a bare house without conveniences, a diet largely of 'hog and hominy',² no literature but a weekly paper,

¹ Olmsted, *Back Country* (1907), i. 42-51, 128-32. Cf. the accounts of other types of large plantations in Phillips, *op. cit.*, chapter xiii.

² Pork, bacon, and a preparation of maize.

no diversion but shooting or an occasional visit to the county seat. That sort of planter belonged to the governing class, and had things much his own way in Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas. He generally shared the profound distrust of other parts of the country than his own, and the hearty contempt for the rest of the world, that characterized the ordinary American of that period. Although division of labour was most effective on plantations with fifty to one hundred slaves, virtually half the cotton crop was made by small farmers with one to half a dozen slaves. Mark Twain describes 'one of these little one-horse cotton plantations' in *Huckleberry Finn*: 'A rail fence round a two-acre yard; a stile, made out of logs sawed off and up-ended, in steps, like barrels of a different length, to climb over the fence with, and for the women to stand on when they are going to jump on to a horse; some sickly grass-patches in the big yard, but mostly it was bare and smooth, like an old hat with the nap rubbed off; big double log house for the white folks—hewed logs, with the chinks stopped up with mud or mortar, and these mud-stripes been white-washed some time or another; round-log kitchen, with a big, broad, open but roofed passage joining it to the house; log smoke-house back of the kitchen; three little log nigger-cabins in a row t'other side the smoke-house; one little hut all by itself away down against the back fence, and some out-buildings down a piece the other side; ash-hopper, and big kettle to bile soap in, by the little hut; bench by the kitchen door, with a bucket of water and a gourd; hound¹ asleep there, in the sun; more hounds asleep, roundabout; about three shade-trees away off in a corner; some currant bushes and gooseberry bushes in

¹ 'Hound' in the South-West means a mongrel. As the Missouri anthem has it:

It makes no difference if he is a houn',
You gotta stop kickin' my dawg aroun'.

one place by the fence ; outside of the fence a garden and a water-melon patch ; then the cotton fields begin ; and after the fields, the woods.'

On a first-class plantation, with improved implements, healthy negroes, strong mules, and a competent overseer, ten acres of cotton and ten of maize could be cultivated per able-bodied field-hand. On rich soil, with a proper division of labour, five bales (two thousand pounds) or more of cotton-wool per field-hand could be produced ; but a more nearly average figure, in the Carolina and Georgia piedmont, would be twelve hundred pounds.¹ The average annual price of middling upland cotton at Liverpool fluctuated between $5\frac{1}{2}d.$ and $8\frac{3}{4}d.$ a pound from 1820 to 1840, fell to $4d.$ in 1845-8, rose to $7d.$ in 1850, and averaged about $6d.$ until the Civil War.² Of course a planter was lucky to get half the Liverpool price for himself ; the rest was consumed by transportation, brokerage, and interest on advance-money.

Although cotton-growing was the most profitable employment for slaves, slave labour was an uneconomical method of growing cotton. Once entangled in the meshes of the system, no planter could escape it, and few wished to. Slaves were the only available labour for large-scale production by men of capital, but their cost absorbed an inordinate amount of capital. The most expensive sort, a 'prime field hand' 18 to 25 years old, was worth \$500 in 1832, whence the price rose to \$1,300 just before the panic of 1837. The same 'buck nigger' who brought \$650 in 1845 at the age of eighteen, sold readily for \$1,000 when five years older ;

¹ Phillips, *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 225. De Bow estimates that it cost only \$15 a year to keep a slave. Others estimate as high as \$60.

² M. B. Hammond, *Cotton Industry*, appendix. The years cited are to 1 September ; J. A. Todd, *The World's Cotton Crop* (Black, 1923), p. 430, gives the annual fluctuations. Sea-island cotton, which was still grown along the Carolina and Georgia coast, ruled steadily higher in price.

and the price of this class of slave reached \$1,800 on the eve of the Civil War.¹ Negro wenches on cotton-plantations were such poor breeders that the labour supply had to be replenished by purchase, and land was always wearing out ; hence the profits that on a Northern farm would have been invested, or spent on better buildings and more comforts, in the South went into more land and more slaves. Even the planters most opulent in nominal wealth found it difficult to keep out of debt, and the poorer depended on the money-lender for maintenance between crops almost as much as the East Indian ryot.

3. *The Slave*

As for Sambo, whose wrongs moved the abolitionists to wrath and tears, there is some reason to believe that he suffered less than any other class in the South from its 'peculiar institution'. The majority of slaves were adequately fed, well cared for, and apparently happy.² Competent observers reported that they performed less labour than the hired man of the Northern States.³ Their physical wants were better supplied than those of thousands of Northern mechanics, English operatives, and Irish peasants ;⁴ their liberty was not much less than that enjoyed by the North of England hinds, or

¹ Chart in Phillips, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

² That the slaves were care-free and happy is asserted by all Southern writers on the subject, and attested by most travellers of the period. Negro intellectuals assert the direct contrary, and insist that no white man can understand the soul of the black. Certainly the Christianized negro discovered for himself the parallel between his own and the Hebrew bondage, and derived his most poignant 'spirituals' from Exodus ; yet it is possible that the coloured intellectual understands the plantation negro less well than did the white master, and has transferred his personal sorrows to his race.

³ Phillips, pp. 382-7, disposes of the myth that field-hands were driven to death in seven years in the sugar districts.

⁴ John Randolph's slave valet, whom he took to Ireland in 1827, 'looked with horror upon the mud hovels and miserable food of the

the Finnish *torpare*. Although brought to America by force, the incurably optimistic negro soon became attached to the country, and devoted to his 'white folks'. Slave insurrections were planned—usually by the free negroes—but invariably betrayed by some faithful darky; and trained obedience¹ kept the slaves faithful throughout the Civil War.

Between a Virginian slave major-domo, whose ancestors had been American for two centuries, and a Carolina rice-hand, who might have been smuggled over from Africa within a year, there was an immense gap. Topsy and Tom Sawyer's nigger Jim were nearer to the average childlike, improvident, humorous, prevaricating, and superstitious negro than the unctuous Uncle Tom. Many were quick at picking up trades, and became skilled artisans who were hired out by the month or year; nor are we much impressed by the complaint of a planter that his slave bricklayer would lay but one thousand bricks per day. Occasionally a humane owner would allow such a one to purchase his freedom out of his earnings: the laws made this increasingly difficult.² American, as contrasted with ancient slavery, offered no legal escape to the talented or intellectual slave; it subjected a writer like Frederick Douglass or a born leader of men like Booker T. Washington

white slaves' (W. C. Bruce, *Randolph*, i. 500); but these 'white slaves' could go to America and become policemen, and their sons bishops or senators. They might, however, be used to spare the slave; a Southern version of Varro's advice to use freemen in harvesting, was to hire gangs of Irish labourers for ditching, canal digging, and other work that involved excessive risk. As a steamboat captain told Olmsted, 'If the Paddies are knocked overboard, or get their backs broke, nobody loses anything!'

¹ Not devotion, as W. L. Fleming points out in his *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama*, p. 211. The army of occupation proved that negroes only needed the touch of a stronger hand than their master's, when the much-praised devotion evaporated.

² The number of free negroes increased 12½ per cent in the decade 1840-50, when the slaves increased 29 per cent. Cf. Commons, *Doc. Hist.*, ii. 160.

to the caprice of a white owner, his inferior in every respect save pigment.¹ And one drop of African blood made any one a nigger.

Whilst the average Englishman or American disliked the negro as such, Southern slave-owners understood him, and loved him *qua* slave; Southern gentlemen still love him 'in his place'. There was no physical repulsion from colour in the South. White children were suckled by black mammies, and played promiscuously with the pickaninnies. In a stage-coach or railway carriage, as a squeamish abolitionist observed, 'a lady makes no objection to ride next a fat negro woman, even when the thermometer is at ninety degrees; provided always that her fellow travellers understand she is her *property*'.² There was a great difference between one region and another, even between one plantation and another, in the treatment of slaves; and everywhere the house servants fared better than the field hands. In central Mississippi, Olmsted passed a plantation owned by a 'very religious lady' who worked her slaves from half-past three every weekday morning, frequently until nine at night, and alternately catechized and whipped them every Sabbath. But a few days before he had stopped with the jolly owner of twenty slaves who had not been 'licked in five year', who taught one another to read, who swung their master's hoes to their own languid cadence, and shared his dinner 'right out of the same frying-pan'.³ In every part of the South a small slave-owner worked side by side with his men

¹ A Virginian planter wrote in 1819 that overseers 'in these days are little respected by our intelligent negroes, many of whom are far superior in mind, morals, and manners to those who are placed in authority over them'. Phillips, *op. cit.*, p. 282. Almost every slave-owner or Southern gentleman of a later day, after cursing the race at large, would then mention some individual whom he considered a better gentleman than many of his white acquaintances.

² Joseph Sturge, *A Visit to the U.S. in 1841* (London, 1842), p. cix.

³ Olmsted, *Back Country* (1907), i. 202, 153-73.

in the field, and treated them like his own children, as indeed they sometimes were. But if he rose to planter's estate, that sort of thing became *infra dig*. Just as the apprentice sank to *proletaire* when his master became *entrepreneur*, so woolly-headed Uncle Daniel, who had learned to read the Bible in the log cabin with his old master's children, moved into slave quarters when young master built a mansion.¹

Flogging with the rawhide or blacksnake whip was the usual method of punishing slaves. Imprisonment lost the master their time, and short rations their health. Although the law forbade cruelty, a master or overseer was not often brought to book for it, since a negro's testimony was not received against a white man; and the abolition agitation created a feeling in the South that the white man must always be found right. A slave had rather less chance for redress at that period than a seaman against his Yankee skipper, or an enlisted man in the army against his officer. Severity pushed too far was apt to turn the slaves into maroons, if not into dead niggers; and a live one was a valuable piece of property. Yet the most civilized communities need societies for the prevention of cruelty to children and animals. It was an old plantation maxim 'never to threaten a negro, or he will run'. Consequently, little time elapsed between detection and a punishment which was not softened by reflection.² Few travellers in the lower South failed to record some observed instance of cruelty, if not sadism.

¹ *Journal of Illinois State Hist. Soc.*, xvi. 117-28. Conversely, the ownership of slaves conferred more social prestige in 1850 than in 1800. Lincoln asked a Kentuckian why it was becoming more respectable to own slaves. The Kentuckian answered, 'Slavery is the most glittering property in the world. If a young man goes courting, the only inquiry is, how many negroes he or she owns.'

² Commons, *Doc. Hist.*, ii. 32. In the towns, however, there was a public flogger who was charged with laying on the number of lashes prescribed by the master or mistress.

The feature of slavery that most appealed to human sympathy was the separation of families, by private sale or auction. It was often asserted in defence that negroes had a very slight family attachment ; that Whittier's ' Farewell of a Virginia Slave Mother ', with its haunting refrain :

Gone, gone,—sold and gone
To the rice-swamps dank and lone,
From Virginia's hill and waters :
Woe is me, my stolen daughters !

was mere abolitionist cant. Yet when a young Northerner asked Randolph of Roanoke, who had listened to Patrick Henry, Clay, Calhoun, Webster, Wilberforce, and Brougham, to name the greatest orator he had ever heard, the old Virginian snapped out : ' A slave. She was a mother, and her rostrum was the auction-block.'

After a slave insurrection at Charleston, in 1822, a system of control was adopted throughout the lower South. Blacks were forbidden to assemble or to circulate after curfew without a written pass. A system of night patrols—the ' patter rollers ' of Uncle Remus—enforced these laws. The abolitionist agitation caused a general tightening up of black codes.¹ A free negro who left his State was not allowed to return, for fear he might bring pernicious doctrines ; and for the same reason it became a misdemeanour to teach a slave to read. As a Carolina magistrate wrote, ' Such laws look to me as rather cowardly. It seems as if we were afraid of our slaves.'² The free negroes fared worst under this régime of fear ; a Georgian law of 1859 even allowed them to be sold into slavery for a violation of city ordinances.

¹ De Bow, *Industrial Resources*, ii. 269-92.

² *Ibid.*, 279. But, as Phillips shows (p. 439), more occupations were open to free blacks in Southern towns than in Northern cities, where the white mechanics regarded them with jealousy.

If we overlook the original sin of the slave trade, there was much to be said for slavery as a transitional status between barbarism and civilization. The negro learned his master's language, and accepted in some degree his moral and religious standards. In return he contributed much besides his labour—music and humour for instance—to American civilization. The trouble was that the South, after 1820 or 1830, no longer regarded slavery as transitional, but as a permanent bulwark of society.

XXXIV

SOUTHERN SOCIETY

1820-50

I. *Poor Whites*

SLAVERY and cotton preserved in the South a rural, almost feudal, society.¹ The old Anglo-Virginian contempt for merchants still prevailed. Agriculture, the Army, the Church, and the Law were the only proper careers for a planter's son. Northern and European merchant-bankers and shipowners handled the cotton crop, and took most of the profits. Shopkeepers in the market towns were largely Yankees, Germans, or Jews. There were few factories; for capital was tied up in slaves, who produced greater profits by growing than by spinning cotton. The upland whites were too independent, and the poor lowland whites too enervated by malaria and hookworm, to become factory operatives. European immigrants shunned a region where manual labour was regarded as nigger's work, and where they had even less protection than in the North against violence. Railway development was slow, for the relatively sparse population of the uplands was largely self-sustaining, and cotton afforded goods traffic during a brief season of the year. The main roads in Kentucky, Virginia, and the Carolinas were considerably improved, and provided with decent inns; but west and south of these States one followed the usual pioneer sloughs and trails. Horseback travellers who, for want

¹ Of twenty-eight cities in the United States with a population of 20,000 or more (1850), only eight were in the slave States, and only three (New Orleans, Charleston, and Mobile) in the cotton belt. The combined population of these three, together with Richmond, St. Louis, and Louisville, was not equal to that of Philadelphia. *Seventh Census of the U.S.* (1853), p. lii.

of inns, were forced to pay well for vile meals and swarming beds at the homes of lesser planters and poor whites, became somewhat bitter at the mention of Southern hospitality. Frontier conditions still prevailed through the greater part of the lower South in 1850, combined with a turbulence and ignorance that seldom lingered in the Northern frontier beyond the first generation.

Michigan and Arkansas were admitted to the Union together, in 1836.¹ The constitution of Michigan prohibited slavery. The constitution of Arkansas prohibited the legislature from tampering with slavery. The first Michigan legislature founded a university, at Ann Arbor. The first Arkansas legislature was remembered for a fatal brawl, when the Speaker of the House came down from his chair and slew a member with his bowie-

¹ At the time they were admitted to the Union, Arkansas and Michigan had approximately the same population. The following statistics from the Census of 1850, are instructive :

	<i>Arkansas.</i>	<i>Michigan.</i>
White population	162,189	395,071
Free coloured population	608	2,583
Slave population	47,100	0
Number of colleges	3	3
Number of pupils in colleges	150	308
Number of public schools	353	2,714
Number of pupils in public schools . .	8,493	110,455
Income of public schools from taxation .	\$250	\$88,879
Total income of public schools . . .	\$43,763	\$167,806
Number of academies	90	37
Number of pupils in academies . . .	2,407	1,619
Number of adult white illiterates . .	16,819	7,912
Value of farms and plantations . . .	\$15,265,245	\$51,872,446
Number of newspapers and periodicals .	9	58
Circulation of newspapers and periodicals	7,250	52,718
Number of public libraries	1	280
Volumes in public libraries	250	65,116
Number of churches	362	399
Value of church property	\$89,315	\$723,600

J. D. B. De Bow, *Seventh Census of the U.S.* (Washington, 1853), pp. 535-62, 882-912.

knife. This was, to be sure, only the ugly side of the rollicking, rough-and-tumble society¹ in those parts of the South where there was no gentry to set the tone. It was a society that made admirable soldiers, as the North shortly learned ; but poor citizens, as the South has since learned to its cost. 'Bleaseism', a recent brand of poor-white politics named after one of the coarse bullies that led it to power, was part of the price the South has paid for the cultivation of cotton and the neglect of men.²

2. *Christianity conforms*

Religion, which had been neglected in the South when the section was liberal and anti-slavery, was much cultivated after it became conservative and pro-slavery. The influence of the evangelical sects among the planters increased in proportion as their ministers found pro-slavery arguments in the Bible. The Catholic and Episcopalian Churches remained neutral on the slavery question, and stationary in numbers. Thomas Jefferson, dying, saluted the rising sun of Unitarianism as destined to enlighten the South ; but it sent only a few feeble rays beyond Mason and Dixon's Line. Horace Holley, the gifted young Unitarian who had made of Transylvania University in Kentucky a southern Harvard, was driven from his post by the Presbyterians. Priestley's old friend Thomas Cooper, who had taken refuge in the South from the anti-Jacobin spirit of the North, was promised by Jefferson the first chair of chemistry in the University of Virginia ; but Cooper was a Unitarian, and the Virginians raised such an outcry that he

¹ Admirably described in Longstreet's *Georgia Scenes*.

² According to the Census of 1850 the illiterate portion of the free adult population was 4 per cent in the free States, 17 per cent in the slave States. A foretaste of Bleaseism appears in the Georgia Act of 27 December 1845, prohibiting slaves or free coloured men from engaging in the building trades. Commons, *Doc. Hist.*, ii. 365.

resigned. Later, in spite of his services to the State-rights cause, Cooper was 'tried' for atheism, and ejected, at the age of seventy-five, from his chair in the College of South Carolina.¹

The Presbyterian became the fashionable church of the planters; Methodists and Baptists enjoyed successive revivals among the poor whites and coloured folk.² For a time these churches were a bond of union between North and South; but when the Northern Methodists insisted that a Southern bishop emancipate his slaves, the Southern members seceded and formed the Methodist Church South, on a pro-slavery basis (1844). The Baptists followed, and doubled their membership in fifteen years. While these Southern evangelicals sprinkled holy water on the slave-pen and the lash, they banned card-playing and dancing; by 1860 the bastard puritanism of the age was more prevalent in Alabama and Mississippi than in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Joseph Le Conte, a precursor of Darwin, belonged to the cultivated circles of Charleston, but could not influence them. It was in the former slave States that theology would make its last stand against biology, in the twentieth century.

3. *The Gentleman Planter*

The finest product of the plantation régime was the Southern gentleman. Although few in number,³ he

¹ It will be remembered that the distinguished American scholar Edward Everett almost failed to get his D.C.L. at Oxford in 1843, on account of his Unitarianism; and that one of the objections against establishing a readership in American History at Cambridge in 1866 was the expected Unitarianism of the appointees.

² 'There was two niggers jined the Methodists up here last summer, and they made the minister put 'em into the branch [stream]; they wouldn't jine 'less he'd duck 'em.' Olmsted, *Back Country*, i. 159.

³ The gentry could hardly have included more than fifty thousand out of a total white population in the South of six million. Cf. statistics on p. 3.

ruled the older Southern States by virtue of his personality even more than his property ; and governed them honourably and efficiently, although not with enlightenment.¹ Discriminatingly hospitable, invariably gracious to women, endowed with a high sense of personal honour and civic virtue, he led his beloved Southland to the worst *débâcle* in modern history. Yet the image of him, dressed in black broadcloth and wide-awake hat, directing from horseback the labours of his slaves ; or in grey uniform leading a cavalry charge under the stars and bars, appeals to the imagination of an era that has repudiated everything, good or bad, that he represented.

Of this ruling class, only a small fraction belonged to the eighteenth-century aristocracy of Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. The supreme type of colonial gentleman that Washington was, appeared undiminished in his Lee kinsmen ; but the old Huguenot families of Charleston were dying out, and the Creoles of Louisiana were easygoing and unambitious. Apart from these three persistent types, the mass of the greater planters, in 1850, were self-made men like Jefferson Davis, whose parents had lived in log cabins. If not well educated themselves, their sons and daughters would be. The South, despite poverty in elementary education, had good secondary schools, especially of the military type,² and had more students in college than the North.

Life on a resident plantation of the better sort was neither sordid as the abolitionists asserted, nor splendid as the novelists have depicted it. The mansion house, seated on a rising bit of ground, was generally a well-

¹ The Southern States like Mississippi, which engaged in wildcat banking enterprises and repudiated their debts, were under the control of the middle-class and poorer planters, not the gentry.

² Such as the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, where Thomas J. Jackson, in 1850, was an unpopular professor of mathematics.

proportioned wooden building of neo-classic style, with a columned portico or verandah that gave dignity to the front elevation and afforded shade to the ground floor and first story.¹ The rooms, seldom more than fifteen in number, were high-ceiled and simply furnished. There were plenty of flowers, although negro gardening was by no means thrifty ; and masses of native flowering shrubs and creepers such as the Cherokee rose, in which the Southland was rich. Simplicity rather than ostentation was the dominant note in the planter's life. His recreations were the wholesome ones of the English country gentry ; but he enjoyed little leisure. On a Virginia plantation visited by Olmsted, not ten consecutive minutes elapsed, even during dinner, when the proprietor was not importuned by his slaves. He must lock his stables every night as the alternative to finding his horses hag-ridden in the morning, and rise at dawn to unlock them. Even if an overseer were employed to direct the field force, the owner's wife must keep linen, silver, food, and household supplies under lock and key from the pilfering house-servants, must serve out supplies with economy, and admonition with tact ; must bind up wounds, and nurse the sick. Mrs. Ann R. Page of Virginia devoted her life to the welfare of her slaves, ran heavily into debt to avoid selling their increase, and when, at her husband's death, the property had to be divided, sat apart in her room praying that none might fall into alien hands. Yet even Mrs. Page had to put up with meals an hour late, with tasks undone and orders forgotten, with prevarication and sluttishness. And how the hearts of Southern mothers were wrung by knowledge of the temptations to which their growing boys were exposed !

Such a life was a continuous exercise of tact, self-control, and firmness ; yet the condition of unlimited

¹ In Louisiana the mansions generally followed the West Indian style, with a two-story verandah on three sides.

power over a race with exasperating habits was a constant temptation to passion. The Southern gentleman had the same conflicting character as a Russian or Hungarian landlord. He would tolerate and condone an amount of shirking and evasion that would drive any British employer frantic ; but cross his will or question his authority, and you found the Tartar. An outburst of temper was a sign of high mettle, not a mark of poor breeding. Duelling was frequent, and not all disputes between gentlemen were settled on the 'field of honour'. Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia was unable to take part in the political campaign of 1848 because disabled by stabs received in an 'affray' with Judge Cone. Southerners in Congress made great efforts to master their passions, not always with success. When Senator Foote of Mississippi invited Senator Hale of New Hampshire to visit his good State, and promised him 'that he could not go ten miles into the interior before he would grace one of the tallest trees of the forest, with a rope around his neck, with the approbation of every virtuous and patriotic citizen ; and that, if necessary, he himself would assist in the operation', Northerners might be pardoned for wondering whether gentleman and bully were not synonymous terms in the South.

4. *The Literature of Chivalry*

The 'Southern chivalry' tradition was created in the generation of 1820 to 1850. In *Ivanhoe* and the flood of imitative literature that followed, the cotton lord and his lady found a romantic mirror of their life and ideals. Some one remembered what the Washingtons and Lees had forgotten, that certain Virginia planters were descended from Stuart refugees, who forthwith were adopted as ancestors by the entire South. Every owner of ten negroes, however dubious his origin or squalid his existence, became a 'cavalier',

entitled to despise the low-bred shopkeepers, artisans, and clerks of the North.¹

Pickenses, Boggses, Pettuses, Magoffins, Letchers, Polks,—
Where can you scare up names like them among your mudsill
folks ?

We should ill begrudge this romantic compensation to an isolated, almost beleaguered people, had it not fed an unwholesome pride and dangerous insolence. What the South wanted was a Cervantes ;² what it got was brummagem gothic.

To comprehend the psychology of the Southern planter, we must remember that his social system was on the defensive against the North, and indeed the civilized world. All his bluster and proud assertiveness was the sign not of confidence but of fear. It was fear, not insensibility, that made him indifferent or hostile to the new tenderness that was dissolving the harsher social relations in England and the Northern States. Just as New England in 1800 refused every quickening current from France or Virginia, for fear it might bear the seeds of Jacobinism ; so the South, a generation later, rejected a literature and philosophy which might conceal abolition. The enthusiasm for popular education that swept over the North stopped short at the Potomac and the Ohio. The University of Virginia, which Jefferson had intended to be the crown of a public school system, became instead the seminary of a privileged class. At a time when Bryant, Emerson, Longfellow, and Whittier were redeeming Northern materialism with cheerful song, Southern silence was

¹ The rage for *Mayflower* or ' Knickerbocker ' ancestry in the North, fifty years later, was the same sort of thing.

² And almost got one, in Augustus B. Longstreet—but Longstreet spent his satire on the ' crackers ' or poor whites of middle Georgia. He did not wish to attack slavery and planter chivalry, and would not have been allowed to if he had. Mark Twain even attempts to prove Walter Scott responsible for the Civil War !

broken only by the gloomy and romantic notes of Edgar Allan Poe. Southern novelists such as Simms, Kennedy, and Caruthers merely glorified the past; and it was a poor song-writer of Pennsylvania, writing in a New York garret, who attuned the beauty and pathos of the Old South to the human heart in 'Uncle Ned', 'Old Black Joe', and 'My Old Kentucky Home'.¹

Ruthless suppression of all criticism of slavery was one phase of the Southern reaction to abolition. The Northern mails were seized upon and censored. Ministers, teachers, professional men, and politicians who would not bow down to mumbo-jumbo were eliminated. Laws were even passed against criticism outside the South of Southern institutions, and a price was placed on the heads of prominent abolitionists. Bishop Moore of Virginia, in conversation with Dr. Daubeny of Oxford, 'spoke of the certainty of an abolitionist being lynched, not indeed as a thing he approved, but without any expression of moral indignation.' Similar sentiments the Doctor 'heard from the lips of laymen, avowed in a more vehement and offensive manner'. The 'Cavalier' blood of Moncure Daniel Conway did not save him from being hustled off Virginian soil when he returned there from Harvard a Unitarian and an abolitionist.

Mere denial was not enough. What the ruling class wanted was some positive pro-slavery theory of society corresponding to the political doctrine of State rights. It was provided by Thomas R. Dew, a bright young Virginian who returned from study in Germany to a chair at William and Mary College. In a pamphlet of 1832, he proved that slavery had been the condition of classical culture, that the Hebrew prophets and St. Paul admitted its moral validity; that civilization required the many to work and the few to think. William

¹ Stephen C. Foster (1826-64) was also the author of 'Oh! Sanna', 'Home, Sweet Home', and 'Old Dog Tray'.

Harper of South Carolina worked out the corollaries of these propositions, while hundreds of clergymen undertook to prove it 'God's law that fetters on black skins don't chafe'. A correspondent and admirer of Carlyle, named George Fitzhugh, in a tract entitled 'Cannibals All', showed the negro to be something less than man, and in his 'Sociology for the South' provided a new set of principles to replace the 'glittering generalities' of a century of enlightenment.¹ John C. Calhoun gave pro-slavery doctrine the sanction of his name and character, and so cunningly combined it with American prepossessions that slavery appeared no longer the anti-thesis, but the condition, of democracy.

Calhoun began with the axiom that no wealthy or civilized society could exist unless one portion of the community lived upon the labour of another. White labour, class-conscious in England and enfranchised in the Northern States, was threatening property and civilization. Chartism, agrarianism, and trade-unionism proved that social stability could not be maintained where labour was free. It was too late to re-establish serfdom in Europe and the North. But to the South a mysterious providence had brought a race marked by God with mental and physical inferiority, created to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for His chosen people. In return, kind masters provided for all reasonable wants of their slaves, and saved them from the fear of misery and destitution that haunted the white proletariat. The masters themselves, relieved from manual labour and sordid competition, would reach that intellectual and spiritual eminence of which the founders of the Republic had dreamed. 'Many in the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political

¹ Extracts from these and other pro-slavery writings may be found in De Bow's *Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States* (1862), ii. 196 ff., and in William Harper *et al.*, *The Pro-Slavery Argument* (Charleston, 1852).

evil. That folly and delusion are gone. We see it now in its true light, and regard it as the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world.' ¹

Such was the doctrine that most educated Southerners accepted between 1830 and 1850, because it was what they had unconsciously come to believe. It harmonized with the facts of their existence as Jeffersonian democracy had never done. Yet it is doubtful how wide or deep the new faith really went. It was never accepted by those Virginian planters who fought so valiantly for the Confederacy.² There was no place in the system for poor whites, from one of whom came the first prophecy of disaster.³ Even the planting class did not accept the logical deduction that the slave trade should be reopened. Even Calhoun, more humane than his doctrine, refused privately to condone the domestic slave trade,⁴ although he might publicly threaten that the South would secede rather than have it forbidden in Washington. The non-slaveholding and

¹ Calhoun, *Works* (Crallé ed.), iii. 179-80; cf. ii. 631-2, and Howell Cobb's statement: 'In all ages and in all countries the conflict between labour and capital has disturbed mankind. It has been reserved for the Southern States of this Union to solve the problem by making the labourer himself capital. The conflict ceases, and interests become identical.'

² Robert E. Lee emancipated the few slaves he inherited from his mother, and owned no others. Stonewall Jackson purchased two slaves at their own request, and allowed them to earn their freedom. J. E. Johnston and A. P. Hill never owned a slave, and disliked slavery. J. E. B. Stuart owned but two slaves, and disposed of them for good reasons, long before the war. M. F. Maury, who called slavery a 'curse', never owned but one, a family servant. B. B. Munford, *Virginia, Slavery, and Secession*, pp. 156-8.

³ H. R. Helper, *The Impending Crisis*, 1857. Several States made it a misdemeanour to possess or distribute this book; and the efforts of the Republican party to do so fed the secession movement.

⁴ 'When I alluded to the subject in conversation with Mr. Calhoun', records one of his admirers, 'an involuntary shudder passed over his whole frame—"The sale of a slave", said he, "I could not look upon!"' S. M. Maury, *An Englishwoman in America*, p. 275.

illiterate whites continued to dislike slavery, but they agreed with the planters that it would never do to emancipate the slave ; and fought bravely on to maintain an institution that bore more heavily upon them than upon any other class.

Just as the new imperialism of 1763 had created a self-conscious unity in the Thirteen Colonies, so the new abolitionism of 1831 created self-conscious unity in the thirteen slave States. In both instances there was a basic social unity, which wanted only political passion to become nationalism. Just as the Seven Years War made England less tolerant of colonial autonomy, so industrialism, westward expansion, and humanitarianism made the Northern States less tolerant of a 'slave power' within their democratic empire. It was not inevitable in 1850 that Southern society would take a nationalist form : but the prospect of any other result was dubious. The Southern ruling class might be brought to face facts. They might learn to conserve their land, diversify their economic life, and look forward to a gradual extinction of slavery. English ruling classes have done as much, again and again : but English ruling classes were never isolated, or in a position to seek a way out by secession. By 1850 the cotton kingdom had killed practically every germ of creative thought, had excluded every means of purifying discipline, and had resolved to make negro slavery, in an ever-widening radius, a permanent basis of society.

WHIGS AND DEMOCRATS

1837-44

1. *The Machinery of Party*

NATIONAL politics long concealed the growing divergence between North and South. Churches might split, social differences might deepen, and extremists revile one another ; but, so long as the Whig and Democratic parties remained national in scope, the Union was safe. The nature of a political system that not only postponed disunion but survived it, is a matter of some consequence to American history.

After forty years' growth party organization acquired in the Jackson era a settled character. In contrast to its British prototype, which exists normally in a single plane for electing members of Parliament, the American party became tri-dimensional, functioning not only in federal but in state and municipal elections. Analysis of the Whig and Democratic parties and their successors reveals a bundle of local, sectional, and class interests. Their cross-sections, instead of displaying a few simple colours, were a jig-saw puzzle of radicalism and conservatism, nationalism and State rights, personal loyalties and local issues. Party strategy was directed towards accumulating as many bundles as possible ; and statesmanship was the art of finding some person or principle common to all the bundles that would make them sink their differences and in union find strength.

Constitutional developments in the States were quickly reflected in the national party organization, as new sectional interests, during the era of good feelings, had thwarted or transformed national party policy. State constitutional changes between 1830 and 1850¹ tended

¹ In most instances effected by constitutional convention and

towards government of, for, and by the people. Religious tests and property qualifications for office were generally swept away, and manhood suffrage adopted. The newer state constitutions, beginning with that of Mississippi in 1832, transferred many offices from the appointive to the elective class. County officials such as sheriffs and justices of the peace, heads of executive departments such as the state treasurer and attorney-general, even judges of the higher courts, were elected by the people; and the democratic principle of rotation limited both the number and the length of their terms. As the urban movement gathered volume, new municipalities with elective mayors and bi-cameral councils were established. Political partisanship extended down from the federal to the state and municipal governments: a good Democrat would no more think of voting for a Whig governor or a Whig sheriff than for a Whig congressman or President. Federal, state, and local politics were so closely articulated that the misconduct of a state treasurer might turn a presidential election; and the attitude of a President on the tariff or the public lands might embarrass his party's candidate for municipal office. The state legislatures consumed much time in drafting resolutions on federal matters outside their competence, with the idea of attracting voters or of influencing Congress.

The convention method of nominating candidates for elective office was invented by the Democrats, and by 1840 had been adopted by the Whigs. Local caucuses sent delegates to county conventions for nominating candidates to county office; county conventions popular referendum. Lord Acton, who in 1853 attended one of the more conservative constitutional conventions in Massachusetts, wrote in his diary, 'The standard of politics is much lower than in England, or anywhere, almost, in Europe; for in no European assembly would such democratical views pass without censure. . . . There is plenty of decorum, no solemnity. Few look like gentlemen.' *Fortnightly*, cxvii. 74, 75. (January 1922.)

sent delegates to state conventions for nominating state candidates, and to district conventions for nominating congressional candidates ; state conventions sent delegates to the quadrennial national convention for nominating the presidential candidates and drafting the ' platform '. Few but professional politicians managed to survive these successive winnowings. Every State had its captains of hundreds and captains of thousands, working for the party every day in the year, and looking for reward to the spoils of victory. Annual or biennial state and local elections kept interest from flagging in the course of a presidential term ; and, like by-elections in England, were regarded as portents of the next general election. Innumerable local rallies, often synchronized with an anniversary, a county fair, or barbecue, gave the leaders an occasion for inspiring the faithful, ' spellbinding ' the doubtful, and confounding the enemy. Steamboats and railways carried political orators long distances without undue waste of time, enabling them to speak in other parts of the country than their own. In 1840, for instance, Senator Rives of Virginia addressed a great outdoor gathering at Auburn in New York for three hours and a half, after which Mr. Legaré of South Carolina carried on for two hours and a half more.

It was a good system for socially democratic regions, where politics still offered the most attractive career to talented and ambitious men, and where the people, for want of other diversions, took a keen interest in their government. Men like Abraham Lincoln rose through the caucus and convention to heights that they could hardly have attained otherwise. But in the cities and manufacturing districts of the North, and wherever social inequality was the rule, property went in search of power, and power in search of property. The multiplicity of elective offices and the spoils system led to corruption. The rough-and-tumble of politics repelled

many excellent men from public life, and the civil service was degraded in America when it was improving in England. Yet these political methods, in so far as they aroused the active interest of the average voter and stimulated party loyalty, strengthened the Federal Union.

2. *Van Buren and the Democrats*

President Van Buren inherited from Jackson (4 March 1837) an organic party whose dominant note was equality, and whose common tendency was westward expansion. Eventually this Democratic party became an instrument of slaveholders, but in the thirties it was a well-balanced alliance of North, South, and West. Shortly it became identified with State rights, but in 1837 the sturdy nationalism of Andrew Jackson was dominant. 'Old Hickory' had caught the imagination or catered to the appetite of Southern yeomen and petty planters, of pioneer farmers in the North-West, German and Irish immigrants in the Northern States, and plain country folk in New England and New York. They voted for his adopted heir in 1836, and were prepared to support him so long as he trod in Jackson's footsteps, if not longer. The 'little magician', however, could not dispel the whirlwind that Jackson's blasts had sowed. He had been in office only a few months when the panic of 1837 broke. The distress that followed seemed to justify the alarmist prophecies of the moneyed men, and gave the administration grave financial embarrassment. Several 'pet banks' defaulted, carrying several millions of federal deposits, and bringing to light corrupt gambling with public money by certain Jackson appointees. A government which in 1836 had been trying to get rid of a surplus was in 1837 at a loss to meet current expenses. Van Buren obtained from Congress a temporary issue of treasury notes. As a permanent fiscal policy, he proposed to lock

up government funds in an 'independent treasury' at Washington and 'sub-treasuries' in the federal mints, safe from the clutches of the money power and the wild-cats.

Van Buren's Independent Treasury Bill of 1837 was hailed with delight by the 'locofoco' ¹ or radical wing of the New York Democracy, and viewed with alarm by the 'hunkers' or conservatives, who had profited corruptly by the connexion between state-chartered banks and federal deposits. A general exodus of conservatives from the Democratic party elected William H. Seward, a brilliant young Whig of western New York, the Governor of that State. In Congress the conservative Democrats prevented the Independent Treasury Bill from becoming law until 1840. Repealed by the Whigs in 1841, it was re-enacted by the Democrats in 1846 and established the federal fiscal system until the Civil War.

3. *The Turn of the Whigs*

If the Democrats were the party of poverty and numbers, the Whigs were the party of property and talents. As Emerson remarked, Democrats had the best principles, Whigs the best men. In the North, where their favourite son was Daniel Webster, they

¹ So called from having provided themselves at a party caucus in New York City, in 1835, with candles and the new loco-foco matches, which enabled them to carry on when the conservatives turned out the gas.—D. R. Fox, *Decline of Aristocracy in Politics of New York* (1919), p. 383. This book, and Mr. Trimble's articles in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxiv. 396-421, help one to thread the mazes of New York politics at this period. The Locofocos (later known as the Barnburners) were really an emergence of the old Workingmen's party of 1829 from Tammany Hall and included many idealists and reformers. They held paper money and the credit system responsible for the poverty and panic of 1837 and believed in 'hard money' as a cure-all for economic distress. In the general literature of the period the 'Locofoco party' means simply the Northern wing of the Democratic party; Hawthorne speaks of himself as the 'locofoco surveyor' in *The Scarlet Letter*.

carried on the nationalist and paternal tradition of Hamilton. The manufacturing interest which wanted protection, the merchants and bankers who suffered from Jackson's financial vagaries, went Whig. Earlier third-party movements, such as the Anti-masons, the nativists, and the anti-slavery followers of J. Q. Adams, were also absorbed, introducing a radical strain that contended with the conservative element. A large number of Westerners, including young Abraham Lincoln, were attracted to the Whig party by the personality of Henry Clay, and the hope of getting something done about the public lands. In the South the Whigs were the party of gentility and property, owning over two-thirds of all the slaves. Sugar planters of Louisiana, who wanted protection against Cuba; big cotton planters, who regretted the United States Bank, and who in state politics resisted the repudiating tendencies of their poorer fellows; antique republicans of Virginia and North Carolina, who disliked Jackson's aggressive nationalism and 'executive tyranny'—all were Whig. Nowhere but in America could a political party have been formed from such heterogeneous elements.

South Carolina followed Calhoun out of the Democratic party in 1832, but refused to ally with the Whigs, noting with alarm the anti-slavery and nationalist tendencies in their Northern wing. It was Calhoun's policy to unite the entire South under the banner of State rights to protect slavery, while the political abolitionists endeavoured to unite the North under the banner of anti-slavery. Both Whigs and Democrats very wisely endeavoured to keep this dangerous issue out of national politics; but events were to force it in.

Senator Archer of Virginia wrote Sir Charles Vaughan in 1840 that the presidential election of that year was a 'contest between radicalism and the property and education of the country'. Sir Charles must have had some difficulty in distinguishing which party was for

property, since the Whigs were too wise to appear in their true character. It was necessary to out-demagogue the Democrats, and carry the West. To this end Clay revived his 'distribution' scheme for public land ; but the Whig national convention, instead of nominating Clay or Webster, or a Southern planter, chose old General Harrison, the 'hero of Tippecanoe'.¹ John Tyler, a Virginian who had sympathized with nullification, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency in order to attract Calhoun's followers. The Whig convention wisely adopted no platform. Catch phrases such as 'Tippecanoe and Tyler too', 'Harrison, two dollars a day, and roast beef', served better than principles.

Harrison's nomination was a milepost in the evolution of the Presidency. Wise politicians realized that when sectional issues threatened the national parties, they could nominate a 'favourite son' such as Webster, or a statesman with a definite policy such as Clay, only at the risk of alienating other members of the party alliance, and losing the election. Since 1840 successful presidential candidates have not been prominent and experienced statesmen, but military heroes or relatively obscure men who had not had time to make enemies. Only by inadvertence, as in the case of Lincoln, did the President prove to be a man of outstanding ability.

The campaign of 1840 was the jolliest presidential election America has ever known. Van Buren suffered from the same humbuggery that he had used against Adams in 1828 ; and the Whigs had plenty of money to influence the numerous unemployed. Clay happily denounced the Independent Treasury as 'The perilous

¹ William Henry Harrison was born in Virginia in 1773, the son of a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Four out of five of the Whig presidential candidates (Harrison, Clay, Taylor, and Scott) were born in Virginia, and the other (White) in North Carolina ; only one Democratic candidate (Polk) between Jackson and Woodrow Wilson was born in a Southern State.

union of the purse and sword, so justly dreaded by our British and Revolutionary ancestors'. A sensible reorganization of the State militia, proposed by the Secretary of War, was compared to Persian satrapies. Van Buren was pictured with cologne-scented whiskers, drinking champagne out of a crystal goblet at a table loaded with costly viands and massive plate. An unlucky sneer in a Democratic newspaper, to the effect that Harrison would be content with a log cabin and plenty of hard cider, gave opportunity for effective contrast. It became the log-cabin, hard cider campaign. There were log-cabin badges and log-cabin songs, a *Log Cabin* newspaper and log-cabin clubs, big log cabins where the thirsty were regaled with hard cider that jealous Democrats alleged to be stiffened with whisky; little log cabins borne on floats in procession, with latch-string out, cider barrel by the door, coon-skin nailed up beside, and real smoke coming out of the chimney, while lusty voices bawled :

Let Van from his coolers of silver drink wine,
 And lounge on his cushioned settee.
 Our man on his buckeye bench can recline,
 Content with hard cider is he,
 The iron-armed soldier, the true hearted soldier,
 The gallant old soldier of Tippecanoe !

Huge balls, supposed to represent the gathering majority, were rolled by men and boys from village to village and State to State, singing as they rolled :

What has caused this great commotion, motion, motion,
 Our country through ?

—It is the ball a-rolling on, for

(*Chorus.*) TIPPECANOE and Tyler too :—

Tippecanoe and Tyler too.

And with them we'll beat little Van, Van, Van,

Oh ! Van is a used-up man.

Tippecanoe and Tyler too rolled up 234 electoral votes, a four-to-one majority.

General Harrison, an honest, simple soldier of sixty-eight years, was expected by the Whig politicians to place himself in the hands of such men as Clay and Webster. The latter had the insolence to offer him a ready-made inaugural address of his own composition. But the General had already compiled from schoolboy memories of Plutarch and Rollin a turgid address of which he was very proud. With some difficulty he was induced to let Webster revise it. After one day of this work the 'god-like Daniel' arrived late for dinner and so haggard that his hostess was alarmed. She hoped that nothing had happened? 'Madam,' replied Webster, 'you would think something had happened, if you knew what I have done. I have killed seventeen Roman proconsuls as dead as smelts!'

On 4 April 1841, a month after delivering his emasculated inaugural address, the Hero of Tippecanoe died. John Tyler succeeded to his office, and title too.¹

It was soon demonstrated that desire for office was the only binding force in the Whig party. Henry Clay expected to be mayor of the White House as well as leader of the Senate; but the new President was an obstinate man of commonplace mind and narrow views. Clay, like Hamilton, wished to integrate the Federal Government by catering to substantial interests; and his immediate ambition was to charter a new Bank of the United States. Tyler believed it his mission to assert Virginian State-rights 'principles of 1798', and

¹ He had no right to the latter. According to the Constitution, the Vice-President is the substitute for, not the successor of, the President, in case of the latter's death, resignation, or inability. John Tyler, however, insisted on being called the President, not the Vice-President acting as President; and the country acquiesced. This precedent was followed upon all later instances of the President's death in office; and the Vice-President has evolved into an heir and successor. Mr. H. W. Horwill, in *Usages of the American Constitution* (Oxford University Press, 1925), points out the importance of the precedent Tyler established.

to strip the Federal Government of its 'usurped' power; but he lacked both the personal magnetism and the saving common sense of Jefferson.

Tyler took over Harrison's cabinet, carried through the purgation of the civil service that Harrison had begun, signed a 'distribution-pre-emption' bill of Clay's to discharge the party debt to the West,¹ and accepted an upward revision of tariff schedules as a necessary measure for the revenue. But he vetoed all bills for internal improvements and harbour works, and refused to accept any fiscal device that bore the remotest resemblance to the B.U.S. of detestable memory. Clay's bill for a new Bank was returned with the President's veto, as was a second bill especially drafted to meet his constitutional scruples (9 September 1841).

From that moment there was open warfare between Tyler and Clay. Four days later the Cabinet resigned—excepting Webster, who wished to appear independent of Clay—and the President was read out of the Whig party.

Here was Calhoun's chance to count in the sectional balance of power. For three years (1841–3), while Tyler attempted to form a party with a corporal's guard of faithful Whigs, Calhoun played a waiting game, repressing a secession movement among his hot-headed followers in South Carolina,² intriguing to obtain the Democratic nomination for the Presidency in 1844. Webster left the Cabinet in 1843; and in March 1844 Calhoun became Tyler's Secretary of State.

¹ G. M. Stephenson, *The Political History of the Public Lands, 1840–62* (Boston, R. G. Badger, 1917), pp. 44–72. This Act provided what the squatters had long wanted (above, i. 391), the right to pre-empt a quarter-section of public land at the minimum price. It provided for distributing ten per cent of the proceeds from sales to the States within whose limits lay the land disposed of.

² This 'Bluffton movement', as it was called, was a protest against the tariff of 1842, and the rising tide of abolition in the North which resulted, as we have seen, in the repeal of the 'gag' resolution in 1844.

The new combination was revolutionary in American politics. It meant that Tyler had gone over to the Democrats, and Calhoun returned to them. Calhoun's purpose was to 'reform' the Democratic party on the basis of State rights; to force upon it the formula which he believed to be necessary to preserve the Union. And this State-rights formula was a mere theoretic cover for the main purpose of his devoted followers, to perpetuate slavery where it existed, and extend it into regions where it existed not. Calhoun tipped the internal balance of the Democratic party very definitely southward; the loss of Tyler inclined the internal balance of the Whig party slightly, but no less definitely, northward. The important question of which side the West would take was decided when the Democrats nominated James K. Polk for the Presidency in 1844, on a platform of westward expansion. It was even more significant that in the same platform the Democrats neglected to reaffirm their faith, as had been their wont, in the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

XXXVI

JONATHAN AND JOHN

1837-42

I. *Protection and Repudiation*

FROM Lake Champlain to the Rocky Mountains the Canadian-United States boundary had been determined and fixed after the Peace of Ghent,¹ but the two ends of it were still hanging loose, wanting definition or compromise, when a fresh expansive movement of the American population threatened once more to involve the two countries in war.

Although war was averted through diplomacy, there was a deeper reason why the two nations remained at peace during a period when their press was provocative, and their expansive energies seemed certain to clash. Each country was bound to the other by economic ties the rupture of which would have been disastrous. In spite of tariff fluctuations the United States remained Britain's best customer. At the same time England was America's best customer for raw materials, especially cotton ;² a fact which counteracted Southern hostility towards the foremost anti-slavery nation. American products supplanted only the coarser sort of British cottons and woollens in the United States, and competed very slightly with British manufactures in South America and the Far East. At the same time the American textile industry created a market for British machinery, the export of which had been permitted since 1825, and provided new employment for emigrating artisans. And although each country considered its own interest

¹ Chapter XXV.

² The following table, from G. R. Porter, *Progress of the Nation* (first ed., 1912), p. 483, M. B. Hammond, *Cotton Industry*, appendix, and *Parliamentary Papers*, 1909, cii. 740 (Census of Production, p. 38), shows

when framing tariff schedules, it could not ignore the other's purchasing power. Sir Charles Vaughan, when British Minister at Washington, followed Huskisson's hint in supplying his Southern friends with free-trade statistics and arguments, which may well have influenced votes for the gradual scaling down of tariff schedules that began in 1833; and this reduction helped the English free-traders in their drive on the Corn Laws.¹ When the American tariff was again raised in 1842, there was a chorus of 'We told you so' from the English free-traders. Conversely, the repeal of the Corn Laws—described by Senator McDuffie of South Carolina as

the independence of Anglo-American trade from American tariff fluctuations, and dependence on periods of American prosperity and panic.

<i>Articles of British growth or manufacture exported to U.S.</i>			<i>American cotton ex- ported to Gt. Britain.</i>		<i>Remarks.</i>
	<i>Value (million £)</i>	<i>Percentage of total British exports.</i>	<i>Million lb.</i>	<i>Percentage of U.S. crop.</i>	
1827	7	19	213	67.3	
1830	6.1	16	201	60.7	U.S. tariff raised in 1828.
1835	10.5	22.3	265	57.6	Tariff lowered gradually 1833-42.
1840	5.2	10	477	57.1	Depression since 1837.
1842	3.5	6	371	55.5	Tariff raised 1 Sept.
1844	7.9	13	495	59.2	
1847	10.9	19	358	46.7	Tariff lowered in 1846.
1849	11.9	19	670	53.6	
1854	21	21.6	666	50.3	Tariff further lowered 1853.
1858	14	11.9	799	52.6	Panic in 1857.
1860	22	16.1	1230	54.0	

¹ In the testimony taken by Hume's Select Committee on Trade (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1840, v), we find English manufacturers using the same argument against the Corn Laws that American free-traders had used against the American tariff on manufactures: that the exclusion of American corn lowered by so much the purchasing power of Americans for British goods.

'the greatest of all the measures of modern times'—was an effective free-trade argument in the American tariff debates of 1846 against the Whig catchwords of 'home market', 'British dumping', and 'pauper labour'. In this Tariff Act of 1846 the United States began to move away from protection;² and in 1853 it may be said definitely to have joined the free-trading nations. Corn and cotton might well have kept it in that column through the nineteenth century, had not the secession of the Southern States given the protectionists an opportunity.

Although commercial relations had a pacifying influence on the two countries, financial relations had quite the contrary effect for several years after 1837. England was then the principal source of capital for American industrial development. During the frenzy of speculation in 1835–6 millions of dollars' worth of State bonds had been floated in London in order to finance State-aided canal, railway, and banking enterprises. The panic of 1837, and the hard times that followed, made it impossible for some of the States and corporations to meet their obligations. The collapse of the Cairo City and Canal Company, in which Charles Dickens had invested, was responsible for his western tour of 1842 and his subsequent onslaught on the American character.³ A suspension of interest pay-

¹ *Congressional Globe*, xv. 1154 (29th Cong., 1st sess.). That the argument was recognized as powerful may be seen by the efforts of Whig speakers like Senator Cameron and Daniel Webster to refute it. *Ibid.*, xvi. 1135, 1151, 1156.

² Often called the Walker tariff, as it was framed by Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker. John Macgregor testified before the Select Committee on the Navigation Laws in 1847 that the American tariff schedules of 1846 were more moderate than those of France, Belgium, Austria, Russia, and the German Zollverein. *Parl. Papers*, 1847, x. 42.

³ J. F. Snyder, in *Journal of Illinois State Hist. Soc.*, iii. 21; W. F. Wilkins, *Dickens in America* (London, 1911), p. 2. This was the 'New Eden' of *Martin Chuzzlewit*.

ments on the Pennsylvanian bonds, in which Sidney Smith had invested, caused his famous outburst against 'a nation with whom no contract can be made because none will be kept', and his facetious proposal to divide the raiment of Pennsylvanian visitors in London among the creditors of their State. Pennsylvania eventually paid every penny due, with interest; but as late as 1845 the interest payments were still suspended on the bonds of seven States, two of which, Michigan and Mississippi, repudiated.¹ Since the non-suability of States was protected by the eleventh federal amendment, there was no way of forcing them to pay up. These financial vagaries, and Dickens's literary exploitation of them, made the task of preserving Anglo-American peace in the early forties much more difficult; and *Martin Chuzzlewit*, though long since forgiven in the United States, still vies with the cinematograph in giving British youth a distorted picture of American life and character.

2. *The Canadian Rebellion*

Against this confused background of commercial rivalry and financial irritation occurred several 'regrettable incidents' along the northern border. In the autumn of 1837 rebellion broke out in Upper and Lower Canada. The long constitutional controversy that preceded this outbreak bore so marked a resemblance to the history of the Thirteen Colonies that most Americans hailed the Canadian rebellion as a new American Revolution. Northern New York and Vermont, adjoining the centres of disturbance, harboured numerous smugglers and refugees from Canadian justice

¹ W. A. Scott, *Repudiation of State Debts* (N.Y., 1893). According to Leone Levi, *History of British Commerce* (1872 ed., p. 393), the export of English capital had so far been resumed by 1857 that £80,000,000 were then invested in the United States.

who were ready for any sort of row ; and among their permanent population were thousands of men whom Lord Durham described as ‘ young, active, energetic and self-relying, who from various motives long for an opportunity of invading Canada ’. A network of secret societies called the Hunters’ Lodges, pledged to expel British dominion from North America, was formed along the border.

President Van Buren, well informed and friendly to the British Empire, endeavoured to maintain a strict neutrality ; but on the long, unfortified boundary his means were few and feeble, whilst the state governments were weak in will, and not much stronger in means. Hence, for a period of over a year (1837-8), Mackenzie and his followers were able to obtain money, supplies, and recruits in the United States, and return to loot and burn in Canada. A force of regulars under General Scott was stationed at Buffalo, just after Mackenzie had recruited two or three hundred ‘ liberators ’ among the bargees, lake sailors, and others who were suffering from winter unemployment. The rebel head-quarters on Navy Island were supplied from the New York shore by a small American steamer called the *Caroline*. On the night of 29 December 1837, as she lay at her wharf in the United States, a picked band of Canadian volunteers performed the hazardous feat of rowing across the Niagara river where it rushes at seven knots to the head of the falls, cutting out the *Caroline*, and setting her on fire. It was a violation—or counter-violation—of neutrality analogous to that of Jackson in Florida ; but New York was not a Spanish province, and Palmerston, not Castlereagh, was in Downing Street.

Lord Durham, with his remarkable clarity of vision, saw the real significance of these incidents. No matter how firmly the rebellion might be suppressed, protracted discontent in Canada must lead to Anglo-American war, or to the liberal elements in Canada

seeking annexation to the United States.¹ Canada owes her grant of responsible government in 1841, in some measure at least, to the disturbing presence of her neighbour. Later, the federation movement was inspired by similar considerations; and if Canadian Union assumed a more nationalist form than the Union of the States, it was largely because the action of New York in 1837-41, and of the Southern States in 1860-1, had bared the weakness of American federalism.² A similar repulsion from the congressional form of representative government led Canada to adopt the British parliamentary system, a guarantee against political connexion with the United States.

In 1840, before the United States could obtain an admission from Palmerston that the attack on the *Caroline* had been deliberate and official, a Canadian named McLeod boasted in a New York bar-room that he had killed an American in the affray, and was promptly arrested and indicted for murder. Palmerston then admitted that the ship had been destroyed under orders as a necessary means of defence against American 'pirates', and demanded the immediate release of McLeod. His execution, so he wrote the British Minister at Washington, 'would produce war, war immediate and frightful in its character, because it would be a war of retaliation and vengeance'.³ President Tyler and Secretary Webster, anxious as Van Buren to preserve the peace, were equally hampered by the limitations of federal government. Governor Seward of New York insisted that the justice of his State should take its course, and Webster could do no more than provide counsel for the prisoner.

¹ *Lord Durham's Report* (Lucas ed.), i. 260; ii. 59-64, 217, 261-3, 311-12.

² R. G. Trotter, 'American Influences on Federation', *Canadian Hist. Rev.*, v. 213-27.

³ Ashley, *Life of Palmerston* (1879), i. 408.

In other directions Anglo-American relations were dangerously strained. The North-eastern boundary controversy had just been rendered more acute by fresh *ex parte* surveys and reports. Palmerston was not prepared to give an inch on this point, and his temper was rising against slave-traders who claimed immunity under the American flag. In a note of 27 August 1841 he emphatically asserted the right of visit,¹ which the United States Government refused to admit, as an entering wedge for the humiliating right of search. On that day the two countries were nearer war than at any time between 1815 and 1861; but on the following day the Melbourne ministry resigned, and Sir Robert Peel formed a new one with Lord Aberdeen in the Foreign Office.

Instantly the war clouds rolled away. In England, Aberdeen appointed a special mission to Washington; in New York, McLeod sober managed to find an alibi for McLeod drunk, and was acquitted.

3. *Boundary and Slavery Squabbles*

The North-eastern boundary controversy was already sixty years old. On the merits it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 'the British claim had no foundation of any sort or kind' in law.² It had been the intention of the negotiators in 1782-3 to give the United States the territory of the old Province of Sagadahoc, and the United States claimed no more. The northern part of that region was then, as much of it still is, a

¹ What the French call *enquête de pavillon*, a verification of a ship's papers without searching it.

² Lieut.-Col. D. H. Mills, in *United Empire*, ii. 687. Cf. W. F. Ganong, in *Proceedings, Royal Society of Canada*, 1901, pp. 348-51, and J. B. Moore, *International Arbitration*, i. 157-60. New Brunswick subsequently made the United States' case her own, in demanding from Quebec such part of the disputed territory as Ashburton had obtained; and a Royal Commission in 1851 sustained New Brunswick's case, indirectly validating that of Maine and the United States.

wilderness ; hence the provincial boundaries had never been marked, and the negotiators of 1782 merely copied the terms of former grants and governors' commissions in agreeing that the international boundary should follow the 'Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean'.

As we have seen, the Colonial Office regretted Lord Shelburne's generosity and endeavoured in one way or another to have various parts of the boundary rectified in favour of Canada.¹ East of Lake Champlain, if the treaty were followed literally, the boundary would run inconveniently close to the St. Lawrence river and obstruct the natural land route between Quebec and the Maritime Provinces. Accordingly, a British case for flattening out the Maine salient was built up, largely on the quibble that the Bay of Fundy was not the Atlantic Ocean. If that interpretation were admitted, the entire valley of the St. John, which flowed into the Bay of Fundy, must be included in Canada. The war of 1812 emphasized this strategic consideration ; and in course of time the British interpretation became, in the minds of most British subjects, a prescriptive right, the denial of which by Americans was accounted low and grasping.

If the Foreign Office and the Department of State had been the only parties to the controversy, and the former had stated frankly that it wanted a bit of Maine, and had offered to pay for it, the two might easily have come to terms. But the Colonial Office, fearing disaffection in Canada, prevented any yielding on that side ; and the Federal Government feared opposition from Maine, which on occasion could bawl as loudly for State rights as South Carolina. The question was referred to Dutch arbitration in 1831 ; but the King of the Netherlands expressed his inability to locate the 'highlands', and proposed to divide the disputed terri-

¹ See above, i. 61, 167, 173, 309.

tory by an arbitrary line which the United States refused to accept. More legal briefs were then accumulated, more surveys were made, and timber-cutters from Maine, in the upper valley of the St. John, brought a clash of jurisdiction between their State and New Brunswick. In 1838 British 'trespassers' along the Aroostook (a tributary to the St. John) seized a 'trespassing' official of Maine; both state and provincial governors called out their militia, and the resulting 'Aroostook War' remained bloodless only because President Van Buren was willing to arrange a *modus vivendi* until the diplomatists could try their skill again.

So matters stood early in 1842, when Aberdeen sent Lord Ashburton of the House of Baring to negotiate at Washington with Daniel Webster, sometime of the House of Biddle. Both men, and Aberdeen and Tyler too, were ardent for peace. To that end Webster stepped down from the Olympian atmosphere in which he was wont to move, conducted the negotiations informally, discarded the treaty of 1783 as inexecutable, and compromised. The negotiations, conducted wholly in private and largely by conversation, resulted in the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 9 August 1842, which established the present boundary. Great Britain obtained about five-twelfths of the disputed territory—more than the minimum stipulated in Ashburton's instructions, better than the Dutch proposal of 1831, and sufficient for a connecting link between Quebec and New Brunswick. The United States with the other seven-twelfths obtained the free navigation of the St. John for lumber-rafts, and a rectification of frontier on Lake Champlain, sufficient to include a fort that had inadvertently been built on Canadian territory. The international lake and river boundary, which a joint commission under the Treaty of Ghent had completed only to the Sault Ste. Marie, was continued thence to the Lake of the Woods.

Another article provided for the 'joint cruising' method of policing the African slave trade, in order to avoid a mutual right of visit. Although this solved an Anglo-American controversy, it did not suppress the slave trade; and the Webster-Ashburton treaty, seconded by the efforts of a meddling American Minister at Paris, served to detach France from the much more promising Quintuple Treaty on which Aberdeen had set his heart.¹

It was one thing for Webster and Ashburton to sign a treaty; quite another to get it ratified by the Senate and accepted by Parliament. This contest was won by what Webster called the 'battle of the maps'. An American historian had discovered in Paris, and placed in Webster's hands, an early French map with a red line sustaining the British claim. Both he and Webster assumed that this map represented Franklin's understanding of the treaty of 1783: a conclusion quite erroneous, but temporarily useful. One look at it brought the delegates of Maine to Webster's heel; and in the Senate it helped to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. On the other side, the Director of the British Museum had discovered, and the Foreign Office impounded, a map formerly belonging to George III, which showed the 'boundary as described by Mr. Oswald' (one of the peace commissioners of 1783), exactly along the line of the American claim! Aberdeen produced this map in Parliament when Palmerston attacked the treaty as the 'Ashburton capitulation'; but it does not seem to have appeased many of the Canadian historians.

¹ *Camb. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, ii. 244-7; cf. A. C. McLaughlin, *Lewis Cass* (American Statesmen Series), pp. 178-92, and Horatio Bridge, *Journal of an African Cruiser* (edited by Nathaniel Hawthorne, N.Y., 1845).

XXXVII

OREGON AND THE FAR WEST

1825-48

1. *The Oregon Country*

THE Webster-Ashburton treaty left only one Anglo-American controversy unadjusted; and that too was a question of the northern border. Both countries claimed the whole of Oregon,¹ while submitting to joint occupation under the treaty of 1818, until the question of sovereignty could be settled. Castlereagh in 1818, Canning in 1824 and 1826, refused the offers of J. Q. Adams to divide Oregon by latitude 49°. By the Florida treaty of 1819 the United States inherited all the Spanish claims north of latitude 42°; and Russia, by later treaties with the United States and Great Britain, withdrew the southern boundary of Alaska to latitude 54° 40'. But the rival pretensions of the Hudson's Bay Company and of American pioneers were to force an issue between England and the United States.

Since 1806, when Lewis and Clark returned from their overland exploration of a trans-continental route to the Pacific, the United States Government had not taken much interest in the Far West. Major Long's expedition of 1819 reported the Great Plains 'almost wholly unfit for cultivation', and laid down on the map of that region, which now supports a thriving population of several millions, the legend 'Great American Desert'. In 1821 the Canadian North-west Com-

¹ Including not only the present State of Oregon, but Washington, Idaho, a part of Montana, and British Columbia. The name, derived from Jonathan Carver's Munchausen-like *Travels*, was popularized by Bryant's *Thanatopsis* in 1817:

The continuous woods
Where rolls the Oregon and hears no sound
Save his own dashings.

pany, which had purchased the American trading-post of Astoria on the Columbia river, amalgamated with the Hudson's Bay Company. Three years later Fort Vancouver was constructed by the Company on the north bank of the lower Columbia. It became an emporium for fur, salmon, and timber, the resort alike of native and white trappers, and the centre of a small agricultural settlement. A Scots factor, Dr. John McLoughlin, ruled the community with wisdom and humanity, preserved the peace between whites and savages, upheld civilized standards of social life, and later received American missionaries so hospitably that the schoolchildren of the American North-West to-day are taught to regard him as the 'father of Oregon'.

2. *The Great Plains and Rockies*

Distance and the Indians were the principal obstacles to an American settlement of Oregon. After two centuries of colonization, the settled frontier of the United States in 1830 was only half-way across the continent at Independence Missouri,¹ its farthest point from the Atlantic. Thence the frontier line sloped away easterly; the Pacific coast was distant fifteen hundred miles as the crow flies. North and South through Independence ran the new Indian barrier.² Transplanted Indians occupied the area where the prairies rise into the Great Plains.

The Great Plains of the United States cover an area equal to that of European Russia. Their smooth or gently rolling surface, rising gradually or by step-like escarpments from an elevation of two thousand to six thousand feet, was covered with a carpet of grass, rank and thick in the eastern portions, but giving way to tufts of short buffalo-grass and sage-brush in the parched High Plains. An occasional rocky dome, butte, or mesa,

¹ See above, i. 408.

² Near the present Kansas City.

established a welcome landmark. The Platte and Missouri rivers, with their short tributaries, cut deep gashes in the soil and watered a thin line of willow, cottonwood, and wild plum trees. A short summer of blistering heat, with fierce thunderstorms and frequent cyclones, followed hard on a long winter of bitter north-west winds and heavy snow. Over this area roamed the Kansa, Pawnee, Sioux, Cheyenne, Blackfoot, Crow, and Arapaho tribes: the plains Indians who are to the modern cinematograph what the forest Indians were to Fenimore Cooper. Countless herds of buffalo grazed on the plains and supplied the redskins with every necessity of life: with meat for immediate use, or, dried and pounded into pemmican, for winter subsistence; with skins for clothing, shields, harness, vessels, and the cover of the tipis or tents; with sinews for thread, cordage, and bow-strings; with bone for arrow-heads and implements; with peltry to sell the traders; even with fuel. These Indians had long since domesticated the wild mustang, offspring of those set free by the Spanish *conquistadores*, and killed buffalo with bow and arrow while riding bareback.

The plains Indians seldom practised agriculture, and knew little or nothing of pottery, basketry, or weaving; but they were the finest physical specimens of the race, and in warfare, once they had learned the use of the rifle, were more formidable than the eastern tribes that had yielded so slowly to the white man. Politically they were even less developed; tribe warred with tribe, and itself knew no common head or council. A highly developed sign language was the only means of inter-tribal communication. The effective unit was the band or village of a few hundred souls, which might be seen in the course of its wanderings encamped by some water-course with tipis erected; or pouring over the plain, squaws and children leading the dogs and pack-horses with their trailing travois, superbly dressed braves lop-



ing gaily ahead on their wiry steeds. Like other redskins, they lived only for the day, recognized no rights of property, robbed or killed any party of whites who could not defend themselves, inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without flinching.

The only white men who penetrated this region before 1830 were explorers, fur traders, and trappers. As soon as Lewis and Clark brought news of the untouched store of fur-bearing animals in the core of the continent, joint-stock companies were organized to hunt them. The plains Indians were able to supply plenty of buffalo skins, but disliked trapping; hence the trading companies organized bands of *engagés*, trappers who spent most of their time in the Rocky Mountains or Black Hills, and returned yearly to a company post on the upper Platte or Missouri, in order to turn in their furs, and enjoy a week's riotous living on the proceeds. Peltry was also obtained from free-lance trappers who managed by prowess or address to obtain a certain immunity from the Indians. Supplies and trading goods were sent up-river from St. Louis in the spring floods, as far as possible by steamboat, and farther in rough *batteaux* manned by French-Canadian *voyageurs*. Peltry and buffalo hides were sent down in the same way; or, if the year's taking surpassed the available tonnage, in 'bull-boats' made of buffalo-hides stretched on a wicker frame, bound with buffalo sinews and paid with buffalo tallow. Every river, valley, mountain, and water-hole of the Far West was known to the trappers before 1830: and without their guidance and knowledge transcontinental emigration would have been impossible. It was they who discovered the South Pass of the Rockies in Wyoming, a wide valley of rolling hills that takes one to the transcontinental divide by easy gradients. A party of trappers led by Jedediah Smith and William Sublette took the first covered wagons from the Missouri to the Rockies, in 1830.

Six years later Captain Bonneville, whose adventures provided literary material for Washington Irving, took the first loaded wagons through the South Pass, and down the Snake valley to the Columbia.

3. *The Oregon Trail*

The methods of the fur trade, and much of the personnel, were of French Canada. As in the Canada of Louis XIV, missionaries followed close on the heels of traders, but the missionaries in this instance were Protestant Yankees. Reports reached the religious bodies in the East that the Indians of Oregon were peaceable and eager for spiritual guidance. Accordingly in 1832 a group of Methodists under the Rev. Jason Lee joined a fur-trading party on the long overland route, and by 1834 had established a mission in the valley of the Willamette, which flowed into the Columbia at the site of Portland. Two years later a band of Presbyterians, including the energetic Dr. Marcus Whitman about whom a legend was soon built up,¹ and the first white women to cross the American continent, founded mission stations in the Walla Walla country, at the junction of the Snake and Columbia. Supply ships were sent to them round the Horn, and Dr. McLoughlin gave them every aid and encouragement, although he had more reason to favour the French Canadian priests who were coming to the Bitter Root valley and the Cœur d'Alène country, somewhat northward.

Proselytizing among the tribes of Oregon was not notably successful, but the missionaries in the Willamette valley found themselves in clover. Western Oregon has a mild and equable climate, more like that of England than of the eastern United States. The country was a mixture of open prairie with magnificent

¹ E. G. Bourne, 'The Legend of Marcus Whitman', in *Essays in Historical Criticism* (N.Y., Scribners; London, Arnold, 1901).

pine woods, rich soil for tillage and natural meadows for grazing cattle. The missionaries' widely published letters spread the notion of Oregon as a home, while Washington Irving in his *Astoria* (1836) and *Adventures of Captain Bonneville* (1837) stressed the wilderness theme. Settlers began to arrive from New England; not many, to be sure, but enough to give Oregon a permanent Yankee flavour.

In 1842 the 'Oregon fever' struck the frontier folk of Iowa and Missouri, eager to renew their forest pioneering. Independence was the 'jumping-off place' for the Oregon trail. 'Prairie schooners' (covered wagons) converged there from the eastward in May, when the plains' grass was fresh and green. More supplies were taken in, since hunting was a precarious source of food; and no help could be expected on the two-thousand-mile hike to the Willamette, unless from fur-trading posts that were not too well stocked themselves. Parties were organized, a captain appointed, an experienced trapper or fur trader engaged as pilot; and amid a great blowing of bugles and cracking of long whips, the caravan, perhaps a hundred wagons strong with thousands of cattle on the hoof, moved off up the west bank of the Missouri. At Fort Leavenworth, one of the bastions of the Indian frontier, the emigrants broke contact with their flag and its protection.

Near the Council Bluffs, where the Missouri is joined by the Platte, the Oregon trail turned west to follow the latter river over the Great Plains.¹ Until a road had been beaten into the sod, it was easy to lose the way. Numerous tributaries of the Platte, swollen and turbid in the spring of the year, had to be forded or swum, to the great damage of stores and baggage. Francis Parkman in 1846 found ancient tables and

¹ Later, the Oregon trail cut straight across the prairie from Independence to the southernmost bend of the Platte, near the site of Kearney, Nebraska.

chests of drawers which perhaps had served some family in a dozen homes between England and the Mississippi, left cracking in the sun where this latest wave of migration had grounded them. Every night the caravan made a hollow square of wagons round its fire of cottonwood or buffalo chips. Sentries stood guard to protect the hobbled horses and grazing cattle, and the howling of prairie wolves was drowned by the chorus of an old Appalachian ballad :

Then o'er the hills in legions, boys,
Fair freedom's star
Points to the sunset regions, boys,
Ha, ha, ha, ha !

Until the forks of the Platte were reached, near the present north-eastern corner of Colorado, the herbage was luxuriant, and the grades easy. Following the North Fork, the trail became hilly and then mountainous, as one turned north to avoid the Laramie spur of the Rockies. Beyond the South Pass came the worst part of the journey—a long, hard pull, across the arid Wyoming basin, where the grass was scanty, and alkali deposits made the water almost undrinkable. Between the Gros Ventre and Teton ranges of the Rockies the Oregon emigrant found westward-flowing waters, and took heart ; but there were still eight hundred miles to go to the lower Columbia, following the meanderings of the Snake river. As there was no good road in early days through the heavily forested country along the Columbia, wagons were often rafted down the stream ; and with fair luck a party that left Independence in May might expect to celebrate Thanksgiving Day in the Willamette valley. But it was a lucky caravan indeed that arrived with the same number of souls that started ; and some of the weaker parties disappeared—whether by starvation after losing the trail, or at the hands of Indians, no one knows.

4. *The Diplomatic Question*

Up to this time there had been no law in the Oregon country outside the Hudson's Bay settlement; and it speaks well for the character of the first emigrants that there was no crime. A group of Willamette valley settlers who gathered to hear a Fourth of July speech in 1843 remained to form a government by compact, as their ancestors had done in the Appalachian valleys. The heavy immigration of 1843-5, four to five thousand strong, including pioneers of lawless proclivities from Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, and Illinois, strained the provisional organization, and convinced Congress that something must be done to provide this remote colony with government, law, and land titles. First, however, the Federal Government wished to reach a settlement with Great Britain.

Webster and Ashburton discussed the Oregon question informally in 1842, but reached no conclusion. The next year, agitation for annexing the whole of Oregon up to $54^{\circ} 40'$ was begun in the Western States, and Democratic politicians scented a good issue to win the Western vote in the next presidential election. A bill for organizing Oregon as a United States Territory passed the Senate in February 1843, but the House, fortunately ignorant of Palmerston's threat that the passage 'would be a declaration of war',¹ let it drop. Secretary Calhoun opened negotiations on the subject in 1844 with the British Minister at Washington, and repeated the proposal thrice made by Adams, to divide the territory along latitude 49° . Aberdeen, like Castle-reagh and Canning, refused to retire from the north bank of the Columbia.

If the question were to be decided by extent of actual occupation the British claim was just; and it would be

¹ Hansard (3rd series), lxxvii. 1217. Palmerston spoke as Leader of the Opposition.

difficult to discover any other basis of division. North of the Columbia, about Fort Vancouver and along Puget Sound, were living over seven hundred British subjects, and only half a dozen American citizens. The United States, however, could well afford to wait. A decline in the Columbia valley fur trade was making Fort Vancouver unprofitable, and the menacing attitude of the latest American immigrants threatened its security. At Dr. McLoughlin's suggestion the Company abandoned Fort Vancouver to the Americans in 1845, and erected a new post on Vancouver Island.¹

By this time the expansionist James K. Polk had become President of the United States. In his inaugural address (4 March 1845) the President shouted defiance at Britain; and in December, asserting that the American title to the whole of Oregon was 'clear and unquestionable', he asked Congress for authority to terminate the joint occupation agreement of 1818. To a timid congressman Polk remarked that 'the only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye; that he considered a bold and firm course on our part the pacific one'. To a bellicose Senator, who put the direct question 'Do you go for 54° 40', or 49°?' Polk replied in effect, 'Wait and see!'

5. *The Mormons*

Before the Oregon question was finally adjusted came the hegira of the Mormons to the Great Salt Lake.

In New England, and that part of the Middle West settled by Yankees, there was a class corresponding to the 'poor white trash' of the South; shiftless people unable to get on in an atmosphere of energy and thrift, resenting the pity or disdain of their successful neighbours, susceptible to religious charlatanry. The Southern under-dog was at this period a frontier individualist, who took his religion in violent revivalist

¹ F. Merk, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxix, 681-99.

doses. 'When I hear a man preach I like to see him act as if he were fighting bees,' said Abraham Lincoln. But the more social Yankee liked to merge his identity in a communal movement, preferably of a sort that gave him a definite place in some theocracy, however squalid, and promised him glorious compensation beyond the grave for his worldly humiliations. Further, the Yankee population had an excess of women. Dozens of new sects such as the Millerites competed in the thirties and forties for this Yankee substratum, which was completely immune to such intellectual movements as Unitarianism. The most permanent and successful upheaval from these cultural depths was the 'Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints'.

Joseph Smith was the village ne'er-do-well and champion liar of Palmyra, N.Y., with a hobby of digging for buried treasure. An Angel of the Lord, so he claimed, showed him the hiding-place of a package of inscribed gold plates, together with a pair of magic spectacles which enabled him to read the 'reformed Egyptian' characters. The resulting Book of Mormon, a dull and illiterate parody of the Old Testament, described the history of certain lost tribes of Israel—the redskins, whom the Saints were commanded to redeem from paganism. Joseph Smith promptly organized the Church of the Latter-day Saints. As Prophet, he received from time to time appropriate and sustaining revelations, including the one sanctioning polygamy, which he and the inner circle of elders were already practising. A hierarchy was duly promulgated, providing place and title for almost every one, but all power to the Prophet. A community was founded near Cleveland, Ohio, where the Saints were set to work under the Prophet's direction, and rigorously tithed for his advantage. In order to approach the Lost Tribes, the community moved to a spot near Independence, Missouri; but the hostility of other frontier folk forced a

transfer to Nauvoo, Illinois, on the east bank of the Mississippi river. At first the Mormons were welcomed in Illinois, courted by both political parties, and given a charter that made Nauvoo practically an autonomous theocracy. But the settlement grew so rapidly—faster even than Chicago—that the Illinoisians became alarmed; and the Mormons were aggressive and thievish neighbours who contributed nothing to the general welfare. In 1844 Joseph Smith and his brother were murdered. Brigham Young, who succeeded to the mantle of the Prophet and to five of his twenty-seven widows, directed retaliation on the ‘Gentiles’ by a corps of ‘Avenging Angels’; and for two years terror reigned in western Illinois. It was clearly time for another move, before they were hopelessly outnumbered and exterminated.

Yet the Mormons had made an astonishing gain in numbers. Missionaries had been raking in converts from the Northern States since 1831; and by 1840, when Brigham Young visited Liverpool, England had become one of their principal harvest fields. For in England there were thousands of poor workers, frustrated by the collapse of Owen’s National Trades Union, who were allured by the prospect of a decent living, and the promise of heavenly ‘thrones, kingdoms, principalities and powers’. Almost four thousand English converts reached Nauvoo between 1840 and 1846, and forty or fifty churches of Latter-day Saints in the Old Country contributed modest tithes to the Prophet’s bulging treasury.

Under their new Moses, a cunning and ruthless autocrat but a leader of energy and vision, the Mormons abandoned their homes in Nauvoo, and in 1846, twelve thousand strong, began their great westward trek. After wintering near the Council Bluffs, Brigham Young pushed ahead with a pioneer band along a new ‘Mormon trail’ on the north bank of the Platte; and

in July reached the promised land, the basin of the Great Salt Lake. Many flinched from the long journey, but by the end of 1848 five thousand had arrived in the future State of Utah.

This new Canaan was a dry and inhospitable land. Young chose it in the hope that his Saints would no longer be molested by Gentiles. Arid wastes, where salt and alkali deposits glistened among sage-brush thickets, sloped down from the Rocky Mountains to the Great Salt Lake, desolate and repulsive as another Dead Sea. Up in the mountains lay natural reservoirs of rain and snow, the means of quickening life.

For such unfamiliar conditions the individualistic tradition of English-speaking pioneers was inadequate; the communal, theocratic customs of the Mormons appropriate. Brigham Young was equally competent as ruler and lawgiver, priest and patriarch. He caused irrigation canals and ditches to be dug, appointed committees to control the water for the public benefit,¹ and adopted a system of small farms, intensively cultivated and carefully fertilized.² He forbade speculation in land, but respected private property and accumulated a considerable fortune for himself. He kept the Indians quiet by a judicious mixture of firmness and justice. He repressed heresy and schism with a heavy hand. He organized foreign and domestic missions and financed the transcontinental immigration. By means of a complicated hierarchy he controlled both temporal and spiritual affairs with Yankee shrewdness, rough

¹ Absence of lawyers among the Mormons enabled them to discard the common-law doctrine of riparian rights, the fruit of racial experience in moist climates, which at a later time hampered the development of irrigation in California.

² The Mormon land system was almost an exact replica of the New England townships of the seventeenth century. Each family was granted a village house-lot, a bit of tillage nearby, and a larger one farther afield, a meadow allotment and a share in the common pasture, where a village herdsman looked after the community flocks.

humour,¹ and substantial justice, and held himself responsible only to God.

For ten years there was intermittent want and starvation in Utah, and the gold rush of '49 caused unrest. Brigham Young announced in the Tabernacle at Salt Lake City, 'If you Elders of Israel want to go to the gold mines, go and be damned!' The wiser Saints found it more profitable to sell corn and potatoes to the Argonauts. Yearly the community grew in numbers and in wealth, a polygamous theocracy within a monogamous and democratic nation. Utah was organized as a Territory of the United States in 1850, but federal control was practically suspended when President Fillmore appointed Brigham Young the territorial governor. Federal judges were driven from the Territory when they refused to obey the Mormon Church; Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston and fifteen hundred regulars could obtain only a nominal submission by the Saints in 1858, and President Lincoln mostly left them alone.

The Pacific Railway brought Salt Lake City into closer touch with the outside world in 1869, but the Mormons have always clung to the cultural level from which they were recruited. Polygamy has died out with a rising cost of living, but the Mormon government was too autocratic for a wholesome civic life. Freedom of thought and liberty of action are still narrowly restricted by the Church, and Utah has been as barren in the arts as prolific in progeny. Yet the Mormons brought comfort, happiness, and self-respect to thousands of humble folk; and Brigham Young must be placed among the successful empire-builders of the English-speaking world.

¹ Sir Richard Burton, who made a flying visit to Utah in 1860, and wrote an interesting book on it (*The City of the Saints*, London, 1861), asked Brigham Young if he might become a Mormon. The President replied, 'I think you have done that sort of thing before, Captain!'

XXXVIII

TEXAS

1820-45

I. *The Frontier Provinces of New Spain*

WHILE one column of pioneers was deploying into the prairies of Illinois and Iowa, and another winding over the Oregon Trail, a third had crossed into Mexican territory, and taken possession of the coastal plain of Texas. Expansion in that direction was no simple matter of endurance, or driving back redskins. There, as of late in Louisiana and Florida, the English-speaking pioneer came into contact with a proud and ancient civilization, no longer upheld by a dying empire, but by the young republic of Mexico. Who could tell whether Mexico might not develop the same expansive force as the United States, and Spain recover in the New World the moral dominion she had lost in the Old ?

There was little sign of it in 1820. Upper California, New Mexico, and Texas, frontier provinces of the old vice-royalty, spread out fanwise towards the United States, and were attached to the parent trunk by the frailest of stems. Explored as early as the sixteenth century by the Spaniards, they had been thinly colonized after a long interval, and in the Roman rather than the English sense. Missions had been planted among the Indians as centres of civilization and exploitation ; *presidios* or frontier garrisons established to protect the fathers in their work ; and such few colonists as could be persuaded to venture so far were generously endowed by the Spanish Government with lands and Indian serfs. A constant drain on the mother country, the frontier provinces had been maintained simply as a protection to Mexico against the enter-

prising peoples to the North and East.¹ Once, all North America had been a Spanish bastion, with feeble forts and missions studding the coast as far north as Virginia. The American conquest of Texas and California was a large chapter in the volume that began with the settlement of Jamestown in 1607 and ended with the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Spain left the stamp of her distinction on the architecture, the place-names, and the customs of these frontier provinces, but her hold on them was slight, as their connexion with Mexico was tenuous. Weak, distracted, lacking expansive energy, Mexico knew not how to use them and was too proud to dispose of them. Garrisons were withdrawn, the missions secularized, and the Indians allowed to relapse into barbarism. Upper California, a province the size of Asia Minor with a mild and equable climate, forests of giant pines and sequoias, broad valleys of marvellous fertility, and mountain ranges abounding in mineral wealth, contained little more than six thousand white men in 1846. The large free-handed life of these Mexicans of California has been admirably described in *Two Years before the Mast*, by a seaman of one of those Yankee ships which were their principal connexion with the outside world. Already in 1835 hundreds of Yankees had 'left their consciences at Cape Horn' to live and trade in this delightful country; and about 1840 overland emigrants began to trickle in from the Oregon trail through the passes of the Sierra Nevada.

Between the Sierra and the Rocky Mountains was

¹ The Oñate expedition which first colonized New Mexico in 1598 was sent out largely with a view to discovering and holding the mythical strait of Anian, through which Drake was rumoured to have sailed home. Pimeria Alta (southern Arizona) appears to have been mainly a missionary enterprise of the Spanish Jesuits. The colonization of Texas began with the founding of San Antonio, in 1718, as a protection against the French fur traders and Louisiana. For the colonization of California, see Chapter X.

another vast region, nominally under Mexican dominion, that did not contain a single white settler until 1846, when Brigham Young led his Saints into the basin of the Great Salt Lake.

Fifteen hundred miles from Vera Cruz, and a thousand from the Mexican border, was Santa Fé, the capital and only town of New Mexico. It was the gateway to a country of marvels and enchantments, shimmering plains with no vegetation but strange cacti, mesas striped with ochre and vermilion, aboriginal cliff-dwellings which the *conquistadores* had mistaken for the Seven Cities of Cibola, and the stupendous cañon of the Colorado river. Annually an armed caravan of American traders assembled at Independence, and followed the Santa Fé trail with pack-mule and wagon through the country of the Osage and Comanche, to this lonely emporium of New Mexico, returning with silver and peltry.

2. *Austin's Colony*

It was in Texas that the first compact wedge of English-speaking people was thrust across Mexico's borders. Texas, seven hundred and fifty miles long from the Sabine river to El Paso, and of equal depth from the tip of the 'panhandle' to the mouth of the Rio Grande del Norte, is a province larger than France, and almost as varied in climate and natural resource. The pioneers found moist gulf plains studded with cane-brakes, and cold arid plateaux; dense forests of pine and hardwood; prairies of a deep, black, waxy loam, perfect for cotton growing, and others of lighter soil, adapted for grain; sage-brush and yucca deserts; and the Llano Estacado or high plains, where roamed immense herds of buffalo and mustang.

We must tread warily here; for a major controversy of American history rages round Texas and the Mexi-

can War. One theory, invented by the abolitionists, made orthodox by the Republican party, and given literary currency by such men as James Russell Lowell, regards the American colonization of Texas, the Texan annexation to the United States, and the Mexican War, as the fruit of a gigantic conspiracy of Southern politicians to get ' bigger pens to cram with slaves '. The other theory regards the whole movement as a more or less conscious and entirely justifiable effort of high-souled pioneers to advance civilization and democracy in a region feebly held by a decadent society.

Texas had never formed part of Louisiana, and the United States' claim to it, renounced in the Florida Treaty of 1819, was based on nothing better than the fact that Napoleon was prepared to seize the province, before he decided to sell Louisiana to the United States. However, no sooner had the United States renounced Texas, and agreed upon the Sabine and the Red Rivers as the American south-western boundary, than they regretted the supposed loss. Adams was accused of abandoning American territory, and he had not been in office three weeks when he instructed Poinsett to propose the purchase of a whole or a part of Texas, with the amazingly naïve argument that ' it would have the effect of placing the City of Mexico nearer the centre of its territories '.¹ Poinsett received the astute reply that, if the treaty of 1819 were abandoned, the treaty of 1795 with the Mississippi boundary would be valid. Jackson pressed the same proposal as Adams, with more persistence and even less tact. At Washington there was ' no comprehension of the out-at-elbows pride of the average Mexican, his vanity and his fierce dreaminess '. The mere offer was an insult ; its repetition aroused suspicion.

Yet, with strange inconsistency, Mexico encouraged American emigration to Texas. In 1823 the Emperor

¹ *Amer. State Pap., For. Rel.*, vi. 580.

Agustín I (Iturbide) confirmed to Stephen F. Austin a concession granted to his father by the Spanish Viceroy, to colonize two hundred American families in one of the most fertile regions of Texas. In 1824 the Mexican Congress offered the same privilege of *empresario*, with sixty-six thousand acres free, to any one who could persuade two hundred families to emigrate and receive each 177 acres of rich tillage, or 4,428 acres of prairie pasture and scrub-oak.

Why these terms were offered is one mystery ; ¹ why they were not more fully taken advantage of, is another. In 1825 Austin's colony, then four years old, included but 1,347 whites and 443 slaves, and by 1834 the white English-speaking population of Texas was probably not higher than eighteen thousand, with two thousand slaves.² Every frontier community in the United States was growing more rapidly than that. Austin, son of a roving Connecticut Yankee, a grave, gentle, and persistent young man with a profound knowledge of human nature, picked the materials for his colony with care, and ruled it with autocratic power until 1829. It resembled in social structure one of the English proprietary colonies of New England or Carolina, and was more law-abiding and better governed than any American frontier of the nineteenth century.

¹ Corruption is the obvious explanation ; but the British chargé, H. G. Ward, attributed the grants largely to ignorance and a vague feeling of republican brotherhood with the United States. In 1830 Robert Owen visited Mexico, whose President offered to make him ruler of a buffer province one hundred miles wide between Mexico and the United States. Owen's condition of religious liberty was not accepted, and the reformer reluctantly abandoned his plan to people the Texan border with 'an intelligent and moral working class from the British Islands', and his ambition to accustom the wild Indians 'to the true family commonwealth arrangements'. *London Investigator*, iii. 244-9 (1856).

² E. C. Barker, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xi. 35, but cf. Channing, *U.S.*, v. 520, note. The Mexican population was outnumbered by at least four to one.

Austin seems to have been anti-slavery by preference, but found himself confronted by the dilemma that meets all colonists with capital: the choice between log-cabin poverty and using some form of forced labour. There were no Indian peons in that part of Mexico, and the soil offered such opportunities for cotton and sugar culture that Southern planters would not come unless permitted to bring their slaves, and could not prosper without them. The Mexican Congress, the state legislature at Saltillo, and various Mexican dictators passed laws or decrees declaring the abolition of slavery throughout the Republic. If these decrees had been enforced, Mexico would have conferred a benefit upon herself and upon the world. But Austin was always able to obtain some 'explanation' of them which allowed the Americans to hold their slaves in fact, if not by law.

Insecurity of slave property¹ was but one of many factors pulling towards the separation of Texas from Mexico. Austin and the older American *empresarios* tried to be good Mexicans; but it was difficult to respect a government in constant turmoil and revolution. The American colonist admired the horsemanship of his Mexican neighbour, adopted his saddle and trappings—and sometimes, we fear, appropriated his horse—but his general attitude towards Mexico was one of humorous contempt for the people, and impatience at the restrictions which their government sought to impose. As time went on the contempt did not lessen, and the irritations multiplied. There was trouble

¹ Prof. E. C. Barker, in his article cited above, shows that there is no positive evidence that anxiety concerning the status of slavery played any appreciable part in producing the Texas revolution. Yet, unless the nature of slaveholders changed when they crossed the Sabine, the same psychological factors that united the South against every attempt on the part of the United States Government to tamper with slavery must have operated equally against Mexican meddling with the institution.

about the tariff, representation, and immigration ; conflicts with Mexican garrisons, whose proud officers resented the crude wit and boisterous individualism of the settlers. And in the early thirties the quiet law-abiding pioneers of Austin's first hegira began to be outnumbered by men of another type—swashbucklers like Sam Houston, once a subordinate of General Jackson, then Senator and Governor of Tennessee, and sometime resident among the Comanche Indians ; Burnet of New Jersey, who had followed Miranda to Carácas in 1806, Archer of Virginia who had almost joined Burr, and had fled his State after a successful duel ; the Bowie brothers of Louisiana, slave-smugglers who designed the long and deadly knife that bears their name ; Davy Crockett, a professional backwoodsman of Tennessee ; and many others of restless ambition and pungent personality, who had left their country for their country's good.

3. *The Lone Star Republic*

The break came in 1835, when Santa Anna proclaimed a unified constitution for Mexico that made a clean sweep of State rights. The American settlers of Texas then established a provisional government and expelled the Mexican garrison from San Antonio de Bexar. Over the Rio Grande came Santa Anna with three thousand men. In the Alamo, the fortified mission at San Antonio, was a garrison of less than two hundred Texans. They refused to retreat or to surrender. On 5 March 1836 Santa Anna assaulted the Alamo, captured it after every Texan had been killed or wounded, and put the wounded to death.

Already a convention elected by the American settlers had proclaimed the independent Republic of Texas, and adopted a flag with a single star. Santa Anna quickly advanced eastward with his wiry Mexican

troops, the settlers fleeing before him, and for a few weeks it looked as if the Lone Star Republic would be snuffed out. Generalissimo Sam Houston managed to keep an army together, and awaited the Mexicans in an ilex grove by the ferry of the San Jacinto River, not far from the site of the city that bears his name. On 21 April, shouting 'Remember the Alamo!' the Texans burst on Santa Anna's army, scattered it, and took the leader prisoner. Mexico made no serious effort towards reconquest. The Texans ratified their new constitution, legalized negro slavery, elected Sam Houston their President, and sent an envoy to Washington to demand annexation to the United States, or recognition as an independent republic.

Enthusiasm over the defence of the Alamo, and liberal land offers by the republic drew hundreds of American adventurers into the Texan army. President Jackson made no attempt to prevent this unneutral aid, but on the questions of recognition and annexation his attitude was diplomatically correct.¹ Only on his last day of office (3 March 1837), after Congress had approved, did Jackson recognize the Lone Star Republic.

Texas, unsatisfied, pressed for annexation to the United States. Unfortunately for her ambition, it was a year of agitation in Congress over the slave trade and the right of petition. On 23 May 1836 Calhoun remarked in the Senate, that 'there were powerful reasons why Texas should be a part of this Union. The

¹ The story that he had fomented the Texan War of Independence, through his friend Houston, and had sent a force of regulars to the frontier to support it may now be dismissed as a myth. Jackson's real sympathies in the matter of annexation are still a mystery. The Texan envoy states in his dispatches that the President encouraged annexation; but on the back of Austin's letter asking for help just after the Alamo Jackson endorsed 'We have a treaty with Mexico, and . . . our national faith is pledged to support it'. He considered the Texan declaration of independence 'a rash and premature act, our neutrality must be faithfully maintained'. J. S. Bassett, *Jackson*, ii. 680.

Southern States, owning a slave population, were deeply interested in preventing that country from having the power to annoy them.'¹ The same year an abolitionist named Lundy brought out a pamphlet called 'The War in Texas ; . . . showing that this Contest is the result of a Long Premeditated Crusade against the Government set on foot by Slaveholders'. Therein was first presented the theory that the Texas revolution was a conspiracy to open new slave markets, and gain slave territory for cotton. Lundy spoke with an appearance of authority, for he had been to Texas ; and with the bitterness of frustration, for he had hoped to found there an abolitionist colony. His pamphlet, describing the Texans as a gang of horse-thieves, land-jobbers, and desperadoes, appealed to that widespread Northern sentiment opposed to the political dominance of the South and the extension of the slave territory : the same sentiment that resented the admission of Missouri as a slave State in 1820. Almost in a moment the whole country realized that the annexation of Texas would affect the balance of power between North and South. On 1 November 1837 the Vermont legislature 'solemnly protested' against the admission 'of any State whose constitution tolerates domestic slavery'. Of course that was the very way to arouse a contrary feeling in the South. Calhoun solemnly announced that any attempt to exclude a State on account of its 'peculiar institutions' would be a virtual dissolution of the Union.

The slave States were already beginning to realize that they had got the small end of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which prohibited slavery in the federal territory north of 36° 30'. Arkansas and Michigan had just been admitted to the Union, making thirteen free and thirteen slave States. Florida was the only slave Territory left ; but three free Territories, Wisconsin,

¹ *Congressional Globe*, iii. 394.

Iowa, and Minnesota would be demanding admission in a few years; and more might well follow if the Indian barrier to the Great Plains were broken. The Alabama legislature, on Christmas Day 1837, resolved: 'It needs but a glance at the map to satisfy the most superficial observer that an overbalance is produced by the extreme north-east, which as regards territory would be happily corrected and counterbalanced by the annexation of Texas.' Texas, greater in area than the nine free States of the North-east, might be carved into several slave States, a New Slavonia to balance New England.

A resolution for the annexation of Texas was promptly introduced in Congress. President Van Buren, engaged at the time in some delicate negotiations with Mexico, and anxious to keep the slavery issue out of politics, used his influence against the resolution, which was finally smothered by a speech of J. Q. Adams that took three weeks to deliver (July 1838).

The politicians were content to let so explosive a question rest. In the meantime, thousands of petty planters, ruined by the panic of 1837, were glad to leave their debts at home, and start life anew across the Sabine.

4. *Aberdeen, Abolition, and Annexation*

Texas acquired a navy, accumulated a national debt, and received British and French recognition. The Lone Star Republic belonged to the family of nations, but for how long? Her white population was barely fifty thousand; Mexico had six or seven millions. Except for a fantastic raid in 1842, Mexico made no attempt to reconquer Texas, and in 1843 Charles Elliot (the opium war Elliot), British Minister to Texas, negotiated a truce between the two republics. But at any turn of the political wheel in Mexico City the truce might be denounced, and hostilities renewed. Political

conditions in Texas were chaotic. A Texan President who bore the conquering name of Mirabeau B. Lamar hoped to incorporate New Mexico, California, and the northern tier of Mexican States in his government, and himself led a forlorn hope against Santa Fé. Sam Houston, who succeeded him after that escapade, knew that Texas needed protection and security. He probably preferred to obtain it through annexation to the United States. But there was no hope of obtaining American consent until 1843, when Webster left Tyler's Cabinet, and Upshur of Virginia became Secretary of State. Houston's second string was a dual mediation by Britain and France to obtain recognition of Texan independence by Mexico; and a dual or triple guarantee to maintain it.

Such a project was certain to appeal to European statesmen. The desire to extend the European balance of power to America, and erect a barrier to further expansion by the United States—the policy successively pursued by Talleyrand, Canning, and Napoleon III—was awakened by Texan independence. Here was a ready-made wedge between the United States and Latin America, an independent source of supply for cotton, sugar, and tobacco, a possible centre of British or French influence. How Canning would have hastened to 'slip in between'! But Aberdeen was in the Foreign Office. He toyed with the idea. What sweetened it for him was the notion that in return for British guarantee and financial assistance Texas might be induced to abolish slavery. The World Convention of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society at London, in the summer of 1843, put the proposition to Aberdeen, definitely. He would not say he would, but refused to say he might not. A year later, he went so far as to tell the Mexican Minister at London that if Mexico would recognize Texan independence, and France would co-operate, England would guarantee both the independence of

Texas and the boundaries of Mexico against the United States and the world.¹ At the same time Louis Philippe warmly urged the same plan on the Mexican Minister at Paris, pointing out the analogy to his own recognition of Belgian independence and neutrality.²

That the Peel and the Guizot ministries were really prepared to set up an American Portugal or Belgium is improbable, but not impossible, given Aberdeen's propensity for assuming dangerous responsibilities. If neither Government was brought to the test, it was owing to Mexican *intransigence*. No Mexican cabinet dared recognize Texan independence, even though in so doing it would have fulfilled an old Spanish dream, and erected a substantial barrier against the northern torrent. There was little doubt of Texan acceptance, if the offer were made in time. Common sense at Mexico City in 1844 might have changed the entire course of American expansion.

Amid the cross-currents of notes, suggestions, and conversations between London, Paris, Washington, Austin and Mexico City,³ another fact stands out clearly: the fear of Southern statesmen that Texas might abolish slavery. Calhoun's journalist son-in-law was picking up gossip in London. In the summer of 1843 he wrote to Upshur, President Tyler's new Secretary of State, that the Texan Minister authorized him to say that Lord Aberdeen had agreed to guarantee a Texan loan if the

¹ 28 May 1844. The Mexican Minister submitted to Aberdeen his proposed dispatch in French describing the conversation, and Aberdeen added a few corrections in English. The significant paragraph is: 'Lord Aberdeen répliqua que *provided that England and France were perfectly agreed* peu importerait à l'Angleterre que le Gouvernement Américain consentit ou non à abandonner cette question, et que, s'il était nécessaire, elle irait jusqu'aux dernières extrémités pour soutenir sa résolution contre l'annexion'. F. O. 180. 29 May 1844.

² 3 July 1844. *Archivo Hist. Dipl. Mex.*, No. 15, p. xxi.

³ These negotiations are well summarized by N. W. Stephenson, and somewhat tendentiously by Justin Smith (see bibliography).

Lone Star Republic would abolish slavery.¹ The prospect of Texas becoming a second Canada, a safe refuge for fugitive slaves from the Gulf States, alarmed the South to the point of panic. Upshur at once began to negotiate a treaty of annexation with the Texan Minister at Washington. He informed the Texan Government, categorically, that the abolition project was inadmissible. Aberdeen, as soon as he heard of the misunderstanding, denied the report of his intentions in a note imprudent in its frankness. 'Great Britain desires, and is constantly exerting herself to procure, the general abolition of slavery throughout the world. But the means which she has adopted, and will continue to adopt, for this humane and virtuous purpose, are open and undisguised.' Calhoun's reply, which he published at once, seized upon this admission to justify the annexation treaty; and proceeded to read the British Government a lesson on negro slavery. Adducing some questionable statistics, Calhoun offered to convince the noble lord that the negro race would be reduced to wretchedness and vice by his misdirected charity! In other words, Tyler's administration declared that the mere prospect of abolition in a neighbouring republic was sufficient reason to absorb it; and suggested that the mission of the United States was to make the world safe for slavery.

Annexation, urged on such grounds and from that source, repelled more votes from one section than it attracted from another. Calhoun's annexation treaty failed to pass the Senate. Then came the presidential election of 1844, in which the Democratic party cleverly lifted the Texas question out of its slavery setting, and made it one of national expansion and prestige.

¹ J. S. Reeves, *Tyler and Polk*, p. 129; *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1908*, ii. 1099-1103. The Texan Minister was reporting what one of the abolitionists told him Aberdeen had said. Aberdeen's disclaimer to the American Government and Calhoun's reply are in the latter's *Works* (1857), v. 330 ff.

In the Democratic nominating convention of 1844, at Baltimore, there was the usual strife between Northern and Southern elements. Then James K. Polk of Tennessee, the first 'dark horse' in a presidential race, trotted out on to a platform where 'reoccupation of Oregon and reannexation of Texas' was written large. Washington heard the result in a minute, by the new electric telegraph. Henry Clay, the Whig candidate, was expected to rally the divided forces of the Whigs, and to win the election; but he remained on the fence too long. His non-committal policy as to Texas diverted so many New York votes to Birney, the abolitionist candidate, that Polk carried the State by a trifling plurality; and the thirty-six electoral votes of New York decided the contest.

There was a deeper reason, however, why Polk carried the election over his popular and distinguished rival, and that reason had nothing to do with slavery or abolition. Another movement of westward expansion had begun, both in thought and in fact. The Oregon trail and the Lone Star Republic caught the imagination of a people recovering confidence after the hard times of 1837 to 1840. The 'manifest destiny'¹ of the United States to expand westward and southward, and prove the democratic principle on a scale hitherto undreamed, became the theme of countless leaders, Fourth of July orations, and political speeches. Much talk

¹ I have not found this exact phrase in contemporary literature as early as 1844. The idea was well expressed by Senator Daniel S. Dickinson of New York in a speech of 12 January 1848: 'Whoever will look back upon the past and forward upon the present, must see that, allured by the justice of our institutions, before the close of the present century, this continent will teem with a free population of a hundred million souls. Nor have we yet fulfilled the destiny allotted to us. New territory is spread out for us to subdue and fertilize; new races are presented for us to civilize, educate, and absorb; new triumphs for us to achieve in the cause of freedom.' *Congressional Globe*, xviii. 157 (30th Cong., 1st Sess.).

there was, too, of Anglo-Saxon genius in colonization and self-government.¹ Parson Wilbur might preach that 'all this big talk of our destinies is half on it ignorance, an' t'other half rum', but no good Democrat or Westerner believed him. 'Reoccupation of Oregon and reannexation of Texas', 'Fifty-four forty or fight', rallied the same sort of people who bawled for 'Tippecanoe and Tyler too' in 1840. Jeffersonian simplicity was dead, and the new note of emancipation was silenced by the war-whoops of strutting democracy.

Congress, persuaded that quick action was necessary to forestall England, voted by joint resolution on 28 February 1845 to admit Texas into the Union. And on 3 March, his last day of office, President Tyler had the satisfaction of sending off a courier to inform Texas that only her consent was necessary to become the twenty-eighth United State.² But the ambition of his successor soared far beyond the Lone Star Republic.

¹ The term 'Anglo-Saxon' had the same popular connotation, in the forties, as 'Teutonic' in the eighties, and 'Nordic' to-day. See quotations in E. D. Adams, *Power of Ideals in American History* (1923), p. 85; and note the ridicule of 'Anglo-Saxons' and 'Manifest Destiny' in Lowell's *Biglow Papers*.

² Florida was definitely admitted on 3 March, so the slave States, when Texas was definitely incorporated on 29 December, were 'two up'. An interesting by-product of annexation was the reversion of Massachusetts to the same State-rights attitude she had taken on the Louisiana purchase, and in 1814. The Whig legislature of the Commonwealth protested that annexation of a foreign country by joint resolution was (1) unconstitutional, (2) 'an alarming encroachment upon the rights of the freemen of the Union', and (3) not binding on Massachusetts as a legal act. (Ames, *State Docs.*, p. 231.) By any logical application of strict construction or State rights, Massachusetts was correct. A similar stand was taken by the legislatures of Vermont, Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio, and Maryland. At the same time six southern States, together with Maine, New Hampshire, and Illinois, which were in the control of the Democratic party, resolved in favour of annexation; and the extremist party in South Carolina advocated, in case annexation failed, the calling of a Southern Convention to secede from the Union and annex itself to Texas.

XXXIX

THE MEXICAN WAR

1845-8

I. *James K. Polk*

‘**W**HO is James K. Polk?’ was the Whig slogan in the election of 1844. ‘The Democrats here cry “Hurrah for Polk!” in the street,’ wrote a Southern Whig, ‘and come round to ask me who the devil he is.’

After all, Polk had been Speaker of the House, if only by dint of keeping a firm hold on the coat-tails of Old Hickory. Like Jackson he was a Tennessean of Scots-Irish ancestry. There the resemblance ceased. He who became President of the United States on 4 March 1845 was a stiff, angular person, with sharp grey eyes in a sad, lean face, and grizzled hair overlapping a black coat-collar. Polk lacked personal distinction, but industry was not wanting. His working day in the White House was nearer eighteen than eight hours, and in four years he was absent only six weeks from Washington. His will controlled a Cabinet¹ of experienced and distinguished men. Determined and tenacious, seldom smiling and never relaxing, Polk recalls that other presidential puritan and diarist, John Quincy Adams. Their domestic policies were as wide as the poles, but Polk adopted by instinct the same foreign policy as Adams, and he had a way of getting things done. Polk aspired to reduce the tariff, re-establish Van Buren’s independent treasury, settle the Oregon boundary, and acquire California.² Within four years his ambition was fulfilled.

¹ James Buchanan of Pennsylvania was his Secretary of State, Lewis Cass of Michigan Secretary of War, Robert J. Walker of Mississippi Secretary of the Treasury, George Bancroft, the Massachusetts historian, Secretary of the Navy.

² Bancroft wrote in 1887 that Polk made this statement to him

Although Polk was a slaveholder, he did not, like Calhoun, think in terms of slavery. The 'peculiar institution' had no more influence on his expansionist ambitions than on those of Adams. With the people at large, he was eager to fulfil 'manifest destiny'. Tyler robbed him at the eleventh hour of the glory of acquiring Texas, but California was still wanting to flatten out the re-entrant angle in the western boundary.

Polk's desire for California was quickened by the fear lest England or France should forestall him. Both countries were then active in the Pacific. New Zealand had been acquired in 1840 by the British Government, which did not want it, in order to keep it from the French who did want it. In 1842 Admiral Dupetit-Thouars took the Marquesas—where Commodore Porter had hoisted the American flag in 1813—and in 1843 he bombarded Queen Pomaré out of Papeete. In the same year the Hawaiian monarch Kamehameha III, hitherto a friend to American whalers and protector of New England missionaries, prepared to place the Sandwich Islands and his royal person under the protection of Queen Victoria. Rumour reached Polk that Aberdeen was fishing for California. It is true that the British consul in California repeatedly urged his Government to acquire that province, that the British Minister at Mexico suggested the cancelling of her debt to Britain in exchange for it, that the First Lord of the Admiralty had said, pointing to the chart of San Francisco Bay, 'Let us obtain possession while we can of the key to the north-west coast of America'.¹ Mexico, to be sure, refused to bite, but Aberdeen would not remain Foreign Secretary for ever; and circumstances might not permit the slow process of peaceful penetration.

shortly after his inauguration. For Walker's tariff of 1846 and the independent treasury, see above, pp. 29, 38.

¹ E. D. Adams, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xiv. 744, 763; Lord Stanmore, *Life of Aberdeen*, p. 183.

2. *Diplomatic Manœuvres*

Shortly after Polk entered office, Mexico protested against the annexation of Texas, and broke diplomatic relations. From her point of view, Texas was still a rebellious province. In July 1845, when Texas had accepted annexation by a plebiscite, Polk ordered a detachment of the regular army under General Taylor to take up a position on the Nueces River, the southwestern border of Texas, to protect the new State against a possible Mexican attack. Polk's apologists make much of the sophistry that as soon as Taylor crossed the Sabine River into Texas, he was invading Mexico from the Mexican point of view; hence war was inevitable, whatever else Polk might do. This argument makes no allowance for Latin disinclination to acknowledge a disagreeable *fait accompli*. In 1845 Spain was still technically at war with most of Spanish America, although hostilities between them had long since ceased; but no Latin-American state would have thought itself thereby justified in attacking Porto Rico, or some other region still faithful to Spain. If Polk had been content with Texas, and had not reached out for something besides, there is little reason to suppose that Mexico would have initiated hostilities; although she must long have delayed acknowledging the annexation of Texas to the United States.

On 24 June 1845 the Secretary of the Navy sent secret orders to Commodore Sloat, commanding the Pacific station, to seize San Francisco if he should 'ascertain with certainty' that Mexico had declared war on the United States. In October 1845 the Secretary of War wrote to Larkin, the American consul at Monterey (California), 'Whilst the President will make no effort and use no influence to induce California to become one of the free and independent States of the Union, yet if the people should desire to unite their

destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can be done without affording Mexico just cause of complaint. Their true policy for the present . . . is to let events take their course, unless an attempt should be made to transfer them without their consent either to Great Britain or France.’¹ At the same time the President dispatched a lieutenant of marines to California with secret instructions to Larkin, the exact nature of which has never been divulged. John C. Frémont, a young captain of United States Engineers, was also on his way to California with an exploring expedition. He had no political instructions, but did not need them.

On 2 December 1845 the Monroe Doctrine, forgotten by Jackson, Van Buren, and Tyler, was reaffirmed by Polk, applied retrospectively to Texas, and prospectively to Oregon and California. ‘The people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine, without any foreign interposition. We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might disturb the “balance of power” which they may desire to maintain on this continent. . . . Existing rights of every European nation should be respected; but . . . no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent.’²

¹ Justin Smith, *War with Mexico*, i. 326; a different version of the dispatch is in Reeves, *Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk*, p. 280. Their respective comments are worth comparing.

² Richardson, *Messages*, iv. 398–9. I am unable to follow those historians who see in this message a new development of the original Monroe Doctrine. J. Q. Adams certainly saw no difference (*Memoirs*, xii. 218). On 29 April 1848, alluding to rumours that the whites of Yucatan wanted foreign protection against the Indians, Polk made

While Polk was priming revolt in California, he proposed to see what could be got out of Mexico in exchange for claims. Like most nations at most times, the United States had claims on Mexico for repudiated bonds, revoked concessions, and damage done to American property during the civil war that broke out every few months. Hitherto the United States had been forbearing, in comparison with the French Government, which sent a squadron to bombard San Juan de Ulúa in 1839. A mixed commission awarded the United States about a million and a half dollars in 1841, since when about three millions more had accumulated. In 1843 the two countries ratified a convention by virtue of which Mexico was to pay the whole with accrued interest in twenty quarterly instalments. After three instalments Mexico suspended payment—as several States of the Union had done on their bonds—but did not repudiate her debts, like Michigan and Mississippi. Torn by civil dissension and virtually bankrupt, she could then do no more, as President Polk knew and admitted.

On 10 November 1845 the President commissioned John Slidell ¹ minister plenipotentiary to Mexico, with instructions to offer that the United States should assume the unpaid claims of its citizens against Mexico, in return for Mexican recognition of the Rio Grande as the southern boundary of Texas and of the United States. Five millions additional would be paid for the cession of New Mexico as well, and ‘money would be no object’ if the cession of California could also be obtained. Polk’s enemies doubted his sincerity in this matter, as the Mexican Government, since breaking re-

explicit a doctrine implicit in Monroe’s message : that the transfer of American territory to a non-American power should not be permitted by the United States. The corollary to the Monroe Doctrine has since been regarded as an essential part of the Doctrine itself.

¹ The same Louisianan who was taken off the *Trent* in 1861.

lations on account of Texas, had offered to receive an American 'commissioner', not a 'minister'. But Polk was simply contemptuous of diplomatic procedure, as he was ignorant of the Mexican character. A practical man, he hoped to put through a business deal with a government that lacked all practical business sense.

Slidell was refused reception by the Herrera government to which he was accredited. No Mexican minister could afford to receive an American plenipotentiary, any more than the Spanish Government could afford to think of South American independence in 1824. Notwithstanding this refusal, General Paredes at once raised the standard of revolution, on the ground that Herrera was proposing a treasonable bargain with the United States. The revolution succeeded, as most Mexican revolutions do; and by New Year's day 1846 the government was in the hands of a military faction that was spoiling for a fight with the United States.

Polk did not give them long to wait. On 13 January 1846, the day after he had received word of Herrera's refusal to receive Slidell, but before he knew of the Paredes revolution, Polk ordered General Taylor to take his army across the Nueces River, and to occupy the left bank of the Rio Grande del Norte.

Thereby the President attempted to force the solution of a boundary controversy. That is the important point. It also happens that his view of the controversy was inadmissible. The Nueces River had been the southern boundary of the Province and State of Texas during a century past. The territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and east of longitude 100°,¹ was a sort of barren Dobrudja, belonging to the State of Tamaulipas. Texas laid claim to the Rio Grande in her declaration of Independence; but her authority as State or Republic had never been exer-

¹ West of longitude 100° was the province of Coahuila, which was combined with Texas as a State of the Mexican Republic in 1824.

cised beyond the Nueces, where the few scattered inhabitants remained under Mexican jurisdiction. The United States, in annexing Texas, was pledged to adjust the southern boundary, but not committed to insist upon the Rio Grande.¹

3. 'War by Act of Mexico'

General Taylor, in obedience to orders, took up a position on the left bank of the Rio Grande, with his guns bearing across it upon the Mexican town of Matamoras (23 March 1846). The Mexican general in command of that district ordered him back to the Nueces (11 April). Taylor replied by blockading the Rio Grande in order to cut off food supplies from Matamoras (23 April). In spite of furious threats by the Mexican press, and by its own members, the Paredes government had made no military disposition threatening Texas, and had kept its forces out of the disputed territory between the two rivers. The responsibilities of office were making the new government more cautious in action than in speech; but more than Mexican caution was now needed to stop Polk.

On 12 March 1846 the Mexican foreign minister informed Slidell definitely that he could not be received, that Mexico still regarded the annexation of Texas as a just cause of war, which would be inevitable if the United States persisted in its present course of adding insult to injury. Having thus asserted his own and his country's dignity, the foreign minister 'intimated a willingness to negotiate' ² with a commissioner *ad hoc*,

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 369. This was also Calhoun's view. Certain writers make much of a convention that Texas concluded with General Santa Anna, when in captivity, recognizing the Rio Grande boundary. Santa Anna had no authority to conclude such a convention; he was not a free agent, and it was not ratified by the Mexican Congress.

² McCormac, *Polk*, p. 404. Some writers make a point of the

on the simple question of the annexation of Texas. This distinction without a difference, so dear to the Latin-American mind, was dismissed by Polk as insincere and treacherous. On 25 April he began to prepare a message to Congress urging war on the sole grounds of Slidell's rejection and the unpaid claims—which amounted to exactly \$3,208,314.96, when adjudicated by a United States commission in 1851.¹ On 8 May Slidell saw the President, and urged him to act promptly. On Saturday morning the 9th, Polk informed the Cabinet that he believed it his duty to send the war message to Congress the following Tuesday. All agreed but Bancroft, who thought that war should not be declared until Mexico committed some definite act of hostility. Buchanan, the Secretary of State, said that he would feel better satisfied if that happened, but that as matters stood there was ample ground for war against Mexico. The Cabinet adjourned at two o'clock. At six, dispatches from General Taylor reached the White House. It appeared that on 25 April—two days after Taylor blockaded Matamoras—a Mexican force had crossed the Rio Grande, engaged in a cavalry skirmish with United States dragoons, killed a few of the troopers, and captured the rest. Polk called another Cabinet meeting for half-past seven. The consciences of Bancroft and Buchanan were now satisfied; it was agreed unanimously that a war message, with documents proving the ‘wrongs and injuries’ the United States had suffered from Mexico, should be laid before Congress on Monday. All day Sunday, except for two hours spent at church, Polk laboured with his Secretaries preparing the war message. ‘It was a day of great anxiety to me,’ wrote the President in his diary, ‘and I regretted the necessity which had existed to make

threatening tone, as if every bumptious note of a small State to a great one were *casus belli*.

¹ Malloy, *Treaties of the U.S.*, i. 1114.

it necessary for me to spend the Sabbath in the manner I have.'

At noon on Monday, 11 May 1846, the war message was sent to Congress. 'The cup of forbearance has been exhausted,' declared the President. 'After reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil.'¹ In the evening the President received visits of congratulation from Senator Sam Houston of Texas, and Governor Archibald Yell of Arkansas.

Congress declared that 'by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States',² on 13 May 1846. That evening Mr. Buchanan almost upset the presidential war-chariot. In a circular letter to the American Ministers abroad he proposed to state 'that in going to war we did not do so with a view to acquire either California or New Mexico or any other portion of the Mexican territory'. Unless assured by this self-denying ordinance, England and France would help Mexico, thought the Secretary. The President remarked that California was no business of England and France, and if they objected he 'would stand and fight until the last man among us fell'. The clause was struck out, and Buchanan went home in a huff.

In the Mississippi Valley the war was highly popular. Mexico evoked visions of gold and glory among the men of the frontier, as in other days to the men of Drake and Hawkins. Thousands of western volunteers came forward, eager to 'revel in the halls of the Montezumas'. In the older States there was little enthusiasm and much opposition.³ Most of the elder statesmen of the

¹ Macdonald, *S. D.*, p. 352.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 354, 371.

³ The Mississippi Valley States and Texas together furnished 49,000 volunteers; the original thirteen States 13,000.

South were content with Texas ; Calhoun’s clear vision foresaw that the conquest of more territory would upset the sectional balance and revive the dangerous question of slavery in the Territories. The Whig party opposed, although with more wisdom than the Federalists of 1812 they voted for war credits and supplies, in the hope that the Democrats would be hanged if given plenty of rope. Anti-slavery men and abolitionists regarded the war as part of the conspiracy to get ‘ bigger pens to cram with slaves ’ :

They may talk o’ Freedom’s airy
 Tell they’re pupple in the face ;
 It ’s a grand gret cemetary
 Fer the barthrights of our race ;
 They just want this Californy
 So’s to lug new slave-states in
 To abuse ye, an’ to scorn ye,
 An’ to plunder ye like sin.

Thus James Russell Lowell castigated the Mexican War, in his *Biglow Papers*. And although few men outside the extreme abolitionists agreed with him that it was time to part from the slave States, the legislature of Massachusetts declared that the Mexican War was a war of conquest, a war to strengthen the ‘ slave power ’, a war against the free States, unconstitutional, criminal, insupportable by honest men, to be concluded without delay, and to be followed by ‘ all constitutional efforts for the abolition of slavery within the United States ’.

President Polk expected a quick and easy victory, for which twenty thousand volunteers, in addition to the regular army of seventy-five hundred, would suffice. In Europe many doubted whether the United States could beat Mexico. ‘ The invasion and conquest of a vast region by a State which is without an army and without credit is a novelty in the history of nations,’ remarked *The Times*. People admitted a great disparity

of population and resources, but remembered American failure in offensive warfare against Canada. Could the soft, untrained American volunteers cope with the hard-bitten, wiry Mexicans? Mexico was confident enough. An officer boasted that his cavalry could break the 'gringo' infantry squares with the lasso. There was wild talk of privateer flotillas, of breaking into Louisiana, arming the slaves, and loosing the Comanche and Sioux on the American frontier. And the unsettled Oregon questions suggested that Mexico might soon have a powerful ally.

4. *The Oregon Compromise*

In April 1846, after a long Senate discussion,¹ Polk threw Oregon into hotchpot by giving notice to the Foreign Office that in twelve months' time the joint occupation would expire. He did not, however, shut the door on negotiation. Every previous attempt at compromise had been thwarted by a Colonial Office notion that the Columbia River was a western St. Lawrence, an essential link of communication between Hudson Bay and China. Aberdeen already knew better, and the Hudson's Bay Company's shift of base to Vancouver Island convinced Sir Robert Peel that the Columbia was no longer of vital importance to the Empire.² After sounding the President, Aberdeen formally proposed to extend the boundary along latitude 49° to Puget Sound, thence to the ocean through the straits of San Juan de Fuca, leaving the whole of Vancouver Island to Canada. Polk submitted this offer to his Cabinet on 6 June 1846. Buchanan 'said the "fifty-four forty" men were the true friends of the ad-

¹ Almost the only gleam of humour in Polk's diary is the statement that the Senate was thinking not of 49° or 54° 40' but of '48, the next election!

² F. Merk, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxix. 695-9; cf. xvi. 296.

ministration, and he wished no backing out on the subject'. Mr. Buchanan was properly admonished; the President laid the proposition before the Senate for advice and consent, which it promptly gave in the affirmative; and on 15 June the Oregon treaty, describing the present boundary between the United States and British Columbia, was signed. Another Anglo-American crisis had passed, largely by reason of the conciliatory disposition of Lord Aberdeen and the desire of Polk to be free to thrash Mexico.¹

5. *Glory and Conquest*

California, the main objective, lay beyond the principal seat of war; but was the scene of amusing if confused conflicts. Frémont rushed about distractedly, and a few dozen American squatters in the Sacramento Valley took possession of Sonoma with its commandant, declared their independence, and hoisted a white flag with a bear painted on it. From this 'Bear Flag revolt' (14 June 1846) California usually dates her birth as a sovereign State. On 7 July Commodore Sloat, having heard of the outbreak of hostilities on the Rio Grande, hoisted the Stars and Stripes at Monterey, and declared California a part of the United States. The Spanish-speaking Californians, not relishing these proceedings, rose in arms, reoccupied Monterey for a time, and had a brush with Colonel Kearney, who had led

¹ The contemporary charge that Polk and Calhoun as slaveholders were not really interested in Oregon, and needlessly sacrificed American rights, is quite unfounded. More plausible is the contention that Aberdeen made an unnecessary surrender. It is true that he compromised a just claim—as Webster had done in 1842—but the responsibility for surrender, if surrender it was, must be laid to the Hudson's Bay Company. Supposing Palmerston had been in office, and Fort Vancouver reinforced instead of abandoned, Polk would have let the negotiations drag until Mexico was beaten, when national pride would have insisted on 54° 40' or war.

150 troopers overland from Independence, mopping up Santa Fé on the way. But by the end of 1846 California was completely in the hands of the Americans.

General Zachary Taylor began what was intended to be a march on Mexico City by pushing across the Rio Grande before war was even declared, and winning two minor engagements ; but refused to move farther from his base until properly reinforced and supplied. Polk, who had never seen northern Mexico, thought that Taylor ought to live on the country. Finally men and munitions were sent. Taylor's army then advanced and captured the town of Monterey,¹ after a three days' battle (21-23 September 1846).

President Polk was not altogether pleased with this brilliant victory. 'Old Rough and Ready' Taylor, an outspoken, blaspheming veteran of the Jackson breed, was becoming dangerously popular, and the Whigs began to talk of nominating him for the Presidency in 1848. As a way out, Polk conceived the brilliant stroke of creating Thomas H. Benton, the aged Senator from Missouri, Lieutenant-General in command of the United States Army. Unfortunately for Mexico, Congress refused to create this new grade. The President then turned to Major-General Winfield Scott of the regular army, a Whig indeed, but a dandy swash-buckler whose airs and foibles were unlikely to win golden opinions from King Demos. Scott's plan to end the war by marching on Mexico City from Vera Cruz had earlier been rejected in favour of invasion from the Rio Grande. It was now adopted. When Taylor seemed likely to succeed, Scott was even authorized to draw on Taylor's army for troops.

In the meantime, Polk had provided Mexico with a leader. General Santa Anna was in exile at Havana when the war broke out. Although he had twice

¹ In the State of Nuevo León, Mexico. Not to be confused with the Californian Monterey.

broken his word to the Texans, he was able to persuade Polk that, once in possession of the Mexican government, he would sign the sort of treaty that was wanted. By the President's command, Santa Anna was allowed to slip past the United States blockading squadron into Vera Cruz. He entered Mexico City in triumph in September 1846, and assumed the dictatorship.

O Santy Anna gained the day

Hooray! Santy Anna.

He lost it once, but gained it twice,

All on the plains of Mexico.

So runs a rousing old chanty, completely reversing the facts. For Santa Anna could not even dispose of the rival to his American benefactor. General Taylor beat him badly at Buena Vista (22-23 February 1847)—a splendid picture-book battle on a sun-soaked plain; a fight that made two American presidents.¹

General Scott's campaign was a brilliant feat of arms. With little more than half of the twenty thousand troops he required, hampered by insubordinate volunteer officers who had been appointed for political reasons, thwarted by the jealousy and incompetence of the administration, often forced to live on the country and to fight with captured ammunition, he yet accomplished his ends. Vera Cruz surrendered on 27 March 1847, and the American army started for Mexico City along the road Cortez had followed three centuries before. In two weeks' time it reached the pass of Cerro Gordo, which the ubiquitous Santa Anna had fortified. Captain Robert E. Lee found a way to outflank the Mexicans by a mountain slope, a brilliant operation in which Captain George B. McClellan and Lieutenant U. S. Grant took part. The army pushed on to Puebla,

¹ General Taylor's son-in-law Col. Jefferson Davis distinguished himself by disposing his regiment in an angular formation that broke up a Mexican cavalry charge. It was this fact that brought him into prominence.

and remained there for three months, renewing half its numbers by replacements for the volunteers whose terms of enlistment had expired. On 7 August General Scott cut connexion with the coast. Three days later his army reached the divide ten thousand feet above sea level, with the wonderful valley of Mexico stretching before, and the towers of Mexico City rising through the mist. More good staff work carried out by the engineers, stiff fights at Contreras and Churubusco (7-20 August), and the army was ready to follow the fleeing Mexicans into the city.

Just in time to stop them, Santa Anna accepted an armistice for which Scott had already paid him ten thousand dollars, and consented to begin peace negotiations. He was promised a million more at the conclusion of them. Polk had attached to the American army as peace commissioner an absurd little gentleman named Trist, the chief clerk of the Department of State. His instructions were to obtain the Rio Grande boundary, with New Mexico, Upper California, and a right of transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, one of the proposed inter-oceanic canal routes. The Mexican politicians, unable to face reality, raised such a babble on hearing these terms that Santa Anna decided to try another throw of the dice with Scott. The American army, refreshed by a fortnight among the orchards and orange groves of the Valley of Mexico, marched forward to a blood-bath at Molino del Rey (8 September), and five days later stormed its last obstacle, the fortified hill of Chapultepec. On they pushed, taking cover under the arches of the aqueducts, Lieutenant U. S. Grant cleverly mounting a howitzer in the belfry of a suburban church. At dawn of 17 September a white flag came out from Mexico City.

The chattering Mexicanos were silent for once, as a vanguard of battered, mudstained dough-boys and hard-boiled marines, led by a brigadier-general who

had lost a boot in the latest fight, swung along their streets to the Plaza de la Constitución. There the conquerors gazed with wonder on the great baroque Cathedral and the lofty pink-walled Palace, the 'Halls of the Montezumas'. Presently a clatter of hoofs was heard on the stone-paved streets; and as the weary veterans snapped into 'Atten—*shun*! Present—*arms*!' General Scott, splendidly uniformed and superbly mounted, escorted by a squadron of dragoons with gleaming swords, came dashing into the Plaza.

Santa Anna promptly abdicated, for the third but not the last time, and two months elapsed before Scott and Trist could find a Mexican government willing to negotiate peace. In the meantime Trist had been recalled, on account of his muddling the August negotiations. Instead of obeying orders he remained, and negotiated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (2 February 1848) in accordance with his original instructions. Mexico ceded Texas with the Rio Grande boundary, New Mexico (including Arizona), and Upper California to the United States. The victor assumed the unpaid claims, and paid fifteen million dollars to boot—three-fifths of the amount Slidell had been instructed to offer for the same territory in 1846.¹

In the meantime, American public opinion was beginning to demand that the whole of Mexico should be annexed. Buchanan, who more than once had been reproached by Polk for his 'contracted and sectional views' of American destiny, chimed in with the new *vox populi*, and advised the President to repudiate both Trist and the treaty. Polk coldly reminded the Secretary of his inconsistency, and sent the treaty to the Senate, which ratified it after the usual bitter debate.²

The United States had rounded out its continental

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 377; *S. D.*, p. 365.

² E. G. Bourne, *Essays in Historical Criticism* (1901), pp. 227-42.

area substantially to the present limits.¹ It remained to be seen whether these immense and valuable acquisitions would be added to 'Freedom's airy', or provide 'bigger pens to cram with slaves'.

¹ The present south-western boundary of the United States was completed in 1853 by the 'Gadsden purchase' from Mexico, for ten million dollars, of the Gila River valley, in southern Arizona. Except for the purchase of Alaska in 1867, this completed the continental area of the United States—all later acquisitions being insular.

XL

THE COMPROMISE OF 1850

1846-50

I. *Slavery in the Territories*

NO sooner were Polk's clutch of eaglets hatched, than North and South began to quarrel over them. Inspection of the nest revealed a young cuckoo whose strident squawks, despite frantic efforts of papa Democrat and mamma Whig to glut him into silence, soon drowned all other notes in the national aerie.

The Slavery question was the intruder. Southern Democrats had obtained Northern support for the annexation of Texas up to the Rio Grande, even though it meant war; and then let their allies down to latitude 49° in Oregon, because 54° 40' would have meant another war. An unforgivable sin in politics or diplomacy! So that when Polk asked Congress for two million dollars to buy more territory from Mexico (August 1846), a disgruntled Pennsylvania Democrat named David Wilmot tacked on to the bill a 'proviso' to the effect that 'neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist' in the territory so acquired.¹ There was no need of this prohibition. So far as any one could foresee, the arid wastes of New Mexico and the cattle-ranches of California were unsuitable for slave labour. Once put forward, however, the Wilmot proviso was maintained as a matter of principle and sectional strategy. Every Northern legislature but one, both Whigs and Democrats, passed resolutions approving it, and acclaiming Wilmot a great statesman.

If Northern Democrats were mischievous in demanding an abstract and unnecessary slavery restriction, Southern Democrats were reckless in opposing it; and

¹ The phrase was copied from the North-West Ordinance of 1787.

the fury of their opposition gave colour to the charge that the Mexican War was being fought for slavery. The Wilmot proviso seemed to them an insulting abstraction, an attempt to put their 'peculiar institution' in Coventry. Polk proposed that latitude $36^{\circ} 30'$ (the old Missouri Compromise line of 1820) should divide freedom and slavery in the new Territories as in the old; but there were too many extremists for this common-sense compromise. Southern Whigs who voted for the proviso in the interest of peace were denounced as 'Southern traitors'; Northern Democrats who voted the other way, for the same reason, were denounced as 'dough-faces' or 'Northern men with Southern principles'. The Wilmot proviso did not pass, nor did any measure to organize the newly acquired territory. American settlers in the Far West wanted law and government, because Congress could not decide whether or not they wanted slaves. Oregon was finally organized as a territorial government without slavery in 1848, because two Southern senators voted with their Northern colleagues;¹ but Polk's presidential term ended (4 March 1849) before anything had been done about California, New Mexico, or Utah.

Hitherto, every one supposed that Congress could legislate slavery in or out of the Territories,² since the Constitution gave it the power to 'make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States'. Congress had introduced slavery into some Territories, such as

¹ The admission of Iowa to the Union in 1846 and Wisconsin in 1848 gave the Senate thirty members from slave States and thirty from free States.

² I must remind the reader that I am using the word 'Territory' in its technical American sense—a possession of the United States, outside the limits of the States. A Territory may be either 'unorganized' (in possession of the Indians or under military rule), or 'organized' with a territorial legislature and a governor appointed by the President. See above, i. 186-7.

Mississippi, and banned it from others, such as Indiana and Minnesota. Now, from the Wilmot proviso debates emerge new theories on the subject. (a) Congress has the moral duty to prohibit slavery wheresoever its jurisdiction extends. Freedom must be national, slavery sectional. In a little while the Free Soil and Republican parties will be founded to enforce this doctrine. (b) Congress has no power to prohibit slavery in the Territories, but a duty to protect it there.

It was difficult to sustain this extreme Southern view, traversing a constitutional practice of sixty years ; but the mind of John C. Calhoun was equal to the task. The Territories, he argued, belonged to the States united, not to the United States. Congress was merely the attorney of a partnership, and every partner had an equal right to protection for his property in his Territories. Slaves were common-law property ; Lord Mansfield's contrary dictum in the *Sommersett* case (1772) did not affect America ; consequently the Mexican laws against slavery ceased to have effect in California and New Mexico when they were annexed to the United States. If Congress had, in 1820, prohibited slavery in the Territories north of $36^{\circ} 30'$, that Act was unconstitutional and void. Slavery followed the American flag, wherever firmly planted. Calhoun's new doctrine, embodied in resolutions by the Virginia legislature in 1847, became the 'platform of the South' ; and in the *Dred Scott* case of 1857 it was read into the Federal Constitution. Only one more step, said many Northerners, and slave-owning would come to be regarded as a natural right, which not even a state legislature could impair.

It is idle to debate whether Wilmot or Calhoun, North or South was the aggressor in this matter. All depends on the moral standpoint. If slavery was a positive good or a practical necessity, any attempt to restrict or to pinch it out by degrees would justify

Southern secession. If slavery was an evil and a curse, any attempt to establish it in virgin territory, even nominally, was an aggression against the free States, and an affront to the public opinion of the Christian world.¹ Motives on both sides were fundamentally defensive. Even when Calhoun wrote of forcing the slavery issue in the North,² his motive was to protect the domestic institutions of the slave States. Even when Seward and Chase asserted that every inch of the new territory must be free soil, their object was to defend Northern farmers, wage-earners, and lovers of peace and liberty, against further wars and encroachments of the 'slave power'. Both sides were thinking in terms of *principiis obstare*. To yield on the purely technical issue of the Territories, it was feared, would merely encourage extremists on the other side to new aggressions. It is just such matters of prestige, punctilio, and strategic advantage that bring on great wars.

The state of the American Union in 1848 may be compared with that of Europe in 1905. Political and diplomatic moves will become frequent and startling. Integrating forces will win apparent victories, but in reality grow feebler. The tension will increase, until some event, that in ordinary times would have little consequence, precipitates a bloody conflict.

2. *The Election of 1848*

President Polk, exhausted by the labours of his eventful term, refused to stand for re-election in 1848. Lewis Cass of Michigan, 'dough-face' and expansionist, re-

¹ As Seward pointed out in his Senate speech of 11 March 1850, the United States had never before established slavery, since slavery already existed in Louisiana, Florida, and Texas when they were annexed.

² Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, ii. 698. The two bodies of opinion here described were not extreme. Outside them were Northern and Southern secessionists: the Garrisonian abolitionists and the 'Bluffton' group of South Carolinians, who looked upon Calhoun as a weak compromiser, aiming at the Presidency.

ceived the Democratic nomination. The Whigs again passed over Henry Clay, and nominated 'Old Rough and Ready' Taylor of Louisiana, the hero of Buena Vista. A third party, the Free Soil, was formed in the North by a coalition of three hitherto separate and hostile elements—the abolitionist Liberty Party, the 'Barnburner' faction of the New York Democracy, who had been punished for their opposition to the war by loss of federal patronage, and the 'Conscience' or anti-slavery Whigs of New England. Their first object was to pass the Wilmot proviso; their platform was comprised in the phrase 'Free soil, free speech, free labour and free men'. Martin Van Buren became the Free Soil candidate for the Presidency. He carried no State, but robbed Cass of so many votes in New York that the Whigs won its electoral vote; and as New York went, so went the nation.

Nathaniel Hawthorne in 1849 lost his place in the Salem Custom House, and proceeded to write *The Scarlet Letter*. Walt Whitman the same year lost his position with an unsuccessful Democratic newspaper, and proceeded to write *Leaves of Grass*. These were the most memorable results of Zachary Taylor's election, and of the clean sweep that followed in the civil service. 'Old Zach' was a simple, honest soldier, who detested the sophistries of politicians and regarded the slavery question as the artificial abstraction that it was. He was ready to sign any sort of bill Congress might pass for organizing the new Territories; but before Congress could resolve the deadlock, California proposed to skip the territorial stage altogether, and to become a non-slaveholding State of the Union.

3. *The Forty-niners*

On 24 January 1848, shortly before the Treaty of Peace with Mexico, a workman in the Sacramento Valley discovered gold in Sutter's mill-race. In a few

weeks the news spread along the Pacific coast ; and in a few months all America was repeating tales of fortunes made from the stream-beds of the Sierra Nevada, merely by separating the golden grains from the sand in a common washbowl. Farmers mortgaged their farms, pioneers deserted their clearings, workmen downed tools, clerks left their stools and even ministers their pulpits, for the California gold-washings. Young men organized companies with elaborate equipment and by-laws, and were ' grub-staked ' by local capitalists as the Elizabethan sea-dogs were financed by merchant adventurers. Five ' Californian and Mining ' companies were registered in London in January 1849, with a capital of a million and a quarter pounds. Any and every route was taken by the ' forty-niners ' : round the Horn in the slowest and craziest vessels, across the continent by the Oregon or more Southern trails, or, if pressed for time, by the deadly Isthmus of Panama. It seemed as if all the world was chanting, to the tune of ' Oh ! Susanna '—

Oh ! California,

That 's the land for me ;

I'm off for Sacramento

With my washbowl on my knee.

By the end of 1849 thousands of Argonauts from every region of Europe, North America, and the antipodes, were jumping each other's claims, drinking, gambling, and fighting in ramshackle mining villages such as Red Dog, Grub Gulch, and Poker Flat. San Francisco arose in a few months from a squalid village to a city of twenty or twenty-five thousand, where eggs laid on the other side of Cape Horn sold for ten dollars a dozen, and a drink of whisky cost a pinch of gold dust ; where Englishmen and Frenchmen, Yankees and Hoosiers, Georgia Crackers and Missouri Pikers rubbed shoulders with Indians, Mexicans, ' Sydney ducks ', and the ' Heathen Chinee '. Fortunes were made in the

gold-diggings, to be lost in a night at a 'Frisco faro palace; even more were made by speculation in goods and land. It was a state of nature that would have made Rousseau a Tory. Owing to the neglect of Congress the Government was still military in theory, though impotent in fact; *alcaldes* and *ayuntamientos* appointed by the military governor administered any sort of law they pleased—it might be the code of Mexico or of Napoleon, or of Judge Lynch.

If Congress would not organize California as a Territory, California might make herself a State. The suggestion came from President Taylor. In August his military governor issued writs of election for a convention which met at Monterey in September 1849, and drafted a state constitution prohibiting slavery. This constitution was ratified by a popular vote of over twelve thousand ayes to eight hundred noes; and without waiting for congressional sanction, the people chose a governor and legislature which began to function in 1850. Only formal admission to the Union was wanting; but on that issue the Union almost split.

4. *Secession threatened*

Up to this time the most extreme Southerners had admitted the right of a State to prohibit slavery—for slavery was emphatically a State matter. But if California were admitted to the Union with its 'Wilmot proviso' constitution, slavery would have lost over half the American conquests from Mexico. During 1849 the temper of the South had been steadily rising. The governor and legislature of South Carolina only hesitated from secession because they hoped to unite the entire South on that programme. Calhoun wrote his daughter, 'I trust we shall persist in our resistance [to the admission of California] until the restoration of all our rights, or disunion, one or the other, is the consequence. We have borne the wrongs and insults of

the North long enough.' St. George Tucker, professor of law at William and Mary College, frankly avowed his desire to press impossible demands so that disunion would result.¹ California's demand for admission, when Congress was convened in December 1849, at once started a movement for a Southern Convention. Like the Hartford Convention of 1814, this was intended by extremists to form a stepping-stone towards a new confederacy.

It is difficult to grasp the real reason for all this sound and fury. After all, as Henry Clay pointed out, the Southern States had an equal vote in the Senate, a majority of the Cabinet and the Supreme Court, and a President who was Virginia born and Louisiana bred. Since 1801 the South had always obtained from the Union what it really wanted—free trade, protection to slavery in the national capital and on the high seas, vast theatres of slavery such as Louisiana, Florida, the Creek and Cherokee lands, and Texas, which had greatly augmented the economic and political power of the slaveholders. Only the abolitionists hoped to interfere with slavery where it already existed; and the Garrisonian abolitionists at that time had come out openly for a separation of North from South—secession would be playing their game. And although passenger traffic on the 'Under Ground Railroad' was increasing, its effect upon the security of slave property in the cotton States was negligible.

Possibly the real trouble was economic. Cotton had averaged only 4*d.* a pound at Liverpool during the last four years, and planters who had been in debt since 1837 looked with envy on the rising prosperity of the North; but cotton began to rise in 1849. More likely we need a psychotherapist to unravel the Southern complexes of that day. 'Cavaliers' were tired of hearing

¹ *Report of the Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1899*, ii. 778; *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxvii. 251.

their form of society denounced by Northern 'mongrels and mudsills', who, according to the popular Southern economics, fattened upon the tribute forced from the South. From every side—England and New England, Jamaica and Mexico, Ohio and the North-West, and now California, abolition seemed to be pointing daggers at the heart of the South. It is under circumstances such as these that men call upon imagination to supersede thought. The vision of a great slaveholding republic stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, governed by gentlemen and affording perfect security to their property in human beings, monopolizing the production of cotton and so dictating to the world, was beginning to lift up Southern hearts.¹

5. *The Compromise*

The House of Representatives that met in December 1849 was so factional that sixty-three ballots were taken before it could elect a speaker, and even the opinions on slavery of candidates for the post of doorkeeper had to be made the subject of careful inquiry. President Taylor recommended the immediate admission of California with her free constitution, and the organization of New Mexico and Utah Territories without reference to slavery. To protesting Senators from Georgia, the old soldier declared his determination to crush secession wherever and whenever it might appear, if he had to lead the army himself.

In the Senate leaders of the coming struggle, such as Davis, Douglas, Seward, and Chase, sat with giants of

¹ Ex-President Tyler wrote in April 1850, 'The monopoly of the cotton plant was the great and important concern. That monopoly now secured [by the annexation of Texas] places all other nations at our feet. An embargo of a single year would produce in Europe a greater amount of suffering than a fifty years' war. I doubt whether Great Britain could avoid convulsions.' Tyler, *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, ii. 483.

other days, such as Webster, Clay, and Calhoun. It was Henry Clay who divined the high strategy of the moment. The Union was not ripe to meet the issue of secession. Concessions must be made to stop the movement now; time might be trusted to deal with it later. On 27 January 1850 he brought forward the compromise resolutions that kept the peace for ten years. The gist of them was (a) immediate admission of free California as her right; (b) the organization of territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah, without mention of slavery; (c) a new and stringent fugitive slave law; (d) abolition of the domestic slave trade in the District of Columbia.¹

These resolutions brought on one of those superb Senate debates that did so much to mould public opinion.² Clay defended them in a speech that lasted the better part of two days. Haggard in aspect and faltering in voice he rose to speak, but his passionate, unwavering devotion to the Union seemed to bring back all the charm and fire of 'Young Harry of the West', and to lift him and his audience to high issues. His appeal was to the North for concession, and to the South for peace. He asked the North to accept the substance of the Wilmot proviso without the principle, and honestly to fulfil her obligation to return fugitive slaves. He reminded the South of the great benefits she derived from the Union, and warned her against the delusion that secession was constitutional, or could be peaceful, or would be acquiesced in by the Middle West. For Clay was old enough to remember the excitement in Kentucky when Spain and France had attempted to stop her river outlet. 'My life upon it,' he offered, 'that the vast population which has already

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 384; *S. D.*, p. 379.

² These debates fill the greater part of the *Congressional Globe*, xxii, parts 1, 2, and appendix (31st Cong., 1st Sess.); the principal speeches will be found in the *Works* of Calhoun, Clay, Seward, and Webster.

concentrated . . . on the headwaters and the tributaries of the Mississippi, will never give their consent that the mouth of that river shall be held subject to the power of any foreign State.'

Calhoun, grim and emaciated, his voice stifled by the catarrh that shortly led to his death, sat silent, glaring defiance from his hawk-like eyes, while his ultimatum was voiced for him by Senator Mason of Virginia, (7 March 1850). 'I have, Senators, believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion.' 'The cords that bind the States together' are snapping one by one. Three great evangelical churches are now divided. The Federal Union can be saved only by satisfying the South that she can remain within it in safety, that it is not 'being permanently and hopelessly converted into the means of oppressing instead of protecting' her. The Senator from Kentucky cannot save the Union with his compromise. The North must 'do justice by conceding to the South an equal right in the acquired territory'—by admitting slavery to California and New Mexico—by doing her duty as to fugitive slaves, by restoring to the South, through constitutional amendment, the equilibrium of power she once possessed in the Federal Government; ¹ and she must 'cease the agitation of the slave question'.

Three days later Webster rose for his last great speech. His voice had lost its deep resonance, his massive frame was shrunk, and his face was lined with suffering and sorrow. But in his heart glowed the ancient love of country, and the spell of his personality fell on Senate and galleries with his opening words: 'I speak to-day for the preservation of the Union.

¹ There seems no doubt that Calhoun's proposed amendment would have taken the form of a dual executive, one President elected by the North and one by the South, each armed with a veto.

"Hear me for my cause." Viewing the situation eye to eye with Clay, Webster merely restated in richer language the points made by his old-time rival; but the North could never have been induced to swallow a new fugitive slave law, unless Webster held the spoon. Just as his reply to Hayne in 1830 stimulated the growth of Union sentiment, so the seventh of March speech of 1850 permitted that sentiment to ripen, until it became irresistible.

Senator Seward of New York, in opposing the compromise from the opposite angle, spoke for the 'Conscience' Whigs, and for the yet unborn Republican party. He admitted that Congress had the constitutional power to establish slavery in the Territories. 'But there is a higher law than the Constitution which regulates our authority over the domain': the law of God, whence alone the laws of man can derive their sanction.¹ The Fugitive Slave Bill would endanger the Union far more than any anti-slavery measure. 'All measures which fortify slavery or extend it, tend to the consummation of violence; all that check its extension, and abate its strength, tend to its peaceful extirpation.'

As the debate progressed compromise sentiment developed. The Southern convention at Nashville, of which the disunionists had high hopes, adjourned in June, after passing some harmless resolutions.² Yet much parliamentary manœuvring, and the steady, loyal support of the Southern Whigs both in and out of Congress, were necessary to get the compromise through. In early September 1850 the essential bills passed: the admission of California; the fugitive slave

¹ It is significant of the change in American political theory that this allusion to a law higher than the Constitution, a mere commonplace in the eighteenth century, was regarded as almost blasphemous by the Senate; the Democrats tried to drive Seward out of public life by fastening on him the nickname 'Higher Law' Seward.

² H. V. Ames, *State Docs.*, pp. 262-9.

law ; the organization of New Mexico and Utah as Territories free to enter the Union with or without slavery when sufficiently populous ; abolition of the slave trade in Washington.¹ Once more the Union was preserved by the same spirit of compromise that created it ; but for the last time.

Another year elapsed before it was certain that the secession movement in the cotton States could be stopped. In the state elections Whigs and Democrats disappeared. The contest was between a Union party led by the Georgian triumvirate, Stephens, Toombs, and Cobb ; and a ' Southern Rights ' or immediate secession party, led by Rhett, Quitman, and Yancey. The Unionists met the secessionists on their own ground, squarely denying the existence of a constitutional right of secession ; although, like all Americans, they freely admitted the Lockean ' right of revolution ' in case the South were really oppressed. In every cotton State but South Carolina the Unionists won.²

In the North the Democrats accepted the Compromise ; the Free-Soilers and Abolitionists denounced it in the most frenzied terms ; the Whigs, in spite of Webster's eloquence, were divided in sentiment between acquiescence and repudiation. It was the Fugitive Slave Act which stuck in Northern throats. If only the South could have realized that the one hope for slavery was to let the North forget about it, instead of perpetually rubbing it in by hunting runaways through Northern streets and countryside ! Even Emerson, the philosopher who had serenely advised the abolitionists to love their neighbours more and their black brethren less, wrote in his journal ' This filthy enactment was made in the nineteenth century, by people who could read and write. I will not obey it, by God ! '

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, pp. 384-94 ; *S. D.*, pp. 379-90.

² Ames, *State Docs.*, pp. 269-77 ; A. C. Cole, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, i. 376-99 ; and *Whig Party in the South*, chap. v.

Already two of the principal antagonists had passed away. Calhoun died on 31 March 1850. His coffin made a triumphal progress through the Southern States to Charleston, where friends and followers pledged devotion to his principles by the marble tombstone over his grave in St. Philip's churchyard. His real monument, as Walt Whitman heard a soldier say in 1865, was the ruined South, a generation of young men destroyed, society torn up by the roots, and slaves become masters.

President Taylor died on 9 July 1850. His vice-presidential successor, a colourless New York Whig named Millard Fillmore, signed the Compromise Bills. 'Old Bullion' Benton was defeated for re-election to the Senate in 1851. His Andrew-Jackson nationalism had grown old-fashioned in Missouri. Clay and Webster, the one denounced as traitor by Southern hotspurs, the other compared with Lucifer by New England reformers, had two years only to live: but that was time enough to teach them grave doubts whether their compromise could long be maintained. With their death the second generation of independent Americans may be said to have gone. The galaxy of 1812 that had seemed to bind the heavens together was extinguished.

XLI

PROGRESS AND DIPLOMACY

1850-4

1. *Peace, Prosperity, and Pierce*

WITH the passage of the Compromise of 1850 the slavery question subsided, and other matters occupied the public prints, if not the public's mind. Higher prices for cotton restored prosperity to the Southland, and confidence to her sons. In the North Jenny Lind and the Rochester spirit-rappings supplanted the Compromise as a topic of conversation. Not that slavery was forgotten. *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, published in 1852, served to keep it in the back of peoples' minds ; but every one save Northern abolitionists and Southern 'fire-eaters' wished to let it remain there.

The period 1849 to 1857 was one of industrial development, along the lines already marked out between North and South. The railway supplanted the canal as a goods carrier, and opened the prairies to profitable settlement. Immigration reached a new high level, and occasioned a new nativist movement in politics. Industrial expansion and westward migration allowed wages to rise evenly with prices. In the labour movement talk gave way to action. Unions of the later American type were concluding trade agreements with their employers, federating nationally on craft lines, but strictly avoiding politics.¹ Marxian Socialism came in with the German immigrants, but the 'Proletarierbund' that one of them founded quickly expired. The American workingman discarded Utopia for two dollars a day and roast beef. Neal Dow won an apparent victory for

¹ The National Typographical Union (1852), the United Hatters (1856), and the Iron Moulders' Union of North America (1859) were the first permanent federations.

cold water with the Maine prohibitory law ; humanitarian reform and education marched hand in hand ; Melville and Walt Whitman joined the increasing ranks of men of letters. Baseball became popular ; yacht racing and intercollegiate rowing were introduced, together with vulgar luxury. In New York, Newport, and Saratoga, according to the season, could be found ' a set of exquisites—daintily arrayed men who spend half their income on their persons, and shrink from the touch of a woollen glove . . . delicate and lovely women, who wear the finest furs and roll in the most stylish equipages '.¹

At the same time the cotton kingdom was consolidating, and becoming more conscious of its strength. Kentucky backwoodsmen, who in the thirties had taken up land in the black belts, were now gentlemen planters, who mingled on equal terms with the First Families of Virginia in the thermal stations of the mountains. Their elder sons, after leading volunteers in the Mexican War, had become lawyers or planters in turn ; their younger sons had gone up to the newer colleges of the Lower South, or to the University of Virginia, with hounds and hunters and black servants. Dread of abolition, with its implication of negro equality, was binding the yeomen and poor whites more closely to their slaveholding neighbours. Economically, the cotton kingdom appeared to be growing stronger. The annual cotton crop rose from a thousand million to twenty-three hundred million pounds, but never wanted purchasers. De Bow's *Review* was preaching the use of guano, conservation of soil, diversification of crops, and local manufactures. Southern society was ripening into Southern civilization. If only the South could have achieved security for her social system, or had dared to lift her ban on creative thought, the late fifties might well have brought an outburst of literary

¹ C. Astor Bristed, *The Upper Ten Thousand* (N.Y., 1852), p. 6.

activity that would have surpassed that of New England. Instead, they brought a fierce propaganda for Southern independence.

The presidential election of 1852 proved that an overwhelming majority of Americans were disposed to regard the Compromise of 1850 as final. As such it was proclaimed by the Democratic party when nominating Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. A winning smile and a blank (hence blameless) political record were the only apparent qualifications of this gentleman. No more were needed. The New York 'Barnburners', starved by four lean years with the Free-Soilers, returned to their Democratic allegiance; and thousands of Southern Unionists, disgusted by the anti-slavery tendencies of Northern Whigs, went over to their opponents. General Winfield Scott, the Whig presidential candidate, made himself rather ridiculous in the campaign; and, although he was a Virginian by birth, that asset was cancelled by a nationalist career that recalled Jackson, Harrison, and Taylor. The result was a 'landslide' for Pierce. Scott carried only four States.

The Whig party never recovered from this defeat. Wanting organic unity, they could not survive when their rivals undertook to maintain the great Compromise and the great silence. The Democratic party, purged of democracy, became a national conservative party, directed by Southern planters and maintained by Northern votes. It controlled the Federal Government for eight years, while the dotting Whigs grew almost cross-eyed trying to discern which way thirty-one cats were going to jump.

2. *Irredentist Democracy*

For a time it seemed as if more 'manifest destiny' would be the thing. The revolutions of 1848 seemed a fulfilment of American destiny no less than the victory over Mexico. France adopted a constitution

that was a centralized edition of that of the United States. Republicanism and democracy appeared to be sweeping the world. A 'Young America' movement sprang up within the Democratic party, a movement devoted at first to creating ideals of service and duty, then to enlisting Young America's aid for democratic movements beyond the seas—and finally to electing Stephen A. Douglas to the Presidency.¹ Walt Whitman spoke for Young America in his poem on the flag :

O hasten flag of man—O with sure and steady step, passing
 highest flag of kings,
 Walk supreme to the heavens' mighty symbol—run up above
 them all
 Flag of stars ! thick-sprinkled bunting !

When the events of 1850 dashed these generous hopes Walt sounded the note of robust optimism that has heartened thousands of imprisoned and exiled patriots :

Liberty, let others despair of you—I never despair of you !

There had been wild talk in 1848 of annexing Ireland and Sicily, as certain revolutionists in those countries requested ; and when the news came that Hungary had fallen, the legislatures of New York, Ohio, and Indiana called for action. In Congress most of the western Senators voted for a resolution offered by Lewis Cass, to suspend diplomatic relations with Austria ; but the cautious Whigs and Southern Democrats voted it down. Even Webster indulged popular sentiment by insulting the House of Hapsburg in a diplomatic note.² Louis Kossuth, brought to New York as guest of the nation in 1851, was given an overwhelming ovation. 'Europe is antiquated, decrepit, tottering on the verge

¹ M. E. Curti, 'Young America' (*Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxxii. 34).

² 'The power of this republic at the present moment is spread over a region, one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison with which the possessions of the House of Hapsburg are but as a patch on the earth's surface.'

of dissolution,' declared Senator Douglas. 'It is a vast graveyard.'

American diplomacy was particularly truculent when directed by Southern gentlemen who wanted new slave territory, as compensation for the 'loss' of California. Cuba, during these eventful years, was in its normal state of unrest. Certain Southern statesmen professed to fear lest the island should fall to England, or become a black republic like Hayti. Others had an eye on the large and redundant slave population there. Polk proposed to buy it in 1848 for a hundred million dollars, but Spain rejected his offer with contempt. Then came filibustering expeditions, frowned upon by Taylor, tolerated by Fillmore and Pierce; and consequent interference by the Spanish authorities with Yankee traders. One such instance, the case of the *Black Warrior* (1854), seemed a good opportunity to provoke Spain into war. The Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, urged President Pierce to take that line; but the Secretary of State, W. L. Marcy, kept his head; and Spain disappointed the annexationists by apologizing. There was a comic anticlimax when the American Ministers to Spain, France, and Great Britain held a conclave at Ostend, and issued a farcical manifesto (18 October 1854). 'In the progress of human events the time has arrived', they informed the world, 'when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale as those of the United States in the purchase of the island' of Cuba. With the purchase money, Spain might 'become a centre of attraction for the travelling world', and 'her vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines'. Should she be so unreasonable as to refuse, then, 'by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power.'¹ As *The Times* re-

¹ Macdonald, *S. D.*, pp. 405-12. The signers were Pierre Soulé of Louisiana, who had been playing the buffoon at the Court of Madrid,

marked, American diplomacy was a very singular profession. The Ostend manifesto had no other result than to lower American prestige in Europe, and that of Pierce at home.

3. *Perry in Japan*

The more solid achievements of American diplomacy under Fillmore and Pierce flowed from the territorial acquisitions in 1846-8. Oregon and California together became the mainspring of American history for ten years. Desire for the one led to the Mexican War ; the acquisition of both brought on the slavery dispute of 1846 to 1850. Together they inspired a remarkable diplomatic adventure in the Pacific that broke down Japanese isolation. The difficulty of communicating with Oregon and California by overland trails led (*a*) to projects of inter-oceanic canals, which raised another controversy with Great Britain ; (*b*) to the perfection of the sailing ship, and a temporary ascendancy of the American merchant marine ; (*c*) to projects of trans-continental railways, which raised once more the question of slavery in the territories, and led directly to the Civil War.

Diplomacy lagged far behind the American merchant flag in the Pacific, until it was planted firmly on Pacific shores. In 1844, two years after the Treaty of Nanking, Caleb Cushing negotiated a treaty with China, in which he obtained access to the treaty ports and extra-territorial privileges for American merchants, but which expressly discountenanced those who were dealing in opium. Japan had been closed for two centuries to all foreign intercourse, save a strictly regulated trade with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki, when the gold rush to California brought American steamships into the

James Y. Mason of Virginia, and James Buchanan. The latter was really the mouthpiece of John Slidell of Louisiana, later the Confederate envoy to France.

Pacific. A desire for a coaling station and for trade prompted the first American mission to Japan ; shipwrecked whalemén was the pretence.¹ Commodore Matthew C. Perry, brother of the hero of Lake Erie, was entrusted with the mission. On 8 July 1853 his armed squadron, including a new steam frigate, anchored in the Bay of Yedo. Although forbidden to use force, Perry so impressed the Shogunate by his display of force, that, contrary to all precedent, his credentials were received and referred to the Mikado and the daimios. Perry tactfully sailed away to China, in order to give the daimios time to make up their minds ; and by the time he returned (February 1854) they had decided to yield. Picturesque conferences were held at the little village of Yokohama. Gifts were exchanged, the rarest lacquers and most beautiful brocades for a set of telegraph instruments, a miniature locomotive, and an assortment of farming implements, death-dealing weapons and munitions, including several barrels of rye whisky. It was old Japan's first taste of the blessings of western civilization. On 31 March 1854 the epoch-making Treaty of Kanagawa was signed. The United States was allowed to establish a consulate, and American vessels were permitted to visit certain Japanese ports for supplies and a limited trade. Such was the famous opening of Japan.² But, as Mr. Dooley once observed, ' We didn't go in ; they kim out.'

¹ Over three centuries before a certain Friar Andrea explained to the Emperor Charles V that, as the Philippine Islands were Portuguese territory, ' some legitimate or pious reason should be assigned for the expedition [of Legazpi], such as the rescue of sailors who have been lost on the islands '.

² Great Britain and Russia concluded similar treaties later in the same year. In 1856 Townsend Harris, a New York merchant, was sent to Japan as the first American consul. His admirable character and appreciation of the Japanese founded that traditional friendship between the two countries which the demagogues of both countries have done their best to break. A similar service in China was performed by

4. *Isthmus Diplomacy*

In the matter of communications between the older United States and its Pacific Territories, the simplest solution appeared to be an inter-oceanic canal. Three different routes were seriously considered : the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the Isthmus of Panama, and through Lake Nicaragua. Over the first route, which was impracticable for a canal, President Pierce obtained a right of way for American traffic in 1853. Over the Isthmus of Panama, Polk obtained a right of transit by treaty with Colombia, in return for guaranteeing to that republic her sovereignty over the Isthmus, and undertaking to defend its neutrality.¹ A Panama railway was undertaken by American capital and completed in 1855. The Nicaragua route brought on a dangerous controversy with Great Britain.

When the Monroe Doctrine was declared, the British Empire already had two *pieds à terre* in Central America : the old log-wood establishment of Belize, which still had the status of a merchant adventurers' factory ; and a shadowy protectorate over the Mosquito Indians on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua. Owing to the weakness of the local republics, the enterprise of British agents, and the lapse of the Monroe Doctrine at Washington, British influence and dominion sensibly increased in Central America between 1825 and 1845. A British superintendent of Belize took possession of the Bay Islands off the coast of Honduras in 1838, and at his suggestion Aberdeen stationed a British resident in 'Mosquitia', which became a sort of Indian native state, with a distinctive flag incor-

Anson Burlingame, a Massachusetts abolitionist whom Lincoln sent to Peking in 1861, and who was appointed by the Imperial Government head of their first mission to the western world.

¹ This was the treaty of 1846 that President Roosevelt invoked in protecting the Republic of Panama from Colombian sovereignty in 1903.

porating the Union Jack. Palmerston, who returned to the Foreign Office in 1846, believed it high time to check 'manifest destiny' in that part of the world, and in 1848 formally declared the sovereignty of 'Mosquitia' over San Juan or Greytown, the eastern terminus of the proposed ship canal.

Further and unauthorized activities of American and British agents in Central America then brought about a very ticklish situation, from which their two countries were only able to emerge by negotiating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (15 April 1850). It was agreed that neither government would ever fortify, or obtain exclusive control over, the proposed Nicaragua canal. Both guaranteed its neutrality, and invited other nations to join. Later generations of Americans regarded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as a self-denying ordinance, and condemned the Senate for ratifying it. At the time, however, it was a very fair compromise of the interests that Britain had acquired in Central America without protest from the United States, and the new interest that the United States had acquired in Isthmian communication. Nevertheless, it marked a retreat from the position taken by Adams and Polk.

As American capitalists showed much less enthusiasm than the diplomatists for a ship canal, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty might have caused no embarrassment for fifty years, but for a clause on the exact meaning of which both Clayton and Bulwer agreed to disagree.¹ The United States Government supposed that it meant British withdrawal from the Bay Islands, Greytown, and the Mosquito Coast; although it did not object to the ancient custom of crowning some black-and-tan Sambo with an old Admiral's hat as King of Mosquitia, if that

¹ 'The Governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby declare that neither one nor the other will ever . . . occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America.'

gratified him and amused the authorities of Belize. The British Government insisted that the treaty merely forbade future acquisition, and held on to what it had. This dispute became dangerous in 1854, when President Pierce and the Democrats were looking for an issue to distract the country from the slavery question, and their opponents were determined to prevent them from running away with it. The game of 'twisting the lion's tail' then began, the object being to produce a roar that would be grateful in the ears of Irish-American voters and native American jingoes. The equally dangerous game of converting a doubtful interpretation into a prescriptive right was played by Palmerston. And the filibustering game was played in Nicaragua by William Walker, the 'grey-eyed man of destiny', with the object of bringing it into the Union as another slave State.¹ Fortunately both governments had more sense than their words would suggest. In 1859-60 Great Britain ceded the Bay Islands to Honduras and the Mosquito coast to Nicaragua—with a string to it, to be sure, but a string that was never pulled. In the end, the whole subject of Isthmian diplomacy served to clear up Anglo-American relations. America became more attached to the Monroe Doctrine, and England very definitely renounced the policy of Canning, Aberdeen, and Palmerston, of establishing a British counterweight in Latin America.²

5. *Reciprocity with Canada*

Midway in the Isthmian negotiations there was established a landmark in North American commerce and diplomacy, the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of

¹ See W. O. Scroggs, *Filibusters and Financiers* (Macmillan, 1916), and Joaquin Miller's poem on Walker in Nicaragua.

² A. P. Newton, in *Camb. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, ii. 274-82; and it was in 1858 that Lord Malmesbury declared 'we have no right of visitation or search whatever'.

1854. The onward march of free trade in Britain had harassed Canadian feeling, and played fast and loose with Canadian interests. Preference to colonial corn and flour gave Canada an unwonted prosperity through milling American wheat for the British market. Peel's repeal of the Corn Laws abolished the preference and prostrated the industry. At the request of the Canadian House of Assembly, the British Government attempted to negotiate at Washington a reciprocity treaty for Canada, and Parliament passed an enabling Act ; but Congress could not then be moved. It was difficult to see the advantage of opening a free market of thirty million people in return for access to the three million people of Canada.

Partly from this failure and partly from domestic causes, certain Canadian Tories came out strongly for annexation to the United States in 1849. Although their perverse sentiment found no answering echo among the American exponents of 'manifest destiny', it accelerated British efforts to obtain an American market for Canada.

Canada could offer *quid pro quo* : the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, which the United States had been demanding as a 'natural right' ; and the shore and bay fishing grounds off Labrador and the Gulf, where the sportive mackerel was wont to elude Yankee fishermen. But it was a difficult matter to effect that exchange. The Foreign Office and the State Department had no trouble in concluding a reciprocity treaty, but such a treaty required concurrent Acts of Parliament, of Congress, and of four Canadian legislatures ; and the Maritime Provinces were loath to admit Yankees to their shore fisheries. William L. Marcy, the New York spoilsman who became Pierce's Secretary of State, greased the way at Halifax, Fredericton, and St. John by judicious bribery ;¹ and Lord Elgin, a hard-headed

¹ C. C. Tansill, *Canadian Reciprocity Treaty*, pp. 68-75.

but genial Scot, is said to have floated the treaty through the United States Senate on oceans of champagne. Both served their respective countries well. The treaty opened the United States to Canadian farm produce, timber, and fish, and gave a finishing blow to Canadian disloyalty. Yankee fishermen obtained new privileges in Canadian territorial waters. The navigation of the Lakes, the St. Lawrence, and their connecting canals became common to both nations. Thus Britain maintained her political dominion over Canada by sanctioning an economic union with the United States.¹

6. *The Clipper Ship*

While the diplomatists were wrangling over imaginary canals to the Pacific, the shipwrights of New York and New England were engaged in cutting down the time of ocean passage round Cape Horn. In one month of 1850 thirty-three sailing vessels from New York and Boston entered San Francisco Bay after an average passage of one hundred and fifty-nine days. Then there came booming through the Golden Gate the clipper ship *Sea Witch* of New York, ninety-seven days out. At once the cry went up for clipper ships at any price.

This new type of sailing vessel—characterized by great length in proportion to breadth of beam, an enormous sail area, and long concave bows ending in a gracefully curved cutwater—had been invented for the China–New York tea trade. The voyage of the *Sea Witch* showed its possibilities. Her record was broken by the *Surprise* within a year, and in 1851 the

¹ The Reciprocity Treaty, dated 5 June 1854, came into force on 16 May 1855, and was extended to Newfoundland the same year. The story that it was pushed through the Senate by Southern members, who feared that the alternative was Canadian annexation and consequent addition to the Northern States, was apparently an invention to create prejudice against the treaty.

Flying Cloud made 'Frisco in eighty-nine days from New York, a record never surpassed and only twice equalled. As California then afforded no return cargo save gold dust,¹ the Yankee clippers proceeded in ballast to the Chinese treaty ports, where they came into competition with the British marine; and the result was more impressive than the victory of the yacht *America*. Crack East-Indiamen humbly waited for a cargo weeks on end, while one American clipper after another sailed off with a cargo of tea at double the ordinary freights. When the *Oriental* of New York appeared at London, ninety-seven days from Hong-Kong, crowds thronged the West India Docks to admire her beautiful hull, lofty rig, and patent fittings; the Admiralty took off her lines in dry dock, and *The Times* came out with a leader challenging British ship-builders to set their 'long practised skill, steady industry and dogged determination' against the 'youth, ingenuity and ardour' of the United States.

In answer to this challenge, the first British clipper ships, the *Stornoway* and *Chrysolite*, were promptly built. Yet so swiftly was the type developed that by the time British designers had caught up with the *Oriental*, their Yankee rivals had far outdistanced them. In 1852 Donald McKay of Boston launched the *Sovereign of the Seas*, the largest merchant vessel yet built, and the boldest in design: stately as a cathedral, beautiful as a terraced cloud. A young American naval officer, Lieutenant Maury of Virginia, had just been doing what the British Admiralty, with all its opportunities, had neglected to do: charting trade-winds and ocean currents by the study of ships' logs. It was he who discovered that the strong and steady westerly gales were to be found in the 'roaring forties' south latitude. Following his sailing directions, the *Sovereign of the Seas* on her homeward voyage made a day's run of

¹ The export of wheat began only in 1855.

411 nautical miles, a run surpassed only four or five times in the history of sailing vessels, only once by the product of another shipyard than McKay's, and that was in the State of Maine.

By this time the British Navigation Acts had been repealed, and gold had been discovered in Australia. For that destination the *Sovereign* was chartered in Liverpool, and made so successful a voyage that four clippers were ordered of Donald McKay for the Australian Black Ball Line. Two of them, the *James Baines* and *Lightning*, were the fastest sailing ships that ever sailed under the red ensign. The *Baines*, with her skysail studding-sails and main moonsail, established the record transatlantic sailing passage—12 $\frac{1}{4}$ days Boston to Liverpool—and then another from Liverpool to Melbourne—63 days—that still holds good. The *Lightning* on her maiden voyage made a day's run never equalled by a sailing vessel, and not surpassed by a steamship for a generation afterward: 436 nautical miles.

Nightingale and *Witch of the Wave*, *Northern Light* and *Southern Cross*, *Young America* and *Great Republic*, *Golden Age* and *Herald of the Morning*, *Red Jacket* and *Westward Ho!*, *Dreadnought* and *Glory of the Seas*—‘I cannot tell their wonder, nor make known . . . these splendid ships, each with her grace and glory.’ Aberdeen and the Clyde produced a fleet of slim tea clippers that equalled them in beauty; no sailing vessel ever approached them in power, majesty, or speed.¹ It

¹ Every recorded day's run of 400 nautical miles or over was made by an American-built clipper. The best by a British-built sailing vessel appears to have been 374 miles by the *Melbourne*—if the data of the *Sheila's* reported run of 394 miles (W. H. Angel, *Clipper Ship Sheila*, pp. 165-8) are checked up by a traverse table, and the Agulhas current allowed for, it will be found incorrect. The best by a British tea clipper was 363 miles by the *Cutty Sark*. But the tea clippers were faster in light airs than McKay's. Although the *Comet's* record run of 84 days (1854), Liverpool to Hong-Kong, was never beaten, the *Witch of the Wave's* record of 90 days, Whampoa to London, was beaten by

seemed as if all the ingenuity of the Yankee race, with its latent artistic genius, had at last found perfect and harmonious expression. Yet the Yankee clipper fulfilled a very limited purpose : speed to the gold-fields at any price or risk. When that was no longer an object, no more were built ; and when the panic of 1857 brought a world-wide depression in shipping, it was the clipper-shipowners who suffered first and most. British builders, leaving glory to their rivals, were quietly evolving a more useful type of medium clipper, and perfecting the iron screw steamer.

The American iron industry and engineering trades were so backward, and the extent of inland and protected waters in the United States was so great, that American steamship builders clung too long to the wooden side-wheeler, unsuitable for ocean work. The Pacific Mail did well in its own sphere, and for a few years the Collins Line, heavily subsidized by Congress, challenged the Cunard ; but its vessels had an unfortunate way of foundering. By 1857 the British Empire had an ocean-going steam tonnage of almost half a million tons, as compared with ninety thousand under the American flag. England had won back her maritime supremacy in fair competition, by the skill of her engineers and the sturdy courage of her shipbuilders. Civil war turned the Yankee mind to other objects ; the Great War revived an ancient challenge.

the *Sir Launcelot* (89 days, Foochow to London, 1869) and the *Hal-lowe'en* (89 days, Shanghai to Tongue Lightship, 1873-4) ; and the *Thermopylae* equalled the *James Baines*'s record of 63 days, England to Melbourne. The Yankee clippers did not, however, compete in the China-England and England-Australia routes after 1857.

XLII

KANSAS

1854

I. *Prairie Settlement*

TRANSPORTATION also had a vital effect on the settlement of the West ; and a contest over Western railway routes revived the slavery question.

Down to 1850 American agricultural settlement had been limited to the forests and to the smaller prairies with scattered groves of trees, by the pioneer's dependence on wood and running water. The larger treeless prairies of Illinois and Iowa were devoid of shelter and remote from markets. Their earliest settlers had to live in sod cabins, and contend with wolves, prairie fires, locusts, and agues. Most emigrants preferred to take the long journey to Oregon, where they could renew the backwoods life that they loved. As late as 1849 one could look northward from a knoll near Peoria, Illinois, over an undulating plain, unbroken by house or tree as far as the eye could reach.

After 1850 the prairie farmer instead of the backwoodsman became the typical American pioneer. In part the change was due to the new agricultural machinery. At Chicago, in 1847, Cyrus McCormick began to manufacture his patent reaper, admirably adapted to soil free of stumps and stones, as was that of the prairies.¹ Marsh's harvester, which gathered the wheat into sheaves, Appleby's self-knotting binder, and the steel-toothed cultivator soon followed. An improved form of plough with a steel mould-board made it easier to break up the tough prairie sod. Steel wire solved the fencing problem. At London in 1851

¹ Obed Hussey, however, invented the important principle of the modern reaper, a moving knife against a fixed finger.

and Paris in 1855, American machines beat all comers in competitive trials. Yet the greatest impetus to prairie farming came from the rising price of wheat,¹ and the rapid building of railways into the prairie country, from lake and river ports like Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Louis. In 1850 railways had hardly penetrated the Middle West; by 1860 their network covered it.² The prairie farmer, hitherto dependent on long wagon hauls over execrable roads, was then able to market his corn, and obtain the means of comfortable living. Most important of the prairie railways was the Illinois Central, financed and managed by capitalists of New York and Boston, constructed with English rails, and endowed by Act of Congress with alternate sections of public land on each side of its right-of-way. The completion of this line from Chicago to Cairo in 1856 opened up the central prairies to profitable settlement.³ And it is significant that the same year saw the foundation of a North-and-West political party which shattered the dream of a South-and-West alliance; and which, four years later, drove the South to seek safety in independence.

2. *Pacific Railway Routes*

In the meantime a struggle over the route of a trans-continental railway was promoting the same result. Of the many different schemes projected since 1845, the four most important were (1) the Northern, from the upper Mississippi to the upper Missouri, and by Lewis

¹ From \$0.93 a bushel in 1851 to \$2.50 in 1855 at the New York Market.

² See maps, B. H. Meyer, *Hist. of Transportation*, p. 654; or Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 380, 393. The railway mileage in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin increased from 660 in 1847 to 7,653 in 1861; that of the United States as a whole from 9,021 to 30,365.


³ L. H. Haney, *Congressional Hist. of Railways* (Bull. of Univ. of Wisconsin, nos. 211 and 243, 1908-10).

and Clark's trail to the Columbia River (the route of the Great Northern Railway); (2) the Central, from St. Louis up the Kansas and Arkansas Rivers, across the Rockies to the Great Salt Lake and by the California trail to San Francisco (followed in part by the Missouri Pacific); (3) the Thirty-fifth Parallel route from Memphis, up the Arkansas and Canadian Rivers, across the Rockies near Santa Fé, and through the Apache and Mojave country to Los Angeles; (4) the Southern, from New Orleans up the Red River and across Texas, and by the Gila Valley to Yuma and San Diego. Either of the first two would follow the natural route of emigration, and bind Oregon and California to the North; but the unorganized Indian country was an obstacle. The Southern route was the shortest, with the best contours, and led through States and Territories already organized. It might well be the means of the South recovering all she had lost by the Compromise of 1850. Congress, in March 1853, authorized surveys of these four routes under the direction of the War Department.¹

Jefferson Davis was Secretary of War and President Pierce's mentor. Although a State-rights man, his keen desire for a Southern transcontinental railway led him to advocate its construction by the Federal Government under the war power—a policy that could only be justified by the nationalist theories of Marshall and Adams. As soon as it became clear that such a railway would have to pass through a bit of Mexican territory, Davis induced the President to buy the land for ten million dollars. In the Gadsden treaty of 30 December 1853² this purchase was effected. The stage was now set for Congress to sanction the Southern route.

¹ G. L. Albright, *Official Explorations for Pacific Railways* (Univ. of Calif. Publ. in History, xi).

² Macdonald, *S. D.*, p. 390. James Gadsden was a Southern railway promoter.



Stephen A. Douglas was then senior Senator from Illinois. A lively five-footer, chock-full of bounce and swagger, the 'Little Giant' was the best stump orator in the North-West, and the idol of Northern Democrats. As an Illinoisian and a heavy speculator in Western lands and Chicago real estate, he wished the transcontinental railway to take the Central route. In order to contest the Southern route on even terms, law and government must be extended over, and settlers invited into, the region through which the Central route must pass. Douglas, accordingly, reported a bill to organize the Great Plains as the Territory of Nebraska, in January 1854. Earlier bills of that nature had been defeated by Southern opposition. So Douglas baited this one for Southern votes with a principle that he called 'popular sovereignty'. It would rest with the people of the new Territory to decide whether or not they would have slavery, as soon as they obtained a territorial legislature.

'Popular sovereignty' (or 'squatter sovereignty' as it was contemptuously called) did not satisfy certain Senators. As Nebraska would be wholly north of $36^{\circ} 30'$, slavery therein would be prohibited by the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820. Douglas's bill would have repealed that Act implicitly; but the Senators from Kentucky and Missouri insisted on repealing it explicitly. Douglas consented. He also agreed to divide the new Territory into Kansas and Nebraska, so that the Missourians might secure the one, and the Iowans the other. There was a touching scene when Senator Dixon of Kentucky told him: 'Sir, I once recognized you as a demagogue, a mere manager, selfish and intriguing. I now find you a warm-hearted and sterling patriot.'

3. *The Kansas-Nebraska Bill*

The fat was in the fire. At this proposal to repeal the Missouri Compromise the angry passions of anti-slavery and pro-slavery flared up; and there was no Clay of other days to quench them. Every one forgot about the railway. The South had not asked for Kansas, and did not want Kansas; but 'Southern Rights' were involved. No one outside Missouri proposed to take slaves farther west,¹ and even Missouri's chief interest was not so much in promoting a transcontinental railway as in preventing an extension of the 'Under Ground Railroad'; but Southern honour demanded that slavery should follow the flag. Northerners, on the other hand, were alarmed at a new proposal to extend the 'slave power', and to break a compromise of thirty years' standing. People could hardly have been more startled at a proposition to repeal habeas corpus and trial by jury, than they were by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Stephen Douglas, morally obtuse, could not see that a principle was involved: he simply did not realize the depth and strength of Northern sentiment against opening virgin territory to the 'peculiar institution'. The North, in Lincoln's picturesque phrase, was determined to give her pioneers 'a clean bed, with no snakes in it'.

For three months the bitter debate dragged on. President Pierce, under the influence of Jefferson Davis, tried to whip his party into line; and all but a few Northern Democrats obeyed.² Old Sam Houston of

¹ A Senator from North Carolina bewailed the fact that he would have to sell his old black mammy before emigrating to Nebraska if the restriction in slavery were not lifted. To which Ben Wade of Ohio replied that there was nothing to prevent him taking his black mammy to Nebraska—he simply could not 'sell her when he got there'. It was this sort of retort that made Southerners secessionists.

² The ringing 'Appeal of the Independent Democrats' in Congress is in *Congressional Globe*, xxviii. 281.

Texas reminded the Senate in vain that by solemn treaties it had confirmed most of Kansas and Nebraska to the Indians 'as long as grass shall grow and water run'. No one else thought of the aborigines. Hordes of emigrants to Oregon and California had killed their game and thinned their numbers by disease. Federal agents were already bullying them into renouncing their perpetual titles. The once powerful Delaware, or Leni-Lenape, accepted a small reservation with an annual bounty. Others, like the Shawnee and Miami, who had once terrorized the Kentucky frontier and beaten a Federal army, were removed to the Indian Territory, which fortunately lay between the rival railway routes.

Democratic discipline triumphed, and on 25 May 1854 the Kansas-Nebraska Bill passed the Senate by a comfortable majority. 'It is at once the worst and best Bill on which Congress ever acted,' declared Senator Sumner. 'The worst, inasmuch as it is a present victory for slavery. The best, for 'it annuls all past compromises with slavery, and makes all future compromises impossible. Thus it puts freedom and slavery face to face, and bids them grapple. Who can doubt the result?'

XLIII

THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT

1854-9

1. *The Know-nothing Interlude*

‘IF the Nebraska Bill should be passed, the Fugitive Slave Law is a dead letter throughout New England’ wrote a Southerner in Boston. ‘As easily could a law prohibiting the eating of cod-fish and pumpkin-pies be enforced.’ It did pass on 25 May 1854. The next day a Boston mob led by a Unitarian minister tried to rescue a fugitive slave from the court-house where he was detained for examination. They did not succeed. Anthony Burns, the slave, was identified by his master, and escorted to the wharf by a battalion of United States artillery, four platoons of marines, and the *posse comitatus*, through streets lined with hissing and groaning spectators, who were kept back by twenty-two companies of state militia. It cost the United States about \$40,000 to return that nigger to his master ; and he was the last returned from Massachusetts.

The North-West, seething with indignation over the Kansas-Nebraska Act, was ripe to form a new anti-slavery party. A big convention held under the oaks at Jackson, Michigan, on 6 July 1854, resolved to oppose the extension of slavery, and ‘be known as “Republicans” until the contest be terminated’. Many places claim the birthplace of the Republican party, but Jackson at least made the happy suggestion of adopting Jefferson’s old label, disused since the time when his Republican party split into Democrats and Whigs. The new party, however, was slow in gathering momentum outside the North-West. Seward sulked in his Whig tent ; the ‘Anti-Nebraska Democrats’ were loath to cut all connexion with their party ; the Free-

Soilers could not see why a new party was needed ; and the people were distracted by a new gospel of ignorance.

Know-nothingism was the political exploitation of an instinctive dislike for foreigners. Many native-born Americans found the rising flood of Irish Catholics and Germans most unpleasant.¹ Others regarded the catering of Democrats to the immigrant vote as disgusting, and the truculent attitude of the immigrant press towards American institutions as ominous. The visit of a tactless papal nuncio appears to have convinced many Northern patriots that the Republic was in danger from Rome ; and the activities of German radicals, who had begun to preach the gospel according to St. Marx, alarmed the pious South. Accordingly a secret 'Order of the Star-Spangled Banner', with elaborate ritual and rigid discipline, was formed by native-born Protestants. Members, when questioned by outsiders, answered 'I know nothing'. Candidates nominated secretly developed surprising strength at the polls, and many politicians joined up, thinking the cat would jump that way. In the state elections of 1854 the Know-nothings almost won New York, and did win Massachusetts, electing a new legislature that spent its time largely on clownish investigations of Catholic schools and nunneries. At Baltimore they organized 'plug-uglies', gangs of ruffians who attended the polls armed with carpenters' awls, to 'plug' voters who did not give the pass-word. In the summer of 1855 the American party, as it then called itself, held a national convention of which the Southern members obtained control, and passed pro-slavery resolutions. The Northerners then lost interest, and outside Maryland the movement collapsed. 'Anything more low,

¹ 'If some of you Kentuckians had to deal with the wild Irish as we housekeepers are sometimes called upon to do, the South would certainly elect Fillmore [the Know-nothing candidate] next time.' Mrs. Abraham Lincoln to her sister, quoted in Sandburg, *Lincoln*, ii. 274.

obscene, feculent,' wrote Rufus Choate, 'the manifold heavings of history have not cast up.' Mr. Choate did not live to see the Ku Klux Klan.

2. *Bleeding Kansas, Black Republicanism*

Kansas soon diverted attention from the popish peril. Since 'popular sovereignty' was to settle the status of slavery in Kansas, pro- and anti-slavery people scrambled to get there first. The Federal Government opened a land office in the Territory in July 1854, before the Indian titles were fairly extinguished; and even before that Missourians began to flock across the border and stake out claims. In the meantime, some enterprising Yankees had formed a company to finance the migration of Northerners. This effort aroused the utmost indignation among the Missourians, who proceeded to blockade the Missouri River against the Northern immigrants, and to sack their first settlement at Lawrence. Presently the Emigrant Aid Company began to arm free-state settlers with a new breach-loading weapon of precision called the Sharps rifle, or 'Beecher's Bible'.¹ There were merry times in Kansas for three years. Parties of Northern 'jayhawkers' gave battle with 'Kickapoo Rangers', 'Doniphan Tigers', and other organizations of 'border ruffians' from Missouri and points South. 'We had at least seven thousand men in the Territory on the day of the election, and one-third of them will remain there,' wrote Senator Atchison of Missouri.

'The pro-slavery ticket prevailed everywhere. . . . Now let the Southern men come on with their slaves. Ten thousand families can take possession of and hold every acre of timber in the Territory of Kansas, and this secures the prairie. . . . We are playing for a mighty stake; if we win, we carry slavery to the Pacific Ocean.'²

¹ So called after the abolitionist preacher who advised their use.

² *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1916*, ii. 160-1.

Few Southern men, however, cared to risk valuable property in such a region, and free-state settlers came pouring in with the spirit of crusaders. One of them named John Brown accounted for quite a number of 'border ruffians' at the 'Pottawotami massacre'. Such were the workings of popular sovereignty. Kansas had become the theatre of a western flanking movement preliminary to the Civil War.

On 19 May 1856 Senator Sumner of Massachusetts delivered a speech on 'The Crime against Kansas' which contained unpalatable truth, much that was neither truthful nor in good taste, and some unnecessary personal invective against Senator Butler of South Carolina. Three days after, a kinsman of Butler attacked Sumner as he was sitting at his desk in the Senate chamber, and beat him senseless with a stout stick, while Douglas and Toombs looked on. Returning to South Carolina the assailant was fêted from place to place, and presented by admirers with suitably inscribed sticks.

A few days after that, the Republican party held a national nominating convention at Philadelphia. It was a mass-meeting of earnest men from all the Northern States, who were convinced that the North, in self-defence, must have a Northern party. For some reason unknown the name of John C. Frémont stamped the Convention, and obtained the first Republican presidential nomination. Their platform proclaimed it 'both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery'. James Buchanan, who had been carefully coached for several years by his bosom friend Slidell, obtained the Democratic nomination; the Know-nothings put up the pallid Fillmore.

The 'Black Republicans', as their enemies called them, made a lively campaign. 'Free soil, free speech, and Frémont' was the slogan. Slavery in the Terri-

tories was the only issue. Most of the Northern Whigs came over, and the Northern Know-nothings as well. Buchanan carried the solid South,¹ with Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana, and was elected. Frémont swept the rest of the North. No previous candidate had so nearly united the North and West against the South. Party lines were approaching dangerously close to Mason and Dixon's line.

3. *Dred Scott*

On 6 March 1857, two days after Buchanan's inauguration, the Supreme Court published its decision on the famous case of *Dred Scott v. Sanford*. Dred was a slave who had been taken by his master to Illinois, to the unorganized territory north of 36° 30', where slavery had been forbidden by the Missouri Compromise, and then back to Missouri, where he sued for freedom on the ground of having twice been resident on free soil. Chief Justice Taney, and the four Southerners among his eight associates, welcomed the opportunity to settle the status of slavery in the Territories. The opinion of the court declared against Scott's claim for freedom on three grounds: (a) as a negro he could not be a citizen of the United States, and therefore had no right to sue in a federal court; (b) as a resident of Missouri the laws of Illinois had no longer any effect on his status; (c) as a resident of the territory north of 36° 30' he had not been emancipated because Congress had no right to deprive citizens of their property without due process of law. The Missouri Compromise Act, therefore, was unconstitutional and void.

None of the Chief Justice's opinion was *obiter dictum*; but only on the second point was it sound. As Justice Curtis proved in his vigorous dissenting opinion,

¹ Except Maryland, which voted for Fillmore.

negroes had been considered citizens in all the Northern States, even though they had seldom possessed the vote, and as such had a right to sue in the United States courts. If slaves ever had been common-law property, they ceased to be such upon Lord Mansfield's decision of the *Sommersett* case (1772). 'Due process of law' in the Constitution¹ referred to the method of a law's enforcement, not to the substance of a law itself. Once before, in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803), the Supreme Court had declared an Act of Congress unconstitutional; but in that case the act in question directly concerned the federal judiciary, whilst in this it was a general law, resting on precedent, the result of sectional compromise, and enforced during a period of thirty-four years. The effect then was to sanction Calhoun's doctrine that slavery followed the flag. Oregon and Nebraska were opened to slavery, as well as Kansas. Squatter sovereignty thenceforth was no sovereignty; the slave power was theoretically supreme in every United States Territory.

Events in Kansas pointed to the same conclusion. Federal troops were now keeping order, but the free-state and pro-slavery men refused to co-operate. Each group held a convention, drafted a state constitution, ratified it, and appealed to Washington for statehood. The anti-slavery Topeka constitution was rejected in the Senate in 1856. The Lecompton constitution, the most out-and-out pro-slavery charter yet drafted,² was accepted by the Senate; but Stephen Douglas insisted on principle that it be re-submitted to the people

¹ The phrase is from Amendment V of the Constitution, and was a translation of *per legem terrae* in Magna Carta. Lincoln observed in his Springfield speech of 17 June 1858 that the Chief Justice's construction of 'due process' would invalidate every emancipatory Act of a State; for a similar clause was in the Bill of Rights of every Northern state constitution.

² Macdonald, *S. D.*, p. 435; *D. S. B.*, p. 420.

of Kansas, who rejected it emphatically. In the meantime slavery was legal in Kansas, and in all the Western Territories; but the overwhelming majority of Northerners in Kansas made that Territory a certain free State, sooner or later.

4. *The Lincoln-Douglas Debate*

Until the Kansas struggle Abraham Lincoln had been distinguished from hundreds of North-western lawyer-politicians only by a reputation for truthfulness and honesty, and a habit of prolonged, abstracted contemplation. He had played the usual game of Illinois politics, and not well. He had served one term in Congress as a Whig, without distinction. Mary Todd, the belle of Springfield, had married him much against his will, and made his life unhappy. Slavery he regarded as an evil thing from his first contact with it on a rafting trip down the Mississippi; but the abolitionist agitation seemed to him mischievous in its effects.

About the time of the Kansas-Nebraska Act some force, that for want of a better knowledge we may call the Divine Will, began to work in Lincoln's soul. He began to preach a new testament of anti-slavery, without malice or hatred toward the slave-owners.

'I surely will not blame them for not doing what I should not know how to do myself. If all earthly power were given me, I should not know what to do as to the existing institution. . . . When they remind us of their constitutional rights, I acknowledge them—not grudgingly, but fully and fairly, and I would give them any legislation for the reclaiming of their fugitives which should not in its stringency be more likely to carry a free man into slavery than our ordinary criminal laws are to hang an innocent one. . . . But all this, to my judgment, furnishes no more excuse for permitting slavery to go into our own free territory than it would for reviving the African slave-trade by law.'

‘Slavery is founded on the selfishness of man’s nature—opposition to it in his love of justice. These principles are in eternal antagonism, and when brought into collision so fiercely as slavery extension brings them, shocks and throes and convulsions must ceaselessly follow.’

These quotations are from Lincoln’s Peoria speech of 16 October 1854. It made him famous throughout the North-West. Two years later he became a rival candidate to Stephen A. Douglas for election as United States Senator from Illinois. The first paragraph of his opening speech in the campaign (16 June 1858) gave the ripe conclusion to his ponderings during the last four years ; and struck the key-note of American history for the seven years to come :

‘We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction ; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.’¹

Lincoln and Douglas engaged in a series of seven joint debates, covering every section of the State, through the summer and autumn of 1858. Imagine some parched little prairie town of central Illinois, set

¹ Seward echoed the same sentiment in his speech of 25 October 1858 at Rochester, N.Y. : ‘It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces, and it means that the United States must and will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slave-holding nation or entirely a free-labor nation’.

in fields of rustling maize ; a dusty court-house square, surrounded by low wooden houses and shops blistering in the August sunshine, decked with flags and party emblems ; shirt-sleeved farmers and their families in wagons and buggies and on foot, brass bands blaring out ' Hail ! Columbia ' and ' Oh ! Susanna ', wooden platform with railing, perspiring semicircle of local dignitaries in black frock coats and two-quart beaver hats. The Douglas special train (provided by George B. McClellan, superintendent of the Illinois Central), pulls into the ' deepo ' and fires a salute from the twelve-pounder cannon bolted to a flat-car at the rear. Senator Douglas, escorted by the local Democratic club in columns of fours, drives up in an open carriage, and aggressively mounts the platform. His short, stocky figure is clothed in the best that the city of Washington can produce. Every feature of his face bespeaks confidence and mastery ; every gesture of his body, vigour and combativeness. Abe Lincoln, who had previously arrived by an ordinary passenger train, approaches on foot, his furrowed face and long neck conspicuous above the crowd. He shambles on to the platform, displaying a rusty frock coat the sleeves of which stop several inches short of his wrists, and well-worn trousers that show a similar reluctance to approach a pair of enormous feet. His face, as he turns to the crowd, has an air of settled melancholy. If Dickens had only visited Illinois in the summer of 1858 ! How he would have roared with laughter at the sight of the two champions—the frenzied gestures of Douglas, and Lincoln's awkward habit of bending his knees and then rising to his full height with a jerk, in order to enforce a point—and how he would have listened to them in the end. For no recorded debate in the English language surpassed those between Lincoln and Douglas for keen give and take, vigorous Saxon language, and clear exposition of vital issues.

Although the Dred Scott decision was a stunning blow to the 'gur-reat pur-rinciple' of popular sovereignty, Douglas had stuck to it courageously, and defied Buchanan and the Southern Democrats, when they attempted to impose the Lecompton constitution on Kansas. In the debate at Freeport, Lincoln attempted to place Douglas in a dilemma by asking whether the people of a Territory could, in any lawful way, exclude slavery from their limits. Apparently, Douglas must either accept the Dred Scott decision and admit popular sovereignty to be a farce, or separate from his party by repudiating a dictum of the Supreme Court. Very neatly Douglas found a way out. 'Slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations,' and if a territorial legislature fail to pass a black code, they will effectually keep slavery out.¹ It is probable that this 'Freeport doctrine', as it was called, won Douglas his re-election to the Senate; and he deserved it. Kansas was safe for freedom; and if theoretically slavery were legal in the Territories there was not a ghost of a chance that they would become slave-holding States. The only political justification for Lincoln's policy, the Republican policy of outlawing slavery in the Territories, was the extreme unlikelihood that the South could rest content with the Dred Scott principle, any more than it had rested content with the compromises of 1787, 1820, and 1850.

Lincoln furnished an even deeper justification in his Quincy speech of 13 October 1858. This controversy

¹ The oft-repeated statement that Lincoln drew this admission from the unwilling Douglas is pure fable. Douglas had already expounded this so-called Freeport doctrine. Lincoln characterized it as 'the naked absurdity that you may lawfully drive out that which has a lawful right to remain'. But Douglas was right. The relation of a territorial legislature to Congress was similar to that of a colonial legislature, in the old Empire, to the Privy Council. Congress could invalidate a positive enactment of the territorial legislature, but not force it to pass a law against its will.

over strategic positions, he pointed out, was an effort to dominate the fundamental moral issue :

‘ the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it wrong. The Republican party think it wrong—we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong. We think it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons of the States where it exists, but that it is a wrong which in its tendency, to say the least, affects the existence of the whole nation. Because we think it wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong. We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there may be some promise of an end to it. . . .

‘ I will add this, that if there be any man who does not believe that slavery is wrong in the three aspects which I have mentioned, or in any one of them, that man is misplaced and ought to leave us. While, on the other hand, if there be any man in the Republican party who is impatient over the necessity springing from its actual presence, and is impatient of the constitutional guarantees thrown around it, and would act in disregard of these, he too is misplaced, standing with us.’

In his reply Douglas took the ground that the right and wrong of slavery was nobody’s business outside the slave States. ‘ If each State will only agree to mind its own business, and let its neighbours alone . . . this republic can exist forever divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it and the people of each State have decided.’ Lincoln, in rejoinder, thanked his opponent for the admission that slavery must exist for ever.

5. *The Slave Trade*

Lincoln and Seward believed that the next Southern demand would be to force slavery into the free States, as it had already been forced into the free Territories. A case involving the status of slaves in transit across free States was actually on its way to the Supreme Court. No responsible Southerner wished to legalize slavery in such places as New York and New England, although most

Southerners were becoming insistent that the Northern States should silence the abolitionists. The next desire of the slavery protagonists was for new territory to the southward, and for reopening the African slave trade.

Buchanan had been an expansionist since 1848, and his friend Slidell kept him steady on that point. In his message of 7 January 1858 the President gently chided William Walker for his filibustering activities in Nicaragua, on the ground that he was hampering 'the destiny of our race to spread themselves over the continent of North America, and this at no distant day should events be permitted to take their natural course'. At the end of that year he asked Congress for money to buy Cuba, and Slidell introduced an appropriation for that purpose; but the Republicans were on the alert and did not allow it to be brought to a vote. The same rising anti-slavery sentiment defeated an extraordinary treaty that Buchanan negotiated with the Juarez Government in Mexico, giving the United States a new railway concession, and an unlimited right of intervention to preserve order.¹

Unquestionably the reopening of the African slave trade was the coming demand of the South. Prime field hands were becoming so highly priced that only wealthy planters could afford to buy them.² Black bootlegging was on the increase. Not only picaroons of the Gulf, but respectable merchantmen of Baltimore and whalers of New Bedford were loading 'black ivory' on the West Coast. The Governor of South Carolina

¹ The treaty was watched with interest in Europe; had it been ratified, Napoleon III would probably have refrained from intervention. Buchanan's motives, in this instance, had nothing to do with slavery. A group of Louisiana capitalists, including Slidell and Judah P. Benjamin, were promoting a new transcontinental route from New Orleans across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. They managed to get a carriage road built by 1858, and carried the overland mails for a year, when civil war in Mexico rendered the route unsafe; hence Buchanan's treaty of 1859. *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, v. 687-701; and *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1910*, pp. 133-51.

² See above, p. 7.

in a public message (1856) recommended the repeal of the Federal Act of 1807 that outlawed the slave trade. The Governor of Florida opposed repeal, from no 'sickly sentimentality' so he said, but because it would alienate Virginia from the cotton kingdom. Repeal was advocated by the Southern business men in their annual conventions. A Senator from Florida proposed, as an entering wedge, that negroes captured on slavers by the United States Navy be 'apprenticed' to kind planters, instead of being sent to Liberia.

By most Southern gentlemen these proposals were regarded with horror. Yet it is difficult to see how the gentry could long have resisted the logic of William L. Yancey of Alabama: 'If it is right to buy slaves in Virginia and carry them to New Orleans, why is it not right to buy them in Cuba, Brazil, or Africa, and carry them there?'¹ If slavery was 'aith's greatest boon', as almost every articulate Southerner was now agreed, why not indeed extend its blessings to those in darkest Africa?

6. *John Brown*

So much for Southern aggression—or defence, if you will. Now for Northern defence—or aggression. In 1859 came two startling portents of the 'irrepressible conflict'. The Burns fugitive slave case of 1854 was followed by a new crop of state 'personal liberty laws', which penalized their citizens for helping federal officials to perform this unwelcome duty. A certain Booth of Wisconsin, convicted in a federal court of having forcibly rescued a runaway slave, was released by the Supreme Court of his State on the ground that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the State decision. The Wisconsin Legislature, quoting the Kentucky resolutions of 1798 which Southern men con-

¹ W. E. B. Du Bois, *Suppression of African Slave Trade*, p. 171; cf. McMaster, *U.S.*, viii. 344-51; Ames, *State Docs.*, p. 305.

sidered canonical, declared 'that this assumption of jurisdiction by the federal judiciary . . . is an act of undelegated power, void, and of no force'. Here was Calhoun's nullification in a new quarter. The Federal Government vindicated its power by rearresting and imprisoning Booth; but that did not minimize the effect on Southern sentiment. For us the deeper significance lies in the fact that the slavery issue had transcended constitutional theory. Janus-like, each side turned to nationalism or State rights, as best suited its purpose. Had it been the South instead of the North that was growing and gaining power, Garrison's principle of 'no union with slaveholders' might well have become the nucleus of an irresistible secession movement in the Northern States.

If the Booth case aroused scorn and bitterness, the next episode of the year brought the deeper anger that comes from fear. John Brown, perpetrator of the Pottawotami massacre in Kansas, was a belated puritan who would have found his proper work in Cromwell's invasion of Ireland. Fanatic but no madman, he formed an audacious plan to establish a sort of abolitionist republic in the Appalachian Mountains, and make war on slavery with fugitive blacks and a few determined whites. On the night of 16 October 1859, leading an army of thirteen white men and five negroes, Brown seized the federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and took prisoner some of the leading townspeople. Day-break brought the neighbouring militia swarming about him, while the telegraph was spreading consternation through Virginia. The irrepressible conflict at last!

Governor Wise called out the entire state militia and implored the Federal Government for aid. John Brown retreated to a locomotive round-house, knocked port-holes through the brick wall, and defended himself. Lewis Washington, one of his prisoners, has left us a graphic description of the scene: 'Brown was the

coolest and firmest man I ever saw in defying danger and death. With one son dead by his side, and another shot through, he felt the pulse of his dying son with one hand and held his rifle with the other, and commanded his men with the utmost composure, encouraging them to be firm and to sell their lives as dearly as they could.' In the evening, when Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived with a company of marines, there were only four of Brown's men alive and unwounded. The next day the marines forced an entrance, and captured the slender remnant alive.

Eight days after his capture the trial of John Brown began in the court-house of Charles Town, Virginia. From the pallet where he lay wounded the old ironside rejected his counsel's plea of insanity. There could be no doubt of the result. On 31 October the jury brought in a verdict of murder, criminal conspiracy, and treason against the Commonwealth of Virginia. John Brown, content (as he wrote his children) 'to die for God's eternal truth on the scaffold as in any other way', was hanged on 2 December 1859.

Southerners thought of Hayti and shuddered, although not a single slave had voluntarily joined the liberator. Keenly they watched for indications of Northern opinion. That Christian burial was with difficulty obtained for John Brown's body they did not know. That every Democratic or Republican newspaper condemned his acts they did not heed, so much as the admiration for a brave man that Northern opinion could not conceal. And the babble of shocked repudiation by politicians and public men was dimmed in Southern ears by one bell-like note from Emerson: 'That new saint, than whom nothing purer or more brave was ever led by love of men into conflict and death . . . will make the gallows glorious like the cross.'

XLIV

LINCOLN ELECTED PRESIDENT

MAY 1860—MARCH 1861

1. *The Election of 1860*

THE Republican party had won the congressional elections of 1858, and had good reason to hope for victory in 1860, although the leaders of the lower South let it be clearly understood that they would not submit to the rule of a 'Black Republican' president. Although but four years old the new party was already more of an organic whole than the old Whigs had ever been; and the platform of its national convention, adopted at Chicago on 18 May 1860, showed that it was no longer a party of one idea, but a party of the North. On the slavery question it was as clear as in 1856, though less truculent: no more slavery in the Territories; no interference with slavery in the States. So there was no place in the party for the abolitionists, who denounced new Republicanism as old Whiggery writ large. John Brown was condemned in the same breath with the border ruffians of Missouri, and secession was called plain treason. The Chicago platform also promised the settlers a free quarter-section of public land, and revived Henry Clay's old 'American system' of internal improvements and protective tariff, representing Northern desires that had been baulked by Southern interests.¹

This careful construction of the platform showed

¹ Protection was not advocated to please the textile manufacturers of New England, who had become reconciled to Free Trade by the discovery that Protection bred a host of petty rivals; but in order to carry Pennsylvania and Ohio. Low tariffs and the panic of 1857 had brought distress to the iron-masters of the one and to the wool-breeders of the other, both unable as yet to meet British competition on equal terms.

that the Republican party was no longer guided by crusaders, but by seasoned politicians. It had lost the first flush of radicalism, and was beginning that evolution to the right which made it eventually the party of big business and finance. In 1860 Republicanism combined the solid policies of Hamiltonian Federalism with the hopeful and humanitarian outlook of its namesake, the Republican party of Jefferson.

Abraham Lincoln received the presidential nomination on the third ballot; not for his transcendent merits, which no one yet suspected, but as a matter of political strategy. His humble birth, homely wit, and skill in debate would attract the same sort of Northerners who had once voted for Andrew Jackson; and no one else could carry the doubtful States of Indiana and Illinois. Seward, the most distinguished and experienced candidate, had too long and vulnerable a record; the others were little known outside their own States.

Already the Democratic convention at Charleston had split on the question of popular sovereignty in the Territories. Southern Democrats believed that they had been duped by Douglas, and his favourite principle now appeared as a stalking horse for abolition. They had plumped for popular sovereignty in 1854, expecting to get Kansas; but Kansas had gone the other way. Her territorial legislature was now in the hands of anti-slavery men, encouraged by Douglas's 'Freeport doctrine' to flout the Dred Scott decision. Nothing less than active protection to slavery in every Territory would satisfy the Southerners. The Democratic party must take distinctly the position 'that slavery was right', said Yancey of Alabama. 'Gentlemen of the South,' replied Senator Pugh of Ohio, 'you mistake us—you mistake us—we will not do it.' They did not do it; and on 30 April 1860 the cotton-State delegations withdrew from the Democratic national convention.

After this symbolic secession no candidate was able

to command the necessary two-thirds majority that Democratic conventions require for a presidential nomination. The rump, therefore, adjourned to Baltimore, where with fresh delegates it made Douglas the official nominee of the Democratic party. The seceders held a separate convention, which nominated the then Vice-President, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, on a platform of slavery extension and annexation of Cuba.

Senator Bell of Tennessee was placed in nomination by the only party in this campaign that was not sectional, the National Constitutional Union. Composed largely of what Lincoln called 'the nice exclusive sort' of old Whigs, who hoped to persuade the American people to forget everything that had occurred since 1848, this party avowed 'no political principle other than the Constitution of the Country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the Laws'.

As Minnesota and Oregon had been admitted to the Union in 1857 and 1859, there were now eighteen free and fifteen slave States. Breckinridge carried every cotton State, together with North Carolina, Delaware, and Maryland. Douglas, although a good second to Lincoln in the total popular vote, had a plurality only in Missouri. Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee went for Bell. The South, then, was divided; but Lincoln carried every free State, and rolled up a large majority in the electoral college.¹

¹ The intricacies of the American system of electing a President are illustrated in the following table:

	<i>Popular vote.</i>	<i>Electoral vote.</i>
Lincoln	1,866,452	180
Douglas	1,376,957	12
Breckinridge	849,781	72
Bell	588,879	39

These figures include no popular vote in South Carolina, where Breckinridge electors were chosen by the legislature. In the other States that seceded the popular vote was Breckinridge, 736,592; Bell, 345,919; Douglas, 72,084.

Northern labour, including the pioneer farmers, was the decisive force in the election. The German-Americans for the most part had joined the Democratic party as soon as they became naturalized; but they had suffered too much from tyranny in the fatherland to support it in any new shape. The personality of Lincoln swept them into a new party allegiance, and in conjunction with the New England element they carried the North-Western States.¹ Before 1854 the native American artisan had been a nigger-hater. Since then he had been aroused by the frequent sneers of Southern statesmen at wage-earners, and by deadly quotations from Southern literature on the evils of free society. He had been deeply impressed by the favourite question of Republican orators: could the free labouring man get two dollars a day, when a black slave cost his master but ten cents a day? Or, as Senator Ben Wade put it, when a Southern colleague called the Homestead Bill a sop to Northern paupers, 'Is it to be lands for the landless, or niggers for the niggerless?'² And in some obscure way Northern labour had come to look upon slavery as an ally of the Northern capitalism that exploited him. He was out to break up what Sumner called the alliance between the 'lords of the lash and the lords of the loom'.

2. Secession

It was a foregone conclusion that South Carolina would secede if Lincoln were elected. Since Calhoun's death, if not before, the leaders of opinion in that State had been waiting for an occasion that would unite the South in a new confederacy. As soon as the result of the election was certain, the South Carolina legislature summoned a state convention. On 20 December 1860 the convention met at Charleston, and unanimously

¹ W. E. Dodd, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xvi. 774-88.

² J. R. Commons, in *Polit. Sci. Quar.*, xxiv. 468-88.

declared 'that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of "The United States of America" is hereby dissolved'.¹

In the other cotton States there was a strong unionist minority. Many planters like Jefferson Davis, who had travelled in the North and maintained their sense of proportion, wished to give Lincoln's administration a fair trial. Outside South Carolina, secession was largely the work of petty planters, provincial lawyer-politicians, and clergymen. Alexander H. Stephens waged a hopeless struggle for union in Georgia. 'All efforts to save the Union will be unavailing,' he predicted on 30 November 1860. 'The truth is, our leaders and public men . . . do not desire to continue it on any terms. They do not wish any redress of wrongs; they are disunionists *per se*,' and on 3 December, 'The people are run mad. They are wild with passion and frenzy, doing they know not what.' Howell Cobb convinced the waverers with the plea, 'We can make better terms out of the Union than in it,' and the Georgia convention passed an ordinance of secession on 19 January 1861. Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi had already gone. Louisiana and Texas, where old Sam Houston, Jackson nationalist to the last, pled in vain for delay, were out of the Union by 1 February. On the 8th, delegates from these seven States met in congress at Montgomery, Alabama, and formed the Confederate States of America. The next day the congress elected Jefferson Davis provisional President, and A. H. Stephens Vice-president, of the Southern Confederacy.

The causes of secession, as they appeared to its protagonists, were plainly expressed by the state conventions. 'The people of the Northern States', declared Mississippi, 'have assumed a revolutionary position towards the Southern States.' 'They have enticed our slaves from us,' and obstructed their rendition

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 423; *S. D.*, p. 441.

under the Fugitive Slave Law. They claim the right 'to exclude slavery from the Territories', and from any State henceforth admitted to the Union. They have 'insulted and outraged our citizens when travelling among them . . . by taking their servants and liberating the same'. They have 'encouraged a hostile invasion of a Southern State to excite insurrection, murder and rapine'. To which South Carolina added, 'They have denounced as sinful the institution of Slavery; they have permitted the open establishment among them' of abolition societies, and 'have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to Slavery'.¹

On their own showing, then, the States of the lower South seceded as the result of a long series of dissatisfactions respecting the Northern attitude towards slavery. There was no mention in their manifestoes or in their leaders' writings and speeches of any other cause.² No allusion was made to State rights apart from slavery. In fact the Northern States were reproached for shelter-

¹ Ames, *State Docs.*, pp. 310-13; Frank Moore, *Rebellion Record* (1861), p. 4 of documents.

² The tariff figured prominently as a cause in the Confederate propaganda abroad; but was not inserted in the Southern declarations because most of the Southern congressmen, including the entire South Carolina delegation, had voted for the one then in force. The Morrill Tariff of 20 February 1861, which began the reversal of American tariff policy, was only passed in consequence of the withdrawal of Southern Senators from Congress. A letter of Jefferson Davis to a Northern friend, written on 20 January 1861, is a fair example of what was in the Southern mind at the moment of secession: 'Many States, like Iowa, have denied our rights, disregarded their obligations, and have sacrificed their true representatives. To us it became a necessity to transfer our domestic institutions from hostile to friendly hands, and we have acted accordingly. There seems to be but little prospect that we will be permitted to do so peacefully.' Rowland, *Davis*, v. 39. All these 'rights', 'obligations', and 'institutions' had reference to slavery and nothing but slavery.

ing themselves under State rights against the Fugitive Slave Law and the Dred Scott decision. It is also clear that nothing less than a rigid censorship of the press and suppression of speech in the North would have held the cotton States in the Union.

The decision to secede was reached more by emotion than by reasoning ; and the emotion had been steadily rising for twenty years. Already a strong minority regarded Southern independence as an end in itself. Their minds were filled with the vision of a great republic ruled by themselves and their own kind, affording perfect security to their social organism. Lincoln, we must remember, appeared to the South not as we know him, but rather as an obscene baboon, with the serpent Garrison coiled about his body. Union feeling was not wanting in the South, as the election of 1860 showed ; but Southern unionism was not nationalism. The Union was merely an alliance that had lasted too long. The South hoisted the Stars and Bars and spurned the Stars and Stripes, with the same ardour with which a European State leaves a worn-out alliance, and embraces a new one. Southern feelings towards the North and the Union had come to be very much as those of a Southern Englishman might be towards his North and his Union, if communism had spread from the Clyde over Scotland, had confiscated his deer forests and shooting preserves, had spread sedition among the English workmen, and obtained a majority in the House of Commons.

If the Southern people had been realists, they would have listened to Stephens when he predicted that even for the purpose of protecting slavery secession was a colossal act of folly. Southerners and Democrats combined would have possessed a majority in both Houses of Congress, at least until 1863. Lincoln could have done nothing without their consent. Republicans might outlaw slavery in the Territories, but secession would

lose the cotton States all rights of any sort in the Territories. Northern States were not enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law, but secession would make that law a dead letter. Abolitionists were disagreeable fellow countrymen; but their propaganda could not be stopped by international boundaries. The Republicans proposed no interference with slavery in the Southern States, and were ready to pledge their sincerity by a constitutional amendment to that effect.¹ Even had they wished, they could have freed the blacks in unwilling States only by constitutional amendment, or as an act of war. The one way would have been impossible even in 1925, if the slave States had kept united.² The other way was courted by secession. But there was very little expectation in the South that the North would care or dare to fight for the preservation of the Union; and if it should, was not one Southerner a match for five Yankees? Was not cotton King?

‘Yes, the North,’ sez Colquitt,

‘Ef we Southerners all quit,

Would go down like a busted balloon,’ sez he! ³

No people of British stock enjoy revolution for its own sake. It is necessary for their comfort and peace of mind to prove rebellion no treason. The Long Par-

¹ Lincoln’s inaugural address.

² Thirteen States can now (1927) prevent the ratification of a constitutional amendment; there were fifteen slave States in 1860.

³ *Biglow Papers*. Senator Hammond of South Carolina wrote (19 April 1860), ‘Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and we have the sense to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry it out successfully. The North without us would be a motherless calf, bleating about, and die of mange and starvation.’ Rhodes, *U.S.* (1899), ii. 440. See Sir W. H. Russell, *My Diary North and South* (1863), for repeated instances of this feeling in 1861. Even so broad-minded a Virginian as Lieut. Matthew F. Maury could write, ‘New England and the North fattened upon the tribute forced from the South, and prospered as few people have ever done’. D. F. M. Corbin, *Maury*, p. 310.

liament applied the common law against King Charles ; Thomas Jefferson discovered dominion home rule in the British Constitution ; and, when the British Government refused to acknowledge it, appealed to the Law of Nature against George III. Similarly, Calhoun laid the legal foundation for the Southern Confederacy in his masterly expositions of all that was implied in State sovereignty. So ably was the case presented that many people in the North were converted—as many in England had been converted by something similar in 1776—and almost every white child in the Southern States to-day is brought up in the belief that secession, in a legal sense, was absolutely right. Historically, the doctrine of constitutional secession, as distinct from the Lockean right of revolution, seems to have been first enunciated by John Taylor of Caroline, and first elaborated by the New England Federalists in 1814.¹ It was quickly forgotten by them, and although developed into a dogma by Calhoun, was denied by the Southern Whigs as lately as 1851.²

The case for secession rests on the axiom that the Federal Constitution created a confederacy, not a government, and did not impair the sovereignty of the States. Although the history of the United States affords the most perfect example of plural sovereignty in history, every one in 1860 was thinking in monistic terms. Either the States were individually sovereign, or the people of the whole United States were. Protagonists of national sovereignty were embarrassed in their search for the precise moment when it came into existence, in a Union that was ratified successively by the peoples of the States. Consequently, they took refuge in the historical fallacy that the Union was older than the States. Conversely, the protagonists of State sovereignty found it difficult to explain how States like

¹ F. M. Anderson, in *Proceedings Miss. Val. Hist. Soc.*, vi. 176-88.

² A. C. Cole, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, i. 376-99.

Ohio and Arkansas, erected out of the national domain by Act of Congress, obtained a sovereignty superior to their creator. Just as Rome, in arguing papal supremacy, rests her case upon authority and history, but scorns the excellent argument of gradual growth; so the American nationalists tried to prove their theory by the language of the Constitution and the debates of 1788, instead of pointing to the gradual growth of national feeling which was their real sanction. In 1800 the vast majority of American citizens felt more loyal to their respective States than to the Union. In 1830 none but Virginians, Georgians, and South Carolinians would have followed their States out of the Union, on any possible issue. After 1844, with the growth of Southern self-consciousness, the phrase and the idea of State rights gave place in that section to 'Southern rights'.¹ Many Southern leaders like Jefferson Davis spoke the language of State rights while thinking and acting in terms of Southern nationalism,² but others like Rhett and Yancey meant what they said—a cause of future trouble in the Southern Confederacy. In the North, especially among old Jackson Democrats, there was still considerable State loyalty in 1860; but the mobility of the Northern population made for nationalism, and the immigrants wanted no half-way house between their old country and their new.³

State rights is a relative term. Every one then be-

¹ U. B. Phillips, in *Turner Essays* (1910), p. 217.

² N. W. Stephenson, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxi. 84-90.

³ Familiarity with post-bellum apologetics and the post-bellum attitude of the two sections has deceived many historians into exaggerating this difference between North and South on the subject of State rights and nationalism. The humiliation of defeat and reconstruction gave the Southern people a sentimental devotion to the principle of State rights, without affecting their practice; whilst in Northern eyes the principle seemed befouled with treason. Since the passage of the Prohibitory Amendment—a Southern measure!—there has been a notable reaction towards State rights in the North and West.

lieved, and believes to-day, that the States have certain rights which the Federal Government has no lawful power to touch. State sovereignty is another matter. Admitting that the rights reserved to the States in the Federal Constitution are sovereign in their ordinary nature, they are hardly so in the condition under which they are enjoyed, since three-quarters of the States, including only a minority of the population, may deprive the other quarter, including a majority of the population, of all their privileges¹ by constitutional amendment; as recently they have done in the matter of alcoholic beverages. Secessionists made much of the reservation under which certain States ratified the Constitution,² as if that could have had any effect on the other States; and of the Kentucky and Virginian resolutions of 1798, although their authors acted upon the national theory as Presidents. The nationalists, on the other hand, could point to the fact that every administration since 1788, every President save Tyler, and the Supreme Court under Jay, Marshall, and Taney had acted on the assumption that a sovereign American people existed. No stronger assertions of nationalism were ever made than by three Southern Presidents: Washington, Jackson, and Taylor. After all, effectiveness is the only test of sovereignty. Under the Articles of Confederation the States could and did do anything they pleased; their individual wills were the court of last resort. And if the American people had not cared enough about nationalism in 1861 to maintain it by force, the sovereignty of the States would have been an accomplished fact.

¹ Excepting equal representations in the Senate—Art. v of the Constitution.

² For Virginia's reservation see L. Schuyler, *Constitution of the U.S.*, pp. 163-4, and the deadly parallel in Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 319.

3. *Confusion and Attempted Compromise*

Many things happened during that awkward four months' interval between the choice of presidential electors and the inauguration of a new President. Lincoln's election was assured in early November, 1860. South Carolina seceded in December, and the Confederate Government was formed on 8 February 1861; but Lincoln could not be inaugurated until 4 March. In the meantime James Buchanan was President, with a Cabinet that included three secessionists, and only one strong nationalist after Cass resigned in disgust (12 December). Buchanan had the same power to defend federal property and collect federal taxes within States that obstructed federal law as Jackson possessed in 1832, but was timid by nature, scrupulous of principle, and oppressed by his surroundings.¹ Washington was a Southern city. House, Senate, Cabinet, and all the federal departments were riddled with secession. To onlookers the Federal Government seemed to be dissolving; soon there would be nothing left to secede from.² Public opinion gave the President no lead. The Northern people had grown so accustomed to Southern threats of secession that when the talk became a reality they could hardly credit the fact, and few had any notion what to do about it. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote a pleasant little poem to 'Caroline, Caroline, child of the sun', promising to kiss the naughty child when she came home again. Horace Greeley of the New York *Tribune* and General Winfield Scott struck the key-note of Northern sentiment

¹ No one should condemn Buchanan before reading his apologia, *Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion* (1866). He had no sympathy with secession, and there is no ground for the assertion that Floyd, Buchanan's Secretary of War, used his position to transfer arms and munitions from Northern to Southern arsenals.

² Henry Adams, 'The Secession Winter', *Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc.*, xliii. 656-87.

in January with the phrase 'Wayward sisters, depart in peace'.

'Why not?' we are entitled to ask, in an era that has heard much of self-determination. The answer was given in Lincoln's inaugural address: 'Physically speaking, we cannot separate.' With the best will in the world, a readjustment and redistribution of federal power would have been difficult;¹ and goodwill was notably wanting. Peace could not have been maintained for a year between the United States and the Southern Confederacy. Fugitive slaves, adjustments of the national debt, of each government's share in the Territories, of the Mississippi outlet for the Northwest, would have raised dilemmas inescapable save by force; and there was no knowing where secession might stop. The inevitable end would have been militarism, and an American balance of power; the probable end would have been the Balkanization of North America.

Buchanan's attorney-general advised him that secession was illegal, but that he had no right to coerce a State; so the good man, with many tears and prayers, spent his slender store of energy in promoting various schemes of compromise. There was still hope, he thought, of tempting back the seceded States, so long as Virginia and seven other slave States were within the Union. Although nothing came of these projects, they served the useful purpose of showing Northern conservatives that there could be no compromise between separation and coercion.

The first of these compromise schemes came in the form of constitutional amendments, proposed by Senator Crittenden of Kentucky, on 18 December 1860:

¹ The matter of breaking up the federal postal service, for instance, was so difficult that the Confederacy permitted the United States mails to run their usual course through the South until 1 June 1861, six weeks after the Civil War had begun, and almost six months after South Carolina had 'resumed her separate and equal place among nations'.

(a) re-establishment of the 36° 30' division in the Territories, (b) non-interference by Congress with slavery in the States and the District of Columbia, (c) compensation to owners for fugitive slaves not recovered.¹ Lincoln, the President-elect, was willing to accept the last two, if the Southern senators would issue an appeal to their States against secession. Respecting the first proposition he had already written to a Republican congressman, 'Prevent, as far as possible, any of our friends from demoralizing themselves and our cause by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort on "slavery extension". There is no possible compromise upon it but which puts us under again and leaves us all our work to do over again. . . . On that point hold firm, as with a chain of steel.'²

The Crittenden compromise, therefore, was not supported by the Republicans; and the seceded States showed not the slightest interest in a so-called peace convention summoned by Virginia on 4 February 1861. The futility of it was brought out by an ironic amendment proposed by a Northern member:

Whenever a party shall be beaten in any election for President, such party may rebel and take up arms, and, unless the successful shall adopt as its own the principles of the defeated party, and consent to such amendments to the Constitution as the latter party shall dictate, then, in such case, the Union shall be at an end.³

A few days later Lincoln agreed that 'no concession . . . short of a surrender of everything worth preserving and contending for would satisfy the South'.⁴

¹ Macdonald, *S. D.*, p. 439.

² To E. B. Washburne, 13 December 1860.

³ *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, i. 368.

⁴ T. H. Pease, *Diary of O. H. Browning*, p. 17.

XLV

CIVIL WAR BEGINS

MARCH—APRIL 1861

1. *Inauguration of President Lincoln*

ON the morning of 4 March 1861, when Abraham Lincoln was to be inaugurated President of the no longer United States, Washington appeared care-free and slovenly as usual. Actually, the people were nervously expectant of trouble. It was rumoured that secessionists from Virginia or 'plug-uglies' from Baltimore would raid the capital, surrounded as it was by slave territory, and prevent the inauguration.

General Scott took every possible precaution, but the soldiers at his disposal were too few even to relieve the black-coated sombreness of the crowd. The inaugural procession, as it moved up Pennsylvania avenue under the harsh glare of a March sun, while a blustering wind blew clouds of dust roof-high, might have been a funeral procession. The Capitol, with its great uncompleted dome supporting an unkempt fringe of derricks, suggested ruination. President Buchanan, urbane and white-haired; Chief Justice Taney, stern and dignified, seemed symbols of a golden age of the Republic that was over. President Lincoln, uncouth and ill-at-ease, inspired no confidence until his high-pitched determined voice was heard delivering the solemn phrases of the inaugural address. One slight incident in the ceremony alone gave promise of better days. As Lincoln, ready to speak and holding his manuscript in one hand, seemed embarrassed by his high hat in the other, Senator Douglas relieved him of it, and stood by as his ancient rival made a last plea for union.

After a brief review of the constitutional issues involved in secession, Lincoln renewed the pledge of his

party to respect slavery in the States, and to enforce any fugitive slave law that had proper safeguards for the coloured people of the free States.

‘In your hands,’ he addressed the South, ‘and not in mine, is the momentous issue of the civil war. The Government will not assail you.’ But, ‘I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. . . . No State, upon its own mere action, can lawfully get out of the Union. . . . I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. . . . The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts.’

2. *Fort Sumter, Seward, and Virginia*

Buchanan had flinched from defending those coigns of vantage, the federal forts in the Southern States; and we shall judge him less harshly when we reflect that it took Lincoln a month to meet the issue bravely. By the time he was inaugurated, all the forts and navy yards in the seceded States, save Fort Pickens at Pensacola and Fort Sumter at Charleston, had fallen unresisting to the Confederate authorities.¹ From the Southern point of view, the jurisdiction of such places passed with secession to the States, and their retention by the Federal Government was equivalent to an act of war. Confederate commissioners came to Washington to treat for their surrender, a few days after Lincoln’s inauguration. Although Seward refused to receive the gentlemen, he assured them that no supplies or provisions would be sent to the forts without due notice, and led them to expect a speedy evacuation.

¹ One attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter by means of an unarmed steamer had been made in January 1861; she had been fired on by a state battery in Charleston harbour and forced to return. It is one of the mysteries of the period why this earliest firing on the flag should have attracted little attention in the North.

William H. Seward, as Lincoln's chief rival for the nomination, and the most experienced statesman in the Republican party, had been given the State Department, where he was playing a deep and dangerous game. Lincoln he regarded as a mere yokel from the Middle West ; and in truth Lincoln's public appearances during the crisis of the winter had been for the most part undignified, and his utterances even flippant. Of course Lincoln was always flippant when thinking most deeply, but Seward did not yet know Lincoln ; nor did he know the Confederate leaders. Judging them in the light of New York politics, Seward doubted their sincerity and determination. In his opinion, secession was a mere humbug for obtaining concessions to Southern rights ; if a collision could be avoided, the leaders would sneak back into the Union. If they did not, Seward would rally the Southern people to their old flag by a foreign war.

Major Anderson, commanding Fort Sumter, notified the War Department that his supplies were coming to an end, and that new Confederate batteries commanded his position. Fort Sumter had no strategic value in case of civil war. Why, then, risk war by holding it ? The Confederacy made it quite clear that any attempt to reinforce or even to supply Sumter would be regarded as a hostile act, when Virginia was certain to join the Confederacy. If, however, the forts were tamely yielded, would not the principle of Union be fatally compromised ? Could a recognition of the Confederacy thereafter be avoided ?

Lincoln delayed decision not from fear, but because he was watching Virginia. Jefferson Davis, too, was watching Virginia. The Old Dominion was a stake worth playing for. Although long since fallen from her primacy in wealth and statesmanship, her sons were the ablest officers in the United States army, and her soil was almost certain to be the theatre of any war between

the sections. The 'panhandle' of western Virginia thrust a salient between Pennsylvania and Ohio, to within a hundred miles of Lake Erie. If Virginia seceded, she must carry North Carolina with her; and Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas would probably follow.

Virginia showed her union sentiment in 1860 by voting for Bell rather than Breckinridge; but unionism in Virginia was almost the antithesis to nationalism. It meant a voluntary association of sovereign States. The ruling class had always regarded their State as a sovereign entity. Patrick Henry's anti-federalism merged easily into the State sovereignty ideas adumbrated by John Taylor, crudely expressed in the Resolves of 1798, and kept alive by Taylor and Randolph during the period of Jefferson's apostasy into nationalism, until Calhoun could refine them into a dogma. Yet Virginia never spoke with a single voice. After Madison and Marshall passed away, their nationalism became orthodox in Virginia's Ulster, her transmontane counties of small farms, few slaves, and growing manufactures, closely knit with Pennsylvania and Ohio. On the other hand, Virginians like Dew and Fitzhugh provided Calhoun with the materials for his intellectual defence of slavery; and scions of the first families, such as Mason, Hunter, and Wise, were prominent among the ranters of Southern grievances and the roarers for Southern rights.

A Virginia state convention was elected by the people in January 1861, and met at Richmond on 13 February. A majority of the delegates were elected as Union men; but even they were torn between sympathy for the lower South, hatred of the Republicans, and suspicion of South Carolina; while the secessionist minority was united and aggressive. For two months the Convention held its hand, while compromise measures were discussed in Congress and in the 'peace conference'.

Delegations of unionist members visited Washington and besought Lincoln to let Fort Sumter go. Twice the President offered to do so if the Virginian unionists 'would break up their convention without any row or nonsense'; but they could not promise so much; and it was fortunate for the Union that they did not. For, as Lincoln came to see, there were too many conditions attached to Virginian unionism. Yielding Fort Sumter would keep Virginia loyal for the time being, but would not bring the 'wayward sisters' back; and Virginia would join them the moment he raised his hand to strike. Lincoln, then, saw that yielding Fort Sumter would not settle the deep issue of State sovereignty. If Virginia would not accept the Union as it was, she must abide the consequences. Towards the end of March Lincoln determined to face the issue squarely. Against the advice of General Scott, and of five out of seven members of the Cabinet, he ordered a relief expedition to be prepared for Fort Sumter.

Seward then showed his hand. On All Fools Day, 1861, he presented Lincoln with a paper entitled 'Thoughts for the President's Consideration'. The most startling proposal in this extraordinary document was one that the United States should at once pick a quarrel with France and Spain, possibly with England and Russia as well, as a means of reuniting North and South for glory and conquest. And Lincoln was invited to appoint Seward his Mayor of the Palace, to execute this mad policy.

Lincoln calmly replied that he saw no reason to abandon the policy outlined in his inaugural address. As for declaring war on Europe, 'I remark that if this must be done, I must do it.'¹ But Seward was too intent on his scheme to catch the President's meaning. On 6 April, when the President ordered the Sumter expedition to sail, Seward by deception obtained the

¹ Both documents are in Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, iii. 445-9.

President's signature directing the capital ship of the expedition to Fort Pickens.¹

It mattered nothing. When Lincoln's informal warning that an attempt would be made 'to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only' arrived at Montgomery, it found Jefferson Davis in a similar state of confusion and perplexity. Southern spirits were evaporating for want of a fight; in Charleston there were murmurs of dissatisfaction with the Confederacy; only a collision could 'fire the Southern heart' and bring in Virginia. Robert Toombs, Confederate Secretary of State, begs for delay. To attack Fort Sumter, he predicts, would be to 'strike a hornet's nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death'. Finally, Davis orders General Beauregard, commanding the Charleston district, to fire on Sumter only if absolutely necessary to prevent reinforcement. On the night of 12-13 April Beauregard sends four staff officers, one a Virginian, to Fort Sumter demanding its surrender. Major Anderson, a Kentuckian who loathed the idea of civil war, had no desire for the sort of fame that would come from being the occasion of it. Nothing as yet had been seen or heard of the relief expedition. So, at a quarter past three in the morning, he offers to surrender as soon as he may do so with honour—in two days' time, when the garrison's food will be exhausted. The Confederate staff officers promptly refuse this condition, and on their own responsibility give orders

¹ The relations between Lincoln, the different members of his Cabinet, the War and Navy Departments, Major Anderson, the Virginian Convention, the Confederate authorities, and many informal go-betweens, were so complicated, and for lack of a complete written record are now so obscure, as to offer an historical riddle of great difficulty. Why Seward thought the South would see a distinction in principle between reinforcing Pickens and Sumter is inexplicable. See Channing, vi. 308-14, and authorities mentioned in his bibliography; Stephenson's *Lincoln*, pp. 142-67, and notes to his chapter xv.

to open fire. For, as the Virginian admitted in later life, they feared that Davis would clasp hands with Seward, and the chance of war would slip away for ever.

On 13 April 1861, at 4.30 a.m., the first gun of the Civil War was fired against Fort Sumter. The relief expedition appeared, but for lack of its capital ship was unable to pass the batteries. All day Major Anderson replied as best he could, to a concentric fire from four or five Confederate forts and batteries, while the beauty and fashion of Charleston flocked to the waterfront as to a gala. At nine the next morning, 14 April, the barracks caught fire; in the early afternoon the flagstaff was shot away, and a few hours later, although his situation was by no means desperate, Major Anderson accepted terms of surrender. On the afternoon of Sunday, 15 April, the garrison marched out with drums beating and colours flying.

Walt Whitman caught the spirit of the moment in his

Beat ! beat ! drums !—blow ! bugles ! blow !

Through the windows—through doors—burst like a ruthless force,

Into the solemn church, and scatter the congregation,

Into the school where the scholar is studying ;

Leave not the bridegroom quiet—no happiness must he have now with his bride,

Nor the peaceful farmer any peace, ploughing his field or gathering his grain,

So fierce you whirr and pound you drums—so shrill you bugles blow.

Doubt and hesitation vanished in the North. Men knew instantly that the Union was what they cared for most and the flag was what they held most sacred. Advocates of letting the 'wayward sisters' depart in peace now remembered Webster's warning, and Clay's, that there could be no peaceable secession. Those who loathed the idea of a Union maintained by force now

knew there could be no Union upon any other terms. Democrats and Republicans, State-rights men and nationalists, native-born and foreign-born, had only one word for the act of firing on their flag—treason.

3. *Secession completed*

On 15 April President Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers in order to put down combinations 'too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings', and 'to cause the laws to be duly executed'.¹ Virginia saw no honourable alternative between contributing her quota for coercion and taking the Southern part. Already the Virginian secessionists were organizing attacks on the Norfolk navy yard and the arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and threatening to purge the state convention. That body was in a state of high-strung emotion bordering on hysteria, when Lincoln's call precipitated matters. On 17 April it voted, 88 to 55, to submit an ordinance of secession to the people. Without awaiting their certain verdict, the Governor placed his State under Confederate orders.

Virginia did not secede whole from the Union;² but three more States followed her greater part into the Southern Confederacy. Arkansas seceded on 6 May; Tennessee on 7 May concluded an alliance with the Confederacy, which a month later the people approved; North Carolina, having previously voted

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 433.

² The Unionists of transmontane Virginia called a regional convention at Wheeling, which declared the ordinance of secession null and void, and instituted a loyal government, theoretically extending over the whole State. It was recognized by President and Congress as the *de jure* government of Virginia and, as such, gave its 'consent' to the admission of West Virginia as a State in 1863. The very lukewarm response of West Virginia to Lincoln's calls for volunteers suggests that the real impulse of this separatist movement was dislike of the planter aristocracy, not loyalty to the Union. J. C. McGregor, *Disruption of Virginia* (Macmillan, 1922).

down secession, was in the impossible position of a Union enclave until 20 May, when she ratified the Confederate constitution. The attitude of Maryland was crucial, for her secession would isolate the Federal Government at Washington. The first Northern troops on their way to the capital were mobbed as they passed through Baltimore (19 April), and Lincoln wisely permitted the rest to be marched round the city until he could spare enough troops to occupy it and enforce martial law. The Maryland legislature protested against 'coercion' of the Southern Confederacy, but refused to summon a state convention; and danger of disunion in that quarter passed.¹ The government of Kentucky, where opinion was divided as in no other State, refused to obey the call for volunteers, and endeavoured in vain to enforce neutrality, but by the end of the year threw in its lot with the Union. Missouri was practically under a dual régime throughout the war; Delaware never wavered in her loyalty. In California there was a fierce struggle between Southern sympathizers and the Unionists, which the latter won; but California was too remote to give the Union cause other than pecuniary aid, in which she was generous.²

4. *Choice of Side*

'The Union of twenty-three States and the Confederacy of eleven were now arrayed against each other.' But the lines were not strictly drawn between the States that seceded and those that did not. The majority of men went with their neighbours, as majorities always do. But there were thousands who

¹ G. W. Brown, *Baltimore and the 19th of April 1861* (Johns Hopkins Studies, 1887, extra vol. iii).

² E. R. Kennedy, *The Contest for California in 1861* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912). The Indians of the Indian Territory, many of whom were slaveholders, threw in their lot with the South.

chose their side from higher motives of sentiment and opinion. It by no means follows, as Lord Wolseley so readily asserted, that had Stonewall Jackson been a Yankee he would have fought for the Union, or that Grant, if born a Virginian, would have worn the Confederate grey. The Confederate army contained men from every Northern State, who preferred the Southern type of civilization to their own; and fashionable society in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York was pro-Southern to the end. The United States army and navy contained loyal men from every seceded State, Americans who knew that the break-up of their Union would be the worst blow to the cause of self-government, republicanism, and democracy since the day that Bonaparte assumed the purple. Admiral Farragut was from Alabama; Caleb Huse, the most efficient Confederate agent in Europe, was from Massachusetts; Samuel P. Lee commanded the Union naval forces on the James while his uncle, General Lee, was resisting Grant in the Wilderness; two sons of Commodore Porter, U.S.N., fought under Stonewall Jackson;¹ Major-General T. L. Crittenden, U.S.A., was brother to Major-General G. B. Crittenden, C.S.A. Three brothers of Mrs. Lincoln died for the South, and the President's kinsmen on his mother's side were Southern sympathizers, while near kinsmen of Mrs. Davis were in the Union army. In a house in West Twentieth Street, New York, a little boy named Theodore Roosevelt prayed for the Union armies at the knee of his Georgian mother, whose brothers were in the Confederate navy. At the same moment, in the Presbyterian parsonage of Augusta, Georgia, another little boy named Woodrow Wilson knelt in the family circle

¹ E. A. Moore, *A Cannoneer under Stonewall Jackson*, p. 29. The author was one of eleven first cousins who fought for the Confederacy against an equal number of first cousins, including General McDowell, in the Union army.

while his Ohio-born father invoked the God of Battles for the Southern cause.

It is degrading to the memory of a man of Robert E. Lee's stature to assume that he acted on the vulgar principle of his country or his state, right or wrong. Lee was a great and simple person, like George Washington, with a character so pure and well-rounded as to offer no flaw or protuberance for the historian's scalpel. His traditions, and those of his family, were nationalist. Light-Horse Harry Lee, his grandfather, had been a companion of Washington, and a Federalist. His wife was a descendant of Martha Washington. Lee abhorred the methods of the abolitionists, but agreed with them that slavery was wrong, and emancipated his few inherited slaves. He did not believe in the constitutional right of secession, and severely criticized the action of the cotton States. Lincoln's inaugural address seemed to him a sufficient guarantee for Virginia. On 23 January 1861 Lee wrote to his son, 'I can contemplate no greater calamity for the country than a dissolution of the Union. . . . Still, a Union that can only be maintained by swords and bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take the place of brotherly love and kindness, has no charm for me.' To a cousin and brother officer of the United States army, who determined to remain faithful to the flag, Lee wrote expressing sympathy and respect for his 'notions of allegiance'. But, 'I have been unable to make up my mind to raise my hand against my native State, my relatives, my children and my home'.¹ With deep regret Colonel Lee resigned his commission in the United States army; only a sense of duty induced him to accept a commission in the cause of which he was to be the main prop.

Robert E. Lee might make a mistake, but he could not do wrong. He would have been right in accepting

¹ Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 256.

the offer of Lincoln to command the United States army, and in leading the forces of Union to victory in a year's time, as he alone might have done. He was right in choosing the part of those who were dearest to him. What anguish that decision cost him we can never know. What it cost the United States we know too well.

George H. Thomas, another great and simple Virginian in the United States army, loved his State no less than Lee ; but after the guns at Sumter had spoken, 'which-ever way he turned the matter over in his mind, his oath of allegiance to his government always came uppermost'.¹

To a third Virginian, Senator James Y. Mason, we are indebted for the most accurate definition of the great struggle that was about to begin : ' I look upon it then, Sir, as a war of sentiment and opinion by one form of society against another form of society '.²

¹ Gamaliel Bradford, *Union Portraits*, p. 108. Winfield Scott, the first General-in-Chief of the Union Army, was also a Virginian ; but his attachment to his State had weakened during fifty years' army service.

² *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 sess., p. 35 (1861). It is for this reason that the Civil War is properly so called. The earlier official title, War of the Rebellion, has been dropped out of deference to Southern wishes, and there seems no good reason to adopt the cumbrous title used by many Southern writers, ' The War between the States '.

XLVI

CONDITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

1861

I. *Conditions of Victory*

AT a distance of sixty years men wonder at the rash and hopeless gallantry of the Southern war for independence. A loose agrarian confederacy of five or six million whites and three and a half million slaves challenged a federal union of nineteen or twenty million freemen with overwhelming financial and industrial advantages.¹ Yet, futile as the effort proved and tragic in its consequences, the Southern cause was not predestined to defeat.

¹ By the census of 1860 the white population of the eleven seceded States was 5,449,467; the white population of the nineteen free States, 18,936,579. Both figures leave out of account the white population (2,589,533) of the four border slave States (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri), which did not secede, but which probably contributed as many men to the Confederacy as to the Union. Subtracting the loyal regions of Virginia and Tennessee would reduce the Confederacy's white population to about five million. By the census of 1860 there were 3,521,111 slaves in the Confederate States, and 429,401 in the four border States, and from those the Union recruited about 100,000 troops. For a discussion of the insoluble problem of the numbers of the two armies, see Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 430-4, and A. B. Moore, *Conscription in the Confederacy*, pp. 357-8. Both Channing and Eckenrode believe that there were about 800,000 enrolments in the Confederate army; Moore estimates from 850,000 to 900,000. T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War*, pp. 50, 61, computes 2,900,000 enlistments in the Union army, which reduced to three-year enlistments by doubling up short terms would make 1,570,000; but his estimate for Confederate three-year enlistments, 1,082,000, is probably too high. The classic Southern estimate, accepted by most Southern historians and even inscribed on monuments, is 600,000 Confederates to 2,750,000 Union soldiers. That is certainly very far from the truth. Perhaps the most accurate basis of comparison is the census of 1890, which showed 432,020 Confederate and 1,034,073 Union veterans surviving.

The Confederacy, in order to win, needed merely to defend its own territory long enough to weary the Northerners of war. The United States, in order to win, had to conquer an empire¹ and crush a people. A negotiated peace, or any less emphatic result than unconditional surrender of the Southern armies and total collapse of the Confederate Government, would have meant some sort of special privilege to the Southern States within the Union, if not independence without the Union: in either event a Southern victory. Material advantages were not all in favour of the Union. To set off the Northern superiority in numbers, wealth, industry, and sea-power, the Confederacy had the advantage of interior lines, and a social organization better fitted for creating an efficient fighting force. The moral scales were heavily balanced in favour of the Confederacy. Slavery was the cause of secession, but only indirectly a force in the war. From their own point of view, Southerners were fighting for everything that men hold most dear: for liberty and self-government, for hearth and home, for the supremacy of their race. They could abandon the struggle only by sacrificing the very bases of their society; and defeat for them involved the most bitter humiliation to which any people has been subjected in modern times. The Northern people, on the contrary, could have stopped the war at any moment, at the mere cost of recognizing what to many seemed an accomplished fact, and without any sacrifice of the solid and material factors that most closely touch the life of the family. They were fighting merely for an idea and a sentiment, the sentiment of Union, which, translated into action, seemed to tender souls scarcely different from conquest. Negro emanci-

¹ The area of the Confederacy at its greatest extent was equal to that of the whole of Western Europe, less Scandinavia and Italy. Texas alone was the size of France, and had a greater man-power than the two Boer republics in 1899-1901.

pation, itself an ideal, came more as an incident than as an object of the war. It was not the abolitionist 'Battle-Hymn of the Republic' that sent the blood leaping through Northern veins in those years of trial, but the simple sentiment of :

The Union forever, hurrah ! boys, hurrah !

Down with the traitor, up with the star,

While we rally round the flag, boys, rally once again,

Shouting the battle-cry of Freedom.

Under these circumstances there was every reason to expect that the South would win. Europe as a whole so believed, as soon as Russell's letters to *The Times*, and the news of Bull Run, seemed to prove that the South was in earnest, and that the North was not. The Thirteen Colonies, the Netherlands, and in recent memory the South American and the Italian States had achieved their independence against greater odds ; and if Hungary had failed, it was because Russia threw her weight on the other side. Even devoted partisans of the American Union like John Bright hardly dared hope for its complete restoration ; and among the statesmen, the military experts, the journalists, the men of letters, and leaders of public opinion in western Europe, those who before the end of 1864 doubted the permanency of separation were few and inconspicuous. For there was one imponderable and unique factor of which almost every one in Europe was ignorant : the steadfast devotion to the Union which alone made it possible for the superior material resources of the United States to prevail. Even to-day, any one remote from the heart of American life cannot but feel that there was something miraculous in the extent to which the common people came to share the vision of Abraham Lincoln, that the whole future of their race, and of democracy, was bound up with the Union of the States.

2. *The Confederate States of America*

The opposing governments were nearly identical in pattern. The Constitution of the Confederate States differed only from that of the 'fathers' in so far as it was 'explanatory of their well-known intent'.¹ In making explicit those guarantees of slave property and State rights, that the South found implicit in the older document, she did not improve it as a framework of government, or as an instrument of war. Like most constitutions it had more reference to the controversies of the past than to the needs of the future. Bounties, protective tariffs, and 'internal improvements' were forbidden. Federal officials and even judges could be impeached by the legislatures of the State in which their functions were exercised.² No 'law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves' could be passed by the Confederate Congress, and in all new territory acquired 'the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected'. In two respects only was the Confederate Constitution an improvement over its model. Congress, unless by a two-thirds majority, could appropriate money only upon the President transmitting the request and estimate by some head of an executive department; and these heads of departments, who constituted an informal Cabinet in the new government as in the old, might be granted a seat in Congress and the privilege of discussion. The President, further, had the right to veto items of appropriation bills. Actually these provisions, which Lord Acton declared

¹ The Confederate and United States Constitutions are printed in parallel columns in Jefferson Davis, *Rise and Fall*, i. 648; the differing clauses of the one may be found in Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 424, or *S. D.*, p. 446.

² Apart from this the section on the judiciary was identical with that of the Constitution in 1787; but State prejudices permitted no Supreme Court of the Confederacy to be established.

alone to be worth a revolution, remained inoperative during the short lifetime of the Confederacy.¹ President Davis and his Congress worked less in harmony than had any President and Congress of the United States since Tyler.

In the view of outsiders, the Southern Confederacy seemed animated by a single will and purpose; actually it was weakened by faction and shaken by its inherent vice of localism. Davis and most of the Southern leaders had been talking in terms of State rights but thinking in terms of Southern nationalism; yet many important men, especially in Virginia and the Carolinas, loved State rights more than Southern unity, and feared a centralizing tyranny at Richmond no less than they had at Washington. No Union general ever had to write, as Lee did of Georgia and Carolina when contemplating an advance: 'If these States will give up their troops, I think it can be done.'² The composition and character of the Southern people was unfavourable for united and intelligent effort. The gentry, more accustomed to direct slaves than to control themselves, full of *idées fixes* on political principles as on slaves and cotton, could neither co-operate effectively with their President, nor get along without him, and were only comfortable in the army. The Southern democracy of yeomen and poor whites made excellent fighting material, and up to a certain point could easily be led; but that point, as we shall see, happened to be at the crucial moment. Ignorant and hopelessly provincial, this Southern democracy never even remotely realized what the Confederacy had to face, and the government did nothing to

¹ Owing to Congressional jealousy of Davis and dislike of his Cabinet, the necessary two-thirds majority was easily obtained, and a bill according the privilege of seat and discussion died in committee. Debates, 31 March 1862, *Southern Hist. Soc. Papers*, no. 45, p. 36. Davis, in his four years of office, vetoed thirty-eight bills, all but one of which were passed over his veto. Lincoln in the same period issued only three vetoes.

² *Lee-Davis Dispatches*, p. 6.

enlighten it. Slaves proved to be a material asset for war production. If Davis could have made up his mind to arm them before Lincoln decided to free them, they might well have been the decisive military factor.

3. *The Two Presidents and their Cabinets*

During the war both Davis and Lincoln were regarded by their enemies as fiends incarnate ; and by many of their own people were accused of everything from incompetence and corruption to tyranny and treason. In 1861 few on either side doubted that the Southerner was the abler, as he appeared the more dignified figure of the two. Successively lieutenant of dragoons, colonel of volunteers, congressman, senator, and secretary of war, Davis brought experience such as Lincoln had never had, and talents that he never claimed, to the Southern presidency. Courage, sincerity, patience, and integrity were his ; only tact, perception, and inner harmony were wanting to make him a very great man. Davis was torn between a desire to command and a taste for intellectual solitude ; between nationalist instinct and State-rights faith. Isolated from the Southern democracy out of which he had sprung, he moved as to the manner born among the whispering aristocracy of Richmond ; yet he had a perverse knack of infuriating the gentlemen who tried to work with him or under him, unless they would place their minds in his keeping.

His pronounced military tastes, and slight military experience, led Davis to his cardinal error of attempting to direct military operations as well as civil administration. Only a Bonaparte could successfully have played the dual role in the Confederacy ; and even Bonaparte had a general staff, and a centralized government. Davis had neither the time to exercise effective control nor the talent to choose effective instruments. The consequences were disastrous, both for the cause and for its leader. The Confederacy lacked the strategic

unity that would have given it the full benefit of interior lines. The President's health and nerves gave way, and his state papers show an increasing querulousness and bitterness, which contrast sadly with the sustained dignity and magnanimity of all that Lincoln wrote during the war.

Davis selected his own Cabinet for work, not for politics. It contained only two members of the governing class, Robert Toombs and Pope Walker, both of whom soon quarrelled with the President and resigned. The others, able and devoted servants to the Confederacy, exerted no influence and inspired slight confidence. Secretary Memminger of the Treasury was a German, and Secretary Mallory of the Navy half Yankee in race and British West-Indian by birth ; Judah P. Benjamin, the ablest of the group and the closest to Davis, was a Hebrew, whose perpetual smile and bumptious manner were peculiarly irritating to the Southern gentry.¹

If Lincoln's Cabinet carried more weight than that of Davis, it had less cohesion. Not a single member was a personal friend or follower of the President. His choice was restricted by the need of representing every element in the Republican party, and every loyal section of the Union. Seward's appointment brought the administration confidence, and eventually strength ; but not until he had almost wrecked it by his aggressive foreign policy. Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, was a Pennsylvanian manufacturer who proved to be criminally careless in the management of his department. Salmon P. Chase, an imposing university graduate with a disagreeable streak of slyness and insolence, received the Treasury as a party chieftain, and a rival for the Republican nomination in 1860. His aspirations

¹ Benjamin, of whom it has been said that no one served the Confederacy with better brains and less heart, was also a British subject by birth, and after the war was admitted to the English Bar and became Queen's Counsel.

were whetted by office, but he never developed more than a moderate talent for administration and finance. Gideon Welles, formerly a bureau chief in the Navy Department, latterly a newspaper editor in a small inland town, was appointed Secretary of the Navy as a New Englander and a recent convert from the Democratic party. His Biblical name and patriarchal beard made Welles the butt of the administration; later he took appropriate revenge by writing a pungent autobiography. Edward Bates and Montgomery Blair, the Attorney-General and Postmaster-General, were good second-rate characters who represented the loyal slave States in the Cabinet.

At the beginning of Lincoln's administration the members of the Cabinet distrusted one another, and Blair alone had much respect for the President. Seward assumed the role of Premier—as he liked to be called and considered.¹ After the firing on Sumter, several months elapsed before the President was really master in his own house. The change of scene, the hurly-burly of war preparations, seemed for a time to cut his contact with that unconscious, unseen force that lifted him from the common herd. Yet his feeling for the democratic medium in which he had to work, for its limitations, imperfections, and possibilities, was akin to that of a great artist for the medium of sculpture or painting. He could capture the imagination of the common soldier and citizen; and at the same time make the outstanding quality of an ill-balanced character, as of McClellan and Stanton, an instrument of his great purpose. This rail-splitter, this prairie clodhopper with his droll stories and his few, poor, crude social devices yet had an innate tact and delicacy that carried conviction of his moral and intellectual superiority to all but

¹ Welles, *Diary*, i. 136. The amazing interference of Seward in naval matters at this period is best told by C. O. Paullin, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xiv. 295-7.

the most obtuse, and a humanity that has opened the hearts of all men to him in the end.

4. *Lincoln's Conception of the War*

If Lincoln was slow to direct the conduct of the war, he never faltered in his conception of the purpose of the war. From Sumter to Appomattox, it was for him a war to preserve the Union. The power that lay in that word came less from an instinct of nationality than from the passionate desire of a youthful people to prove its worth by the only test that all the world recognized. The Union, which for Washington was a justification for the American Revolution, and for Hamilton a panoply of social order, had become, in the hands of Jackson, Clay, and Webster, a symbol of popular government. Lincoln drove home this conception in his every utterance, and gave it classical expression in the Gettysburg address. He made the average American feel that his dignity as a citizen of a free republic was bound up with the fate of the Union, whose destruction would be a victory for the enemies of freedom in every country.

Lincoln could not bring every one to this conception. Many members of the Democratic party in the North still looked upon the States as the symbol of democracy. Many believed civil war too great a price to pay for union. The abolitionists would support the Union only on the condition of its serving their immediate purpose. Nor did Lincoln completely dominate his own group. Many Republicans regarded the war as a mere assertion of Northern superiority ; for the Republican party in 1861 was essentially a Northern, not a Union party. Because Lincoln, ignoring all appeals to hatred, sectionalism, and humanitarianism, raised the standard of Union at the beginning and kept it paramount, the Union was preserved. Prominent Democrats such as Stephen Douglas promptly rallied the best elements of their party to the colours ; and in a few

months the entire Ohio valley, half slaveholding in fact, and largely pro-slavery in sentiment, was secure. His enemies sneered, 'Lincoln would like to have God on his side, but he must have Kentucky.' His friends doubted whether even God could preserve the Union without Kentucky. Nor did he ever forget that those whom he liked to call 'our late friends, now adversaries' must, if his object were attained, become fellow citizens once more. The frantic appeals of Davis to class and sectional hatred found no answering echo in the words of Lincoln, who could never bring himself to contemplate the South with other feelings than sorrow and compassion.

5. *The Two Armies*

In the matter of military preparations the Confederacy had a start of several months on the United States, and secured the ablest officers of the United States Army then in active service—Lee, both Johnstons, Beauregard, J. E. B. Stuart, and A. P. Hill; as well as Jackson and D. H. Hill, who were teaching in Southern military colleges. No other nation has ever had commanders of such calibre at the very beginning of a great war. The Union army found its proper leaders only through the costly method of trial and error. McClellan, Grant, Sherman, indeed most of the West Pointers¹ who rose to prominence in the Union army, were in civil life at the beginning; and it was fortunate for the Union that they were, since the regular army of the

¹ West Point, on the Hudson, is the military academy that produces officers for the regular army. The corresponding naval academy at Annapolis had been founded in 1845. Both academies were recruited on a geographical basis, so that their Northern and Southern graduates were approximately equal in number. Military service was, however, more attractive to the Southern temperament, and was one of the few careers open to gentlemen in the South. Hence many of the Northern graduates and but few of the Southern resigned from the army after a few years' service, to go into business.

United States—only sixteen thousand strong—was kept intact. Hence many brilliant young officers like Philip Sheridan were confined to small regular units, instead of being used as their seceding brethen to leaven the loaf.

The forty United States naval vessels in commission were scattered over the seven seas. Until mid-April no attempt was made to enlarge or even to concentrate these slender forces, for fear of offending the Virginia Unionists. In the meantime the Confederate States had seized upon the United States arsenals and navy yards within their limits, had obtained munitions from the North and from Europe, had organized State armies; and on 6 March 1861 President Davis called for and quickly obtained a hundred thousand volunteers for twelve months.

Winfield Scott, General-in-Chief of the United States Army, infirm in body but robust in mind, advised the President that at least three hundred thousand men, a general of Wolfe's capacity, and two or three years' time would be required to conquer even the lower South. No one else dared place the estimate so high; and Seward believed with the man in the street that one vigorous thrust would overthrow the Confederacy within ninety days. The President, in his proclamation of 15 April 1861, called for only seventy-five thousand volunteers, for three months.¹ Militia regiments fell over one another in their alacrity to aid the government; New York alone voted to supply thirty thousand men for three years. Within two weeks thirty-five thousand troops were in Washington or on their way thither, and twenty thousand more were waiting for transportation. Undoubtedly the government should have taken advantage of this patriotic outburst to create a really national army for the duration of the war. Instead, Lincoln on 3 May called for forty more volunteer regi-

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 433.

ments,¹ and forty thousand three-year enlistments in the regular army and navy, leaving the recruiting, organization, and equipment of all volunteer regiments to the States. Over-zealous States were coldly admonished, 'it is important to reduce rather than enlarge this number.'² That Lincoln, inexperienced and bewildered, should have lost this golden opportunity, is not perhaps so surprising as that the British Government should have made exactly the same error in 1914.

As a basis for the new army, every Northern State had some sort of volunteer militia force which was mobilized for an annual 'muster' and 'Cornwallis' (sham battle). The company officers were elected by the men, the regimental and general officers appointed by the state governor. A few militia regiments, like the Seventh New York, were well officered and drilled. There were also a number of semi-social, semi-military companies, such as the Fire Zouaves and Sarsfield Guards, which were accustomed to perform fancy evolutions in showy uniforms. Many of these volunteered *en masse*, and proceeded on the road to glory without undue delay.³ But for the most part, the volunteer regiments that made up the bulk of the United States army during the war were regiments *ad hoc*. A patriotic citizen would receive a colonel's commission from his governor, and raise a regiment by his own efforts and

¹ Full regimental strength was 1,050 men.

² F. A. Shannon, 'State Rights and the Union Army', *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xii. 51-7. The author of this important article seems to me wrong in attributing the Federal Government's dependence on State efforts and volunteering to a tenderness for State rights. It was simply following the traditional American methods of raising an army, and used the same machinery as in 1812 and 1846.

³ Walt Whitman describes how two Brooklyn companies were provided with pieces of rope, tied to their musket barrels, with which to bring back 'traitors' from the South. Similarly the Southern volunteers armed themselves with huge bowie-knives to terrorize their presumably pallid enemies.

those of men who expected majorities under him. Units of fifty to one hundred, recruited by some youth of local popularity whom they would select as their lieutenant or captain, were incorporated as companies. When the regiment was reasonably complete and at least partially equipped, it was forwarded to a training camp, and placed under federal control. Although examining boards were appointed for the purpose of removing incompetent officers, the Federal Government in practice had to respect State appointments until they were found wanting in action ; and its own were scarcely better. Prominent politicians like Banks and Butler, without the slightest military experience, received major-generals' commissions from the President, and outranked seasoned officers of the regular army. For giving the whole country a stake in the war, for utilizing community pride and competition, and attracting to the colours the greatest number of men in the shortest possible time, no better method could have been devised after the first blush of enthusiasm had faded ; but it was continued long after its military inadequacy had been proved.

By much the same system was the first Confederate army raised, but with less baneful results ; and the early adoption of conscription substituted a better. The Southern respect for rank and caste gave prompt recognition to natural leaders. Indeed the earlier Southern armies were embarrassed by a plethora of officer material. As J. E. B. Stuart remarked of one Virginian unit, ' They are pretty good officers now, and after a while they will make excellent soldiers too. They only need *reducing to the ranks !*'¹ After the South lost

¹ G. C. Eggleston, *A Rebel's Recollections*, p. 52. Owing to the objection of Southern as well as Northern troops to being led by officers of another State, much of this Virginian officer material remained in the ranks throughout the war. One of General Lee's sons was a private of artillery until after Antietam.

this initial advantage, the two armies were as nearly equal in fighting capacity, man for man, as any two in history ; and they took an unprecedented amount of punishment.¹ If the Confederates won more battles, it was due to their better leadership, which gave them a ' tactical ' superiority on the field of battle, against the ' strategic ' superiority of their enemies on the field of operations. Again and again we find a numerically inferior Confederate army defeating its enemy in detail ; or a Union commander failing to get his available forces into action in time to influence the result. A false contrast has been drawn by many writers between the ' Anglo-Saxon ' or ' Nordic ' country-bred Southerners and the ' mongrel ' city-bred Northerners. As the North had the greater immigrant population, it had a larger proportion of foreign-born soldiers ; but the average Northern soldier was a farmer's son rather than a clerk or factory-hand. There were large numbers of Irish and Germans on both sides ; Dick Taylor's Louisiana Creoles gave quite as good an account of themselves as Stonewall Jackson's dour Presbyterians.

At first the Southern troops had the great advantage of being accustomed to the use of arms—for every slaveholder had to keep weapons by him in case of insurrection, and the non-slaveholders were good marksmen. Both classes were lovers of horseflesh, and it was a poor white indeed who did not own a saddle-horse. Northern troops, unless from the West, had outgrown the hunting and horseback-riding frontier, and the Northern gentry had not yet adopted field sports or fox-hunting for recreation. Discipline, from which the more primitive individualistic Southerners were averse, soon ironed out these differences.² Yet there is no

¹ See comparative statistics in T. A. Dodge, *Bird's Eye View of the Civil War*, p. 121.

² Straggling and desertion impaired the strength of both armies, but particularly of the Confederates. ' Stragglers cover the country, and

doubt that the average Southerner really enjoyed fighting and the average Northerner did not. Even among the generals Lee was the only Confederate who positively loathed war, whilst among the Northern leaders one could count upon the fingers of both hands those like Sheridan, Barlow, Hancock, and Custer, who had a genuine *gaudium certaminis*.

Mobility of the Union armies was impaired by dependence upon communications through hostile territory for the beef and wheat that alone gave Northern troops a stomach for fighting. The Southern soldier, like the Southern European, was a comparatively light eater. His accustomed diet of 'hog and hominy' could be picked up almost anywhere when army supplies ran short; Lee's invading army of sixty thousand lived on apples and growing maize in the Maryland invasion of 1863. The over-fed condition of the Northern 'dough-boy' received ghastly confirmation in the rapid decomposition of his body on the battle-field, compared with those that were clothed in the Confederate grey.

Throughout the war the Union army was the better equipped in boots and clothing, and more abundantly supplied with munitions; yet the red tape of War Department bureaux, and the prejudice of elderly officers, prevented the adoption of the breech-loading rifle. Both in artillery and small-arms, it was largely a war of the muzzle-loader, and to a great extent of the smooth-bore. When the blockade stopped regular shipments from Europe, which was not until the end of 1863, the Confederate ordnance service, under a resourceful Pennsylvanian named Josiah Gorgas, was able to keep the army supplied; and the Confederacy never

Richmond is no doubt filled with the absent without leave,' wrote J. E. Johnston in the midst of the Peninsular campaign. 'The men are full of spirit when near the enemy, but at other times to avoid restraint leave their regiments in crowds.' 1st series *Official Records of the Rebellion* (hereinafter cited as *I O. R.*), xi, part iii, 503.

lost a battle for want of ammunition.¹ Richmond was one of the principal coal- and iron-producing centres in the United States, and her Tredegar Iron Works were well equipped for the manufacture of heavy castings and ordnance. It was there that the iron armour of the *Merrimac* was rolled, her rifled guns cast, and that the first practical submarine vessel was built. But these were the only works in the Confederacy so equipped until 1863, when a newly established plant at Selma, Alabama, began to turn out cannon. Much enterprise was also shown by the Confederate government in organizing Southern woollen mills to turn out cloth for uniforms,² but the Southern armies were never properly supplied with boots. Deficiencies in clothing, equipment, artillery, and small-arms were constantly made good from the supplies abandoned by Union armies in their frequent retreats.

6. *Terrain and Tactics*

We must visualize the battles of the Civil War in a rough, forested country with occasional clearings, and a scattered population. Antietam, Gettysburg, and Fredericksburg were the only important battles fought in open country. The defending infantry is drawn up in a double line, the men firing erect or from a kneeling posture. The attacking force moves forward by brigade units of 2,000 to 2,500 men, covering a front of 800 to 1,000 yards, in double rank; captains in the front rank, the other officers and non-coms. in the rear, to discourage straggling. They are preceded by a line of skirmishers. Normally the attack moves forward in

¹ Channing, vi. 616. E. P. Alexander, *Memoirs of a Confederate*, p. 54.

² The Confederate bluish-grey—not far from the French *bleu horizon*—was much less conspicuous than the Union dark blue. Yet the Confederate regiments from frontier districts preferred homespun jackets and trousers, dyed brown with the butternut or white walnut, and the officers indulged them in that preference.

cadenced step, and is halted at intervals to fire and reload, the enemy returning fire until one or the other gives ground. Occasionally the boys in blue, more often the boys in grey, advance on the double-quick, the former shouting a deep-chested 'Hurrah!', the latter giving vent to their famous 'rebel yell', a shrill staccato yelp, derived perhaps from the view-halloo of the hunting-field.¹ An attack of this sort generally ends in a bayonet encounter; but both sides, ill-trained in bayonet work, prefer to club their muskets. There was slight attempt at concealment, and so little entrenchment until 1864² that the moments of actual combat were more deadly to officers and men than the battles of the Great War; but as soon as contact was broken the men were comparatively safe. A regular feature of the Civil War was the fraternizing of picket guards, and even whole units of men, during the intervals between fighting.

7. Geography and Strategy

Union strategy, aggressive by the nature of the Union cause, took a form dictated by the geography of the Confederate States. The Appalachians and the Mississippi river divided the Confederacy into three parts, nearly equal in area: the East, the West, and the Trans-Mississippi theatres of war. The scene of the most spectacular campaigns and battles was the East, in the Piedmont and Tidewater provinces of Virginia: an equilateral triangle bounded by North Carolina, the Blue Ridge, and the line of the Potomac river and Chesapeake Bay. Washington was near the northern apex, Richmond near the centre, and between them

¹ Rev. Henry Alexander White, C.S.A., in *Papers Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass.*, iv. 34. A more likely if less romantic derivation is the Indian war-whoop.

² And then the tactics of capturing entrenchments were so little understood that the casualties became even greater in proportion.

lay a rough wooded country, crossed by numerous streams and rivers. Between the Blue Ridge and the Appalachians was the Shenandoah-Cumberland Valley, pointing like a long cannon at the heart of the Union. Military operations beyond the Mississippi had little effect on the result ; but the Western theatre of war, between the Mississippi and the Appalachians, was at least of equal importance with the Eastern. Lee might perform miracles in Virginia, and even carry the war into the enemy's country ; but when Grant and the gunboats had secured the Mississippi, and Sherman was ready to swing round the southern spurs of the Appalachians into Georgia, the Confederacy was doomed. Control of the sea was a priceless asset to the Union. The navy maintained communications with Europe, cut off those of the South, captured important coastal cities, and on the Western rivers co-operated with the army like the other blade to a pair of shears.

A threefold task lay before the armed forces of the Union : constriction, scission, and defeat of the Southern armies. Both the nature and the magnitude of the task were imperfectly apprehended in 1861, unless by Winfield Scott, whose ' anaconda policy ' of constriction was dismissed as the ravings of an old fogey.

8. *Bull Run*

The Union plan of campaign for 1861 was to blockade the Southern coast, and occupy strategic points along its edge ; to mobilize and train the volunteer army in regions convenient for invading the Southern States ; and to capture Richmond, which, it was fondly supposed, would cause the Confederacy to collapse. Kentucky had to be nursed carefully out of neutrality during the summer and autumn, and Confederate sympathizers in Missouri threatened the Union right flank. Hence the first forward movements were from Columbus (Ohio), St. Louis, and Washington. The ' sacred soil

of Virginia' was first 'polluted' by the 'abolition hosts' of a 'reckless and unprincipled tyrant' (as General Beauregard declared) on 24 May—six weeks after Sumter—when Union troops occupied Lee's mansion at Arlington Heights. Two days later General McClellan, commanding the volunteers raised in Ohio, crossed from that State into western Virginia, where the 'battle' of Philippi and other easy victories over small Confederate forces made him the man of the hour.

Congress, convened in special session on 4 July, voted loans and taxes, and authorized the President to recruit half a million men for the duration of the war. Already there were some twenty-five thousand three-months volunteers at Washington, spoiling for a fight. The Northern press and people were vociferous for action. Against General Scott's advice, President and Cabinet yielded to the cry of 'On to Richmond'. General Patterson, a veteran of 1812, was sent to Harper's Ferry in order to watch Joseph E. Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces in the Shenandoah Valley; while General McDowell, with a 'grand army' thirty thousand strong, crossed the Potomac in order to seek out Beauregard's army near Manassas Junction, Virginia. A throng of newspaper correspondents, sight-seers on horse and foot, and congressmen in carriages came out to see the sport.

On 20 July McDowell attacked Beauregard on a plateau behind the small stream called Bull Run. The troops on both sides were so ill-trained, the officers so unused to handling large numbers, the opposing flags so similar,¹ and the uniforms so varied that a scene of extraordinary confusion took place. For hours it was any one's battle, although the famous 'stone wall'

¹ After Bull Run (which the South calls the battle of Manassas) the Confederate 'Stripes and Bars', indistinguishable at a slight distance from the 'Stars and Stripes', was replaced for battle purposes by a blue St. Andrew's cross on a red ground.



stand of Thomas J. Jackson probably averted a Union victory. The tide was turned by a few regiments sent by railway from the Shenandoah Valley, where Johnston had completely outwitted Patterson. The Union lines began to retreat, and although there was little attempt at pursuit, the retreat became a disgraceful rout to Washington. All the next day, soldiers came straggling into the city without order or formation, dropping down to sleep in the very streets ; Washington bar-rooms ' full of shoulder-straps—thick, crushed, creeping with shoulder-straps ' ; ¹ rumours flying about that Beauregard was in hot pursuit, that the Capitol would be blown up if not abandoned ; treason openly preached everywhere. ' One bitter, bitter hour—perhaps proud America will never again know such an hour.' ¹ But Lincoln did not flinch, and Beauregard did not pursue. ' The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat.' ² There was no more talk of a ninety-days war. From the dregs of humiliation the Union was nerved to make adequate preparations for a long war ; while the South, believing her proved superiority would dissolve the Northern ' hordes ' and procure foreign recognition, indulged in an orgy of conceit and self-applause.

¹ Walt Whitman, *Specimen Days*.

² Joseph E. Johnston, *Narrative*, p. 60.

XLVII

PREPARATION, BLOCKADE, AND DIPLOMACY

1861-2

1. *General McClellan*

ON 24 July 1861, the day after Bull Run, President Lincoln summoned General McClellan to Washington, and gave him command of the army in that department. George B. McClellan was only thirty-four years old. A graduate of West Point on the eve of the Mexican War, in which he performed distinguished service as a lieutenant of engineers, he later served as American military attaché to the allied armies in the Crimea, and wrote a report that showed unusual powers of observation. His subsequent business experience accustomed him to deal with large affairs in a large way, and gave him the confidence of men of property ; his personal magnetism and quick success in western Virginia made him a popular idol. The Northern States provided him with plenty of three-year volunteers. Congress was generous with money and equipment, and the President gave him the fullest support. No untried general in modern times has had such abundant means as McClellan enjoyed during the nine months that followed Bull Run ; and few have been so cruelly deprived of them when the opportunity came to use them.

McClellan proved an ideal organizer. His precise, methodical mind, his appetite for detail and love of work, and above all his attractive personality and genuine interest in his men were exactly the qualities needed to form an army from a mob. But his defects in conduct and character impaired his usefulness and weakened his support when the time came for action. There was never a grain of truth in the charges against McClellan's

loyalty. There can no longer be any reasonable doubt of his technical military ability. His position, however, required not only military ability, but some perception of the democratic medium in which he must work ; and that perception, which was given to Grant and Lincoln, McClellan wholly lacked. Impatient democracy demanded quick results, and McClellan neither gave them nor explained in terms that people could understand why quick results could not be expected. His love of display, the Orléans princes on his staff, too frequent mention of ' my army ', a short way with politicians combined with frequent and dogmatic statements as to what the politicians should do, seemed out of place in a republican soldier. The note of self-laudation and of contempt for Lincoln that runs through McClellan's confidential letters makes it difficult for any one to do him justice to-day. Yet no Union general was so beloved as ' Little Mac ' by the untrained volunteers whom his genius turned into a superb instrument of war, the Army of the Potomac.

Weeks stretched into months, and the newspapers had nothing to report but drills and reviews. ' All quiet along the Potomac ' appeared so often in the headlines as to become a jest. Joseph E. Johnston extended his lines along the south bank of the Potomac—on which McClellan held only the bridge-head opposite Washington—and closed the river to unarmed vessels in October. McClellan estimated the enemy's number at 150,000. Actually, at that time, the Confederate army of Northern Virginia was less than 50,000 strong, and wretchedly equipped. Its fortifications, which McClellan insisted were ' stronger than those of Sebastopol ',¹ were field-works of the most primitive description, dangerously extended, and in part defended by Quaker guns. General Johnston, an experienced soldier of

¹ According to Senator Wade's statement of his interview with McClellan, about 26 October. *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxiii. 552.

dogmatic temper and choleric disposition, McClellan's senior by twenty years, had much the harder task of the two. President Davis found great difficulty in sending him recruits, for every section of the South wished a large home guard, and looked upon the Washington army with contempt. Rustic Southerners were difficult to bring under proper discipline, and peculiarly liable to the diseases that breed in ill-regulated camps.

Lincoln refused to let the politicians worry him into ordering an advance. When General Scott got in McClellan's way, the President allowed him to resign ; and on 1 November appointed McClellan General-in-Chief of all the armies of the Republic. At his instance the War Department took over all matters of recruiting, equipment, and organization from the States. Yet McClellan persistently snubbed the President, and on one occasion affronted him in a way that no other ruler would have pardoned. 'Never mind,' said Lincoln, 'I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success.' November passed with no preparations made for an offensive. December came, and the general began to play with plans for an oblique instead of a direct advance on Richmond. 'What are you waiting for, tardy George?' was the burden of a new popular song. 'If something is not done soon, the bottom will be out of the whole affair,' said the President. 'If General McClellan does not want to use the army I would like to *borrow* it.'

It was no mere temperamental caution, or illusion of the enemy's strength, that was holding McClellan back. The Union cavalry, to be sure, had proved useless as a reconnoitring force ; and the Pinkerton detectives on whom the general relied for information of the enemy's numbers probably concocted their reports in some Washington bar-room. McClellan believed these preposterous estimates because he wished to do so. Loving his army and his country, and loathing blood-

shed, he sought 'to heal as well as to conquer'.¹ A mere victory, he believed, would be useless if not decisive; but one dramatic coup such as the capture of Richmond, if accompanied by a display of overwhelming strength and by satisfactory assurances as to slave property, would win back the South. 'I shall carry the thing *en grande*, and crush the rebels in one campaign,' he wrote to his young and adoring wife.

Now McClellan was not alone in this delusion that rebellion could be stamped out as suddenly as it arose. Lincoln, Seward, Grant, and the mass of the Northern public shared it, until the year 1862 ended in the horror of Fredericksburg. He differed from others only in his estimate of the preparation necessary for a fatal blow. Yet McClellan's strategy of delay was correct, as his policy of crushing was mistaken. Since 1914 we have learned to our cost that it takes time to create an army from a mob. Nothing was to be gained by stirring up Johnston prematurely. He would have fallen back, and the Confederacy would have been aroused from its fool's paradise of over-confidence, as it finally was in April 1862. The Confederacy was defeated in 1865, as Germany was in 1918, by attrition and constriction. It was the true policy of the Union to postpone offensive movements until its superior resources were organized for offensive war. It was the true policy of the Confederacy to force an issue promptly. The Union could not afford another Bull Run; the Confederacy could not afford to let another such opportunity slip. McClellan was inspired, in so far as he spent his efforts in preparation; and Lincoln was inspired, in so far as he supported McClellan's strategy. Neither could rationalize an instinct that ran counter to his reasoned policy of crushing; hence neither was able to explain himself to the other, or to his country. McClellan, from Yorktown to Antietam, thought he was 'striking at the

¹ Fitz-John Porter's phrase, quoted in Channing, vi. 452.

heart of the rebellion', while his strategy was uniformly directed by this instinct of delay and constriction. On the Confederate side, Lee certainly, and Johnston probably, had the right instinct of aggression; but they were overruled by their President's academic policy of defence and delay. Stonewall Jackson was the only Southern leader in whom instinct and intellect were completely fused; and him God removed upon the brink of opportunity.

2. *The Union Navy*

For the Union navy, the policy of constriction was so obvious that it was consciously applied from the first. President Davis invited applications for letters of marque on 17 April 1861; two days later President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports. The following day brought a naval counterpart to Bull Run. The navy yard at Norfolk, which the United States Government had neglected to reinforce for fear of offending Virginia, was captured without a blow by the troops of that State, together with enormous stores of ordnance, munitions, and the hull of the *Merrimac* frigate.

The Navy Department then awoke, and Gideon Welles proved to be one of Lincoln's lucky finds. Painstaking and methodical as an administrator, respectful as few secretaries have been of navy traditions, his imperfect knowledge of the service was supplemented by a highly capable assistant secretary, Gustavus V. Fox, who had spent eighteen years in active service, and had acquired connexions of influence in business and politics. Between them the navy was much more efficiently directed than the army, and without costly mistakes in higher command—since the country did not force it to make rear-admirals out of politicians. But the problem of blockading 3,550 miles of coastline from Washington to Matamoras, with the vessels and *matériel* available,

seemed at first insoluble. Congress had begun to build a new steam navy in 1850 ; but as yet only twenty-four steamers had been placed in commission ; and only twelve of these were in the home squadron. The sixty sailing-vessels proved as obsolete as medieval galleys.¹ The American merchant marine had a very small supply of screw steamers suitable for conversion, and the number of machine shops capable of turning out good engines was small. Although American inventors had for some years been planning ironclads, whose value had been suggested by the Crimean war and proved by Napoleon III's fleet of *cuirassées* ; and although the Navy Department was eager to experiment in that direction, Congress had refused to appropriate money for that purpose, or even, latterly, for proper upkeep of the existing fleet. The personnel, top-heavy with captains past sixty and commanders past fifty years, was organically weakened by routine, and promotion by seniority ; and reduced by over twenty per cent by the resignation of Southerners. There was no naval reserve. Without waiting for Congress to assemble, a large construction programme was undertaken, and side-wheelers, screw steamers, clipper ships, tug-boats, and even ferry-boats were purchased in large quantities, at generous prices. More time, and legislation, were required to build ironclads, to retire the aged officers, and establish promotion by merit. Throughout the war old-fashioned seamen were placed in command of steamers, where they were apt to be more anxious about their boilers than about the enemy.

3. *The Blockade*

It was a paper blockade for two or three months after 19 April, but the government did not attempt to en-

¹ A complete list of the U.S. Navy at the beginning of the war, and of vessels commissioned during the war is in the appendix to J. R. Soley, *Blockade and Cruisers* (1883).

force the penalties of blockade-running until a given harbour had been actually invested. When that happened, the neutral vessels already within the port were given fifteen days' grace to depart. By the end of July four blockading squadrons were stationed off the seven or eight enemy ports that were commercially important, and connected by railway with the interior. Even then the blockade was doubtfully 'effective' as that very elastic adjective is defined by British courts; and not until 1862 did it become really 'effective' in the continental meaning of the term. According to a report of the Confederate State Department, dated 21 April 1862, almost eight hundred vessels entered and cleared from the ports of the Confederacy during the first year of the blockade; but the corresponding figures for the last year of peace had been in excess of six thousand.¹

Owing to the character of the coast it was impossible to close the Confederate ports completely. From the Chesapeake to Wilmington (North Carolina) the coast proper is protected by long barrier beaches, jutting out in Cape Hatteras, Cape Lookout, and Cape Fear, and pierced by numerous inlets. Again, from Georgetown (South Carolina) to Fernandina (Florida) the littoral is protected by the 'sea islands' which make an intricate network of channels. Small vessels clearing from a Carolinian port could sneak along an inside passage until they reached an outlet to a clear horizon, and then make a dash for the high seas. It was about six hundred miles from Mobile (Alabama) to Havana, and even less distance from the South Atlantic ports to protected waters in the Bahamas, where Nassau quickly acquired an importance it had not known since the days of the buccaneers, and a prosperity it did not recover until the days of the bootleggers. Until 1862 the Confederacy had no naval vessels that could even challenge the

¹ 2 O. R. N., iii. 397. *Report of Sec. of Treas. on Commerce and Navigation of the U.S. for year ending 30 June 1860*, pp. 553-4.

blockading squadrons; but the more important Southern harbours had been provided by the United States with excellent fortifications, which served to keep hostile ships at a respectful distance.

During the summer of 1861 the Navy Department began to establish bases on the Southern coast. Cape Hatteras, Ship Island in the Gulf of Mexico near New Orleans, and Hilton Head on the sea-islands off Port Royal (South Carolina), were captured between August and November 1861. This last was the only important Union victory of that year. For want of military co-operation these successes were not followed up by raids into the interior; but they kept thousands of Southern troops away from the main theatres of war.

4. *British Interests and the Neutrality Proclamation*

Southern expectations of victory were based on three delusions: that 'cavaliers' were invincible, that the Ohio valley would not fight, and that the Lord Chancellor of England sat on a cotton bale. The Southern people were as certain that England would break the blockade to get cotton, as they were of the justice of their cause. The theory that inspired Jefferson's embargo,¹ the old delusion that Southern staples ran the wheels of industry in Europe, had gathered strength with the growing export of cotton to Great Britain and France. Instead of buying every pound of available cotton, and rushing it abroad before the blockade closed down, the Confederate Government did nothing; and certain state governments applied local embargoes on cotton, in order to hasten foreign intervention. British

¹ One Southern Senator, in his farewell speech at Washington on 28 January 1861, remarked, 'We can live, if need be, without commerce. But when you shut out our cotton from the looms of Europe, we shall see whether other nations will not have something to do on that subject. Cotton is king and it will find means to raise your blockade and disperse your ships.' J. M. Callahan, *Dipl. Hist. Confederacy*, pp. 79-80. See above, i. 140, 264.

and French industry did depend on American cotton to a surprising degree ; but two important factors were overlooked by the plantation economists. In April 1861 there was a fifty per cent over-supply both of cotton and of cottons in the English market. There had of late been overproduction in the mills ; and the bumper cotton crop of 1860, largely exported before the blockade, added to the glut. The war proved disastrous to the Lancashire workers when mills shut their doors ; but a boon to the cotton merchants and manufacturers who were able to work off their surplus stock, and a bonanza to the Liverpool cotton brokers. If the masses believed that the blockade was responsible for their distress, the ' cotton lords ' knew that it was not. Their only fear was of a premature peace ; and until 1863 both the British and the French manufacturers were for non-intervention.¹

Another factor ignored by the South was the British doctrine of naval warfare. As Lord John Russell wrote (15 February 1862), the American blockade satisfied the tests of due notification, permanent ship stations, and hazard of entry or departure. In view of England's future interests as a belligerent, Lord John dared not commit his Government to any stricter standard. The reiterated Southern complaints of the ineffectiveness of the blockade he shrewdly suspected to be indications to the contrary.

International complications first arose from the fact that the United States officially regarded the war as a domestic insurrection, and expected other nations to adopt the same attitude ; yet itself tacitly accorded belligerent status to the Confederacy by declaring a public blockade.² Lincoln might simply have declared

¹ Channing, vi. 332-41 ; E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and American Civil War*, chapter x. The facts were well stated in R. A. Arnold, *Hist. of the Cotton Famine* (London, 1864).

² For the legal status of the Civil War and the blockade, see such

rebel ports closed to foreign commerce, as any Government would do under similar circumstances to-day.¹ But the world was not then prepared to respect a blockade unless the word were pronounced, and the fact proclaimed; nor would neutral vessels on any other terms submit to visit and search.

Lord Palmerston's Government, alarmed by the probable consequences of the war to British commerce, hastened to define its attitude in the Queen's Proclamation of 13 May 1861,² declaring her 'Royal determination to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest . . . between the Government of the United States of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America', and her intention to enforce the Foreign Enlistment Act against unneutral aid. This proclamation was greatly to the advantage of the Union. A Foreign Office circular of 1 June,³ forbidding British and Imperial port authorities to admit prize ships, was decidedly to the disadvantage of the Confederacy. But the very promptitude and explicitness of the neutrality proclamation seemed unfriendly to the Northern people, and raised false expectations of recognition in the South.⁴ Seward at once drafted an

decisions of the Supreme Court as *The Prize Cases of 1863* (excerpts with luminous notes in J. B. Thayer, *Cases in Constitutional Law*, pp. 2339-52).

¹ A bill authorizing the President at his discretion to close the ports of rebel States passed Congress in the summer of 1861, but Lincoln wisely refused to put it in effect.

² *Brit. and For. State Papers*, li. 165.

³ Montague Bernard, *Hist. Account of Neutrality of Great Britain* (London, 1870), p. 136. In the same work are printed the Neutrality Proclamations of other European countries. That of France (10 June) was based on the British one; those of Prussia and the Netherlands did not mention the Confederate States by name.

⁴ Mr. E. D. Adams (*op. cit.*) points out that the Cabinet's decision—arrived at within a week of the news of Sumter—was due to fear lest delay might commit the Government to Seward's policy of treating Southern privateers as pirates. Actually there was no need for haste,

aggressive protest which Lincoln carefully toned down, and which he instructed the American Minister at London to communicate in substance only. Otherwise diplomatic relations between the two countries would have been severed at the outset.

5. *British and Continental Opinion*

From the very start the British and French people were deeply interested in the Civil War. Their opinion divided along lines of political thought. Europe in general saw the issue eye-to-eye with Lincoln. Restoration of the Union would mean a new triumph for democracy; destruction of the Union a mortal wound to democracy. The United States had been obnoxious to European ruling classes since 1815, for the encouragement that its very existence and success afforded to European radicals.¹ 'An involuntary instinct, all-power-

since only very few Southern privateers were ever fitted out, and they after considerable delay. Further, as Bernard admits (*op. cit.*, p. 132), the Royal Proclamation 'imposed on the subjects of the Crown no legal liabilities from which they would otherwise have been free'. I cannot agree with Mr. Adams's statement (i. 94) that in form and substance the Proclamation did not differ from customary usage. The mentioning of the Confederacy by name gave the Southern cause considerable prestige, and was contrary to British and American usage. The Prince Regent's Proclamation of 27 November 1817 referred to a 'state of warfare between His Catholic Majesty and divers Provinces or Parts of Provinces in Spanish America'. A later proclamation respecting the same war speaks of 'the Insurgent Troops of the Spanish-American Provinces'. President Madison's Proclamation of 1 September 1815 enjoined American citizens from committing unlawful acts against 'the dominions of Spain'. Van Buren's Proclamation of 6 January 1838 forbade Americans to interfere 'with the affairs of the neighboring British provinces'. *Brit. and For. State Papers*, ii. 984, iv. 488, v. 1224, xxvi. 1324, xxxviii. 1074. The Proclamation of 13 May 1861 was actually based upon an earlier proclamation respecting a war between two recognized States, in 1859 (Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 133, note).

¹ 'The example of America . . . kept alive, as it had created, the party of so-called progress,' *Quarterly Review*, cx. 253 (July 1861). The aggressive diplomacy of Pierce's and Buchanan's administrations must

ful and unconquerable,' wrote Montalembert, 'at once arrayed on the side of the pro-slavery people all the open or secret partisans of the fanaticism and absolutism of Europe.'¹ Many Englishmen outside that category favoured the South, for, as Henry Adams wrote, 'the English mind took naturally to rebellion—when foreign'.² Most liberals could see no difference between the Southern struggle for independence and the nationalist movements in Europe with which they had always sympathized. Dissenters and humanitarians, who would have welcomed a war against slavery, were put off by the repeated declarations of Lincoln and Seward that slavery was not an issue. Army men found little to admire in the Union camp until the end of the war. Navy men observed that the two American seamen they knew best, Maury of the 'Sailing Directions' and Tatt-nall of the blood-is-thicker-than-water episode, were now officers in the Confederate navy. The commercial classes marked the return of the United States to a high protective policy, which the Confederate constitution forbade; and Southern propaganda made much of the contrast. Shipping interests hoped for the ruin of their most formidable competitor, and approved a new cotton kingdom for which they might do the carrying trade. Indeed it is not surprising that the Union had few articulate partisans in the England of 1861. Yet the tone no less than the variety of English arguments betrayed a common ground of dislike for the United

have accounted for much of the anti-Union sentiment in European chancelleries.

¹ *La Victoire du Nord aux États-Unis* (Paris, 1865), translated in *Old South Leaflets*, no. 213. It is perhaps significant that the only Government that even indirectly recognized the Confederacy was that of Pius IX. Cardinal Antonelli 'made no secret of his sympathy with our cause, and had not the slightest hesitation in saying he desired our success', wrote the Confederate commissioner at Rome, 21 November 1864. 2 *O. R. N.*, iii. 1246; cf. iii. 952-75.

² *Education of Henry Adams* (Boston, 1918), p. 183.

States. While the English press teemed with flippant leaders and shallow articles, the great organs of French opinion were printing reasoned analyses of the causes and issues of the war ; and from no English pen, during the early part of the struggle, came such hearty appreciation of the Union cause as Laboulaye's *Les États-Unis et la France*, or the Comte de Gasparin's *Un Grand Peuple qui se relève*.

In such an atmosphere there was grave danger lest some untoward incident should precipitate hostilities between the Union and the Empire. An event so disastrous for English-speaking unity was averted by circumstances, and by wisdom in high places. Fortunately there were no outstanding disputes between the two countries in 1860. Lord Lyons, alone of the important diplomatists at Washington, believed in the Union cause, and recognized the good intentions if not the greatness of Lincoln. With Seward, who by July was anxious to preserve the peace, as in April he had been eager to quarrel, Lyons established a friendly and almost confidential relationship. Charles Francis Adams, the American Minister at St. James's, inherited the thick-skinned tenacity of his Massachusetts father, with the tact of his Maryland mother. The Palmerston Ministry, unstable and unenterprising, represented almost every shade of British opinion on the war, but collectively was anxious to avoid trouble ; and in foreign affairs it was more influenced by the cautious views of Lord John Russell than by the impetuosity of its octogenarian premier. Even the chip on Seward's shoulder served the cause of peace by making Russell walk warily long after the chip was removed.

6. *The Trent Affair*

All these restraining influences pulling together were barely able to avert war over the *Trent* affair. The British mail steamer of that name was conveying to

Southampton two Confederate diplomatic agents, J. Y. Mason and John Slidell, when on 8 November 1861 she was boarded from the U.S.S. *San Jacinto*, Captain Wilkes commanding, deprived of her two distinguished passengers, and allowed to proceed.

It is easier to understand the orgy of glorification in which the Northern people, hungry for action, indulged themselves upon the news of Captain Wilkes's exploit, than to comprehend the intemperate rage of the British press and people at an event that was paralleled almost every week during the Great War. Of course Captain Wilkes should have sent in the *Trent* for adjudication, when she would have been condemned for performing unneutral service. But the British Government, anticipating the event, had already received an opinion from the Law Officers of the Crown, that the removal of the Confederate envoys would be legal if done outside the three-mile limit. Palmerston communicated this opinion to Delane of *The Times* on 11 November.¹ Yet, when the news reached England two weeks later, the Law Officers changed their opinion, *The Times* rang the tocsin of war, the Government sent reinforcements to Canada, and Russell drafted a demand for apology and reparation, in terms which resembled those of the famous Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

Fortunately Prince Albert toned down Russell's dispatch; and by a notable dispensation of Providence the Atlantic cable had ceased to function. Yet the minatory tone of the British press made it difficult for the United States Government to give way, and the cock-a-doodle-doo of the American press made it impossible for the British Government to recede. Seward from the first saw that Mason and Slidell must be surrendered; but Lincoln feared the political effect of yielding to British menace. Not until Charles Sumner, armed with admonitory letters from Bright and Cobden, had

¹ E. D. Adams, *op. cit.*, i. 207.

argued before the Cabinet during a four-hour session on Christmas Day, could the President be persuaded to yield. Seward's note to Lyons, designed more to placate the American than the British public, contained no apology ; but Mason and Slidell were promptly released and forwarded to their uncomfortable posts.

In the end the *Trent* episode cleared the air. Seward now appeared in the new role of conciliator ; an Anglo-American war had been faced and found disagreeable to both Governments ; and the British Cabinet was stiffened in its policy of neutrality. The Northern people even forgot their resentment in laughing over *The Times's* warning to Mason and Slidell that they, personally, were nothing to the English people, who would ' have done just as much to rescue two of their own negroes '.

XLVIII

THE UNION OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST

JANUARY—JULY 1862

I. *Lincoln, the Radicals, and Stanton*

THE new year opened gloomily in both capitals. President Davis was flattered by unanimous reelection to the Presidency,¹ but troubled by a new and factious Congress. The *Trent* affair had fizzled out, and the blockade was beginning to pinch; Confederate paper-money had depreciated fifty per cent, and prices were soaring; but the Southern people still trusted in the potency of cotton and the impotency of Northern men.

In the North McClellan's inaction every day increased the political difficulties that were gathering about Lincoln. *L'union sacrée* forged by the guns that fired on Fort Sumter was falling to pieces; and from the Republican party a faction emerged to challenge Lincoln's leadership. This was the Radical group, led by 'Bluff Ben' Wade and 'Zach' Chandler, middle-western senators of coarse fibre but fine talent for politics. From their point of view the war was one of revenge on the insolent slave power; and abolitionist doctrine gave a moral sanction to their hatred. The policy they wished to force upon the President was immediate emancipation and arming of the slaves—a policy which, if adopted in 1861, would have driven the border slave States into secession, alienated the Northern Democrats, and narrowed the war party to a faction. Bitter Republican partisans, the Radicals disliked the appointment of a Democrat such as McClellan to high

¹ Hitherto Davis had been provisional President, chosen by the Montgomery convention. His constitutional term of six years began on 22 February 1862.

command. General Frémont's pretence to free the slaves in Missouri by proclamation, an act which Lincoln sternly rebuked, received their hearty approbation.

'A new temper was forming throughout the land, . . . a blend of all those elements of violent feeling which war inevitably releases, . . . the resurrection of that primitive bloodlust which lies dormant in every peaceful nation like a sleeping beast.'¹ To this temper the Radicals appealed by voice and pen, during the recess of Congress (August—December 1861). To their standard surged the bitter-ender, unconditional-surrender sort of people, sincere in their desire to win the war, yet certain to lose it for any Government that yielded to their misguided zeal.

Lincoln gave no sign of yielding in his first annual message to Congress (3 December 1861): 'I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict . . . shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle.' To Radicals this sentiment was at once a challenge and a sign of weakness, while McClellan's apparent procrastination savoured of treachery.

The first product of this complex of hatred and zeal, suspicion and patriotism, was the appointment by Congress of a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (20 December 1861). Radical Republicans were the dominant spirits of this committee. Throughout the war their inquisitorial activities, *ex parte* investigations, and missions to the front, hampered the executive, undermined army discipline, and discouraged the more competent generals. Frémont, Butler, and Hooker were, in the opinion of this committee, the three peerless leaders who could do no wrong.

Owing to the efforts of a House committee, corruption on a gigantic scale was uncovered in the War Department. The conduct of secretary Cameron, concludes judicious Mr. Rhodes, 'was not that of a correct

¹ Stephenson, *Lincoln*, p. 195.

business man'. Lincoln let him down easily into the St. Petersburg legation, and appointed a Democrat turned die-hard, Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Gloomy, ill-mannered, and vituperative, Stanton was another cross for Lincoln to bear. Ignorant of military matters and contemptuous of military science, intolerant of delay and harsh to subordinates, he was hated by almost every officer with whom he came in contact ; and on several he did cruel injustice. Yet for all that, Stanton's determination, thoroughness, honesty, and system proved him a fit instrument for Lincoln's purpose. He stood for discipline against the President's desire to pardon all deserters. He browbeat politicians and got things done. As Lincoln remarked at a dark period for the Union cause, ' Folks come up here and tell me that there are a great many men in the country who have all Stanton's excellent qualities without his defects. All I have to say is, I haven't met 'em ! I don't know 'em ! I wish I did ! '

2. *Union Plans for 1862*

When Stanton took office (15 January 1862), McClellan had already prepared, and the President approved, the general outlines of a plan of operations for 1862 :

(1) In the Eastern theatre of war, (a) McClellan intended to advance against Richmond, but there was yet no agreement as to the route ; (b) a joint naval and military expedition was ready to leave Fortress Monroe for the North Carolina Sounds.

(2) In the Western theatre, Kentucky ' neutrality ' had been violated in September 1861 by that notable man of God, Bishop and General Leonidas Polk ; since when the State had been a sort of military chess-board. General Don Carlos Buell, commanding the Union army of the Ohio, had instructions to rescue the be-

The Eastern THEATRE OF WAR

Miles
0 25 50 75 100
Railways thus



leaguered Unionists of Eastern Tennessee,¹ and to break the Richmond-Memphis railway. Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Confederate Department of the West, was there to prevent him.

(3) In the military department which embraced both banks of the Mississippi, General Henry W. Halleck was mainly occupied with (*a*) the isolated war in Missouri ; but (*b*) a fleet of armoured river gunboats was being rapidly constructed at St. Louis, with the intention of helping the army to push down the Mississippi.

(4) A naval and military expedition under Captain Farragut and General B. F. Butler was being prepared, to force a passage up the Mississippi to New Orleans and Vicksburg. The Confederacy was improvising an armoured naval force to repel this invasion and break the blockade.

Action began in Buell's department in the Western theatre of war. Colonel James A. Garfield marked a stage in his progress from the log cabin to the White House by defeating a body of Confederate mountaineers at Prestonburg in eastern Kentucky (10 January 1862) ; but went no farther. General George H. Thomas, apparently on the road to Knoxville, was attacked at Logan's Cross Road (or Mill Spring, 19 January) by General Zolicoffer, who lost both the battle and his life. Thick and sticky mud, the Confederacy's most faithful ally, stopped a further advance—and almost smothered Thomas's communications. Lincoln, desperate for action, then issued (27 January) his pathetic General War Order No. 1, designating Washington's birthday, 22 February, as 'the day for a general movement of all the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces'.

The 22nd passed before even a definite plan for the

¹ Throughout the war Lincoln was eager to co-operate with these loyal Southern mountaineers, who were his own sort of people ; but unfortunately their region had little strategic significance.

Army of the Potomac had been agreed upon. But the second operation in the Eastern theatre of war started on schedule. On 11 January the 'Great Naval Expedition' of a hundred vessels with 13,000 soldiers sailed from Fortress Monroe under General Ambrose E. Burnside. The handling of this motley flotilla, including everything from screw frigates and clipper ships to harbour tugs and New York ferry-boats, drove navy men to unusual blasphemy; but it was one of the best-conducted operations of the war. Burnside's orders were to follow up the earlier capture of Hatteras Inlet by bringing the entire region of Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds under Union control; and he carried them out to the letter. His capture of Roanoke Island, on 7 February 1862, gave the blockading fleet a sheltered depot, and 'unlocked two sounds, eight rivers, four canals, and two railroads'.¹ Two small seaports, Newbern and Beaufort (North Carolina), were occupied in March. Unless followed up, these exploits of Burnside were mere pin-pricks in the Confederacy. The first substantial victory for the Union came in an unsuspected quarter, from an unknown general.

3. *U. S. Grant, from Galena to Shiloh*

Ulysses S. Grant, an officer who disliked war and loathed army routine, had fallen on evil days since his proud moment before Mexico City. After promotion to a captaincy he was forced to resign from the army in order to avoid a court-martial for drunkenness. Unable to extract a living from 'Hardscrabble Farm' near St. Louis, he attempted to sell real estate, and failed again. His father bestowed a clerkship in the family leather store at Galena, Illinois. Brothers condescended, fellow townsmen sneered. Only his wife had faith; and the most ill-tempered horses were docile to his voice and hands.

¹ Gen. H. A. Wise, C.S.A.

Fort Sumter fell two weeks before Grant's thirty-ninth birthday. His love of the Union blazed forth and kindled a new faith in himself. After many rebuffs he obtained a colonelcy of volunteers. His regiment, the 21st Illinois, was promptly ordered into Missouri, to dislodge a Confederate regiment under a Colonel Harris. Approaching the reported position, so Grant relates, fear gripped his heart ; but he had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do. Suddenly there opened a view of the enemy's encampment—abandoned ! 'It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a new view of the question I had never taken before ; but it was one I never forgot afterwards.'¹

In August 1861 Grant received a brigadier's commission. 'Be careful, Ulyss,' said his father, 'you are a general now—it's a good job, don't lose it !' In the late autumn he was assigned to Halleck's department, and stationed at Cairo, Illinois (Dickens's 'New Eden'), at the junction of the Ohio with the Mississippi. In the summer of 1861 the Confederates began to throw up earthworks at strategic points along the Mississippi where the old Spanish forts used to choke down-river trade. In order to force a passage past them, J. B. Eads of St. Louis undertook to construct a fleet of river gunboats, each with a partially armoured casemate shaped like a mansard roof, resting on a flat-bottomed hull.

Less than fifty miles up the Ohio from Cairo the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers offered parallel routes into Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. Grant observed that Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, the two Confederate earthworks which closed these rivers, were the twin keys to the Confederate West. Their capture would open a navigable waterway into the enemy's centre, and drive in his flanks. On 11 January Grant obtained Halleck's reluctant consent to try, and was

¹ *Personal Memoirs*, i. 250.

furnished with the necessary transports and gunboats. On 7 February Fort Henry was reduced by the gunboat flotilla before Grant's army arrived.

Fifteen miles across country, on the high left bank of the Cumberland, was the strong entrenched camp called Fort Donelson. There Albert Sidney Johnston had stationed half his army of 30,000, and thither the Fort Henry garrison retired. Grant disposed his troops in a semicircle about Fort Donelson on the land side, while the gunboats steamed down the Tennessee and up the Cumberland. On 13 February they attacked the fort at a range of 400 yards, but were driven back disabled. It seemed that a siege would be necessary. Two days later the Union right, occupying dense woods on either side of the road to Nashville, was surprised by a sortie. Grant, who was then conferring with the gunboat commander, arrived in the thick of the battle to find his right in disorder and his centre in danger. With the utmost coolness he thought out the situation. Deducing from the three-days' rations in a captured Confederate's haversack that the enemy was trying to cut his way out, and perceiving a certain confusion in his movements, Grant made exactly the right tactical disposition to drive the Confederates back into their entrenchments. It was a fierce, blind battle in the forest, but the result justified Grant in asking and the Confederate generals in granting unconditional surrender of army and fortress.¹

The results of this Battle of Fort Donelson (15 February 1862) were unexpected, even to Grant. Nashville was no longer tenable by the enemy, and A. S. Johnston retreated to the Memphis-Chattanooga railway. Grant had practically restored Tennessee to the Union ; and, if his victory were followed up, the Mississippi would

¹ See Gen. Lew Wallace's spirited description in *Battles and Leaders*, i. 398-428 ; a Confederate private's account is in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxxi. 477-84.

be open. Equally important was the moral gain to the then dispirited North. The prairie boys of the new North-West had tried their mettle with the rangy foresters of the old South-West; and the legend of Southern invincibility collapsed.

'Unconditional Surrender' Grant had still an old army reputation to live down. His jealous and pedantic superior, General Halleck, instead of allowing him to pursue A. S. Johnston, diverted troops to attack the northernmost Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi. The capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10 (7 April 1862) was a pretty operation, in which General Pope unfortunately acquired fame; but a pure waste of time. Grant's way, up the Tennessee River, was the right method to open the Mississippi; Halleck's way gave Johnston time to concentrate with Beauregard and Polk at Corinth.

Finally, after subjecting Grant to unnecessary humiliation, Halleck ordered him to combine with Buell on the upper Tennessee, and then proceed against the enemy. But Albert Sidney Johnston was not Colonel Harris, and Grant was caught napping. His Army of the Tennessee, encamped in an ill-chosen position at Pittsburg Landing, with its rear to the swollen river and its front unprotected by entrenchments, was attacked on 6 April by Johnston and Beauregard. The Battle of Shiloh (or Pittsburg Landing) began. For twelve hours there was confused fighting between detached portions of the Union lines and the dashing Confederates, superbly led. If the Union army was not routed it was due less to Grant's steadfast coolness than to the fiery valour of divisional commanders like William Tecumseh Sherman, and to the pluck of individual soldiers. By the end of the day the Confederates had captured the key position at Shiloh church, the Union lines were dangerously near the river, and thousands of stragglers were cowering under the bluffs at Pittsburg Landing. But the

South had lost her most gallant leader. Albert Sidney Johnston, leading a charge, was mortally wounded.

All night a torrential rain drenched both armies, and the Union gunboats dropped shells on the Confederates. When the battle reopened at dawn on 7 April Grant had been strengthened by Lew Wallace's division, and the van of Buell's Army of the Ohio. After ten hours more of desperate fighting Beauregard withdrew the Confederate army to Corinth. Grant's army was too exhausted to pursue.

Shiloh was a Union victory ¹ at a dreadful price. Out of 63,000 Union troops engaged, the loss was 13,000 ; ² the Confederate loss was 11,000 out of 40,000. One could walk on corpses across some of the clearings on the battle-field. A storm of controversy arose. Grant's lack of precaution was magnified by the newspapers into gross incompetence, and even drunkenness. Pressure was put upon the President to remove him ; but Lincoln replied, 'I can't spare this man ; he fights.'

General Halleck thought he could spare Grant, and did so by taking command of his army in person. After assembling 100,000 men at Pittsburg Landing, Halleck took a month to cover the twenty-three miles thence to Corinth, giving Beauregard plenty of time to withdraw the Confederate army intact. Corinth was an important junction on the railway from Richmond to Memphis ; but Richmond could still maintain communication with Alabama and Mississippi through Chattanooga.

In the meantime the gunboats continued their ad-

¹ Almost every statement one can make about Shiloh, including this one, is open to controversy ; and the battle was so confused that the *Official Records* are not of much assistance. See the interesting articles by Grant, Buell, Beauregard, and other participants, in *Battles and Leaders*, i. 465-610, and the experiences of a private 'In the Ranks at Shiloh', *Journal Ill. State Hist. Soc.*, April-July 1922, p. 460.

² Almost all this loss was suffered by the 42,000 men of the Army of the Tennessee.

vance down the Mississippi, defeating a Confederate flotilla off Memphis on 6 June, running up the White River into the heart of Arkansas, forcing the enemy to evacuate Missouri, and on 1 July 1862 joining Farragut's fleet above Vicksburg.

4. *Farragut takes New Orleans*

Captain Farragut had to force his way up the Mississippi from the Gulf without a single ironclad ; but his old wooden walls were manned by stout hearts. At Plaquemines Bend, twenty miles from the head of the Passes and ninety miles below New Orleans, the river was protected by Forts Jackson and St. Philip, by sunken hulls supporting a boom, by a fleet of rams and armed steamers, and by a current of three- to four-knot strength. A flotilla of Union mortar schooners, so small that the crews had to stand on tiptoe with open mouths during each shot from their 13-inch mortars, fired continuously on Fort Jackson for three days, without much effect. In the small hours of 24 April Farragut's fleet of eight steam sloops-of-war and fifteen wooden gunboats, with chain cables secured as a coat of mail abreast the engines, crashed through the boom single line ahead, and ran the gauntlet of armoured rams, fire-rafts, river-defence fleet, and the two forts.

In the gay creole city of New Orleans, largest and wealthiest of the Confederacy, there had been no business since the blockade closed down, and little laughter since the news of Shiloh. When Farragut's fleet anchored off the levee on 25 April, so near that the crowd could see the grinning Jack Tars as they fondled the breeches of their Dahlgren guns, New Orleans was already abandoned by the Confederacy, and the following day the United States took possession.

New Orleans was a rough city, and the Union troops of occupation were commanded by a tough character, General B. F. Butler. Repeated insults to his men by

the creole wenches were put a stop to by his famous order of 15 May 1862, rendering such a person 'liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation', or in other words to be lodged in the common jail. Butler was declared a felon and an outlaw by President Davis, denounced in Parliament, and finally removed from his post in consequence of diplomatic protest.

After landing the army Farragut proceeded up-river, receiving the surrender of Baton Rouge and Natchez, and running past Vicksburg to join the up-stream gun-boat fleet (1 July). But as General Halleck could not be induced to provide troops for a joint attack on Vicksburg, that 'Gibraltar of the Mississippi' held out for a year longer, enabling the Confederacy to maintain communication with Arkansas, Missouri, and Texas.

The Union offensive in the west had failed in its great purpose, yet accomplished much of value. By July 1862 the enemy was driven south of the Memphis-Chattanooga Railway, the leading Southern seaport was occupied, and the greater part of the Mississippi was under Union control. The Confederacy was tightly pinched along its waistline; but the blood could still circulate.

XLIX

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN

MARCH—JULY 1862

1. *McClellan moves*

EVERY constriction of Confederate territory in the West was pure gain to the Union ; but Western victories were small compensation for apparent failure in the East. The Virginian stage held the ‘ big show ’ because it contained the star performers, and both capitals. Every one admits the enemy’s army and not the enemy’s capital to be the true objective in warfare ; but in a civil war, especially, capture of the enemy’s capital has an immense moral value. Richmond, moreover, was the industrial centre of the Confederacy, and the strategic hub of the Virginian wheel.

‘ In ten days I shall be in Richmond,’ declared General McClellan on 13 February 1862. It was one of those rash boasts that belied his sound instinct, and made men doubt his ability. He was planning to outflank J. E. Johnston—then stationed at Manassas—by the Rappahannock, and race him for Richmond. A glance at the map will show the extreme unlikelihood of his success ; and even before the plan was accepted by Lincoln, Johnston thwarted it by moving to Fredericksburg (7 March). McClellan promptly emulated the famous King of France by marching a portion of his army to Johnston’s deserted head-quarters at Manassas, and back again to Washington. For Lincoln this was the last straw.

Throughout the winter Lincoln had stood between McClellan and a rising tide of popular impatience, die-hard suspicion, and denunciation by the Committee on the Conduct of the War. His patience was now exhausted, his confidence impaired, his resistance worn

down. Stanton was even beginning to suspect the general's loyalty. Lincoln offered McClellan the choice between an immediate frontal attack on Richmond, covering Washington as he advanced, and a wide flanking movement by the York peninsula. McClellan chose the peninsular campaign. The President then (11 March) stripped McClellan of his superior command, leaving him only the Army of the Potomac ; and within the next few weeks detached Blenker's division and McDowell's corps from that Army, appointed commanders to the remaining corps who were agreeable to the Radicals, gave Stanton supreme control of military operations, created a new department in western Virginia for Frémont with more troops than he knew how to handle ; and on 3 April, just as the peninsular campaign was beginning, allowed Stanton to stop recruiting.

Every one of these acts, save in some measure the first,¹ was a mistake ; but every one except the last ² was inevitable. Public impatience, political scheming, and McClellan's own defects in conduct and character left the administration no alternative. It could no longer entrust the Union cause in the East to so Fabian a commander ; yet it dared not dismiss a general so popular with his troops. McClellan received these distressing orders as a soldier and a gentleman should, and went forward gallantly to do his best with the

¹ No doubt it was wise and proper to relieve McClellan of responsibility for the Western armies, but it was absurd to hope for success in the peninsular campaign unless he were given command of all the armies in that theatre of war. Instead, during the greater part of the peninsular campaign there were no less than six separate departments in the Eastern theatre between the Atlantic, South Carolina, and the Appalachians : the Mountain Department (Frémont), the Shenandoah (Banks), the Rappahannock (McDowell), Eastern Virginia (Wool), the Army of the Potomac (McClellan), and North Carolina (Burnside).

² Stanton not only stopped recruiting but dismantled the entire federal recruiting machinery established at McClellan's instance in December ; so that when the army had to be quickly reinforced in July the Federal Government was forced again to lean upon the States.

means in hand. But 'there was no Peninsular Campaign of General McClellan As carried out it was the campaign of Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Stanton, and the Committee on the Conduct of the War.'¹

The plan at least was McClellan's, and it was a far better one than Lincoln's favourite 'covering advance' by land. Instead of maintaining long communications through an enemy country, the peninsular line of approach enabled the Union army to be supplied and reinforced by sea. Fortress Monroe, at the tip of the York peninsula, was in Union possession. The navy could protect the army's right flank as it advanced up the peninsula as far as White House on the Pamunkey river. On its left flank the James, with deep water up to the suburbs of Richmond, was a better line of approach; but the *Virginia* (ex *Merrimac*) closed it to the Union navy during the first few weeks of the campaign. The *Virginia*—a more powerful edition of the armoured gunboats already being used on the Mississippi—met her equal in the *Monitor* in Hampton Roads on 8 March 1862. A new principle of naval armament, the revolving turret, thereupon obtained the sanction of success. But so long as the *Virginia* was afloat she protected the mouth of the James, and held the North Atlantic Squadron in Hampton Roads.²

The Army of the Potomac, well armed and equipped, clothed uniformly in dark-blue tunics (too conspicuous against the lush green of the Virginia spring) light-blue trousers (poor protection from Virginian mud), and blunted cloth képis,³ was the most formidable military

¹ Gen. C. A. Whittier, in *Papers of Military Hist. Soc. of Mass.*, i. 294.

² 'That confounded Merrimac has set like a nightmare upon our Dept.'—Gustavus Fox, 12 May, in *Correspondence*, i. 120. Her presence alone enabled the Confederates to get their garrison of 12,000 men to Richmond by water before Norfolk was evacuated on 10 May. Comte de Paris, *Civil War* (1874), ii. 8, 29, 53. Cf. Johnston's comment in *O. R.*, xi, part iii, 473.

³ Some regiments which had expanded from Zouave companies still

force yet seen on American soil. The men were eager for action, their discipline was at top notch, their devotion to their young commander absolute; and now that they were finally in motion popular confidence rallied to them. In the York peninsula they were on a classic ground of American history. Here were the ruins of Jamestown, the first English settlement in America, the Chickahominy river, arising north of Richmond in the old hunting grounds of Powhatan and Pocahontas, the colonial capital of Williamsburg, with William and Mary College, and Yorktown where the War of Independence was concluded. A few mansions of the eighteenth century still lined the York and James, but the greater part of the peninsula had reverted to its savage state. Even the environs of Richmond were a wilderness, broken by occasional farms and clearings.¹

McClellan intended and expected to take Richmond, and crush the rebellion that summer. His sense of injury at the hands of the administration, his suspicion that they did not really wish him to win, only made him the more ardent of success. Splendid visions were in his brain. (Himself, on prancing charger, entering Richmond in triumph, the Comte de Paris and Duc de Chartres conspicuous among his glittering staff. Davis, Stephens, and Toombs playing the role of the burghers of Calais. Magnanimous terms to the gallant enemy: civil rights restored, slave property guaranteed. Discomfited administration not daring to refuse ratification. Grand review at Washington. Modest saviour of his country resigns sword to Congress and returns to wife and baby, appropriately at Cincinnati.) Yet McClellan had a touch of Zouave colour and swagger in their uniforms; and one regiment, through the mistaken charity of the colonel's wife, was provided with white straw hats, which gave it an undue proportion of the enemy's attention.

¹ Note the frequent mention of impassable swamps, dense forests, broken, thickly wooded, and even unknown country, in Lee's report on the Seven Days, 1 O. R., xi, part ii, 489-98.

did not employ the only methods that had the slightest chance of realizing these dreams : audacity, mobility, dash. His strategy throughout the campaign was determined not by his ambition, but by his inner perception of the true Union policy of cautious constriction.

2. Lee at Richmond

At the first trial, instinct won. The army's advance from Fortress Monroe was promptly arrested on 5 April by Confederate field-works, extending across the Peninsula from Yorktown. They were hastily constructed—even some of Cornwallis's works of 1781 were utilized—and manned by only 16,000 Confederates. McClellan had several times that number. Lincoln implored him to attack, and, as Johnston wrote Lee, 'No one but McClellan could have hesitated.'¹

'The army needed a *coup d'audace*,' wrote his staff officer, Colonel Philippe d'Orleans; 'its morale would have suffered less from a sanguinary check than from the fruitless fatigues of a prolonged siege. . . . But he would not compromise the young army entrusted to his care in an enterprise which he considered too hazardous. Thinking that the national cause could endure delays and slow movements, but not such another disaster as that of Bull Run, he preferred to rely upon the superiority of his artillery in order to dislodge the enemy from his lines.'²

Instead of assaulting, McClellan sent to Washington for siege artillery, began siege operations, and wasted a precious month. That month meant everything for the Confederacy. 'Spades are trumps' sneered McClellan's enemies.

The Confederate Government had been shaken out of its lethargy by Grant's capture of Fort Donelson. Its military organization had been improved by the removal of Benjamin from the War to the State Department, and by the President's appointment of Lee as his

¹ 1 O. R., xi, part iii, 456.

² Comte de Paris, *Civil War*, ii. 9.

military adviser (13 March). Yet it was difficult to see how Richmond could be saved ; certainly not by the theory of the bigger battalions. No men could be spared from the West, and at least 50,000 were held in the lower South by the thrusts and threats of Union expeditionary forces. Looking out from Richmond along the roads and waterways that led to the Union periphery, McClellan with over 100,000 men would soon be advancing up the York peninsula, and J. E. Johnston had less than 60,000 to oppose him. McDowell's corps of 40,000 was before Fredericksburg (21 April) with only 11,000 Confederates between him and McClellan's right flank. Banks with 20,000, having defeated Stonewall Jackson's 10,000 near Winchester, had apparently corked up the Shenandoah Valley. Frémont with 15,000 was approaching the upper Valley through the Appalachian passes, and only 3,000 Confederates faced him. Ewell's shuttle division of 8,000 Confederates was just east of the Blue Ridge. Upon Lee's advice President Davis on 16 April adopted the strategy of delaying McClellan before Yorktown until Jackson could confuse the Union forces in the Valley, threaten Harper's Ferry, and thus frighten the Union Government into recalling McDowell's corps from its advanced position. Then the Confederate forces could be drawn in to meet McClellan before Richmond. On the same day the Confederate Congress adopted conscription. Of doubtful constitutionality, this courageous act drove a wedge between Davis and his State-rights critics, who feared that their precious theory was being done to death in the house of its friends. But conscription retained in the ranks the men who saved Richmond.

While Johnston kept McClellan occupied at the Yorktown lines, Jackson eluded Banks's slack vigil in the Valley, and on 8 May defeated Frémont's van forty miles west of Staunton. Johnston, on the 3rd, withdrew from his Yorktown position just as everything was

set for McClellan's big bombardment, leaving Longstreet and D. H. Hill to check the enemy at Williamsburg (5 May). The Confederates, pinched out of Norfolk on 10 May, between the blockading squadron and a landing party, were forced to blow up the *Virginia* and open the James River. On the 15th a fleet of Union gunboats, led by the *Monitor*, steamed up the James to Drewry's bluff, eight miles below Richmond, where a well-placed battery barred their further progress. On the 14th McClellan wired 'for every man the War Department can send, by water'.¹ Secretary Stanton, believing Stonewall Jackson to be lost somewhere in the mountains, then ordered McDowell to join the Army of the Potomac by land, from Fredericksburg.

3. Stonewall Jackson

McDowell's corps never reached McClellan. Lee and Jackson were the reasons why. Lee at Richmond, amid frightened citizens who heard the cannon of Union gunboats on the James, and expected McClellan, then distant only three days' march, to inflict upon them the fate of New Orleans: Lee, the military adviser to a President who was hurriedly receiving the rites of baptism and confirmation: Lee, the general, refused to do what Johnston advised, and what any but a great captain would have done: to recall the scattered legions to

¹ I cannot accept Mr. Rhodes's theory (*United States*, iv. 6-7) that McClellan had an 'unhampered power' to transfer his army from the York to the James side of the Peninsula between 11 and 18 May. On the former date the Army of the Potomac was strung out along the York and Pamunkey rivers from Yorktown to White House, and all its supplies were afloat on that side. By the 19th, when the army was sufficiently concentrated to permit a change of base, McClellan was already pinned to the Chickahominy by Stanton's order of the 18th, to extend his right northward to meet McDowell. Stanton ordered McDowell to prepare to advance by land, as early as the 7th, and Lincoln wired McClellan on the 15th, 'I am still unwilling to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here'. 1 O. R., xi, part i, 26-7, part iii, 147-50, 170, 173.

defend his capital. Instead of recalling Jackson, he sent Ewell's division to join Jackson, and ordered him (16 May) to perform a manœuvre as audacious in its conception as it proved to be perfect in execution.

Stonewall Jackson, a stern and bearded puritan, brought to the Southern cause a mastery of the principles of strategy and a religious faith that enabled him to perform what seemed miracles to his enemies. The nucleus of his division was the 'Stonewall brigade' recruited in the Shenandoah Valley, whose population, Unionist in the spring of 1861, as Jackson himself then had been, was now whole-hearted for the Southern cause. The Valley itself, a long, rolling plateau of copses and cornfields, white wooden farm-houses and great red barns, was enclosed by the wooded ridges of the Appalachians and the Blue Ridge, through which numerous 'gaps' or passes offered innumerable combinations to the clever strategist; and Jackson knew every hole and corner of it. Although greatly outnumbered, he was faced by inferior generals: by Nathaniel P. Banks, promoted from the speakership of the House to a major-generalcy, and Frémont, the abolitionists' darling. Nor were the military deficiencies of these gentlemen made good by the efforts of Stanton to move them as upon a chess-board, from Washington. They had no proper cavalry to discover Jackson's movements, while he moved behind a screen of born cavaliers.

Having neutralized Frémont on 8 May (Battle of McDowell), Jackson returned to the upper Valley, and in conjunction with a division under the able if eccentric Dick Ewell, gave his attention to Banks. The Massanutten Mountain, a ridge parallel to the Blue, that rises in the midst of the Valley between the two forks of the Shenandoah River, gave him an opportunity for surprise. Banks, with only 10,000 men (Shields's division had been sent to join McDowell), was at Strasburg, stopping the western outlet of the upper Valley, with

only an outpost to guard the eastern exit. Jackson, instead of attacking him directly, crossed the Massanutten, crushed the outpost at Front Royal (23 May), and pushed north to cut the Union communications with Washington. Banks was reluctant to save his command. 'By God, sir, I will not retreat!' he exclaimed to Colonel Gordon. 'We have more to fear, sir, from the opinions of our friends than from the bayonets of our enemies.' In the nick of time he did retreat to Winchester, where Jackson administered a stinging defeat, and sent him whirling north to Harper's Ferry, where he hastened to get on the safe side of the Potomac (26 May).

Washington was panic-stricken by Jackson's rapid advance, although shielded by double his numbers. Stanton, in a blue funk, telegraphed the governors of the loyal States, 'Enemy in great force advancing on Washington'. Lincoln hurriedly recalled McDowell's corps, on the point of marching to join McClellan;¹ and Richmond had another respite.

Jackson, who well knew the limits of audacity, had no intention to attack Washington. Had the Union armies in northern Virginia acted promptly, they could have cut off his retreat, and occupied the Valley. Instead, after a feint at Harper's Ferry, Jackson doubled on his tracks, passed between his enemies' converging columns, placed himself in a strong position south of the Massanutten, and on two successive days, 8 and 9 June, whipped Frémont at Cross Keys and one of Banks's divisions at Port Republic. He was then ready to transfer his army to the York peninsula, while large Union forces remained immobile in the Valley, to protect Washington from another attack of nerves. In a few days McClellan would be on the defensive.

¹ 1 O. R., xii, part i, 281-2.

4. *Lee takes the Offensive*

By 24 May, the day before McDowell's march was countermanded by Lincoln, McClellan had taken a position imposed upon him by the War Department, in the expectation of McDowell's arrival.¹ His army was divided by the Chickahominy. Three corps were on the north bank, extended out to meet the reinforcements that never came; two corps were on the south bank, in order to cover the railway from the army base at White House. On 31 May, when abnormal rainfall had flooded the sluggish Chickahominy to a zone of swirling waters, J. E. Johnston fell upon these two advanced corps. The pious Army of Northern Virginia doubtless expected that the Lord had delivered up the heathen to be stubble to their swords. But Johnston's orders were not well executed, he was severely wounded, and a part of Sumner's corps managed to cross the Chickahominy by swaying bridges and save the day.

After this battle of Fair Oaks (or Seven Pines), McClellan, true to his instinctive strategy of caution and constriction, dug himself into a stronger position, and waited for good weather to advance on Richmond, under cover of his superior artillery. As Stanton alternately promised and postponed the dispatch of McDowell's corps, he could have taken no other position; and by the testimony of his enemies his strategy was sound. 'We are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win,' Johnston had written Lee.² 'It is plain that General McClellan will adhere to the system adopted by him last summer, and depend for success upon artillery and engineering.'

Lee, who succeeded the wounded Johnston as com-

¹ 'You are instructed to co-operate, so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.' Stanton to McClellan, 18 May 1862, 1 O. R., xi, part i, 27; cf. part iii, 184-9.

² 1 O. R., xi, part iii, 477.

mander of the Army of Northern Virginia on 1 June, saw that McClellan must win Richmond if he were permitted to choose his own 'species of warfare'. The closing cordon must be broken. Accordingly, on 11 June, he ordered Jackson to sweep down from the Valley upon McClellan's right flank, cut communications with White House while the Army of Northern Virginia attacked him in front, and force him out of his entrenchments.¹

Unfortunately for Lee's plans, he placed McClellan on his guard by a gallant but futile exploit—J. E. B. Stuart's raid around the entire Union Army (13–15 June). The information that Lee thereby obtained might as well have come from scouts; the warning that it gave McClellan of the weakness of his communications led him to prepare a new base on the James River, and to study with his usual thoroughness the intervening terrain.

5. *The Seven Days*

McClellan's advance on Richmond, by positions, was timed for 25 June. That day there was an inconclusive affair of outposts; the next day Lee took the initiative, and the great Seven Days' battles² began. Lee planned to crumple up McClellan's right, north of the Chickahominy, with A. P. Hill's and Jackson's divisions, to cut his communications with White House, harass his army front and rear, and force him either to retreat down the peninsula or to surrender. Superb strategy, but too ambitious for his army to execute. Neither his staff nor his commanders were yet equal to the task of executing an exact combination of several columns in a thickly wooded country. And the Jackson of the Seven Days

¹ 1 O. R., xi, part iii, 589.

² Mechanicsville (26 June), Gaines's Mill or first Battle of Cold Harbor (27th), Savage Station (29th), Frayser's Farm or Glendale (30th), Malvern Hill (1 July).

was not the Jackson of the Valley, or of Chancellorsville. Whether his almost fatal delay in arriving at Mechanicsville (26 June) was unavoidable, or due to a Sabbath halt to propitiate the God of Battles, is an open controversy ; but his failure to cross White Oak Swamp on the 30th can be explained only on pathological grounds.

After beating off the first attack on his extreme right at Mechanicsville (26 June), McClellan withdrew Fitz John Porter's corps, which occupied that wing of his army, to a much stronger position near Gaines's mill. There the Union troops threw up hasty field entrenchments, that mark a stage in modern tactics ; if spades were not yet trumps, they would be shortly. Against them, on the 27th, Lee developed his plan. The massed commands of Jackson, both Hills, and Longstreet (57,000) were hurled in line after line against the Union defenders (34,000), and at nightfall broke through.

Towards midnight McClellan made his great decision : to move his army by the left to the newly prepared base on the James. It was either that or ignominious retreat down the peninsula (which would have fitted Lee's plans exactly), or march round Lee's right towards Richmond. During the evening McClellan considered the possibility of this ' swing into Richmond ', and promptly dismissed it as offering not even a sporting chance of success. Richmond was not an open town that a hostile army could stroll into at will. The Army of the Potomac would have been placed in an impossible position, cut off by Lee from the White House base ; and unless Lee made some colossal error, would have been surrounded and captured.¹ Again McClellan's

¹ One of the most unaccountable things in Civil War literature is the persistent criticism of McClellan for not doing in 1862 what Grant, with infinitely superior means, was unable to do in 1864, after a battle on the identical ground of Gaines's mill. Apparently the unwarranted expectation of ' crushing the rebellion ' in 1862, and the disappointment at McClellan getting so near Richmond without taking it, has continued to colour Northern writings. As justly might one criticize



The SEVEN DAYS BATTLE before RICHMOND June 26th - July 2nd

Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Confederate earthworks for
defence of Richmond

instinct for cautious constriction won over his ardent desire to 'crush the rebellion at one blow'; and again his instinct was inspired. The distress that decision cost him, after the slaughter of Gaines's Mill, found vent in an unforgivable dispatch to Stanton:

'I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat into a victory. . . . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.'

To which Lincoln replied:

'Save your army, at all events. . . . I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you . . . neither you nor the government is to blame.'¹

On the night of 27-28 June McClellan withdrew his right across the Chickahominy, and began to move by the left, southward, to the James. Lee was completely baffled. His cavalry was sent sweeping eastward, to cut communications that were no longer there. During thirty precious hours the Confederate leader lost all touch and knowledge of an army of ninety thousand men, whose rear-guard was only a few hundred yards from his pickets, and whose van was within a few miles of his capital. Only at sunrise on the 29th did Lee discover that he had concentrated on empty camps and deserted entrenchments. Promptly he drafted another brilliant plan of concentration, which 'under ordinary circumstances' should have destroyed the Union Army;²

Von Kluck for not taking Paris, because his outposts got within sight of the Eiffel Tower.

¹ 1 O. R., xi, part i, 61; part iii, 269; Lincoln, *Complete Works* (1894), ii. 190; *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 425. The last two sentences of McClellan's dispatch were deleted by the military supervisor of telegraphs before it was laid before Stanton and Lincoln.

² Lee's report, in 1 O. R., xi, part ii, 497.

but again his staff and his divisional commanders were unequal to the task. McClellan's manœuvre was conducted with the precision of a grand review. 'Throughout this campaign we attacked just when and where the enemy wished us to attack', wrote D. H. Hill.¹ The Army of the Potomac, 90,000 strong, with its trains of artillery, 5,000 wagons, and 2,500 beeves, marched by two narrow country roads (one of them long disused and blocked by fallen trees), crossing the highways that led from Richmond, defending itself flank and rear in fierce bayonet encounters at Savage Station and Frayser's Farm (29-30 June) against Lee's pursuing army. On Malvern Hill (1 July), in a position carefully chosen by its commander, the Union army stood at bay, while Lee hurled his divisions without order or unity over artillery swept wheatfields, in a last desperate attempt to trap the host he had hoped to destroy. By the close of the second day of July, while Lee was withdrawing his decimated legions towards Richmond, the Army of the Potomac, with trains intact and morale unimpaired, was safe within its fortified base at Harrison's Landing on the James.

It was magnificent, and it was not a retreat. McClellan, outnumbered in effective force at the beginning of the Seven Days, had inflicted a superior loss on his adversaries.² His army was still full of fight, and ready to resume the advance on Richmond if properly reinforced. The summer was still young. McClellan entreated Lincoln, who visited Harrison's Landing on 9 July, to give him an opportunity to attack Richmond via Petersburg. General Halleck (who had replaced Stanton in control of operations) pronounced this plan, by which Grant brought the war to an end, to be

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, ii. 395.

² Union effectives engaged, 91,169; Union loss (killed, wounded, and missing), 15,849. Confederate effectives engaged, 95,481; Confederate loss, 20,614. T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses*, p. 86.

wholly impracticable from a military standpoint ; and Lincoln feared that the Administration could no longer carry McClellan. It was not merely that his performance had fallen short of his promise, and of the public expectation ; his dispatches during the campaign had been often querulous, sometimes insolent, and once hysterical. At Harrison's Landing he presented Lincoln with a memoir on political policy which would have been improper on the part of a victorious general. The country had lost confidence in him, if the army had not. The Committee on the Conduct of the War was clamouring for his scalp, and the autumn elections were approaching.¹ Politicians and public could see nothing save that Richmond was still in rebel hands after a costly campaign. Accordingly, on 3 August, Halleck ordered the Army of the Potomac back to the river that gave it birth ; and all the gains of the Peninsular Campaign were thrown away. Not for over two years did another Union army approach so near Richmond.

So ended the first grand campaign of the war. Lee by audacious strategy, Jackson by brilliant execution of Lee's orders, had taken full advantage of the enemy's mistakes, and saved Richmond. But Richmond alone was hardly worth the loss of 20,000 men ;² only the capture or destruction of the Army of the Potomac could have staggered Northern morale and won Southern independence. McClellan too had been wanting ; but he missed no such opportunity as that. Asked to do the impossible, he had saved his army, and with it the Union. Intuitively, almost unconsciously, he had

¹ According to Senator Chandler, McClellan could have walked right into Richmond after Williamsburg, but deliberately 'sat right down' in the centre of the 'worst swamp' he could find, in order to give Lee and Jackson time to concentrate and himself an excuse to retreat. *Congressional Globe*, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., iv. 3386-92.

² The top point of Confederate numbers under the colours was probably about 350,000 men, just before the Seven Days. A. B. Moore, *Conscription in the Confederacy*, p. 158.

adapted his strategy to the true Union policy of attrition, caution, and constriction.¹

Halleck's recall of McClellan's army gave Lee and Jackson a precious opportunity before the year was out to break through the wall of steel that was closing round the Confederacy.

¹ For the contemporary narratives and monographs on the Peninsular Campaign see the foot-notes to Rhodes and Channing. A study of the reports and correspondence in the *Official Records*, first series, vol. xi, is indispensable. I acknowledge great indebtedness to Dr. Douglas S. Freeman (editor of the *Lee-Davis Dispatches*), whose expert guidance over the fields of the Seven Days' battles opened up for me a new light; and to Captain Thomas G. Frothingham, both for his conversation and for his brilliant article in *Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc.*, lvii. 88-122.

L

ANTIETAM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

JULY 1862—JANUARY 1863¹

1. *Recognition?*

THE eight weeks that followed the Seven Days were pure sunshine for the Confederacy. Davis and Lee were masters of the situation. Although New Orleans was gone, Vicksburg kept in touch with the Far West; delegates from Arizona and the Indian Territory sat in the Confederate Congress. Morgan's brilliant cavalry raid through Kentucky, in July, seemed to prove that State ripe for Southern picking. With Chattanooga in Confederate hands railway communications were maintained with all parts of the republic, and thousands of replacements for Lee's army came pouring into Richmond. If the blockade was tightening, the Confederate cruiser *Florida*, built at Liverpool and armed at Nassau, was beginning to embarrass the blockaders; and on 28 July the *Alabama* left Liverpool for a cruise that proved equally costly for the American merchant marine and the British taxpayer.

'There is an all but unanimous belief that you *cannot* subject the South to the Union,' Cobden wrote Senator Sumner on 11 July, when news of the Seven Days' battles reached England. 'I feel quite convinced that unless cotton comes in considerable quantities before the end of the year, the governments of Europe will be knocking at your door.'² The same day W. S. Lindsay,

¹ This period, which any title is inadequate to describe, illustrates better than any other six months of the Civil War the complex forces that influenced the result: military campaigns and naval raids, internal politics and foreign diplomacy, popular opinion at home and abroad, political theory and social prejudice. Any history of the Civil War that neglects these non-military forces distorts the truth.

² Sumner MSS. (Harvard College Library), cxxxvii. 3.

M.P., the largest shipowner and most active Southern partisan in Great Britain, introduced a motion for Franco-British mediation in the Civil War. On 16 July, at Vichy, Napoleon III listened graciously to John Slidell's offer of one hundred thousand bales of cotton if France would denounce the blockade. The Emperor telegraphed to his foreign minister: 'Demandez au gouvernement anglais s'il ne croit pas le moment venu de reconnaître le Sud.' Palmerston, in the debate on Lindsay's motion, declared that the South had not yet established her independence, and could not then be recognized. But Napoleon III left on Slidell the impression that France would act alone if England held back. Fortunately the long vacation had come, and the British Cabinet was scattered from Scotland to Germany; but the cotton shortage was becoming more acute, and Lee's army was preparing to break through. 'The pinch has again passed by for the moment and we breathe more freely,' wrote Henry Adams from the London Legation. In his opinion only victory, or a prompt and definite stand on the slavery question, could prevent interference.¹

2. *Lincoln and Slavery*

For Lincoln the slavery question was somewhat more complicated than for a young Bostonian in the London Legation. Lincoln always remembered what it seemed all the world had forgotten, that he was President of the United States—not of the Northern States. His policy, as stated in the famous letter to Horace Greeley,² was

¹ *Cycle of Adams Letters*, i. 168-9; cf. pp. 169-75.

² 'As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing", as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be—"the Union as it was". If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union

simplicity itself: the cause of the negro must be subordinated to the cause of the Union; but only the most delicate perception of public opinion, and the most accurate weighing of imponderabilia, could decide what policy respecting the negro would serve the Union best at a given time. From the first advance into Southern territory, slaves of rebel owners had flocked into the Union lines, embarrassing both government and commanders, until the irrepressible B. F. Butler declared them 'contraband of war'. The 'contrabands' were organized in labour battalions. Welfare workers and school teachers were provided to look after them in the several occupied portions of the Southern coast where they congregated. Emancipation was not really a practical question, for wherever the Union armies penetrated, slavery dissolved; beyond their reach slavery would thrive whatever the United States Government might decide. But it was a burning question of politics, sentiment, and constitutional law.

On one hand the border slave States had to be considered. Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Missouri, sensitive on the subject of the 'peculiar institution', blocked proposals for compensated emancipation on which the President had set his heart. In April and June 1862 Congress finally carried out a Republican party pledge by abolishing slavery in the

without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.' (22 August 1862.)

District of Columbia and the Territories.¹ This failed to satisfy abolitionists who since the summer of 1861 had been trying to free all the slaves without compensation, and recruit them for the Union army. A long step towards that end was taken in the Confiscation Act of 12 July 1862, declaring 'contrabands' and the slaves of convicted rebels to be for ever free, and authorizing the President to recruit negroes. Lincoln signed this bill only after it had been so modified as to make its application discretionary with him ; for the President's war powers were involved. Lincoln rightly insisted on his exclusive power, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to decree a general emancipation in enemy territory. If Congress were able to wrest this power from him it might also dictate his war policy, and—what he feared most of all—impose a vindictive peace.

An even larger question intruded : of what avail to restore the Union if slavery, the original cause of disruption, remained ? James Russell Lowell expressed this admirably in his 'Biglow Paper' that appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* of June 1862. Hosea is conversing with the shade of his 'gret-gret-gret-gran'ther,' some time colonel in the New Model Army :

'Hosee', sez he, 'I think you're goin' to fail :
 The rattlesnake ain't dangerous in the tail ;
 This 'ere rebellion's nothin' but the rattle,—
 You'll stomp on thet an' think you've won the bettle ;
 It's Slavery thet's the fangs an' thinkin' head,
 An' ef you want selvation, cresh it dead,—
 An' cresh it suddin, or you'll larn by waitin'
 That Chance wun't stop to listen to debatin'.'—
 'God's truth !' sez I,—'An' ef I held the club,
 An' knowed jes' where to strike—but there's the rub !'

'The moment came', said Lincoln, 'when I felt that slavery must die that the nation might live.'² In the

¹ Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, pp. 450-2.

² F. B. Carpenter, *Six Months in White House*, p. 76.

Cabinet meeting on 22 July he proposed to declare that on the next New Year's Day all slaves in rebel territory would be free. Seward pointed out that such a proclamation at such a time would be interpreted as 'our last shriek on the retreat' from Richmond. Emancipation was then put aside to be a crown to the first victory.

Victory seemed well within reach that summer, if one merely counted the battalions; but Northern morale had been gravely impaired by McClellan's failure to take Richmond. There was a panic in Wall Street; and the gold dollar reached a seventeen per cent premium over paper, in mid-July, when Congress authorized a new issue of \$150,000,000 in fiat money. Lincoln called upon the States for 300,000 volunteers for nine months. There were patriotic rallies at which 'John Brown's Body' was set to new words, 'We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more,' but less than 80,000 actually came, and they were organized in new nine-months' regiments instead of being used like the Confederate conscripts as permanent replacements.

Yet, if the situation had changed for the worse, Lincoln had attained new stature. Resolute in purpose and sure of vision he had always been; but often vacillating and uncertain in performance. From those anxious vigils at the White House during the terrible days of June the perplexed, over-advised, and humble Lincoln emerged humble only before God, but the master of men. He seemed to have captured all the greater qualities of the great Americans who preceded him, without their defects: the poise of Washington without his aloofness, the mental audacity of Hamilton without his insolence, the astuteness of Jefferson without his indirection, the conscience of J. Q. Adams without his harshness, the democracy of Jackson without his ignorance, the magnetism of Clay without his

vanity, the lucidity of Webster without his ponderousness ; and fused them with a sincerity and magnanimity that were peculiarly his own.

3. *Lee's Masterpiece*

From the Peninsular Campaign Lincoln had learned the folly of divided command and civilian direction ; but the instruments of victory he had not yet found. On 11 July he relegated Stanton to his proper place as war minister, and summoned Halleck from the West to become General-in-Chief in control of operations. 'Old Brains' Halleck, as the army called him, wrote excellent treatises on military science, but was helpless before actual problems. General John Pope, the hero of Island No. 10, was also summoned from the West to command a new army composed of the three corps then covering Washington. On taking command Pope insulted the men under him by a famous pronunciamiento : ' I come from the West where we have always seen the backs of our enemies, from an army . . . whose policy has been attack and not defence.'

McClellan was still at Harrison's Landing, begging for reinforcements to attack Richmond by way of Petersburg ; but Halleck withdrew his army by dribblets to reinforce the war department's favourite plan of an overland march on Richmond, covering Washington. 'My head-quarters will be in the saddle,' Pope remarked for the press. 'A better place for his hind-quarters !' said Lincoln.

Pope's first objective was Gordonsville, possession of which would bar Jackson from his favourite valley. Lee, remaining at Richmond to watch McClellan, sent Jackson and A. P. Hill forward ; they defeated Pope's right at Cedar Mountain on 9 August. Pope then began to concentrate along the Rappahannock, covering both Washington and the point on the Potomac to which McClellan's army was being rapidly transferred.

On 24 August Lee adopted a plan amazing in its audacity : to divide his army in the face of its far more numerous enemy, send Jackson by a circuitous route round Pope's right to attack the Union base at Manassas Junction, draw Pope away from his line of concentration, and fall upon him in the open. Knowing Pope and Halleck as he did, the risk was not so great as would appear ; and there was really no other alternative but retreat. Yet Lee was risking his cause on a single throw. One slip in the staff work and there would have been no biography of Robert E. Lee in the series of 'Great Commanders' ; one smile of fortune on John Pope, and his name would now be in the list of American presidents.

On 26 August Jackson's 'foot-cavalry', having marched fifty miles in thirty-six hours, were between Pope and Washington, revelling in the Union stores at Manassas. Halleck and Pope, completely unprepared for this bold manœuvre, made one blunder after another. Pope won the race with Lee to the old Bull Run battlefield, but, incapable of handling large numbers of men, and bewildered by attacks from unexpected quarters, was badly defeated in the Second Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas (29-30 August 1862). It was the neatest, cleanest bit of work that Lee and Jackson ever performed. Their irresistible combination of audacious strategy and perfect tactics had undone the Union gains of an entire year in the Virginia theatre of war.

'Dark days are upon us. Pope a lying braggart . . . has been driven into Washington. . . . The rebels again look upon the Dome of the Capitol, and the flag of disunion can be seen on the neighboring hills.'¹

General Halleck, confounded by the rapid movements of the last few days, sat in the War Department, perpetually rubbing his elbows and gazing with watery eyes at a mounting pile of dispatches. One bright

¹ G. V. Fox, *Correspondence*, i. 154, 6 September 1862.

thought came, to summon McClellan, then a general without command at Alexandria. On 1 September, as the news from the front became more and more alarming, McClellan conferred with Halleck and the President. Early the next morning Lincoln, without consulting Halleck or his cabinet, placed McClellan in 'command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defence of the capital'.¹ The general at once rode out to meet Pope's retreating army, and to receive the wild enthusiasm that his presence always inspired among troops.

In the meantime Lincoln faced his Cabinet meeting. Stanton and Chase were vehement in their opposition to McClellan, and all their colleagues but Seward and Blair concurred. Lincoln admitted most of their allegations—including the one now known to be untrue, that McClellan had deliberately withheld troops from Pope—but pointed out that no one else had the confidence of officers and men, or the ability to cope with so desperate a situation.

'In stating what he had done,' wrote Gideon Welles, 'the President was deliberate, but firm and decisive. His language and manner were kind and affectionate, especially toward two of the members who were greatly disturbed; but every person present felt that he was truly the chief, and every one knew his decision, though mildly expressed, was as fixed and unalterable as if given out with the imperious command and determined will of Andrew Jackson.'²

When, three days later (5 September), news came that Lee was crossing the Potomac above Washington into Maryland, Lincoln verbally gave McClellan 'command of the forces in the field'.

Of many crises for the Union this was the most acute. With Virginia clear of invaders Lee was about to break through into the heart of the Union. In the West

¹ 1 O. R., xii. part iii, 807 (2 September).

² Welles, *Lincoln and Seward*, p. 196.

a Confederate offensive was undoing the work of Grant and Buell ;¹ in England the movement for intervention was coming to a head.

4. *The Antietam Campaign*

Lee expected to win Maryland for the Confederacy ; but his prime objective was the railway bridge over the Susquehanna at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Possession of that bridge and of the line of approach would come perilously near cutting the Union in two. It would leave Washington connected with the West only by the roundabout Hudson river and Great Lakes route. The victorious Southern army would be in a central position to attack Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia. President Davis, on Northern soil, would propose peace on the basis of Southern independence ; and if Lincoln's government refused they would have to reckon with the people in the November election, and face the likelihood of foreign intervention.² On 7 September the French Minister at Washington informed Seward that in his opinion it was time to recognize the independence of the Confederacy. Napoleon III was only waiting for English approval to do so. One week later Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell : ' Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. If this should happen would it not be time for us to consider an Anglo-French mediation ? ' Russell replied, ' I agree with you that the time is come for

¹ Kirby Smith had taken Lexington (Kentucky) and was threatening Cincinnati ; Braxton Bragg, Davis's favourite general, was racing Buell for Louisville ; if he won, Kentucky might be secured for the Confederacy, and a Southern invasion of Ohio might follow.

² It is doubted by some of the best authorities (e. g. Freeman, in *Lee-Davis Dispatches*, p. 62) that Lee looked to anything further than the invasion of Maryland ; but the dispatches in *I O. R.*, xix, part ii, 598-600, and Gen. J. G. Walker's account of his interview with Lee in *Battles and Leaders*, ii. 605, seem to leave no doubt that Lee's plan was as described above.

offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree further, that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent State.'

As they splashed through the fords of the Potomac the regimental bands of Lee's army played the stirring air, nowadays familiar to devotees of 'The Red Flag', in which an ardent citizen of Maryland implored his State to 'clothe her beauteous limbs with steel' and 'be the battle-queen of yore'.

Come, for thy shield is bright and strong,
Maryland!

Come, for thy dalliance does thee wrong,
Maryland!

But she did not come. Southern influence in Maryland extended little beyond tidewater. The prudent farmers of the western counties were more impressed by the ragged uniforms of Lee's barefooted veterans¹ than by his invitation to throw off their 'foreign yoke'; and Stonewall Jackson needed no mythical flag-waving by Barbara Freitchie to inform him that he was not wanted in Frederick Town. It was the harvest season in that rich Maryland piedmont. Orchards heavily fruited, well-stocked piggeries, and ripe 'roast-in' ears' of maize refreshed the foot-weary boys in grey, but tempted many to remain. Lee lost more men by desertion than he gained by recruiting.

For the safety of his northward raid it was essential that Lee should control a line of communications through the Shenandoah Valley. Fearing lest the Union force at

¹ Between four and five thousand pairs of boots were obtained in Maryland, but 'this was by no means sufficient to supply the men without them, there being at this time at Winchester, a camp of 900 men who are not effective because barefooted; and a great many more likewise with the army'.—Lee to Q.M.G., 21 September. *O. R.*, xix, part ii, 614.

Harper's Ferry should block the Valley's mouth,¹ Lee once more divided his army, sent Jackson to take Harper's Ferry, and with the rest moved north of Hagerstown. Lee counted on McClellan taking weeks to reorganize ; but McClellan's energy and personality worked miracles with Pope's defeated army. Within a week of Manassas he was marching on Frederick Town with 70,000 men, followed by frantic telegrams from Halleck² to the effect that Lee's move was a mere feint to draw him from Washington. But McClellan kept on, 'with a halter around his neck'—and the Committee on the Conduct of the War at the other end of the rope—for he had no formal written order to command the army in the field.³

South Mountain, as the Blue Ridge is called where it crosses Maryland, separated the hostile armies. Sending his van to force the passes, McClellan sat his horse as in review by the roadside, pointing to where clouds of smoke showed that the battle of South Mountain had begun. Men and officers as they passed cheered themselves hoarse, falling out of ranks to touch and caress his charger Dan, and cry 'God bless you, Little Mac!' That day (14 September) South Mountain was carried. 'I thought I knew McClellan, but this movement of his puzzles me,' exclaimed his West Point classmate, Stonewall Jackson. Lee knew what it meant, and hastened south from Hagerstown just in time to prevent the Union army interposing between his great lieutenant and himself. An over-careful reconnaissance by the Union commander gave Jackson time to cross the Potomac and join Lee on the 16th ; but the reunited Army of Northern Virginia was fairly caught in a cramped position between Antietam Creek and the

¹ Actually Harper's Ferry was of no strategic importance, and in the Gettysburg campaign was properly neglected by both sides.

² Quoted by Frothingham in *Proceedings Hist. Soc. Mass.*, lvi. 185.

³ *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 546-51.

Potomac, where Lee had no room to perform those brilliant manœuvres that were his delight and the enemy's confusion. He had no alternative but to fight or to retreat, and he chose to fight.¹

The battle of the Antietam or Sharpsburg (17 September) was a series of desperate unco-ordinated attacks and equally desperate but skilful counter-attacks, that exhausted Lee's army but did not drive it from position. Although fresh reserves were available, McClellan refused to renew the battle the next day, as Grant or Sherman would certainly have done under like circumstances. Without further pressure from him, Lee recrossed the Potomac into Virginia on the night of 18 September. The crisis was ended.

Antietam was the most nearly decisive battle of the Civil War. It might have been really decisive if McClellan had attacked more promptly, combined his attacks properly, and held on persistently. Two years and a half more elapsed before the war closed, but the Confederacy was never so near independence as on that bloody field in the Maryland hills. Thereafter, if the Northern will to victory could be maintained, Union victory was inevitable. A better general might have destroyed Lee's army; but McClellan by his restoration of morale to the army, by his prompt divination of the enemy's plans, and his brave assumption of responsibility in the absence of precise orders, had frustrated Lee's campaign and parried the most serious thrust at his country's heart. Antietam averted foreign recognition of the Confederacy; and by giving Lincoln the opportunity he sought to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, it brought the liberal opinion of the world to his side.²

¹ 'Of all Lee's actions in the war this seems to me to be the most open to criticism,' Sir Frederick Maurice, *Lee*, p. 152.

² See the judicious comment on McClellan's conduct of this battle in F. W. Palfrey, *The Antietam and Fredericksburg* (Campaigns of the

5. *Emancipation determined*

It was on the 22nd of September, five days after Antietam, that Lincoln opened a momentous Cabinet meeting by reading Artemus Ward's 'High-handed Outrage in Uticy'. The President had not summoned his Cabinet for their advice, so he told them. He had made a covenant with God to free the slaves as soon as the rebels were driven out of Maryland; God had decided on the field of Antietam. His mind was fixed, his decision made. Blair and Bates, both from border slave States, thought the moment inopportune; the President reminded them that for months he had urged their States to take the initiative in emancipation. He must now take the forward movement. In the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation the President, by virtue of his power as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, declared that upon the 1st of January 1863 all slaves within any State or district then in rebellion against the United States, 'shall be, then, thenceforward, and forever free'.

This proclamation, more revolutionary in human relationships than any event in American history since 1776, lifted the Civil War to the dignity of a crusade. But it was very slow to influence public opinion; and only a complete Union victory could give it practical effect. The South, indignant at what she considered an invitation to the slaves to cut their masters' throats,¹ was nerved to greater effort. The Northern armies received from it no new impetus. The Democratic party, presenting it to the Northern people as proof that abolitionists were responsible for the duration of Civil War, v), pp. 119-22. Frothingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-7, discusses the question of numbers and losses, on which Henderson's *Jackson*, ii, chapter xix, is unreliable.

¹ In order to repel this charge, the definite proclamation of 1 January 1863 (Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 457) enjoined the negroes to abstain from violence, and to 'labor faithfully for reasonable wages'.

the war, obtained signal gains in the autumn elections. Julia Ward Howe saw in it the glory of the coming of the Lord ; but many radicals and abolitionists received it as a tardy surrender to themselves. In England and Europe the Proclamation was greeted by liberals and radicals with joy, but by most people with contempt, as a flat political manœuvre. Only by degrees did public opinion at home and abroad perceive that the cause of American Union had been definitely fused with that of human liberty.

Antietam did not alter the opinion held by almost every member of Palmerston's ministry that the Union could never conquer the South ; but it did convince every member of the Cabinet save Gladstone that the moment was inopportune for intervention. Joint mediation between North and South, which Lord John Russell began to advocate after the second Bull Run, died in the hands of his colleagues by the end of October. A more concrete proposal from Napoleon III, that England, France, and Russia should join in proposing an armistice and lifting the blockade for six months, was definitely rejected by the British Cabinet on 13 November.¹ So passed the second and great crisis in foreign relations.

¹ E. D. Adams, *op. cit.*, chapter xi. Mr. Adams shows that Gladstone's famous statement in his Newcastle speech of 7 October, ' There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army ; they are making, it appears, a navy ; and they have made, what is more than either, they have made a nation ' , did not have the effect often ascribed to it, of making the Cabinet decide the other way ; it was rather Cornewall Lewis's masterly analysis and Palmerston's common-sense view of the actual situation. It was also well understood that to press any proposal of interference, however mild, would bring immediate diplomatic rupture with the United States, if not war. As *The Times* remarked on 14 November, ' It would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire in turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our back '.

6. *McClellan removed*

Lee's Army of Northern Virginia retreated up the Shenandoah Valley in a demoralized condition. 'The absent are scattered broadcast over the land,' Lee wrote the Secretary of War, on 23 September. 'There is great dereliction of duty among the regimental and company officers, and unless something is done the army will melt away.'¹ And the invasion of Kentucky had proved as disappointing as that of Maryland; the spirit of Henry Clay was too strong. 'Unless a change occurs soon, we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky to its cupidity,' wrote Braxton Bragg on 25 September. On 8 October Buell won a western Antietam, at Perryville; and Bragg retreated to middle Tennessee.

Public opinion in the North was less grateful to McClellan for what he had done than indignant because he had let Lee escape. On 6 October Lincoln ordered McClellan to 'cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South', while the roads were yet good, and sensibly advised him to take the line east of the Blue Ridge, between Lee's army and Richmond. Instead of moving at once, McClellan began to clamour for supplies and clothing in a tone reminiscent of the quiet days on the Potomac; and on 9 October J. E. B. Stuart cut loose for another successful cavalry raid round the entire Union army. Lincoln wrote his general on 13 October, urging and entreating him 'at least to try to beat' Lee 'to Richmond on the inside track'. When McClellan answered by demanding remounts, the President replied: 'Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues any-

¹ 1 O. R., xix, part i, 622. In a letter to Davis the same day he admits, 'We have now abundance of arms'.

thing?' McClellan retorted that pursuing J. E. B. Stuart was enough to fatigue any one.

From the purely military point of view this new delay may have been justifiable; but a general of McClellan's reputation could not afford to indulge another case of what Lincoln called 'the slows'. He had reorganized the army and saved the capital; but could he smash Lee's army and 'stamp out the rebellion'? Lincoln believed not. Could he count on McClellan's loyalty to the Government now that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued? For the general had warned his President on 7 July, 'a declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies'.¹ The prospect of another winter of bickering and procrastination was more than Lincoln thought the Union cause could stand. And the autumn elections had begun. Towards the end of October Lincoln decided that if McClellan permitted Lee to get between himself and Richmond, McClellan must go. On 26 October the Army of the Potomac began to cross into Virginia. Lee moved Longstreet's corps athwart its path. On 7 November the President relieved McClellan of command of the Army of the Potomac, and appointed Burnside in his place.

That ended for ever the military career of the Union general of whom Lee afterwards said that he was the ablest of his opponents 'by all odds'. The reasons for Lincoln's action are clear; the consequences are no less certain. It was the greatest mistake Lincoln ever made, and it probably cost his country a year of warfare. On the morrow of victory the Army of the Potomac was deprived of its beloved commander, then fast learning the art of offensive strategy, and was sent to useless sacrifice under a general distinguished for man-

¹ I O. R., xix, part ii, 395-6. For a vivid personal impression of McClellan after Antietam and the unwholesome atmosphere at his head-quarters, see James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag*, chapter iv.

ners and side-whiskers, who had already proved his incompetence as a corps commander at the Antietam. And Halleck was still General-in-Chief.

7. *Fredericksburg*

Burnside reverted to McClellan's plan of February, to mass his army behind the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg, where Acquia Creek on the Potomac could serve as depot, and thence advance on Richmond. As Johnston had done in March, so Lee and Jackson now hasten across Northern Virginia, and are posted on the south bank before Burnside has obtained the means of crossing the river. 'The luxurious Army of the Potomac, petted to bursting, is no match in celerity of movement to the famished freezing soldiers of Lee.'¹

Lee wished to inveigle Burnside into the Wilderness between the Rappahannock and the North Anna, there to administer a Sedan; but Davis feared the effect on Southern opinion of a retreat, and refused his consent. So Lee took his stand on the wooded heights above Fredericksburg. There, on 13 December, he met an attack by Burnside that presented the most inspiring spectacle and the most useless slaughter of the Civil War. Six times the Union infantry—long double lines of blue, bright national and regimental colours, bayonets gleaming in the sun—pressed on across an open plain, completely covered by the Confederate artillery and entrenched riflemen, to the stone wall at the foot of Marye's heights. Six times the survivors were hurled back, leaving seven thousand killed and wounded lying literally in heaps. 'It is well this is so terrible!' said Lee, as he watched the battle; 'we should grow too fond of it.'²

¹ *Correspondence of G. V. Fox*, ii. 447.

² John E. Cooke, *R. E. Lee* (1889), p. 184.

8. *Political Intrigue*

The South hoped that this battle would end the war ; but the Fredericksburg position was not one from which Lee could pursue the enemy with profit. Yet to many loyal men in the North it must have seemed, as it did to *The Times's* Southern correspondent, that the day of Fredericksburg would be a memorable one to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic.¹ Elections in October and November to the new House of Representatives had increased the Democratic delegation from 44 to 75 members. New York had elected a Democratic governor by 10,000 majority ; Pennsylvania, Republican by 60,000 in 1860, went Democratic by 4,000 in 1862. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois—Lincoln's own State—together returned 33 Democrats and only 11 Republicans to the new House ; and in this number were several of the so-called 'Copperheads', the pro-Southern pacifist Democrats. Only in New England and the trans-Mississippi West did the Emancipation Proclamation seem to strike a responsive note ;² those regions and (strangely enough) the border slave States saved the Republican majority.

Instead of being drawn more closely to the President by emancipation and misfortune, the Radicals were still his bitterest enemies. A few days after Fredericksburg, the Republican members of Congress held a caucus, and on Senator Sumner's proposal appointed a committee

¹ This correspondent was F. C. Lawley, a former M.P. and private secretary to Gladstone, who had left England under suspicion of dishonest speculation. His reports did much to create the Stonewall Jackson myth in England.

² Senator Grimes of Iowa wrote, 24 October, that he 'jumped astride' the Emancipation Proclamation, 'and rode it vigorously until the day of election. In every county in Iowa where it was discussed, explained and understood, we greatly increased our majorities. It suited *our* people exactly, & I have seen hundreds of Wisconsinians who tell me that it suits the people of that state as well.' *Correspondence of G. V. Fox*, ii. 411

of seven—Radicals all—to call on the President and demand a change of men and measures. Seward must go, for Seward was the friend of McClellan; and the jealous Chase, angling for the Presidency in 1864, had convinced his friends in Congress that Seward was the cause of all the nation's woes. That night the President confided his distress to an intimate friend, Senator Browning, 'We are now on the brink of destruction. It appears to me the Almighty is against us, and I can hardly see a ray of hope.'¹

Apparently, Lincoln must choose between yielding to the Radicals by sacrificing the indispensable Seward, and defying the Republican party by expelling Chase. He must, in derogation of established constitutional practice, allow Congress to choose his cabinet, or separate himself wholly from Congress. Either horn of the dilemma would impale disaster. Browning suggested that he should form an entirely new cabinet, which would obtain the support of all loyal men. Lincoln replied that he would rather try to get along with the one he had. Browning told him that the radical game was to surround him by a radical cabinet. 'The President said with a good deal of emphasis that he was master, and that they should not do that.'

Seward promptly offered his resignation. Holding it in his pocket, Lincoln confronted the visiting caucus committee with all his cabinet but Seward. Questions were asked. Chase, who had been the tale-bearer, wriggled and squirmed, but in the presence of his colleagues said that the cabinet was harmonious. The committee retired convinced that Chase had lied; still they would have Seward's scalp. In the hope of recovering their confidence and support, Chase proffered his resignation to the President. Lincoln, his eye lighting up, almost snatched the paper from his secretary's

¹ T. C. Pease, *Diary of Orville H. Browning* (Univ. of Chicago, 1924), p. 33.

hesitating hand. Laughing, he exclaimed with a graphic pioneer metaphor, 'Now I can ride; I have got a pumpkin in each end of my bag.' He wrote identical letters to both secretaries, refusing to accept their resignations; and both resumed their duties. Lincoln was master indeed.

9. *The British Working Man*

To crown this eventful year there only remained for Lincoln to issue the definite Emancipation Proclamation, which faint-hearted Union men had urged him to postpone indefinitely.¹ In anticipation, on New Year's eve, pro-Union meetings were held in several English cities, and stout resolves were passed that heartened the President and his people. 'The erasure of that foul blot upon civilization and Christianity—chattel slavery—during your Presidency will cause the name of Abraham Lincoln to be honoured and revered by posterity,' declared a meeting of six thousand working men at Manchester. 'Accept our high admiration of your firmness in upholding the proclamation of freedom.'²

¹ The Emancipation Proclamation of 1 January 1863 (Lincoln, *Complete Works*, Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 457), did not, as is often assumed, end slavery in the American Union, even on paper. It expressly exempted the loyal slave states, and those counties of the eastern shore of Virginia and Louisiana which had been occupied by Union armies, and practically withdrawn from the war. Slavery was abolished by state action in West Virginia in 1863, in Maryland and Missouri in 1864, in Tennessee in 1865, and in Delaware and Kentucky only by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1865.

² Frank Moore, *Rebellion Record*, vi, documents, pp. 344-5. One of the prime movers of this meeting was Thomas Evans, a Lancashire working man who had already thwarted a pro-Southern meeting at Bolton, so wrote Thomas Bayley Potter to Charles Sumner (26 Sept., 1863), adding, 'My grandfather, a small farmer and draper . . . 7 miles from York had his windows smashed because he would not illuminate for victories *reported* in the war for American Independence. I am thankful to be able now to follow in his footsteps and those of my father Sir Thomas Potter who was the first mayor of Manchester, and to

To which Lincoln replied : ‘ I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the working men at Manchester, and in all Europe are called to endure in this crisis. . . . Under the circumstances, I cannot but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic and reinspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity and freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by your great nation ; and, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration, esteem and the most reciprocal feeling of friendship among the American people. I hail this interchange of sentiment, therefore, as an augury that whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exist between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual.’¹

uphold the great principles of liberty involved in your present struggle. —To aim unceasingly to elevate the *dignity of labour* in America and *here* too is the best foundation and security for the prosperity and happiness of mankind.’ Sumner MSS., cxxxviii. 34.

¹ 19 January 1863.

I. *Liberty in War time*

IN the Cabinet crisis of December 1862, only Lincoln's astuteness saved him from becoming a mere premier, instead of a President. Yet Lincoln wielded a greater power throughout the war than any other President of the United States, not excepting Wilson; a wider authority than any English-speaking ruler between Cromwell and Lloyd George. Contemporary accusations against him of tyranny and despotism are strange reading to those who know his character, but not to students of his administration. If Lincoln was the ideal tyrant of whom Plato dreamed, he was none the less a dictator from the standpoint of American constitutional law and practice; and even the safety of the republic would not justify some of the acts committed under his authority. President Davis is open to the same charge. In the Confederacy, as in the United States, there were many men of high standing and character who preferred to risk defeat at the hands of the enemy rather than submit to an arbitrary government by their own President.

The war power of the President as commander-in-chief of the army and navy is, in practice, limited only by public opinion and the courts. At the very beginning of the war, Lincoln of his own authority called for enlistments not yet sanctioned by Congress, declared the blockade, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus in parts of Maryland. The first assumption of power was shortly legalized by Congress, the second by the Supreme Court; but Chief Justice Taney protested in vain against executive suspension of the famous writ.

At the same time military officers, acting under orders from the State or the War Department, began to arrest persons suspected of disloyalty or espionage, and to confine them without trial in military prisons, for indefinite terms. Lincoln could not afford to indulge a meticulous reverence for the Constitution when the Union was crumbling ; but the power he asserted was grossly abused. A loyal mayor of Baltimore, suspected of Southern sympathies, was arrested and confined in a fortress for over a year ; a Maryland judge who had charged a grand jury to inquire into illegal acts of government officials was set upon by a provost marshal's guard while his court was in session, beaten and dragged bleeding from the bench, and imprisoned for six months ; a former Congressman from Ohio, seventy years old, was arrested in his home by military authority, for alleged 'discouragement of enlistments'. His constituents elected him to the state legislature while in prison.

Simultaneously with the Emancipation Proclamation, the President issued an order that seemed to deny to white citizens the liberty he proposed to accord to negro slaves. He proclaimed that all persons resisting the draft, discouraging enlistment, or 'guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels' would be subject to martial law, tried by court martial, and denied the writ of habeas corpus.¹ Under this proclamation, over thirteen thousand persons were arrested and confined by military authority, for offences ranging from the theft of government property to treason. Earlier in the same year, and only a few days after he had denounced such practices of the Union Government, President Davis obtained from his Congress the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and promptly did so in Richmond and other places, where equally arbitrary and unjust proceedings occurred.

Undoubtedly the provocation was great, especially

¹ Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vi. 98.

in the North, where opposition to the war was open, organized, and active in almost every State. One of the most delicate and difficult subjects with which both Lincoln and Davis had to deal was the peace movement. On both sides it included doctrinaire pacifists and defeatists ; but the great body was composed of sincere persons who, if Northerners, believed that the Union could be restored, or if Southerners, that independence could be established, by negotiation : that only the obstinacy of Lincoln, or the ambition of Davis, prevented peace. Many there were also who feared that war was swallowing up liberty ; that a division of the Union (or a restoration of the Union) was preferable to militarism and tyranny. The 'copperheads', as the Northern opponents to the war were called,¹ held a great mass-meeting in Lincoln's home town, on 17 June 1863. They resolved 'that a further offensive prosecution of this war tends to subvert the Constitution and the Government', and proposed 'a national Convention to settle upon terms of peace, which should have in view the restoration of the Union as it was'.² In the single Southern State of North Carolina over one hundred peace meetings were held within two months after Gettysburg, in order to promote negotiations for reunion. On both sides the defeatists organized secret societies. In the North the 'Knights of the Golden Circle' harassed loyal households by midnight raids and barn-burnings ; in the South the 'Heroes of America' gave aid and comfort to the enemy.³ Neither the Union nor the Confederate Government made any systematic effort to suppress these organizations : they were too formidable. In Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,

¹ After a venomous species of snake. The term was accepted by the peace Democrats, who sported badges consisting of the head of Liberty cut from copper cents.

² Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, vii. 378.

³ A. S. Roberts, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xi. 190-9.

where treason flourished side by side with the most stalwart loyalty, General Burnside attempted repression in 1863 with slight success. In a general order he declared, 'The habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department.' For violation of this order, in a campaign speech, a prominent copperhead named Vallandigham was arrested, tried by a military commission, and sentenced to confinement for the duration of the war. Lincoln humorously altered the sentence to banishment, and Vallandigham was dumped within the military lines of the Confederacy. He received *in absentia* the Democratic nomination for Governor of Ohio, and conducted a campaign for peace and reunion from Canadian soil, although his unwilling Confederate hosts had made it perfectly clear that they would accept peace only with independence. After the war was over the Supreme Court took cognizance of a very similar case (*ex parte* Milligan), and declared in unmistakable terms that neither the Constitution nor any usage of war could sanction the military trial of a civilian in districts where the civil courts were open.

Personal liberty, freedom of speech, and of the press, were subject to a far more arbitrary control under this military régime during the Civil War than during the Great War. Yet no one who has studied the administration of Lincoln, and lived through the second administration of Wilson, can doubt that pacifists, conscientious objectors, the outspoken press, and critics of the government, fared better under the one than under the other. The Espionage Act of 1917, administered by a Department of Justice with a corps of paid spies and volunteer informers, enforced by judges and juries often maddened with war propaganda, was much more drastic in its effect and unjust in its operation than the courts martial of 1861-5. Throughout the Civil War active disloyalty was effectively dealt with wherever it raised its head; but there was no censorship of the press,

discussions of war aims and peace terms was seldom hindered ; and hardly a Northern community lacked a few ' unterrified Democrats ' who maintained with impunity that Jeff Davis was a better man than Abe Lincoln, that secession was legitimate, and the Union for ever dissolved. Sentences of the courts martial were comparatively mild, and offenders were pardoned promptly with the coming of peace ; whilst sentences of twenty years and over were not uncommon during the Great War, and in 1925 there were still many political prisoners in jail.¹

2. Northern Industry and Westward Expansion

It was an article of faith among subjects of King Cotton that Northern industry, cut off from its Southern markets and its supply of fibre, would collapse. On the contrary, Northern industry prospered during the war as it seldom had before. There was not only ' business as usual ', but business unusual. Union sea-power maintained the routes to foreign markets ; the waste of war stimulated production. In Philadelphia alone 180 new factories were built during the years 1862-4. The government, generous in its contracts and lavish in expenditure, helped to create a new ' shoddy aristocracy ' of profiteers, who became masters of capital after the war. Paper money and the high protective tariff that Congress imposed as a counterweight to internal taxation occasioned a sharp rise of prices, which the government made no effort to control. Owing to the relatively slight development of labour unions, wages did not rise in the same proportion,² and the salaried classes

¹ For the subject of civil liberty and the President's war powers, see Rhodes, *U.S.* (1907 ed.), iv, *passim* ; W. A. Dunning, *Essays on Civil War and Reconstruction* (Macmillan, 1910) ; George W. Brown, *Baltimore and the 19th of April, 1861* (Johns Hopkins Studies, extra vol. iii, 1887). The principal cases, with notes, will be found in J. B. Thayer, *Cases on Constitutional Law*, pp. 2354-95.

² Average prices rose 117 per cent, 1860-5 ; average wages, 43 per

suffered considerably. But American factory labour, more mobile and less dependent than that of England, returned to the farms whence much of it had come, or shifted into the woollen and other industries; and after the middle of 1862 enough cotton was obtained from the occupied parts of the South, and even from Liverpool,¹ to reopen many of the cotton mills. Indeed the only essential Northern industry that suffered from the war was shipbuilding and the carrying trade. Only 257 American merchantmen were accounted for by Confederate cruisers,² but many more took foreign registry to escape capture; and with the diversion of the better ships into government service, the share of foreign bottoms in the American carrying trade greatly increased. Naturally the nation that chiefly profited was Great Britain; and American writers have been disposed to credit the Lairds and W. S. Lindsay with patriotic motives in building the *Alabama* and in supporting the Confederacy, which had no shipping of its own.

In many ways the drain of men into the army and navy was compensated. Immigration never reached the high record of 1851 until twenty years later; but the total for the five years of war was almost eight hundred thousand. Labour-saving devices, invented before the war, were now generally applied. The Howe sewing-machine proved a boon to the clothing manufacturer, and a curse to the poor seamstress, whose wage dropped to eight cents an hour in 1864. The Gordon McKay machine for sewing uppers to boot-soles actually speeded up that process one hundred-fold, and revolutionized the industry. Petroleum, discovered in Pennsylvania in 1859, was so rapidly extracted that the production in-

cent, Nelson W. Aldrich, *Report of Senate Committee on Finance*, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Senate Report No. 1394.

¹ Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 339.

² J. R. Spears, *American Merchant Marine*, p. 292.

creased from 84,000 to 128,000,000 gallons in three years ; and refining methods were so rapidly improved that kerosene in cheap glass lamps had begun to replace candles and whale oil by 1865.

Like causes speeded up that revolution in American agriculture which ended in the ruin of British agriculture. The mechanical reaper, hitherto confined to the better prairie farms, came into general use ; giving every harvest-hand fivefold his former capacity with scythe and cradle. Westward migration and the opening up of new prairie cornlands were greatly stimulated by the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, after almost forty years' agitation by agrarians and pioneers. Under this law the Federal Government presented a quarter-section of public land (160 acres) to any bona-fide settler for a nominal fee. Fifteen thousand homesteads, including two million and a half acres, were thus given away during the war.¹ The annual pork-pack almost doubled, the annual wool-clip more than tripled between 1860 and 1865. Every autumn brought bumper crops of wheat and maize, while England and Europe suffered a succession of poor harvests. England, deprived of her normal sources of supply, turned to the United States, whence over five million quarters of wheat and flour were imported in 1862, as compared with less than one hundred thousand in 1859. Although the lack of cotton threw many English factory operatives out of work, it was evident that any attempt to break the blockade, and consequently fight the United States, would bring the British Isles face to face with starvation. 'Old King Cotton's dead and buried,

¹ Over half of these were in Minnesota, although there was a serious outbreak of the Sioux Indians there in 1862 ; five thousand in Wisconsin, Kansas, and Nebraska. In addition, these States sold hundreds of thousands of acres from their educational grants, and the Illinois Central Railroad sold in war time almost one-third of the 2,600,000 acres granted to it by the Federal Government.

brave young Corn is King', went the refrain of a popular song.¹

Apart from this westward extension of prairie farming, the normal development of the Far West continued during the Civil War.² Colorado, the goal of the 'Pike's Peak or Bust' gold rush in 1859, was organized as a Territory in 1861; and with the organization of Dakota and Nevada Territories the same year, no part of the United States, on paper at least, was any longer outside the dominion of law. Kansas became a State of the Union in 1861, as soon as Congress lost its Southern delegation; and Nevada was admitted prematurely in 1864, because the Republicans thought they needed its electoral vote. At least three hundred thousand emigrants crossed the plains to California, Oregon, and the new Territories during the war³—some to farm, others to seek gold, and many to escape the draft.

In general, the normal growth and activity of a civilized community continued in the North, without abatement. The cities increased in wealth and population. Enrolment in the universities hardly decreased beyond the loss of Southern students, although in some of the Western colleges the undergraduates enlisted in a body for short tours of service. Fifteen new colleges, including Cornell, Swarthmore, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, were founded in war time, and numerous bequests and new buildings were obtained by the older institutions. The Harvard-Yale boat-races, interrupted in 1861, were resumed in 1864, when a good imitation of the Oxford-Cambridge classic was

¹ Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 340; *Cycle of Adams Letters*, i. 184; E. D. Fite, *The North during the Civil War* (1910), pp. 18–20; L. B. Schmidt, in *Iowa Journal of History* (July 1918); W. Trimble, in *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1918*, l. 223–4; E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and American Civil War*, ii. 13–14, challenges the theory that 'wheat defeated cotton' in the contest for recognition of the Confederacy.

² F. L. Paxson, *History of the Frontier* (1924), chapters 1–lii.

³ Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 583.

held at Worcester, while Grant was besieging Petersburg.

3. *Union Conscription*

Northern prosperity was sufficient to clog the wheels of war. Bountiful harvests and opportunities for profiteering were the dangerous counterweight to patriotism; and political blundering fell in the same scale. Having allowed Stanton to dismantle the new federal recruiting service before the Peninsular Campaign, Lincoln had to appeal to the States to raise 'three hundred thousand more' on 2 July 1862; and the States, even by drafting from their own militia, produced less than eighty-eight thousand men, organized in new regiments and enlisted for nine months. Replacements for veteran regiments simply could not be obtained. Yet Congress flinched from a national conscription.¹ During the winter of 1862-3 it became evident that unless these scruples were surmounted, the game was up; and Congress on 3 March 1863 passed the first Conscription Act.

It was a most imperfect law, 'a grotesque shadow of a conscription act.'² All men between the ages of 20 and 45 were declared liable to military service, and had to be registered. As men were needed, the number was divided among the loyal States in proportion to their total population, and subdivided among districts, giving

¹ It has always been a principle of American law, inherited from the English common law, that the sovereign had a right to command the subject's military service within the realm, but not outside the realm. Although the Constitution merely delegated to Congress the right to 'raise armies', it was assumed that the sovereign for that purpose was the State; and the Federal Government had never ventured to attempt to raise armies by conscription. Daniel Webster made a powerful argument against federal conscription in 1814, and Hannis Taylor, in 1917, made a most ingenious and logical argument on the same ground, denying the power of the Federal Government to send drafted soldiers to Europe.

² F. A. Shannon, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xii, 67.

credit for previous enlistments. In the first draft (1863) these credits wiped out the liability of most of the Western States, which had been most forward in volunteering. Between each subsequent call and the actual draft, every State and district had fifty days' grace to furnish its revised quota by volunteering, after which the balance was obtained by drafting men on the registered lists. No attempt was made to levy first on the younger men or bachelors, and instead of exempting specified classes such as ministers, conscientious objectors, supporters of families, and essential producers, payment was made the basis of exemption. One could commute service in a particular draft upon payment of three hundred dollars; or evade service during the entire war by procuring a substitute to enlist for three years—no matter if the substitute died the next month, or deserted the next day.¹ A system so inequitable to the poor was unpopular everywhere; and in the working-class quarters of New York the first drawing of names in 1863 was the signal for terrible riots.

Apparently the Irish-Americans of New York, always hostile to the negro, were disaffected by the Emancipation Proclamation, and inflamed by the importation of 'contrabands' to break a stevedores' strike. On 13 July, while the names were being drawn, the Provost

¹ The system was so complicated that certain exceptions to these broad statements must be noted. (a) The basis of the quota was changed from total population to population registered for service, after the first draft. (b) Naval enlistments were not credited in the first draft. (c) In the first draft the married men over thirty-five were not to be drafted until all others had been called out; but there was no such distinction in later drafts. (d) From all the drafts exemption was granted to sole supporters of aged parents and eldest brothers in large families of young children, but not to supporters of families as such. Physical disability was the principal cause for exemption. (e) The commutation privilege was abolished for all but religious conscientious objectors by Act of 24 February 1864, but such objectors had to serve in some non-combatant branch.

Marshal was driven from his office by a mob. Men, women, and boys paraded the streets during the better part of four days and nights, sacking shops, gutting drinking saloons, burning mansions, lynching and torturing every negro who fell into their clutches. The police—who also for the most part were Irish-Americans—did their best, but it was not until troops were poured into the city that order was restored, after the loss of hundreds of lives.

These scenes, which gave great delight to enemies of the Union cause, were not repeated; but they were equivalent to a victory for the Confederacy.¹ In fact a very small proportion of the Union army was furnished by conscription. Every fresh draft began an ignoble competition between districts to reduce their quotas by fictitious credits, and to fill the residue by bounty-fed volunteers. As recruits were credited to the district where they enlisted, and not to that of their residence, several wealthy communities escaped the draft altogether by purchasing cannon-fodder in the poorer country districts, which were then left with only fathers of families and physical rejects to fill subsequent drafts. In a rough way the burdens of service were thus placed on those best able to bear them; poor volunteers could profit from the privilege of well-to-do slackers while swindlers fleeced them both.² Professional substitute- and bounty-brokers, apt graduates of the shipping agents' offices, so covered the country with their network that it was difficult for any one to get into service without passing through their clutches; and as the state bounties or individual substitution fees were paid

¹ Over 15,000 men were detached from the Army of the Potomac after Gettysburg to do guard duty at New York and other Northern cities threatened with draft riots. This so reduced Meade's army that he was unable to take the offensive against Lee. J. C. Ropes, in *Papers Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass.*, iv. 366.

² F. A. Shannon, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xii. 523.

on the nail, the brokers often induced the recruits they had furnished to desert at the first opportunity, and re-enlist elsewhere. 'Bounty jumpers' enlisted and deserted, ten, twenty, even thirty times, before being apprehended. Brokers had their crimps in Canada, offering fabulous bounties that were never paid, kidnapping civilians, and tempting soldiers of the British garrison to desert.¹ State agents scoured occupied portions of the South for negroes and even obtained men from the poor-houses of Belgium and the slums of Europe.² Federal officials were bribed to admit cripples, idiots, and criminals as recruits. One can easily imagine the effect on the morale of a veteran regiment which received replacements of this class. The success of the Union conscription, however, is not to be measured by the very small number of actual draftees obtained, or the large proportion of deserters, but by the enormous number of volunteers who could have been obtained by no other method.³ Unquestionably the average quality of the Union as of the Confederate army deteriorated as the war dragged on; but the men who followed Grant through the Wilderness and Sherman to Atlanta will compare well with any soldiers of modern times for courage, discipline, and tenacity.

4. *Confederate Conscription*

Compared with the Union, the Confederacy was a nation in arms. During four years, war was its only business. Fighting for independence and race supre-

¹ W. F. Raney, *ibid.*, x. 21-33. Between forty and fifty thousand Canadians served in the Union army.

² Senator Wilson of Massachusetts alleged as a point of merit to his State that it had obtained a shipload of German paupers to complete its quota in one of the drafts. For the proportion of foreigners in the Union army, and the colossal expense of this bounty system, see *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xii. 539 note.

³ The following table is compiled from the final report of the

macy, the Southerners gave their government more, and asked of it less, than did the Northern people. Yet the glamour of a lost cause and the loyal reticence of Southern writers have until recently obscured the part that selfishness, indifference, and defeatism played in losing it. Not that there was any Union party in the Confederacy, outside the mountainous regions—where no Confederate conscription officer dared show his face—but there was inveterate provincialism and widespread ignorance, and withal a certain shrewd instinct on the part of the poor whites that it was ‘a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight’.

The Union system of conscription was simply a series of requisitions on the States, enforced by national authority. The Confederate system was, in theory, a *levée en masse* of Southern manhood between the ages

Provost-Marshal-General (1866), 39th Cong., 1st Sess., House Exec. Docs., iv, part i, pp. 43-213.

	1863 July.	1864 14 Mar.	1864 18 July.	1864 19 Dec.
Number called for . . .	700,000		500,000	300,000
Reduced by credits to . .	407,092		234,327	300,000
Names drawn . . .	292,441	113,446	231,918	139,024
Failed to report . . .	39,415	27,193	66,159	28,477
Examined . . .	252,566	84,957	138,536	46,128
Exempted for physical disability, &c. . . .	164,855	41,248	109,754	93,050
Exempted by paying commutation	52,288	32,678	1,298	460
Substitutes furnished by registered men		84,733	29,584	12,997
Substitutes furnished by draftees	26,002	8,911	28,502	10,192
Draftees held to personal service	9,881	3,416	26,205	6,845
Voluntary enlistments . .	489,462		188,172	157,058
Total number obtained . .	537,672 *		272,463	187,092

* The excess, 130,579, credited to call of 18 July 1864.

of 18 and 35. Yet, instead of promoting solidarity, it fomented class antagonism. Originally adopted (April 1862) in order to obtain replacements, and retain in the ranks all men whose terms of enlistment were expiring, it was generally regarded as a mere temporary expedient of doubtful constitutionality. There was no answer to Senator Foote's question, 'If agents of the Confederate Government had the right to go into any State and take therefrom the men belonging to that State, how were State rights and State sovereignty to be maintained?'¹ State courts generally supported the law, quoting decisions of Chief Justice Marshall as if State rights were forgotten; but other state authorities refused to enforce it; and thousands of Southern men resisted it, whether constitutional or not.² Although the law granted exemptions to ministers, conscientious objectors, railway employees, postmen, apothecaries, teachers, and the like, South Carolina of her own 'sovereign' authority proceeded to extend the privilege, and to assert the right of nullification in 1862 as roundly as in 1832. Congress was frightened into adding millers, blacksmiths, editors, printers, and plantation overseers, at the rate of one to every twenty slaves, to the already numerous classes of exempts; whereupon there arose a mighty clamour from the democracy, especially against the 'twenty-nigger law', and the privilege of substitution. So much fraud and skulking developed that Congress swung in the other direction until the Confederate war department had to supply labour for essential industries by details from the army. Substitution was stopped towards the close of 1863, when the price of

¹ Debates in Confederate Congress, 29 March, 22 August 1862, *Papers Southern Hist. Soc.*, no. 45, pp. 26-9, 204-11.

² The Governor of North Carolina wrote the President, 13 May 1863, that two deserters who killed two members of the state militia when resisting capture were discharged by the Chief Justice of the State on the ground that the State had no authority to arrest deserters from the Confederate service! Rowland, *Davis*, v. 486.

a substitute had reached six thousand paper dollars. Early in 1864 the Confederate Congress cut down exemptions and extended the age of military service to seventeen and fifty.

No Southern city was disgraced by draft riots like that of New York, but fraud and evasion were widespread, and many of the remoter districts of the South were terrorized by armed bands of deserters and draft-dodgers, who waged a successful guerrilla warfare against the troops sent to apprehend them. President Lincoln on 10 March 1863 proclaimed amnesty to all absentees without leave who would return to their colours within the month. In June, when the percentage of absentees in the Confederate army was approaching thirty per cent, President Davis extended a similar invitation to them. So few came in that the offer of twenty days' grace was repeated shortly after Gettysburg, and accompanied by a lurid description of Union war aims.¹ The President was right in his contention that the South was invincible if every man liable to service would do his duty.

5. *The South in War Time*

In 1863 many thousand Southerners began to feel the pinch of poverty, and as the war dragged on many more came face to face with starvation. Yet the South was an agricultural country, and the production of food steadily rose as an increasing proportion of the cotton fields were planted with corn.² There was no lack of

¹ 'Their malignant rage aims at nothing less than the extermination of yourselves, your wives, and children . . . they debauch the inferior race, hitherto docile and contented, by promising indulgence of the vilest passions as the price of treachery.' 4 *O. R.*, ii. 687 (1 August 1863). A. B. Moore states that there were 136,000 deserters and a.w.o.l. from the Confederate army by that time, out of a total enrolment of 500,000, *op. cit.*, p. 202; 'But it is impossible to say how many men passed through the channels of conscription' (p. 356).

² The cotton crop of 1862 was one-quarter, the crop of 1864 one-

labour, for the slaves remained loyal and at work, unless a Union army appeared in the neighbourhood. Only transport was wanting.

Transport was the weak point in the Confederate economic organization, as State rights in its political system.¹ Numerous local lines of varying gauges converged on market towns and seaports. Through traffic, which hardly existed in the South before the war, encountered many 'bottle-necks' and even breaks—as in Petersburg, Lynchburg, Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Raleigh—where goods had to be transported by lorry from one station to another. Imbued as the Southern people were with *laissez-faire* ideas, their government was slow to attempt any sort of control over railways; and although Congress appropriated money to construct missing links, little was done. The few rolling mills and foundries were too busy with government work to replace outworn equipment. Main lines could be kept going only by using the rolling-stock and tearing up the rails of branch lines; junctions became congested with supplies, and breakdowns were frequent. That is why there were bread-riots in Richmond when the barns of the Valley were bursting with wheat; why government clerks had to pay fifteen dollars a bushel for maize that was bringing the farmer only one dollar in south-western Georgia.

The ruling class in the South, which had most at stake, gave all it had to the cause. In the North able-bodied young men of means and position could remain in mufti without incurring social stigma; in the South the women saw to it that there were no gentlemen slackers. The patriotism of the Southern women was

eighth, that of 1860—which was, however, abnormally large. Schwab, *Confederate States*, p. 279.

¹ C. W. Ramsdell, 'The Confederate Government and the Railroads', *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxii. 794–810. Cf. the same author's article on the control of manufacturing in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, viii. 231–49.

only equalled by their devotion. Left in charge of plantations they had to direct the necessary changes from cotton-raising to the production of food, to revive obsolete household industries such as spinning, weaving, and dyeing, to extract nitrates from the earth of cellars and smoke-houses, to care for wounded soldiers, and feed passing armies. Yet those who remained on their plantations fared well in comparison with refugees and government clerks at Richmond, where the speculators offered as great a contrast to their own penurious lives as the more bloated profiteers of New York did to the Northern wage-earner.

6. *War Welfare Work*

Individual sacrifice and devotion were not lacking among the civilian population of the North ; but the Union was more conspicuous for organized service. Remembering Florence Nightingale and the British Sanitary Commission, a number of public-spirited citizens organized the United States Sanitary Commission at the beginning of the war. Like the later Red Cross, this organization acted as an auxiliary to the Army Medical Corps. It fitted up hospital ships, organized hospital units, and kept them supplied, taught company officers how to care for their men, sent men and women to nurse the wounded at the front, supplied the soldiers with clothing, comforts, and welcome additions to their abundant but unvaried army rations of bread, beef, and coffee. There was also a United States Christian Commission which deluged the army with Bibles, tracts, and patriotic song-books, and supplied a certain number of coffee-stalls and reading rooms. If the boys in blue and the boys in grey obtained less aid and attention than the combatants of the Great War, they expected less ; and their standard of comfort was lower. Compared with any earlier conflict the amount

and variety of volunteer organized non-combatant service was unprecedented.¹

7. *War Finance*

Both governments attempted to finance the war by loans and taxes ; both resorted to indirect taxation by fiat money. Neither Secretary Chase nor Secretary Memminger rose above mediocrity as ministers of war finance. Chase's earliest expedient of importance was an issue of 7·3 per cent three-year gold notes, to which the Northern banks subscribed liberally. The Treasury then sucked away their specie reserves to such an extent that they were forced to suspend specie payments at the end of 1861. Congress was able to devise nothing better, although William P. Fessenden, chairman of the Senate committee on finance, learned enough to make him a competent successor to Chase. The customs duties were raised ; an income-tax, with rates varying between three and ten per cent, was levied ; bonds were issued in small denominations, and eagerly subscribed ; and in July 1862 a comprehensive scheme of internal taxation was imposed. 'No other nation', said the London *Economist*, 'would have endured a system of excise duties so searching, so effective or troublesome.' System, however, there was none, since Chase was unable to guide Congress, and Congress could not force Chase. During the fiscal year between 1 July 1862 and 30 June 1863 the government received 111 millions from taxation, and 175 millions from bonds ; but spent 715 millions ; it was not until 1864 that taxation became sufficiently heavy to meet one-third of the government's expenditure. That it did reach this proportion was a matter of astonishment to

¹ Rhodes, *U.S.* (1907), v. 244-62—bibliography in Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 437-8. Most of the army nurses in the Civil War were men ; Walt Whitman has related his nursing experiences in his *Specimen Days* and other writings.

foreign governments ; and a tribute to the strength of popular government.

The deficiency was made up in part by various forms of government paper, but chiefly by inflation. 'Greenbacks' (legal tender notes) were authorized by Congress, against the wishes of the Treasury and Wall Street, in February 1862.¹ Gold had already disappeared ; silver and copper followed as the greenbacks depreciated to thirty-five cents on the gold dollar.² 'Shinplasters'—fractional paper currency, in denominations as low as three cents—had to be issued. The greenbacks rallied to seventy-eight cents on the gold dollar after Lee's surrender, but did not reach parity until 1879.

As legal tender for all debts and payments the greenbacks were fiat money pure and simple. Dan Shays was justified ; Bill Bryan portended. Their influence on the financial standards of the nation was deep and pernicious. Their adoption so early in the war was a gesture at Wall Street rather than a necessity, although the initial errors of Chase and of Congress, based as they were on the expectancy of a short war, would before long have brought in some form of inflation.³

¹ These notes, or bills as they are generally called in America, were the first issued by Congress that were legal tender for all debts and payments, public and private. Previous and later issues of interest-bearing 'treasury notes' were receivable only for federal dues. The customs duties, however, were by special Act collected in gold or the equivalent, throughout the Civil War. The Supreme Court decided in 1869 that the Legal Tender Act was unconstitutional and void in respect of debts contracted before its passage ; but upon the filling of two vacancies in the Court, it promptly reversed its decision. On both occasions Chief Justice Chase voted against the legality of his action as Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury.

² Dewey, *Financial History of the United States*, p. 293, has a table of monthly averages.

³ Another feature of Chase's financial policy was far-reaching—the National Bank Act of February 1863, which allowed banks to issue notes up to ninety per cent of their holdings in federal bonds. Although comparatively few banks took advantage of this during the war,

Inflation was almost the exclusive method of Confederate war finance. Jefferson Davis had to obtain supply from a people even less used to heavy taxation than those of the North, and much less able to bear it ; and the blockade precluded any considerable income from customs duties. In four years the receipts of the Confederate government did not exceed \$27,000,000 in specie value. Its expenditures ran to a couple of billions in treasury notes, payable in gold upon 'ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States'. Prices, measured by this currency, rose to levels that seemed fantastic, until the German mark began to tumble in 1920.¹ All the older historians adduce Southern financial policy as a contributing cause of Northern victory—but in the light of recent events there is some reason to believe that finance was one of the Confederacy's strongest points. Certainly that government was never at a loss for money ; and its methods of making money have received the sincere flattery of imitation from some of the oldest established governments in Europe.

Inflation tempted many Southerners to hoard food, to speculate in other essential supplies, and to exchange the gains from profiteering for sterling or United States notes. Government attempted to fix maximum prices without the authority to enforce them ; and the most drastic regulations were unable to prevent blockade-runners from importing luxuries for the profiteers rather than necessities for the army. As the stringency of the blockade increased, Southern economic life diverged more widely from the normal ; but economic revolution came only with defeat and reconstruction.

it became subsequently the basis of the federal currency system, until its inelasticity and other defects caused it to be superseded by the Federal Reserve System of 1913.

¹ The Confederate dollar was worth 1·6 cents in gold at the time of Lee's surrender. Until 1863 it never fell below 33 cents.

After noticing these many instances of selfishness, indifference, and defeatism on both sides, we must remember that, after all, both the Union and the Confederate governments were sustained by popular suffrage in 1862 and 1864, and that no earlier war in modern history drew out so much sacrifice, heroism, and fierce energy.¹ Vice-President Stephens probably divined the situation at the beginning of 1863, when he wrote, 'The great majority of the masses both North and South are true to the cause of their side. . . . A large majority on both sides are tired of the war ; want peace. . . . But as we do not want peace without independence, so they do not want peace without union.' Similarly it might be said that the European peoples in 1916 and 1917 were tired of the Great War ; but none wanted peace without victory. The very numerous elements that wanted peace at any price were either silenced by a repression such as Lincoln and Davis could not exert, or converted by a war propaganda in comparison with which the efforts of North and South were amateurish and unconvincing. Outwardly, at least, the American people in 1918 were more whole-heartedly in the war against Germany than their grandfathers had been in the war against each other ; but in comparison with the heart-breaking struggle of 1861-5, the Great War, so far as the American people were concerned, was a brief and happy adventure.

¹ 'In the Union army 67,058 were killed on the field, and 43,012 died of wounds (total 110,070); 224,586 died from disease and 24,872 from accidents and other causes. The total deaths were thus 359,528. The number wounded in battle but recovered was 275,175. In the Confederate army 94,000 were killed or mortally wounded ; probably 164,000 died from disease, accidents, and other causes.' J. F. Rhodes, *U.S.*, v. 186-7.

LII

DIPLOMACY AND VICKSBURG

JANUARY—JUNE 1863

I. *Napoleon III*

MILITARY operations became simpler as the war progressed. In 1863 both sides concentrated towards the objectives they had failed to attain the year before : the Union on strengthening the blockade, and pressing out such obstacles to military constriction as Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Lee's army ; the Confederacy on defence, and on breaking through into Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and the high seas.¹

During the early months of 1863 interest shifts from the armies in America to the conflict of opinion and diplomacy in Europe. On 9 January 1863 Napoleon III proposed an informal conference between Northern and Southern representatives, with the avowed object of discovering by ' an argumentative discussion of the interests which divide them . . . whether separation is an extreme which can no longer be avoided ', or some basis for reunion might be laid. Argumentative discussion having ceased in April 1861 Seward returned an emphatic refusal, from which Napoleon concluded that any further efforts towards mediation would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Never strong enough alone to risk war with the United States, the Emperor

¹ The year 1863 was a brilliant one for the Confederate navy. On New Year's Day the Confederates at Galveston, Texas, with two cotton-clad steamers supported by artillery fire, delivered their city from a Union naval force which had taken possession the previous October. On 7 April the guns of Fort Sumter broke up a new fleet of Union monitors in their attempt to capture Charleston. Other attacks on Charleston in July and August were repulsed with heavy loss. The commerce-destroyers *Alabama* and *Florida* were at large respectively until 19 June and 7 October 1864.

dared not recognize the Confederacy without British support. His neutrality, however, leaned as definitely towards the South as did that of Palmerston and Russell towards the Union.

Napoleon's American policy was determined by his Mexican adventure.¹ The Civil War gave him an opportunity to perform the feat of which Talleyrand, Canning, and Aberdeen had dreamed: to bring the New World into the balance of power, to establish European influence in America. Having thus challenged the Monroe Doctrine, it would seem that Napoleon's true interest in the Civil War was to prolong it. He is said to have remarked, 'If the North wins, I shall be pleased; if the South wins, I shall be delighted.' But Slidell had offered him Confederate support in Mexico;² and after all, two English-speaking republics offered more openings than one for the balance-of-power game.

Spain in a small way was pursuing the same policy. At the invitation of the conservative faction in San Domingo she was endeavouring to convert that unstable republic into a Spanish colony, a bastion to the 'ever-faithful island' of Cuba. France in Mexico, Spain in San Domingo, meant a counter-stroke of monarchical Europe against republican America; an after-clap of the Holy Alliance.

'A little audacity', wrote the biographer of O'Donnell, 'and France was assured of her possessions, England of Canada, . . . ourselves of the treasure of our Antilles, and the future of the Spanish race. Mexico and the Southern States . . . were the two

¹ The Anglo-Spanish-French intervention in Mexico, planned before the Civil War and begun in 1861, ostensibly to secure payment of the Mexican debt, became a purely French enterprise in April 1862 when the Spanish and British contingents were withdrawn. General Forey's army entered Mexico City in June 1863; Maximilian, having accepted the crown, arrived a year later.

² Slidell's account of his interview at Vichy on 16 July 1862. John Bigelow, *France and Confederate Navy*, p. 120.

advanced redoubts which Europe in its own interest should have thrown up against the American colossus.’¹

2. *Liberalism rallies*

A strong liberal sentiment for the Union, rapidly developing in 1863, kept both Spain and France neutral. A Confederate agent reported :

‘ With the exception of the Emperor and his nearest personal adherents, all the intelligence, the science, the social respectability, is leagued with the ignorance and the radicalism in a deep-rooted antipathy . . . against us. . . . It is much easier for the English, accustomed to a hierarchy of classes at home and to a haughty dominion abroad, to understand a hierarchy of races than it is for the French, the apostles of universalequality.’²

General Prim learned something of American power at McClellan’s head-quarters in 1862, and communicated his impressions both to Napoleon III and the Spanish Government. ‘ An empire in Mexico is nothing else at bottom than an aid to the slaveholders of the South,’ declared Emilio Castelar.

English labour rallied to the Union cause, when Lincoln gave the Union a new meaning. The Emancipation Proclamation had no direct influence on the Palmerston ministry, which had determined some time before to maintain British neutrality. It did not shake the loyalty of Confederate partisans in England or their confidence in a Southern victory.³ But it brought about such an upheaval of evangelical, radical, and working-class opinion in favour of the Union, that no ministry could, if it would, give aid and comfort to the

¹ Navarro y Rodrigo, *O'Donnell y su Tiempo* (1869), p. 195. Mr. E. J. Pratt of Hertford College has kindly supplied this and other references on Spanish policy.

² *O. R. N.*, iii. 916.

³ J. S. Mill wrote to J. Motley, ‘ In England the proclamation has only increased the venom of those who, after taunting you for so long with caring nothing for abolition, now reproach you for your abolitionism as the worst of your crimes.’ Motley, *Correspondence*, ii. 95. See the famous ‘ Last Card ’ cartoon in *Punch* of 6 October 1862.

slave-power. Bright, Forster, and Goldwin Smith were now believed when they asserted that the cause of the Union was the cause of liberty. The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society awoke to new activity. A Union and Emancipation Society issued tracts by the tens of thousands, and organized Union meetings in the industrial centres, where the cotton famine was being relieved to the profit of India. Karl Marx organized a gathering of three thousand representatives of the London Trades Unions at St. James's Hall on 26 March 1863. It was there that Bright made his pithy exposition of aristocratic hostility to 'thirty millions of men, happy and prosperous, without emperor, without king . . . without state bishops and state priests'.¹ It was there also that the Trades Unionists declared in formal resolution 'that the success of free institutions in America was a political question of deep consequence in England, and that they would not tolerate any interference unfavourable to the North'. Young Henry Adams, who reported the meeting for his father, wrote, 'I never quite appreciated the "moral influence" of American democracy, nor the cause that the privileged classes in Europe have to fear us, until I saw directly how it works.'²

3. *The Cotton Loan*

One week before the Trades Union meeting the Confederacy launched its first foreign loan, precursor of a new diplomatic offensive. Bonds to the amount of three millions sterling, redeemable in cotton at a rate of exchange that promised fabulous profits, were floated on 19 March 1863. Issued at 90 the 'cotton loan' promptly rose to 95 on the 23rd. Slidell deemed

¹ G. M. Trevelyan, *Bright*, p. 307.

² E. D. Adams, *op. cit.*, ii. 292-3; *Diplomatic Correspondence of the U.S.* 1863, i. 161-3; *Cycle of Adams Letters*, i. 244-5.

this success 'a financial recognition of our independence'; Mason wrote, 'Cotton is king at last'.¹

The *Alabama* and *Florida* were at large; another English-built commerce-destroyer, the *Alexandra*, was almost ready for sea; and the Lairds were building two armoured rams to break the Union blockade. Bright and Forster attacked the government for its negligence, the morning after the Trades Union meeting; apparently with complete futility. Lord Russell stood stiffly on the ground that the government could not seize vessels on mere suspicion of hostile destination; and the House supported him. But some one or something had made an impression on the noble lord. On 31 March, five days after the Trades Union meeting, he referred the case of the *Alexandra* to the law officers of the Crown, and on 4 April ordered her detention.

At once King Cotton began to tremble on his new financial throne. Confederate war loan fell to 87, and only by using the subscription money to bull the market were Mason and Slidell able to arrest its decline.²

4. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign

It is a relief to turn from this diplomatic front to the Western theatre of war, to Union armies composed of stout ploughboys of the Middle West ('reg'lar great big hellsnorters, same breed as ourselves,' said an ad-

¹ E. D. Adams, *op. cit.*, ii. 161. The Confederate government, strangely enough, authorized this loan with some reluctance at the instance of the Paris firm of Erlanger, which persuaded Slidell that it would give important European interests a stake in Southern independence. Although the Confederate agents in England wanted money, that was due to the difficulty of remittances rather than lack of Confederate credit. About £2,400,000 of the bonds were in English hands at the close of the war, and a good deal of the internal war loan of the Confederacy was taken up by English investors.

² *The Times*, financial columns. The loan was quoted at par for the last time on 16 July, and began its permanent decline with the news of Gettysburg.

miring enemy), officers who for the most part had risen from the ranks by merit, generals who never knew they were beaten and seldom were.

On New Year's Day 1863 General Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland were just finishing their deadly and drawn battle of Murfreesborough (Stone River) with Polk and Bragg, in middle Tennessee. Grant's Army of the Tennessee covered the important railway from Memphis to a point beyond Corinth. His task and object was to open the Mississippi to New Orleans. Although both sides of the Mississippi below Memphis were Confederate territory, there was nothing on the river to oppose the passage of a hostile fleet and army until it reached Vicksburg. At that point the line of bluffs that borders the Mississippi valley touches the river itself, and follows close beside its eastern bank for over a hundred miles to Port Hudson, Louisiana. At both points the Confederates had strongly fortified the bluffs, and between them troops and supplies reached the heart of the Confederacy from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. General Banks, who had learned something of war by this time, had 15,000 troops at New Orleans, mostly nine-months men and negroes, with which to reduce Port Hudson. But there was a Confederate army in Louisiana, ready to nip into New Orleans when his back was turned.¹

Vicksburg was the most difficult nut to crack. Strongly fortified and held by General Pemberton, its front was impregnable to assault from the river, its rear was two hundred miles from Grant's base at Memphis, and its right was protected by the densely wooded and waterlogged valley of the Yazoo, intersected with countless backwaters and bayous. After one check, on December 1862, Grant concentrated the entire Army

¹ James K. Hosmer, *The Color-Guard* (1864), one of the best enlisted men's narratives of the war, gives a vivid account of Banks's campaign of 1863.

of the Tennessee on the west bank of the Mississippi, about twenty miles north of Vicksburg, and spent the cold wet months of the new year in fruitless attempts to outflank Pemberton in the slimy jungle of the lower Yazoo.¹

Another general would have retired to Memphis with 'baffled and defeated forces', as President Davis predicted Grant would do. But in Grant's judgement 'there was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory'. In order to advance he must cut loose from his base of supplies, march his army below Vicksburg along the west bank of the Mississippi, cross over to the dry ground, and attack the fortress from the rear.


'I don't know what to make of Grant, he's such a quiet little fellow,' said Lincoln, whose experience had been mainly with generals who let their presence be

¹ Grant and Banks were the first generals who made any considerable use of negro troops, as the Union could do with good conscience after the Emancipation Proclamation was issued. In an action at Milliken's Bend, attacked by a Confederate force from the West while Grant was away, and in the assault on Port Hudson, the black soldiers gave an excellent account of themselves. Grant and Sherman both relied on the negroes for their ditch-digging operations, and Porter wrote that his squadron was 'chock-full of niggers . . . they are better than the white people here' (*Corresp. of G. V. Fox*, ii. 155). It was during the Vicksburg campaign that the famous ballad of the Contrabands appeared:

Say, darkeys, hab you seen de massa,
 Wid de muffstash on he face,
 Go long de road some time dis mornin',
 Like he gwine leabe de place?
 He see de smoke way up de ribber
 Whar de Lincum gunboats lay;
 He took he hat an' leff berry sudden,
 And I spose he's runned away.
 De massa run, ha, ha!
 De darkey stay, ho, ho!
 It mus' be now de kingdum comin',
 An' de yar ob-jubilo.

known to the eye and ear. 'The only way I know he's around is by the way he makes things *git*!' Grant had many military qualities in which McClellan was deficient; but his strategy wanted some surer test than Fort Donelson, and his reputation was still under the cloud of Shiloh. He had trained his men for heavy work and hard fighting, but his modesty and simplicity made him an easy prey to politicians in uniform and old army friends of dubious reputation, who infested his head-quarters. Fortunately he had a volunteer adjutant-general named John A. Rawlins, who was more to him than Berthier to Napoleon. This fellow townsman and devoted friend was Grant's complement and counterpart. Rawlins protected Grant from human parasites, stimulated his sense of duty and ambition, and watched over him like a nurse to see that he did not indulge his weakness for that whisky of which Lincoln once expressed the desire to distribute several barrels among his other generals. Fortunately Grant's corps commanders, with one exception, were devoted to him; and the Army of the Tennessee worked in perfect concert with the freshwater navy. 'Grant and Sherman are on board almost every day. Dine and tea with me often; we agree in everything,' wrote Flag-Officer Porter.

Grant's plan was as audacious as any campaign by Lee; and he had difficulties that Lee never encountered. The Army of the Tennessee marched along the west bank of the Mississippi to a point south of Grand Gulf, where there was an easy crossing. The fleet had to run the gauntlet of Vicksburg on the night of 16-17 April 1863. With lights dowsed and engines stopped, it floated down stream until discovered by a Confederate sentry. Then, what a torrent of shot and shell from the fortress, and what a cracking-on of steam in the fleet, and what a magnificent spectacle, lighted by flashing guns and burning cotton-bales, as the case-



mated gunboats, turtle-backed rams, and river steamboats with tall flaring funnels, dashed by the batteries! 'Their heavy shot walked right through us,' wrote Porter; but all save one transport got by safely.

A part of Grant's army crossed the river south of Grand Gulf unopposed (30 April). Without waiting for Sherman, or for a line of communications to be established, Grant struck out for the rear of Vicksburg with 20,000 men,¹ subsisting on the country. Pemberton came out to meet him; and Joe Johnston was moving south from Chattanooga with another army. By a series of masterly combinations and rapid marches, fighting as he progressed, Grant captured the important railway junction at Jackson (Mississippi) before Johnston could occupy it (14 May), then turned on Pemberton in quick pursuit. 'In eighteen days he marched two hundred miles, won five pitched battles, took eight thousand prisoners and eighty cannon, scattered a hostile army larger than his own fighting on its chosen ground, and had the rebel army penned in Vicksburg.'² It was as good as Stonewall Jackson's best; and Stonewall never campaigned in enemy country.

5. *Chancellorsville*

Leaving Grant besieging Vicksburg, his flanks protected by the river gunboats and the Yazoo swamp, Joe Johnston prowling cautiously about his well-entrenched rear, and Banks besieging Port Hudson at the southern bastion of the Confederate river front: let us turn to the Virginia theatre of war.

Fighting Joe Hooker, 'brave, handsome, vain, insubordinate, plausible, untrustworthy,'³ replaced Burnside on 26 January 1863. The Army of the Potomac, in cantonments behind the Rappahannock, was de-

¹ 33,000 when joined by Sherman's corps, 50,000 before ending the siege.

² L. A. Coolidge, *U. S. Grant*, p. 118.

³ Palfrey, *Antietam*, p. 55.

moralized by its defeat at Fredericksburg. Soldiers' friends were even sending them packets of civilian clothes, as an aid to desertion. Hooker restored their morale and organization, and received more reinforcements than he could handle. His first move in the direction of Richmond, on 27 April, brought on Chancellorsville, one of the bloodiest battles of the war. Again, as at the second Manassas, Lee divided his army in the face of superior numbers, and sent Jackson by a wood road through the Wilderness round the Union right, whose commander refused to change front in spite of ample warnings from his picket line (2 May). Earlier in the war, so complete a surprise as Jackson then sprung would have meant disaster. Only individual valour saved it then, for Hooker seemed to forget the very rudiments of generalship, while Lee, with half his man-power, chose time and place of attack, always outnumbering him at the point of contact. Three days of this and Hooker, dazed and bewildered, retired across the Rappahannock (5 May). A well-earned Southern victory was too dearly won by the loss of Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded by his own men when reconnoitring between the lines.

Lee's army was soon ready for another spring at the Northern throat. Men high in Confederate councils doubted the wisdom of an offensive in that quarter and at that juncture. Johnston wished to draw on Bragg in middle Tennessee to save Vicksburg; but if Bragg were further weakened, Rosecrans would move on Chattanooga. Beauregard and Longstreet wished to reinforce Bragg at the expense of Johnston and Lee, and draw Grant away from Vicksburg by invading Kentucky. But if the Army of Northern Virginia were weakened, Hooker would strike at Richmond. Political considerations decided Davis in favour of Lee's plan. A victory on Northern soil might finish Northern morale, already staggering from Chancellorsville, and trembling in

prospect of the draft ; French and perhaps British recognition would follow. It was a bold game for the highest stake, but Davis was not a bold player. He could not make up his mind to weaken Bragg or Johnston, and feared to strip Richmond and the Carolinas of troops, lest the Union garrisons at Port Royal, Newbern, and Norfolk should raid Charleston or Petersburg or Richmond. So Lee moved northward (3 June 1863) into Pennsylvania with only 73,000 men, while 190,000 Confederate field troops were scattered between the Mississippi and the Rappahannock.¹

6. *Roebuck's Motion*

Keeping time with Lee's marching men, the Confederacy launched a diplomatic drive. Confederate war loan rose from 87 to 91 upon news of Chancellorsville, but something more than financial recognition was wanted. President Davis was becoming impatient with Lord Palmerston. As his Secretary of State wrote : 'When successful fortune smiles on our arms, the British cabinet is averse to recognition because "it would be unfair to the South by the action of Great Britain to exasperate the North to renewed efforts". When reverses occur . . . "it would be unfair to the North in a moment of its success to deprive it of a reasonable opportunity of accomplishing a reunion of the States"'.² Accordingly, Mason and Slidell planned with Roebuck and Lindsay to place the ministry in a dilemma between recognition and resignation. Armed with verbal assurance from Napoleon III that he was only awaiting English co-operation to recognize the Confederacy, they accused the ministry (30 June) of truckling to the North and prolonging the war. But the conspirators had failed to make sure of their forces, Napoleon III let them down badly. Several prominent

¹ W. R. Livermore, *Story of the Civil War*, iii. 339-44.

² *O. R. N.*, iii. 847.

Conservatives supported Roebuck's motion to recognize the Confederacy, but Disraeli refused to commit the party. Bright replied with a powerful speech in favour of neutrality, and with sarcastic cuts at Roebuck's efforts to represent the French Emperor on the floor of the House. Palmerston, although furious with Roebuck for going over the head of the Foreign Office, wished to avoid a direct vote ; and the pro-Southern members adjourned the debate from day to day, hoping that every mail would bring news of a crushing victory by Lee on Northern soil. Finally, on 13 July, Roebuck moved the discharge of his motion. One week later, all London knew of Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg.¹

¹ Subscribers to the *Quarterly*, the *Edinburgh*, and to the religious periodicals were probably surprised to find stitched up with their July numbers an 'Address of the Southern Clergy to Christians throughout the World', soliciting their 'solemn protest' against the Emancipation Proclamation. This singular method of propaganda was arranged by one of the Confederate secret agents in England, and financed by an English publishing house.

LIII

GETTYSBURG AND CHATTANOOGA

JUNE-DECEMBER 1863

1. *Lee's March into Pennsylvania*

GENERAL LEE, on 3 June, began to move his left towards the Shenandoah valley, having selected that well-screened highway to Pennsylvania. One corps only, A. P. Hill's, remained on the Rappahannock to watch the Army of the Potomac. Hooker was eager to make a counter-stroke at the Confederate capital, but Lincoln advised him not to 'take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other'. And again, 'I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his.' Hooker took this excellent bit of advice; but he failed to observe the next hint, that Lee's army 'must be very slim somewhere'.¹ It was actually cut up into several units with one hundred miles between the van and the rear. On 15 June, before Fredericksburg had been evacuated by A. P. Hill, Ewell's corps smashed the Union garrison at Winchester and cleared the great valley route to the heart of the North. On the 17th a part of Ewell's corps was across the Potomac; on the 23rd it was near Chambersburg in the Cumberland valley of Pennsylvania. The same day Lee sent J. E. B. Stuart on a cavalry raid, with orders not sufficiently precise to restrain that gallant horseman. 'Jeb' and his men enjoyed themselves as usual, and cut out a wagon train within four miles of the capital; but

¹ Lincoln to Hooker, 5, 10, and 14 June 1863.

Hooker, by crossing the Potomac on the 25th, separated them from Lee, and deprived the Confederate army of its 'eyes' during the most critical days of the campaign.

On 27 June 1863 the whole of Lee's army was in Pennsylvania. His head-quarters were at Chambersburg. Ewell had reached Carlisle, within fifteen miles of the state capital at Harrisburg, and the next day Jubal A. Early's division laid York under contribution of dollars and boots. Hooker, on the 28th, having concentrated the Army of the Potomac about Frederick Town, resigned the command.¹ Lincoln turned it over to one of his corps commanders, General George Gordon Meade. For once, swapping horses in the middle of the stream was justified. There was no counting on 'Fighting Joe', but Meade was the very type of good ordinary general, safe and sane, certain to do nothing foolish if unlikely to do anything brilliant.

Lee hoped that the mere presence of his army in Pennsylvania would strengthen the 'copperheads', and would force Lincoln to receive Vice-President Stephens, then proceeding towards Washington under flag of truce to open peace negotiations on the basis of independence. Yet the North showed no sign of flinching. Democratic governors were not behind their Republican colleagues in offering volunteers. Militia and civilians turned out in large numbers to protect the Pennsylvania cities. Grave anxiety was felt, but no panic; and Lincoln did not recall a single unit from the West.

¹ He had been getting along very ill with Halleck, and resigned when Halleck refused to let him have the garrison of Harper's Ferry. His successor gave Hooker reason on that point, by ordering the garrison to join the Army of the Potomac—Harper's Ferry was a trap, as the Antietam campaign had proved. Hooker, who owed his appointment to the Chase faction in the Republican party, would have been removed after Chancellorsville but for his political backing.

² This was the period of Burnside's activities against the defeatists in Ohio. See above, p. 257.


2. *The Battle of Gettysburg*

On 29 June, when Ewell's cavalry had reached the Confederacy's farthest north—a point within three miles of Harrisburg—Lee ordered his entire army to concentrate on the eastern slope of the South Mountain, near Cashtown. There, in a strong defensive position, he proposed to await attack. Meade intended to take position behind Pipe Creek, and let Lee attack him. But chance placed the great battle where neither Lee nor Meade wanted it; because neither knew exactly where the other was. On 30 June a part of A. P. Hill's corps, which was covering Lee's concentration, strayed into Gettysburg in search of new boots. Boots and saddles were there—on Buford's cavalry division, masking the Army of the Potomac. Gettysburg commanded some important roads; and each army was so eager for action that this chance contact drew both into the quiet little market-town, as to a magnet. There, on 1 July, the great three-days' battle began, each unit joining in the fray as it arrived. Hill's zeal for footwear changed the battle from a defensive one near Cashtown to an offensive one at Gettysburg.

The first day (1 July) went ill for the Union. Hill and Ewell drove the Union First Corps through the town. In the nick of time, Winfield Scott Hancock, the greatest fighting general in the Army of the Potomac, rallied the fugitives on Cemetery ridge. The position so fortunately chosen proved to be admirable for defence: a limestone outcrop shaped like a fish-hook, with the convex side turned west and north, towards the Confederates. Along it the Union army was placed as rapidly as it arrived from the South and East, while the Confederates took up an encircling position, their right on the partially wooded Seminary ridge, parallel to Cemetery ridge. Lee decided to attack the following day. Ignorant of the whereabouts of the rest of Meade's

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

Miles
0 5 10 15 20 25
--- Route of Army of N. Virginia
--- " " " " Potomac
--- Stuart's Cavalry Raid
--- Railways



army, he dared not retreat to the Cumberland valley, or attempt the flanking movement that Longstreet advocated.

Lee's great opportunity came on the morning of 2 July. Before half the Union army was in line, Ewell captured Culp's hill, on the Union right—the barb of the hook—but Longstreet's corps arrived too late to do much against the Union left. It drove in Sickles's corps which had incautiously occupied the peach orchard in advance of Cemetery ridge, but failed to take Little Round Top—the eye of the hook—which would have enabled his artillery to enfilade the entire Union position. Meade's army lost heavily, but he determined to stand his ground and fight it out.

The third day of the battle and of July opened with a desperate struggle for Culp's hill, from which Ewell's corps was finally dislodged. Silence fell on the field at noon. Meade guessed what was coming, and reinforced his centre. At one o'clock there came a deafening artillery fire from the Confederate lines. Deep silence again. Lee, against Longstreet's protest, had ordered a direct attack on the strongest part of the Union centre with Pickett's, Pettigrew's, and Trimble's divisions, 15,000 strong. The time had come. Pickett rode up to Longstreet and asked, 'General, shall I advance?' Longstreet, unwilling to give the word, bowed his head. 'Sir, I shall lead my division forward,' said Pickett, and rode forth at the head of his men, with the jaunty bearing of a holiday soldier.

From Cemetery ridge, the Union troops saw three grey lines of battle issue from the wooded ridge three-quarters of a mile away, and march with colours flying and bayonets glittering into the valley before them. Less than half-way across, the Union artillery opened fire upon them; a little nearer they came under a raking fire from the batteries on Round Top. The flank divisions melted away; but the Northern troops, peer-

ing through the smoke, could see Pickett's division still coming on, merged in one crowding, rushing line. Lost for a moment in a swale, they emerged so near that the expression on their faces could be seen. Then the boys in blue let them have it. Two of Pickett's brigadiers were killed and himself wounded. Fifteen of his regimental commanders were killed, and the other five wounded. General Armistead, with cap raised on sword-point, leaped the stone wall into the Union lines; a hundred men followed him, and for a brief moment the battle-cross of the Confederacy floated on the crest of Cemetery ridge. The Union lines closed in relentlessly, and all Armistead's men were shot down or captured.

Pickett's charge marked the high tide of the Confederacy, but its repulse did not mean destruction for the cause. The Confederacy still had twenty months of life. As the scanty remnant limped back to their lines, the Union army expected an order for counter-attack; but Meade had made no dispositions to that end. All the next day—4 July—Lee remained defiantly in position. That evening his army, with baggage and prisoners, retired to a position west of Sharpsburg. There the flooded Potomac stopped his retreat, and gave Meade an opportunity that Lincoln begged him to seize. 'Act upon your own judgement and make your generals execute your orders' telegraphed Halleck. 'Call no council of war. . . . Do not let the enemy escape.' Meade called a council of war (12 July), the Potomac fell, and the enemy escaped (14 July).

Lee was too sincere to congratulate himself for having escaped. He had seen the flower of his army wither under the Union fire. He knew that all hope of peace that summer was gone, and he must have felt that slight hope for Southern independence remained. Yet after the battle, as before, his soldiers gathered only confidence and resolution from the placid countenance of

their beloved 'Marse Robert'. With justice, Lee might have blamed Longstreet or Stuart or even Davis for the disaster; but no word of censure escaped him, and no complaint. To President Davis he wrote, 'No blame can be attached to the army for its failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should it be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public. I am alone to blame.'¹

Lincoln was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee's army. 'Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand, and they would not close it,' he said. 'Still, I am very grateful to Meade for the great service he did at Gettysburg.' 'General Meade has my confidence, as a brave and skilful officer and a true man.'² Good old Meade! 'I'm no Napoleon,' he used to say to his staff. Unpretending and unpopular, placed in command of an army thrice whipped within a twelvemonth, on the eve of battle with an enemy hitherto invincible, he fairly won the greatest battle of the war. And from the Wilderness to Appomattox he was the right arm of Grant.

3. *Events of the Summer*

Elsewhere, as at Gettysburg, the birthday of the nation brought events that made it 'the best Fourth of July since 1776'. General Rosecrans, stung by Stanton's telegram, 'If you cannot hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you,' began in June to clear the enemy

¹ *Lee-Davis Dispatches*, p. 110; cf. his letters in Rowland, *Davis*, v. 535-43.

² Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, vii. 278; Lincoln to General Howard, 21 July 1863. Among the extensive literature on Gettysburg, the best short account, with admirable maps of every stage of the campaign and battle, is in W. R. Livermore, *Story of the Civil War* (1913), iii, chapters ix, x. General Maurice's account in his *Lee, the Soldier*, is based on this. The best by a Southern participant is in E. P. Alexander's *Military Memoirs*, pp. 363-446. The controversies are well aired in *Battles and Leaders*, iii. 244-440, and in *Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass.*, iii-v; the principal documents are in *O. R.* xxvii.

from middle Tennessee, and on 3 July, by clever strategy, drove Braxton Bragg into Chattanooga.

Since 22 May, Grant had been keeping Johnston at arm's length, and directing siege operations against Vicksburg. Civilians were living in bomb-proofs and the Confederate defenders were on the point of mutiny when Pemberton, on 3 July, sent out a flag of truce, asking for a parley. The next day he surrendered his army, and the 'Confederate Gibraltar'. Port Hudson surrendered to Banks on the 9th. Within a week a steamboat arrived at New Orleans from St. Louis, having passed the entire course of the Mississippi undisturbed by hostile shot or challenge.

Four months later, when a national cemetery was dedicated on the battle-field of Gettysburg, Lincoln delivered his immortal address :

'Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

'Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that the nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

'But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion ; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain ; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom ; and

the government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.'¹

After Gettysburg, nothing of consequence occurred in the eastern theatre of war until the spring of 1864. The Army of the Potomac, reduced by sending 15,000 men to put down the draft-riots, could do little more than spar for a hold with the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee tried to pull off another manœuvre like the second Manassas ; but Meade kept his head. Subsequently Meade tried a turning movement at Mine Run in the Wilderness (26 to 30 November), too complicated for success in that tangled country. Both armies went into winter quarters along the Rappahannock.

After Vicksburg, Grant's Army of the Tennessee was dispersed in a 'pepper-pot campaign' by orders from Washington. Instead of leaving the trans-Mississippi Confederacy to die 'like the dissevered tail of a snake', Halleck distributed Grant's army from Memphis to Matamoras. Thus the summer was wasted in the West.

On the diplomatic front Gettysburg and Vicksburg bore fruit. Roebuck's motion to recognize the Confederacy was already withdrawn,² but the Laird armoured rams, from which the Confederacy hoped much, were being rushed to completion. Lord John Russell was most anxious to prevent another *Alabama* from swelling the tide of American resentment ; but the destination of the vessels was so cleverly covered by a fictitious sale that the Government could find no evidence to

¹ 19 November 1863. There is an interesting discussion of the Gettysburg address in W. E. Barton, *Lincoln*, ii, chapter xv. Apparently it made very little impression on the audience, in comparison with the two-hour oration by Edward Everett that preceded it, although Everett generously wrote the President, 'I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near the central idea of the occasion in two hours as you did in two minutes'. P. R. Frothingham, *Everett* (1925), p. 458. Little notice was taken of the address in the newspapers, and Goldwin Smith was the first to point out its supreme literary quality.

² See above, p. 287.

warrant seizure or detention. On 1 September Russell wrote from Scotland to the American Minister that he could not stop the departure of the rams unless further evidence were presented. Charles Francis Adams, on receipt of this, wrote in his diary, 'I clearly foresee that a collision must now come out of it;' and on the 5th wrote to Russell, 'I can regard this in no otherwise than as practically opening to the insurgents, free liberty in this kingdom to execute a policy' of breaking the blockade. 'It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war.' Fortunately the crisis was past. Russell had already decided to stretch a point, and keep the peace. On 3 September he gave orders to prevent the departure. The Admiralty placed a guard upon the ram that was already finished, and a month later both were seized.¹

John Bigelow, the American consul-general at Paris, obtained evidence in the same month that four steam corvettes and two armoured rams were being constructed for the Confederacy at Nantes and Bordeaux. Napoleon III had practically invited Slidell to place the contracts, although he was careful to insist that their destination should be concealed. Now that the secret was out, he ordered the vessels to be sold to foreign governments; but only the utmost vigilance by the American authorities prevented their falling into Confederate hands. The ram *Stonewall* eventually did, but too late to help the Southern cause.

¹ Rhodes, *U.S.* (1907), iv. 377-87. E. D. Adams, *op. cit.*, chapter xiii, argues that the real crisis of the rams question came in March and April, and that Seward's threat to loose privateers against neutral commerce was the decisive factor. In view of Russell's firm belief that the Confederacy was invincible (Adams, ii. 199, 212), it is hard to believe that anything less than the fear of immediate rupture with the United States could have induced him to perform an action so unfair to the Confederacy as straining the law in favour of their enemy. Eventually the British Government had to buy the rams, as no good evidence of their belligerent ownership could be found.


4. *Chickamauga*

The advance of the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans from Murfreesborough to the neighbourhood of Chattanooga, in July 1863, began a campaign that ended only with Sherman's march to the sea, and a subdivision of the Confederacy. Chattanooga, after Richmond and Vicksburg, was the most vital point in the Confederacy : a junction on the important Richmond-Knoxville-Memphis railway for lines running south-west and south-east. The Tennessee river, after flowing southward through the continuation of the Shenandoah valley, there breaks through the parallel ridges of the southern Appalachians. So long as the Confederates held Chattanooga, they could make counter-strokes towards the Ohio, and the Union armies could not hope to penetrate far into the lower South, however firmly they might press its periphery. Once in possession of Chattanooga, the Union armies might swing round the Great Smoky mountains (the southern prolongation of the Blue Ridge) and attack Savannah, Charleston, or even Richmond, from the rear.

Rosecrans outmanœuvred the Confederates, and, without fighting a battle, marched into Chattanooga on 9 September 1863. Burnside, with a new Army of the Ohio, captured Knoxville on 2 September, fulfilling his President's long-cherished ambition to give the faithful Unionists of East Tennessee a sight of their flag.

Having got so much without fighting, Rosecrans and Burnside were forced to fight for what they had got. Fortunately they had to face an army full of politics and dissension, under a dyspeptic martinet. Braxton Bragg, by steady retreating and constant fault-finding, had lost the confidence of his officers and men. His plan was sound enough : to concentrate his army behind the curtain of steep, wooded ridges that screened him from

Chattanooga, and beat the Army of the Cumberland in detail. Rosecrans, by dispersing his army south of Chattanooga, with fifty-seven miles between the head and the tail, appeared to be walking straight into the trap. Bragg, however, was 'bewildered by the popping out of the rats from so many holes'.¹ Rosecrans, warned in time, concentrated between the Chickamauga creek



and Missionary ridge. On 19 September, just as reinforcements under Longstreet were arriving from Virginia, Bragg began the Battle of Chickamauga.

Rosecrans, ambitious and theatrical, competent to a certain point but unnerved by too great responsibility, made a mistake that enabled Bragg to cut the Union army in two, and sweep its right and centre into Chattanooga. But George H. Thomas commanded the Union left. For six hours that afternoon the undaunted Virginian held his ground against repeated assaults by

¹ D. H. Hill, in *Battles and Leaders*, iii. 644.

the whole Confederate army; and, when nightfall found him stripped of ammunition, retired unmolested to a safe position. 'The *élan* of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga,' wrote D. H. Hill.¹ 'That brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever.' It broke against the lines of Thomas, 'the rock of Chickamauga'.

Having eluded the trap that Bragg had set, Rosecrans walked into one of his own choice. Withdrawing his entire army into Chattanooga, he allowed Bragg to occupy the crests of the Lookout and Missionary ridges, which come within a few hundred yards of the river; to cut the railway, and every other communication northward, save one rough mountain road. Transport broke down, rations fell short; even crackers (as the western troops called their hard-tack) gave out. Retreat meant fighting at a tremendous disadvantage; remaining where they were meant surrender. Rosecrans, fertile in expedients but scatter-brained, was approaching a state of imbecility when Lincoln sent Grant to the rescue, as supreme commander in the West.² On the way, he relieved Rosecrans, placed Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland, and ordered him to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. 'I will hold the town till we starve,' was Thomas's reply.

5. Chattanooga

Grant arrived at Thomas's head-quarters in Chattanooga on the evening of the 23rd of October, soaked through after his fifty-mile ride over the mountain road. A fall of his horse had injured his game leg, so that he had to be lifted from the saddle. After a light supper,

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, iii, 662.

² Over a new Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing Grant's own Army of the Tennessee (henceforth under Sherman), the Army of the Cumberland (Rosecrans), and the Army of the Ohio (Burnside at Knoxville).

he began to fire volleys of questions at Thomas's staff, astonishing them with his quickness of perception and his evident intention to rescue the Army of the Cumberland by resuming the offensive. Such was Grant's method of defence.

Grant's first movement, planned by that resourceful general of engineers, W. F. ('Baldy') Smith, was to open a new line of communications with Bridgeport, where Joe Hooker was waiting with 16,000 reinforcements and ample supplies. It was beautifully executed, and on the evening of the 28th a steamboat came up the Tennessee with a full cargo of precious crackers. 'Full rations, boys! Three cheers for the cracker line!' rang through the Union camp.

Braxton Bragg, believing that he held Grant at his mercy, detached Longstreet's corps to push Burnside out of Knoxville, while Grant was being reinforced by Sherman's corps of his old Army of the Tennessee. On 24 November Grant began the great Battle of Chattanooga. Simultaneous attacks delivered by Hooker, Sherman, and Thomas drove the enemy from the steep wooded ridges across the river. The capture of Missionary ridge was perhaps the most gallant action of the war. Thomas's men, after driving the Confederates from the rifle-pits at the foot, were ordered to halt. Refusing to obey, they kept on straight up the steep rocky slope, overrunning a second and a third line of defence, rushed the Confederate guns from the crest, and turned them on the enemy; then, with Phil Sheridan leading, pursued the fleeing greycoats down the eastern slope.¹

This Battle of Chattanooga finished Braxton Bragg, drew Longstreet out of East Tennessee, and placed the combined armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland in a position to advance into Georgia in the early spring. The West had proved her valour in two brilliant cam-

¹ See Bragg's comments on this action, in *Battles and Leaders*, iii. 727.

paings. One portion of the Confederacy had been severed along the Mississippi, and a deep salient, resting upon the Appalachians and the great river, had been thrust into the remainder. And the West had provided the nation with a general.

THE WILDERNESS AND THE ELECTION

JANUARY—NOVEMBER 1864

I. *The Atlanta Campaign*

IT was the brightest New Year for the Union since the war began. Volunteering was going on rapidly, the danger of foreign intervention was over, the copperheads seemed cowed by recent victories, and nothing but the armies of Lee and Johnston stood between the Union and victory. A considerable 'but'. Except before Antietam, the Confederacy was nearest independence in the summer of 1864, when half her nominal area was in enemy possession. The prowess of one man nearly conquered the Northern will to victory.

On 9 March 1864 Grant was appointed lieutenant-general and general-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Summoned to Washington, where he had never been, to confer with Lincoln, whom he had never seen, this 'ordinary scrubby-looking man with a slightly seedy look',¹ perpetually smoking or chewing a cigar, caused some misgivings among those who were used to the glittering generals of the Army of the Potomac. For perhaps the only occasion in history, an American hotel clerk lost countenance, when the inconspicuous officer to whom he assigned a top-floor room registered 'U. S. Grant and son, Galena, Illinois'. Better observers were impressed with his rough dignity, simplicity, and calm confidence. Grant, first of the commanders in the East, never doubted the greatness of his President; and Lincoln knew that he had a general at last 'who would take the responsibility and act'.

Grant assumed personal direction of the Virginia campaign and left Sherman at Chattanooga in com-

¹ C. F. Dana, in C. F. Adams, *Dana*, ii. 271.

mand of the combined armies of the Tennessee (McPherson), the Cumberland (Thomas), and the Ohio (Schofield), with a grand total of 100,000 men. Sherman's objective was Joe Johnston's (late Bragg's) army, 65,000 strong, which lay between him and Atlanta, Georgia. In early May he began the campaign, with an army stripped to the barest essentials in baggage and equipment. Johnston divined the needs of the situation when he adopted Fabian strategy. The only hope for the Confederacy lay in fretting, fighting only at a decided advantage, and wearying the Northern people of the war. Sherman restrained his natural eagerness and aggressiveness, to beat Johnston 'at his own game of patience'.¹ His advance and Johnston's retreat to Atlanta was a pretty game of thrust and parry, with a constant development in the arts of field entrenchment, bridge-building, and railway reconstruction. On 17 July Sherman moved across the Chattahoochee river, eight miles from Atlanta, and began to besiege the capital of Georgia. With a line of communications 140 miles longer than at Chattanooga, his situation was perilous; and the appointment of J. B. Hood in Johnston's place meant that the Confederates would speedily take the offensive.

2. *The Wilderness Campaign*

Grant's plan for the campaign against Lee appeared to be as inexorable as a nutcracker. Grant himself, leading the Army of the Potomac under Meade and an unattached corps under Burnside, was to move by the left flank towards Richmond, forcing the Confederate leader to give battle or abandon his capital. Sigel was to rush up the Shenandoah valley, with Lynchburg as his destination. B. F. Butler, worst of the political generals, was given command of the Army of the James, apparently in order to keep him out of politics. His task

¹ Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View*, p. 228.

was to march up the south bank of the James and cut Lee's communications with the lower South. Both these movements miscarried. Sigel, checked half-way up the valley, was superseded by Hunter; and Lee, after Cold Harbor, detached Early's corps which drove Hunter across the Appalachians. Butler was 'bottled up in Bermuda Hundred' at a loop of the James, by Beauregard. Upon Grant fell the entire burden of the offensive. 'He habitually wears an expression as if he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall, and was about to do it,' wrote one of his officers.¹

'I determined', wrote Grant himself, 'to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.'²

On 4 May 1864 Grant crossed the Rapidan without opposition, and began to march his army of 102,000 men through the same tangled Wilderness from which Jackson had fallen upon Hooker's flank at Chancellorsville. When half-way through, Lee repeated Jackson's manœuvre. Grant accepted battle and changed his front, but his enormous army corps manœuvred with great difficulty in that dense undergrowth, and in two days' fierce fighting he lost 17,700 men. This Battle of the Wilderness (5-7 May) was a draw. Grant now knew that he had to deal with a general of different metal from Johnston or Bragg; and Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had obtained a leader worthy of it.

Grant then tried to outflank the enemy; but clouds of dust from his marching columns warned Lee of his intention, and by the time his van had reached the cross-roads at Spottsylvania Court House, Lee was there

¹ Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 81.

² Grant's report of 22 July 1865, *Memoirs*, ii. 556.

to check him. Both armies threw up field entrenchments, and the five-days' battle that followed (Spottsylvania, 8-12 May) was the first of modern trench warfare.

'Again and again we read in the story of these assaults that the attacking troops were thrown by their very success into confusion, and so fell easy victims to reserves who had escaped the rough and tumble of capturing trenches; again and again we read that the turmoil of the battle-field prevented the arrival of supports in time to enable the assaulting troops to make good their success, or, as the jargon of the Great War had it, "to consolidate their position"'.¹

Having lost 31,000 more men, the imperturbable Grant declared, 'I . . . propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.'² Again he moved by his left in the hope of outflanking Lee's right. Again the Army of Northern Virginia was there to welcome him, and in a position so well chosen and entrenched that Grant needed all his adroitness to withdraw in safety, and continue his flanking march (26 May). Lee swung with him to McClellan's old battle-field of Gaines's Mill. Both armies entrenched. The lines were six or eight miles long. On 1-3 June came the Battle of Cold Harbor, costliest and most futile in the entire war—an assault upon the entire line of Lee's trenches with no adequate preparations to improve any success. Before going over the top, the Union soldiers pinned papers on their backs, giving their names and addresses to identify their corpses. Eight or nine thousand men fell in two or three hours, but hardly a dent was made on the Confederate lines.

¹ Maurice, *Lee, the Soldier*, p. 233. There are excellent descriptions of the methods of entrenching in *Cycle of Adams Letters*, ii. 138, and *Meade's Headquarters*.

² Facsimile of this dispatch to Lincoln, in Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*, p. 105. During the next movement Grant discovered that the house at Guiney's Station, where he stopped to rest, was the one where Stonewall Jackson died, and remarked, 'He was a gallant soldier, and a Christian gentleman.'

During ten more days the armies faced one another. War had now acquired most of its modern horrors. The wounded, unattended between the lines, died of thirst, starvation, and loss of blood. Corpses rotted on the ground. Sharpshooters kept up their deadly work. Officers and men fought mechanically without hope. The war had begun so long ago that one could hardly remember anything else. It would continue until every one on both sides was killed.

In one month Grant had advanced from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, the exact spot where McClellan had stood two years before; and he had lost about 55,000 men. Such were the results of attrition, of blind, relentless hammering.¹ On 12 June Grant followed McClellan's exact plan—a change of base to the James, and an attempt to cut the communications of Richmond at Petersburg. The manœuvre was skilfully executed, and, unlike that of 1862, was unmolested by Lee. But an opportunity to push into undefended Petersburg was lost. Lee slipped in by the interior lines, entrenched in time, and three general assaults cost the Union 8,000 more men (15–18 June). Grant's army sat down to besiege Petersburg, and remained there for nine months. A pure war of position had arrived.

Such, in brief, was the most desperately fought campaign of the war. Lee, with an army that despised

¹ Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*, p. 192. Channing, vi. 571, points out that the often-repeated statement that Lee inflicted a loss on Grant equal to his own army was obtained by adding together two independent estimates of Grant's losses. Returns for the battles of this campaign are defective, and all estimates of exact numbers should be regarded with suspicion; but it seems that Lee lost about 30,000, a greater proportion than Grant. No student of this campaign can afford to neglect the analysis and trenchant criticism of it by John C. Ropes, in *Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass.*, iv. 365–405; and see Major A. L. Wagner's prophetic paper, 'Hasty intrenchments in the War of Secession', *ibid.*, xiii. 130–53.

digging as 'nigger's work', and hated fighting from entrenchments, had developed the technique of trench warfare to a point that Europe only reached in 1916. He had saved his army, and saved Richmond. Grant, after making mistakes and suffering losses that would have broken any of his predecessors, was still indomitable. But how long would the country suffer such stupendous losses, with no apparent result? People were beginning to forget Vicksburg, and to whisper the name of Shiloh.

3. *Early's Raid*

Jubal A. Early, having qualified for the role of Stonewall Jackson by driving the Union forces from the Shenandoah Valley, now had an opportunity to repeat the drama of 1862. On 2 July 1864 his 15,000 veterans were at Winchester, marching north by the classic route. A few days later he was laying Hagerstown and Frederick under contribution, and at noon on 11 July he was at Fort Stevens in the District of Columbia, only five miles from the capital. Almost at the same moment two Union divisions, which Grant had hurriedly detached from the Army of the Potomac, disembarked at Washington. The general rode out to Fort Stevens, whose commander pointed out the enemy's pickets only a few yards away, and remarked by way of greeting, 'Well, Wright, there they are; I've nothing here but quartermaster's men, and hospital bummers; the enemy can walk right in if he only tries. Let's go down below and get some lager beer.'¹ What a contrast with 1862! Early had lost his chance. Wright's men marched forth from Fort Stevens; President Lincoln watching the engagement, as the bullets whistled past his high hat. Early was driven back a mile, and on 13 July made good his escape to the Valley, with loot and provisions.

Grant's check before Petersburg, Sherman's check

¹ *Papers of Mil. Hist. Soc. Mass.*, i. 280.

before Atlanta, and Early's raid revived the popular clamour for McClellan. Neither Lincoln nor the army had lost confidence in Grant.

'We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object,' said Lincoln, 'and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God, I hope it never will end until that time. Speaking of the present campaign, General Grant is reported to have said, "I am going through on this line if it takes all summer". This war has taken three years; it was begun or accepted upon the line of restoring the national authority over the whole national domain, and for the American people, as far as my knowledge enables me to speak, I say we are going through on this line if it takes three years more.'¹

On 18 July the President called for half a million more volunteers, any deficiency to be filled by draft on 6 September.

As usual, the country was not up to Lincoln's stature. The appalling toll of casualties seemed to have brought the war no nearer conclusion. Paper dollars fell to their lowest point, thirty-five cents in gold, on the day that Early appeared before Washington. And the cost of living had soared far beyond the rise of wages or salaries. Unable to look beyond their own troubles to the far greater ills of their enemy, the Northern people began to ask whether a further prosecution of the war would profit any one but the profiteers. This undercurrent of doubt and despair induced some strange developments in the presidential campaign that was already under way.

4. *The Presidential Election of 1864*

Alone of modern governments since manhood suffrage was adopted, the United States faced a general election in war time. For, as Lincoln said, 'We cannot have free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forgo or postpone a national election,

¹ Speech of 16 June 1864.

it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us.' ¹ Lincoln was renominated for the Presidency by acclamation in the Republican convention ² on 7 June; but in early August, before the Democrats had held their convention, there developed an amazing conspiracy against Lincoln within his own party.

Horace Greeley of the New York *Tribune* was attacked in early July by one of his not infrequent delusions: a belief that the Union could be restored through negotiation. In answer to his passionate appeal to take notice of an alleged Confederate peace mission in Canada, Lincoln ordered Greeley to go and investigate, with these credentials: 'If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis, in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you.' ³ Greeley went to Niagara Falls, and ascertained that the Southern emissaries had no authority and nothing to offer. Instead of acknowledging his error, he demanded safe conduct for the Southerners to Washington; and, when Lincoln refused, accused him privately of wishing to prolong the war. Greeley even allowed the Southern emissaries to make that charge in the *Tribune* without reply. One can easily imagine the effect of such hints upon public opinion, at that juncture. ⁴

Greeley now thrust himself into a new breach that had developed between the President and the Radicals over the manner and method of reconstructing the Union after the war. When Lincoln, on 4 July 1864, 'pocketed' ⁵ a bill embodying the die-hard views,

¹ 10 November 1864.

² This body called itself the National Union Convention, and represented War Democrats as well as Republicans. Andrew Johnson, nominated for the Vice-Presidency, was a Southern War Democrat.

³ 9 July 1864.

⁴ Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, ix, chapter viii.

⁵ A 'pocket veto' is made by the President failing to consent to a bill

Senators B. F. Wade and H. W. Davis issued a public 'manifesto', accusing the President of perpetrating a 'studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people' from the basest motives of personal ambition. Greeley published this Wade-Davis manifesto in the *Tribune* on 5 August; and on the 18th he and the Radicals began to circulate among the politicians a 'call' for a new Republican convention, to reconsider the candidature of Lincoln. The pacifist had slipped into bed with the die-hards.

It was a dangerous conspiracy, an alarming situation. Letters came pouring into Washington from Lincoln's staunchest supporters, declaring the election already lost. The executive committee of the party implored Lincoln to throw himself into the arms of the pacifists, as the only means to save himself. Lincoln sent them away satisfied that he cared nothing for himself, but that so palpable a confession of weakness as an overture to Jefferson Davis, at that juncture, would be equivalent to surrender. What Lincoln really thought of the situation is clear from the paper he wrote and sealed on 23 August.

'It seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward.'

If Jefferson Davis had been adroit or dishonest he could have completed the distraction of Union councils by proposing an armistice or a peace conference on any terms.¹ Had he been a supremely wise man he would

presented to him within ten days of the close of a session. For the disputed principles of reconstruction see next chapter.

¹ As Stephens wrote to Davis in December, it would be impossible to renew hostilities if once suspended, and any negotiation must have resulted in separation, 4 *O. R.* iii. 934-6. Cf. attitude of Allied Powers towards President Wilson's peace proposals, 1915-17.

have accepted the President's condition of peace : restoration of the Union without slavery. The Southern States would thereby have been spared the tragedy of reconstruction. But to the ruling class of the Confederacy in 1864 reunion with the Yankees was less thinkable than reunion with Great Britain ; and President Davis still believed his cause invincible. A certain Mr. Jacques, a more adroit amateur diplomatist than Greeley, published on 20 August the result of an interview with Davis himself. ' Say to Mr. Lincoln from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our Independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other.'

In the face of this plain and honest statement from the Confederate President, the Democratic national convention on 29 August adopted a resolution drafted by Vallandigham :

' After four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities . . . to the end that at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.'

General McClellan received and accepted the Democratic nomination for President. He repudiated the peace plank in the platform, but was not unwilling to ride into the White House on a wave of defeatism.

Jefferson Davis by his frankness, the Democrats by their shameless defeatism, and Sherman by capturing Atlanta on 2 September, knocked the bottom out of the Wade-Davis-Greeley conspiracy. Nothing more was heard of the ' call ' for a new nominating convention. On 6 September the new draft went quietly into effect, the New England Radicals held a thumping Lincoln rally in Faneuil Hall, and, marvellous to relate, Ben Wade announced he would take the stump for the President ! Lincoln's election, so doubtful in August,

was conceded on every side in October. After Sheridan had beaten Early at Cedar Creek (19 October), and devastated the Shenandoah Valley so completely 'that a crow flying over it would have to carry his own rations', the Northern people, on 8 November, chose 212 Lincoln electors, and only 21 for McClellan.¹ 'The election', said Lincoln two days later, 'has demonstrated that a people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war.'

¹ Lincoln's majority in the popular vote was only ten per cent of the total, and in New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio less than half that. But not all who voted for McClellan were pacifists or defeatists; he had repudiated the Democratic platform and declared for the continued prosecution of the war.

LV

VICTORY

OCTOBER 1864—APRIL 1865

1. *Sherman's March to the Sea*

GRANT never had enough men or artillery to carry the Petersburg lines by assault, as the fiasco of the 'crater' affair (27 July 1864) proved. Yet Grant was right in holding Lee in position while Sherman reduced the effective area of the Confederacy, for Lee, unable to manœuvre, was not dangerous.

President Davis assured the people of Georgia on 28 September that Sherman must sooner or later retreat from Atlanta. 'And when that day comes the fate that befell the army of the French Empire in its retreat from Moscow will be re-acted.'¹ On 17 October Sherman cut loose from Atlanta in the opposite direction, towards the sea. He abandoned all communications, and marched 62,000 men without supplies into an enemy country, while Hood was striking northward into Tennessee, and Forrest, the dashing Confederate cavalry leader, was raiding Kentucky.

The march to the sea, like Sheridan's campaign in the Valley, was one of deliberate and disciplined destruction. Sherman's army cut a swath sixty miles wide through central Georgia, the 'garden spot of the Confederacy', destroying stores of provisions, standing crops and cattle, cotton-gins and mills, railways beyond all possibility of repair, in fact everything that could be useful to the Confederacy and much that was not. The looting of houses, although forbidden by orders, could not altogether be prevented, and many a Georgian family was stripped of its possessions; but outrages on persons were surprisingly few; on white women, none.

¹ Rowland, *Davis*, vi. 341.

'No army ever enjoyed such freedom and kept within such bounds.'¹ It was the sort of campaign that soldiers really love—maximum of looting and destruction, minimum of discipline and fighting : splendid weather, few impediments : broiled turkey for breakfast, roast lamb for dinner, and fried chicken for supper.

How the darkeys shouted when they heard the joyful sound !

How the turkeys gobbled which our commissary found !

How the sweet potatoes even started from the ground,

While we were marching through Georgia.

Hurrah ! Hurrah ! we bring the jubilee !

Hurrah ! Hurrah ! the flag that makes you free !

So we sang the chorus from Atlanta to the sea,

While we were marching through Georgia.

For a month the North completely lost sight of Sherman. He emerged at Savannah on 10 December, and was able to offer Lincoln the city as a Christmas present.

The North had another bad turn in December when Schofield's corps, defeated by Hood at Franklin (Tennessee) on 30 November, fell back on Nashville. It looked like another Confederate break-through to the Ohio. But Thomas, the 'Rock of Chickamauga', was in command at Nashville. Despite frantic telegrams from Stanton and Grant to attack at once, he bided his time. Finally on 27 December, when the order for his supersession had already been given, Thomas inflicted on Hood the most smashing defeat of the war (Battle of Nashville). Grant made prompt amends to Thomas for his impatience ; but this great Virginian, who had forsaken home and kindred for loyalty to the Union, was neglected in the distribution of post-war honours. No military critic to-day would deny him a place among the immortals ; and there are many who believe that, if given the opportunity, he could have proved himself peer to Lee or Jackson.

¹ Dodge, *Bird's-Eye View*, p. 290.

2. *The Collapse of Confederate Morale*

Sherman had now planted another army in the heart of the Confederacy ; and with the capture of Wilmington (North Carolina) in January 1865 the Union blockade became very nearly absolute. Yet, in a military sense, the Confederacy was by no means doomed to defeat. On paper there was no reason why the fight should not be kept up almost indefinitely. Communication of a sort could be maintained between the Atlantic and the Gulf States, across Sherman's swath of destruction. There were some 35,000 men under arms in the Carolinas to oppose his march northward ; and Lee, emulating Napoleon's strategy of 1814, might break loose from Grant and unite with them. There were enough white men of fighting age in the Confederacy to provide its armies with half a million men, and enrolment of the blacks might have provided two hundred thousand more. The Confederate munitions service was independent of outside supplies, and the great munition-producing centre at Selma (Alabama) was not captured until 2 April 1865. There was plenty of corn and cattle in the country south of Virginia.¹ Every material factor justified a protracted resistance, only morale was wanting. The re-election of Lincoln, the failure to obtain foreign recognition, Sherman's march to the sea, and the increasing pinch of the blockade, took the heart out of the South. 'Two-thirds of our men are absent . . . most of them absent

¹ Actually 174,223 Confederate troops surrendered in April and May 1865. Comparing the number of desertions during the previous four months, and the population of fighting age, the estimate of 500,000 possible fighting men is not excessive. And if there had been the same fighting spirit as in 1862 who can doubt the result ? The starving condition of Lee's troops at Appomattox was not symptomatic, but caused by failure of the government to send ahead supplies. See the statistics and reports in 1 *O. R.*, xlv, part ii, 1211 ff. ; 4 *O. R.*, iii, 930, 1032, 1137 ; Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 620.

without leave,' admitted President Davis in September 1864. Senator Hill of Georgia, who wrote the President on 25 March 1865 'We shall conquer all enemies yet', admitted, nine years later, 'All physical advantages are insufficient to account for our failure. The truth is, we failed because too many of our people were not determined to win.'¹

Davis could see only the outer reality—so many men and rifles and cannon, so much food and gunpowder. To the deeper reality in the hearts of his people he was insensible as any autocrat of the Old World. His last political manœuvre was to obtain from Lincoln a clear statement of Union peace terms, in the hope of 'firing the Southern heart'. There was no heart left.

On 3 February 1865 came this strange conference on a steamer in Hampton Roads, between the President of the United States and the Vice-President of the Confederacy, who had been his friend and mentor in Congress sixteen years before. Stephens had credentials to negotiate peace as the envoy of an independent power. Lincoln patiently repeated his refusal to negotiate on that basis. Senator Hunter, who accompanied Stephens, alleged as precedent the negotiations during the English Civil War. Lincoln replied, 'I do not profess to be posted in History. On all such matters I will turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I is that he lost his head.' But 'the war will cease on the part of the Government, whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it'. He could not promise immediate admission of the Southern representatives to Congress, which alone was competent to decide; but he would exercise his discretion in enforcing the Confiscation Act 'with the utmost liberality',² and he would accept judicial

¹ *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, i. 101; *Southern Hist. Soc. Papers*, xiv. 500; Whitelaw Reid, *After the War*, p. 75.

² Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, x, chapter vi.

determination of the scope of the Emancipation Proclamation. Offered a lifeboat, Stephens clutched at a straw, the very straw that Seward set afloat on All Fools' Day 1861¹—Union and Confederacy might ally to expel Maximilian from Mexico!

It was as Lincoln had predicted—'He cannot voluntarily re-accept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it.'² Lee might with honour surrender his army to irresistible force; Davis could not with honour surrender his nation. The inherent dignity of his refusal was marred by his frantic boast at a public meeting in Richmond that he would compel the Yankees in less than twelve months to petition him for peace on his own terms.

3. *Appomattox*

It was now the sixth day of February 1865. The Confederacy was sinking fast. Even slavery was jettisoned—in principle.³ Sherman, as he marched northward, was proving his sulphurous synonym for war. 'Columbia!—pretty much all burned; and burned good.'⁴ General Johnston, restored as usual to command, fought his last battle at Bentonville, North Carolina, on 19 March. On the 23rd Sherman marched into Goldsborough, and made rendezvous with the victors of Nashville. Reunited, the great Army of the West had 90,000 men; Johnston a scant 25,000. Yet the doughty Sherman passed some anxious hours, when he learned that Lee and his grim veterans were on the loose again.

For nine months the two armies had faced one another across long lines of entrenchment running through the

¹ Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, x, chapter vi.

² Annual Message, 6 December 1864.

³ President Davis sent an envoy to Europe, in January, to offer abolition in exchange for recognition, and on 25 March the Richmond Congress authorized the arming of the slaves.

⁴ *Meade's Headquarters*, p. 327.

suburbs of Petersburg. At the beginning of the siege their forces were not disparate ; but by the middle of March 1865 Grant had 115,000 effectives to Lee's 54,000.¹ If Lee did not move out of his trenches Grant would soon envelope him ; but if Petersburg were abandoned, Richmond must fall. Lee first tried moving forward, but his assault on the Union left was a costly failure. He must make up his mind to retreat, or it would soon be too late even for that. Sheridan, having marched across Virginia from the Valley, thrust back Lee's right at the Battle of Five Forks (1 April) ; and on the next day Grant penetrated the centre of the Confederate defences. Lee's only hope was to retreat by the line of the Danville railway, and unite with Johnston.

On the night of April 2-3 Lee's army slipped out of the Petersburg lines ; and the next evening the Union forces entered Richmond. Without pause Grant pursued. Sheridan entered the important railway junction of Burkesville before the Confederates, preventing their escape southward. Rations failed Lee through some mistake at Richmond ; his thirty thousand men had to live on a thinly populated country in spring-time. On 9 April Sheridan closed the only avenue of escape westward. Whether Lee could have cut his way through to the mountains and continued guerrilla warfare indefinitely may be doubted ; but it is certain that, as he wrote himself, he had only to ride along the lines and all would be over. ' But it is our duty to live, for what will become of the women and children of the South, if we are not here to support and protect them ? '

Lee ordered a white flag to be displayed, and requested an interview with his opponent. The scene that followed, in a house of the little village of Appo-

¹ The siege of Petersburg has acquired great technical significance in the light of the Great War. T. L. Livermore, in *Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc.*, xlviii. 92-101.

mattox Court House, has become a part of American folk-lore. Lee, in the new full-dress uniform with jewel-studded sword that he had saved in the flight, Grant in his favourite private's blouse, unbuttoned, and without a sword, 'his feelings sad and depressed at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly.' Small talk of other days, in the old army . . . Grant writes the terms of surrender in his own hand. . . . Officers and men paroled . . . arms and *matériel* surrendered . . . not to include the officers' side-arms, and— 'Let all the men who claim to own a horse or mule take the animals home with them to work their little farms. . . . This will do much toward conciliating our people.'

The conference is over. Lee pauses a moment in the doorway, looking out over a field blossoming with the stars and stripes. Thrice, and slowly, he strikes a fist into the palm of his gauntleted hand. He mounts his horse Traveller and is gone.

A sound of cheering spreads along the Union lines. Grant orders it to cease:

'The war is over; the rebels are our countrymen again.'¹

¹ The remaining history of the Confederacy is quickly told.

President Davis slipped away from Richmond in time, and with Braxton Bragg and a part of his cabinet moved slowly south over the Danville railway. On 4 April he announced to the Southern people that they had entered upon a new phase of the struggle, the memory of which was to endure for all ages; nothing but 'unquenchable resolve' was needed to make triumph certain. (Rowland, *Davis*, vi. 530.) At Greensborough, North Carolina, he summoned General Johnston into conference, and endeavoured to induce him to continue the war. Johnston refused, and on 26 April surrendered his army to Sherman. At Abbeville, South Carolina, on 3 May, Davis implored his faithful officers to rally the South to victory. There was no reply. At Washington, Georgia, on 5 or 6 May, Davis held his last cabinet meeting with its single remaining member, General Breckinridge. On the 10th he was captured by a troop of Union cavalry. General Kirby Smith surrendered the last Confederate army, west of the Mississippi, on 26 May 1865.

4. *The Last Days of Lincoln*

‘ With malice toward none ; with charity for all ; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in ; to bind up the nation’s wounds ; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.’

Thus closed the second inaugural address of President Lincoln on 4 March 1865. The struggle over reconstruction was already on. Ben Wade with his truculent vigour and fierce hatred of the slaveholders, the Democrats, eager for revenge on the President, Charles Sumner, with his passionate conviction that right and justice required the South to pass under the Caudine forks, were certain to oppose the terms with which Lincoln proposed to bind up the nation’s wounds. But Congress would not meet until December. It might be confronted with the established fact of a restored nation, if the South were wise, and nothing happened to Lincoln.

On 11 April, two days after Lee’s surrender, Lincoln delivered his last public address. After a brief allusion to Appomattox and the hope of a speedy peace, he unfolded his reconstruction policy—the most magnanimous terms towards a helpless opponent ever offered by a victor. For Lincoln did not consider himself a conqueror. He was, and had been since 1861, President of the United States. The rebellion must be forgotten ; and every Southern State readmitted to its full privileges in the Union as soon as ten per cent of the whites had taken the oath of allegiance, and organized a state government.

On Thursday night, the 13th of April, Washington was illuminated on account of Lee’s surrender, and crowds paraded the streets. A general light-heartedness was in

the air ; every one knew that the war was practically over. On Good Friday, the 14th, the President held his last cabinet meeting. It was decided to lift the blockade. He urged his ministers to turn their thoughts to peace. There must be no more bloodshed, no persecution. General Grant, who attended the meeting, was asked for late news from Sherman, but had none. Lincoln remarked that it would come soon, and be favourable, for last night he had dreamed a familiar dream.¹ In a strange indescribable ship he seemed to be moving with great rapidity towards a dark and undefined shore. He had had this same dream before Sumter, Bull Run, Antietam, Murfreesborough, Vicksburg, and Wilmington. Matter-of-fact Grant remarked that Murfreesborough was no victory—‘ a few such fights would have ruined us ’. Lincoln looked at him curiously and said, however that might be, his dream preceded that battle.

Secretary Welles, who records this incident, may be our guide to the fearful events of that night. He had gone to bed early, and was just falling asleep when some one shouted from the street that the President had been shot, and the Secretary of State and his son assassinated. He dressed, and crossed Lafayette Square to Seward's house on 15th Street. The lower hall was full of excited people. Welles went upstairs to the room where Seward was lying on a bed soaked with blood, his lower jaw sagging as if in death. In the next room lay the son, unconscious from the injuries he had received in defending his father.

Leaving the Quartermaster-General in charge of the house, Welles, who by this time had been joined by Stanton, hurried down to 10th Street in a carriage. The President had been carried across that street from Ford's theatre to a lodging-house, and laid on a bed in a narrow back room. He never recovered conscious-

¹ *Diary of Gideon Welles*, ii. 282-3.

ness. 'The giant sufferer', writes Welles, 'lay extended diagonally across the bed, which was not long enough for him. . . . His slow, full respiration lifted the clothes with each breath that he took. His features were calm and striking.' The room and the house were uncomfortably crowded. It was a dark and gloomy night, and rain fell at dawn. Crowds remained in the street, looking in vain for hope from the watchers who came out for a breath of air. 'About once an hour Mrs. Lincoln would repair to the bedside of her dying husband and with lamentation and tears remain until overcome by emotion.' A little before half-past seven the President's breathing entirely ceased. Dr. Gurley, the Lincolns' pastor, made a short prayer. Then silence, broken only by Stanton's calm sentence: 'Now he belongs to the ages'.

In the back parlour of the lodging-house the Cabinet assembled without Seward, and wrote a letter to Vice-President Johnson, informing him of the event.

Welles continues, 'I went to breakfast to the Executive Mansion. There was a cheerless cold rain and everything seemed gloomy. On the Avenue in front of the White House were several hundred coloured people, mostly women and children, weeping and wailing their loss. This crowd did not appear to diminish through the whole of that cold, wet day; they seemed not to know what was to be their fate since their great benefactor was dead, and their hopeless grief affected me more than almost anything else, though strong and brave men wept when I met them.'

LVI

RECONSTRUCTION

1865-77

I. *The Problem*

Bow down, dear land, for thou hast found release !
 Thy God, in these distempered days,
 Hath taught thee the sure wisdom of His ways
 And through thine enemies hath wrought thy peace !
 Bow down in prayer and praise !
 No poorest in thy borders but may now
 Lift to the juster skies a man's enfranchised brow ;
 O Beautiful ! my Country ! ours once more !

THUS James Russell Lowell, at the Harvard commemoration service of 1865, saluted, as he believed, a reunited nation purged by war of all the grossness that had accompanied its rise to power. *Dis aliter visum*. Only in the narrow sense of territorial integrity had even the Union been restored. Only in a legal sense was slavery dead.¹ The Old South indeed was destroyed for ever, and no more would politicians proclaim the sophistry that black servitude was necessary for white freedom. But the fierce passions of warfare had burnt good with evil ; and in the scorched soil the new growth showed more tares than wheat. Lowell was, in fact, delivering the swan-song of the New England intellectuals and reformers. In the generation to come that region would no longer furnish the nation with teachers and men of letters, but with a mongrel breed of politicians, sired by abolition out of profiteering. Industrialism and commercialism had the Middle States firmly in their grasp, and were extending tentacles throughout the Middle West. The old sim-

¹ And not even in that sense until the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted, in December, 1865.

plicity and idealism retreated beyond the Mississippi, and materialism soon overtook them there.

The Federal Union as it had been before 1861 was never restored. Eventually all the Southern States were readmitted to a greatly strengthened and centralized Federal Union, and resumed the same rights of home rule as the Northern States still possessed. Until then the United States were essentially two countries : a triumphant North and West, striding ahead to achieve the conquest of the continent with railway, gang-plough, and excavator ; and a conquered South, torn by racial struggle, and crushed in all save spirit under the rule of Northern spoilsmen and Union bayonets. The Civil War was over ; a less bloody but not less cruel conflict began between victor and vanquished, a conflict with striking analogies to that which began in Europe with the armistice of 1918, and which is not yet finished as I write.

Reconstruction had been a subject of discussion in the North since the beginning of the war. As usual with American political issues involving sectional balance, the discussion took place on the plane of constitutional theory. It turned largely on the question whether the seceded States were in or out of the Union when their rebellion was crushed. From the Northern premiss that secession was illegal, strict logic reached the conclusion that the Southern States were now States of the Union, with all rights and privileges pertaining to that position. If, on the contrary, secession was valid, the South might consistently be treated as conquered territory, without any legal rights that the Union was required to respect. Yet both sides adopted the proper deductions from the other's premiss. Radical Republicans, the most uncompromising nationalists, managed to prove to their satisfaction that the Southern States had lost or forfeited their rights, or, as Sumner liked to put it, were *felo de se* ; whilst former

secessionists clamoured for privileges in the Union they had declared to be irrevocably dissolved !

Lincoln in his last speech, on 11 April 1865, declared that this question whether the Southern States were in or out of the Union was a ' pernicious abstraction '. ' Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad.' Obviously these States were ' not in their proper practical relation with the Union '. The object of all should be to ' get them into that proper practical relation ' again. Lincoln, indeed, had already been actively pursuing that policy. At the time of his death loyal state governments, organized by virtue of his proclamation of 1863, controlled almost the whole of Tennessee, and a large part of Arkansas and Louisiana. But even they were subject to military control, and Congress refused to admit their elected representatives, or even to recognize their existence.

Congressional opposition to Lincoln's plan was due in part to legislative *esprit de corps*, in part to the hatred engendered by the war. It seemed monstrous that traitors and rebels should be readmitted to full fellowship in the Union they had repudiated. But the real motive behind this appeal to passion was political. If the Southern States returned a solid Democratic contingent to Congress, as appeared inevitable, the reunited Democratic party would have a majority in both Houses.¹ It would be the Union as in Buchanan's time, administered by ' rebels ' and ' copperheads '. Even those Northerners who were willing to admit that Davis and Stephens might be honest men did not care to see them at their old desks in the Senate, screaming for ' Southern rights '. As Thaddeus Stevens put it, the

¹ Further, the abolition of slavery meant the abolition of the old ' federal ratio ' of representation by which a slave counted only as three-fifths of a freeman ; hence the Southern delegation in the Lower House would be increased by several members on the basis of the census of 1860.

Southern States 'ought never to be recognized as capable of acting in the Union, or of being counted as valid States, until the Constitution shall have been so amended . . . as to secure perpetual ascendancy to the party of the Union'.¹ The amendment that Stevens had in mind was negro suffrage. By this brilliant device, selfish and cynical politicians obtained the support of humanitarians and doctrinaires who believed the vote necessary to protect and uplift the freedmen.

If Lincoln had lived, there is every likelihood that his policy of wisdom, justice, and magnanimity would have prevailed; for in spite of his death the Radicals had great difficulty in imposing their policy of vengeance on the country. For some six weeks after the assassination there was a petty reign of terror, directed by Secretary Stanton, and enhanced by President Johnson, who had always been in favour of hanging 'traitors' when apprehended. Only the stern intervention of Grant prevented the seizure of Lee and other Confederate generals. Colossal rewards for Davis and his Cabinet, as alleged promoters of the murder, resulted in their capture; and 'Hang Jeff Davis!' became as popular a cry as 'Hang the Kaiser!' in 1918. But the charge of complicity in the murder was soon seen to be preposterous, and that of treason, although pressed for a time, was wisely directed to the circumlocution office. Thirst for revenge appeared to be slaked by shooting the assassin, and by hanging his three accomplices and the unfortunate woman who had harboured them, after an extra-legal trial by a military tribunal.

2. *The Conquered South*

Radicals who hailed Johnson's accession as a godsend were soon disappointed, for the new President made Lincoln's policy his own. From many quarters in the

¹ Fleming, *Doc. Hist. of Reconstruction*, i. 148. By Union party Stevens meant Republican party.

North came unmistakable signs of public approval ; yet circumstances in the South were such that the conquered people could not humanly avoid furnishing their former enemies with pretexts for further humiliation.

Conditions varied from one region to another, even in adjoining counties ; but on the whole the plight of the Southern people in 1865 was far worse than that of the central Europeans in 1919. The blockade was raised immediately, normal trading relations with the rest of the Union were promptly restored, and there was no confiscation of private property ;¹ but a considerable portion of the South had been devastated, her political institutions—federal, state, and local—were destroyed, and her labour system, the very basis of Southern society, had been overthrown. It was a country without government, without capital, without currency, and without labour.

In the more settled regions where the invading armies did not penetrate, the negroes for the most part went on working for their old masters during the year 1865 ; and life went on much as before the war until reconstruction by Act of Congress began. In other and unoccupied regions the countryside was terrorized by marauders and deserters. Where Sherman and Sheridan had passed, almost the whole apparatus of civilized life had been destroyed. No Southern bank was solvent ; and the Confederate securities into which the people had sunk their savings were now worthless as continen-

¹ All Confederate and State property—which amounted to very little—was confiscated, but Johnson's Attorney-General ruled that the war-time confiscation Acts were overruled by peace ; consequently the confiscated estates of individuals were only sequestered until their owners could claim them and take the oath of allegiance. Plantations abandoned by their owners in occupied portions of the South, such as Louisiana and the sea-islands of South Carolina, were in many instances sold for unpaid taxes, bought in by the United States Government, and parcelled out to freedmen, the balance of the purchase price being paid to the original owners.

tal currency. Shops were depleted of their goods. Almost the only medium of exchange was cotton.¹ The breakdown of transport prevented many planters from realizing anything for their cotton, and others were robbed of it by villainous United States Treasury agents, on the pretence that it had been pledged to the Confederacy. There were scarcely any schools for the white children. Young men of family, who had interrupted their education to fight for Southern independence, had to labour in the fields to keep their families from starving; and a planter's family which still had young men was deemed fortunate. We hear of a Confederate colonel peddling his wife's pies to the Northern soldiers, of a faithful negro supporting his old master's family by wages earned in valeting a United States officer, of white women yoked to the plough. 'Pretty much the whole of life has been merely not dying,' wrote a Southern poet, Sidney Lanier.

The negro was a peculiar factor in American reconstruction. He was practically a ward of the Union, with undetermined status and a doubtful future. Victory and the Thirteenth Amendment set him free, but in the very worst manner for him and for his white neighbour. Many negroes assumed that freedom meant no more work, and proceeded to celebrate an endless 'day ob jubilo'. Thousands took to the woods or to the road, or clustered about the United States army posts, living on doles or dying of camp diseases. Fortunate were those who remained faithful to their old masters and continued to work for mere subsistence. The Freedman's Bureau of the War Department, created by Congress in March 1865, and given general powers of relief and guardianship over negroes and refugees,² was an absolute necessity to keep them alive, and did

¹ Very little cotton beyond the need for home consumption had been grown during the war, but a large part of the crop of 1861 was still in the hands of the planters. ² Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 488.

much to solve the problem of readjustment before it became a political machine of the Radical party.

'I am satisfied that the mass of the thinking men of the South accept the present situation of affairs in good faith,' wrote General Grant to the President, after a journey of observation in the summer of 1865.¹ 'Slavery and State rights . . . they regard as having been settled forever by the highest tribunal—arms—that man can resort to.' 'No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people South, we cannot accomplish it by force,' wrote General Sherman to his brother, the Senator. 'You hardly yet realize how completely this country has been devastated, and how completely humbled the man of the South is.'² Every one now admits that Grant and Sherman were right. Without in the least admitting that her cause had been wrong, the South accepted her defeat as final and irrevocable, and very definitely put aside all thought of revenge. She accepted the advice of Lee, that her allegiance was now due to the United States, and that her duty was to create a new and better South within the Union. Allegiance could not be transferred in a day, and the process was hardly complete before the century ended. Young hotheads among the Confederate officers, old 'fire-eaters' who had never been under fire, and many women, most inveterate of 'rebels', refused to be 'reconstructed'. A few thousand irreconcilables emigrated to Europe, Brazil, or Mexico. But even the hardships of the next decade and the likelihood of foreign complications for the United States failed to produce any organization, open or secret, to recover Southern independence. There was no attempt to keep alive a phantom Confederacy, no watching for an hour of American difficulty to make Southern opportunity. Therein the political common sense of English-

¹ 18 December 1865, Fleming, *D. H. R.*, i. 51.

² 21 September 1865, *The Sherman Letters*, p. 156.

speaking peoples had perhaps its most striking illustration. Thereby Lincoln's belief, that the irreconcilable differences between North and South would disappear with slavery, was completely proved. Like the Scots Highlanders, the Southern gentry to this day cherish the memory of their lost cause, yet rejoice that it was lost; and many will even declare that the war was not too great a price for the abolition of slavery.

Whilst the Southern people were ready to acknowledge the Union in 1865, they expected to receive their acknowledged rights within the Union; and if they accepted the abolition of slavery, it did not mean that they acknowledged the political or social equality of the negro. Therein they were worlds apart from the Northern Radicals, who expected the South not only to submit but to repent, and to do works meet for repentance. And the longer the restoration of their rights was postponed, the more causes of friction developed. As armies of occupation go, the Union army was small in numbers—less than 20,000¹ by the end of 1866—and well behaved. There were of course exceptions, and the occasional use of negro troops for police purposes was neither wise nor just.² Equally unfortunate was the attitude of the better class of Southern women. Unlike the men, they did not realize the completeness of the Union victory; and their provocative attitude of defiance and contempt towards all 'Yankees' turned many a Northern soldier who was anxious to help and ready to forget into a bitter Radical.³

¹ 'Not more than 25,000 soldiers fit for duty' constituted the entire U.S. Army, much of which had to be kept in the Western Army posts. W. A. Ganoe, *Hist. of U.S. Army*, p. 309.

² Grant urged Stanton to demobilize the negro troops in the South. Carl Schurz, a German 'forty-eighter who held a general's commission in the war, urged the use of more black garrisons, as the best means to impress the fact of abolition on the whites.

³ Eliza Andrews, *The War-Time Journal of a Georgia Girl*, is an

3. *The Presidential Plan*

Nevertheless, the presidential plan of reconstruction progressed smoothly during the year 1865. Johnson appointed provisional civil governors in all the Confederate States where Lincoln had not already done so. These governors proceeded to summon state constitutional conventions, which were elected by 'whitewashed rebels'—former citizens of the Confederacy who took the oath of allegiance required by presidential proclamation. Fourteen specified classes, assumed to be inveterate rebels, were not allowed to vote.¹ Although many of the proscribed received special pardons from President Johnson, the general effect was to exclude natural leaders and experienced statesmen from the new state governments. Broadly speaking, they were poor-white governments.

The constitutional conventions declared invalid the ordinances of secession, repudiated the state war debts,² declared slavery abolished, and amended the former state constitutions. Elections were promptly held under these constitutions, and by the new year 1866 regular civil administrations were functioning in all the Confederate States except Texas. The President restored the writ of habeas corpus, and on 20 August 1866 declared the 'insurrection' at an end, 'and that peace, order, tranquillity and civil authority now exist

unconscious and interesting expression of this attitude; cf. Whitelaw Reid, *The South after the War*, p. 441.

¹ Including all civil officers of the Confederacy and state governors, general officers of the Confederate Army, former U.S. officers or Congressmen who resigned their commissions or seats, and other Confederates worth over \$20,000. Confederate common soldiers were not disfranchised under this or any subsequent plan of reconstruction, although they were ineligible for office under the Congressional plan.

² South Carolina and Georgia invited criticism by repealing their ordinances of secession instead of declaring them null and void, and South Carolina failed to repudiate the state war debt.

in and throughout the whole of the United States of America'.¹

Such was the fact; yet within a few months all Lincoln's and Johnson's work of reconstruction was undone, and the Southern States cast once more into the political melting-pot.

4. *Congress intervenes*

The Congress which met for the first time on 4 December 1865² showed its temper by forbidding the clerk of the House even to read the names of members-elect from the reconstructed States at the first roll-call. The Radical leaders shrewdly postponed any definite decision on the ground that Congress was not yet properly informed. A joint committee of both Houses was appointed, with authority to investigate and report on the title of the Southern members-elect to be received. A majority of this Joint Committee on Reconstruction was Radical. It was in fact a resurrection of the old Committee on the Conduct of the War. Immediately it began to take testimony on the condition of the South from witnesses who, for the most part, were selected to prove that the new state governments were composed of inveterate rebels, whose object was to oppress loyal white men and re-enslave the freedmen. All this was due largely to the shrewd management of Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, leader of the Republicans in the House of Representatives, and for two years the virtual ruler of the United States.

Stevens is one of the most unpleasant characters in American history. A harsh, sombre, friendless old man of seventy-four, ill educated, and with no redeeming

¹ Richardson, *Messages*, vi. 438. He had already proclaimed the war at an end in all the States save Texas on 2 April.

² The House of Representatives had been elected in November 1864. Lincoln and Johnson refused to summon a special session, in order to carry out their reconstruction policy without interference.

spark of generosity, he was moved less by sympathy for the negro than by cold hatred of the Southern nobility. The former he would exalt to a status of complete political and social equality, the latter he would humiliate, disfranchise, and distribute their landed property among the freedmen. Stevens was a finished parliamentarian, with a talent for controlled invective and devastating sarcasm that made him a dangerous opponent. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, Republican leader in the Senate, was a complete doctrinaire, a Yankee Brissot, *l'ami des noirs*. Against the ex-Confederates he cherished no vindictive feelings, but without any personal knowledge of the negroes he believed them no exception to the dogma of equality, and that they only wanted the vote to prove it. Vain, over-educated, and irritable, Sumner could only be influenced by flattery. The New England intellectuals looked to him for leadership, and his polished orations impressed the commonalty.

While Sumner declaimed on the rights and wrongs of the coloured race, Stevens played for time. It would not do to make an issue of negro suffrage on its merits, for very few of the Northern States outside New England allowed negroes to vote. The Freedmen's Bureau was given a new lease of life when its legitimate work was almost completed, and made a political machine. The prospect of 'whitewashed rebels' controlling the Southern States and uniting with 'copperheads' to dominate Congress was allowed to dim the clear vision imparted by Lincoln. The new Southern legislatures, despite some prominent figureheads, were directed by men of slight experience, who innocently passed laws irritating Northern sentiment, such as pensions for Confederate veterans, and changing the names of counties to honour chieftains of the lost cause. But the heavy ammunition for Radical propaganda was afforded by the so-called 'black codes' of the reconstructed States.

Every Southern State gave the freedmen essential rights of citizens to contract, sue and be sued, own and inherit property; but in no instance were they accorded the vote or made eligible for juries. Owing to their well-known aversion from steady work, the negroes were required to have some settled occupation, and subjected to special penalties for violation of labour contracts. In some States laws closing to the freedmen every occupation save domestic and agricultural service betrayed a poor-white jealousy of the negro artisan; and in Mississippi they were forbidden to own or lease land. On the other hand, there were special provisions to protect the negro from undue exploitation and swindling. On the whole, the 'black codes' corresponded fairly closely to the essential fact that nearly four million irresponsible ex-slaves needed special attention until they were ready to mingle in free society on equal terms. But in several States there was also evident a desire to keep them in a permanent position of tutelage, if not peonage. Southern whites, who had never dreamed it possible to live side by side with free negroes, believed their new laws to be liberal and generous, but from the abolitionist point of view they were a palpable attempt to evade the Emancipation Proclamation. The more objectionable laws, promptly nullified by the Freedmen's Bureau,¹ were as futile as they were injudicious; and equally futile in the long run, it must be said, was Northern opposition. As soon as home rule was restored to the South, the 'black codes' were re-enacted, and the essential principle of them, one law for the black and another for the white man, is still enforced by public opinion and Judge Lynch, if not by statutes and the courts.

¹ The Bureau had the power to make rules and regulations for labour contracts of freedmen, and take jurisdiction over almost any case in which a negro was involved.

5. *Andrew Johnson*

Lincoln's political astuteness might have defeated the sharp-witted leaders of the Radicals, if only by appealing over their heads to honest men. President Johnson simply played into the Radicals' hands. Like Tyler in 1841, he was the nominal head of a party of which he was not really a member. A War Democrat from a seceded State, he had been placed on the same ticket with Lincoln to emphasize the Unionism of the Republican party in 1864. Of origin as humble as Lincoln's, in early life a tailor in a Tennessee mountain village, and unable to write until taught by his wife, he had few of Lincoln's qualities save honesty and a good heart. His policy was identical with Lincoln's ; but he was unable to connect with Northern opinion. Yet Johnson was perhaps the most maligned and misunderstood of all the Presidents. In the historical literature of the last half-century he is represented at the best as a pugnacious idiot, at the worst as a drunken ruffian. Actually he had all the private virtues, and timidity rather than pugnacity was his fault. No President was ever in a more difficult situation. The Radicals, including most of the professional Republican politicians, controlled the party machinery : and the civil service looked to them for leadership. Seward and Welles were loyal to him ; but Stanton, with his customary duplicity, used the machinery of the War Department against the President, and kept the Radicals posted on Cabinet secrets.¹

Johnson threw down the gauntlet to Congress in February 1866, by vetoing bills for extending the Freedmen's Bureau, and forbidding the States to discriminate

¹ There is no good published biography of Johnson. I am much indebted for my interpretation of his character and for many facts in this chapter to a MS. thesis on the election of 1866 by Dr. Howard Beale of Harvard University.

between citizens on the ground of race or colour. The latter was passed over his veto ; and the fight was on. Having accepted the issue, Johnson should at once have remodelled his Cabinet, and removed federal officials who were working against him. But, unlike Tyler, he did not wish to be the first to split his adopted party. Consequently the Radicals were able to unfold their programme with no opposition save the President's vetoes ; and to continue their propaganda against him, and against the South. Under the greatest provocation he remained silent, while Stevens on the floor of Congress referred to him as an ' alien enemy, a citizen of a foreign state ',¹ and Sumner called him ' an insolent, drunken brute in comparison with which Caligula's horse was respectable '.

In April 1866 the joint committee reported a congressional plan for reconstruction, in its essence a denial of statehood to the South until negro equality should be incorporated in their laws. This plan was embodied in what subsequently became the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which guaranteed civil rights to the negro, disqualified ex-Confederates who had formerly held federal office, and forbade the payment of Confederate war debts. Southern representatives would be admitted to Congress, it was announced, only on the condition of their States ratifying this amendment.

The issue was now joined between President and the majority in Congress. Everything turned on the election of a new Congress in the autumn of 1866. A National Union Convention of moderate men from both sections pledged support of the President, but it did not form a new party or create party machinery. Hence, in most congressional districts, voters had to

¹ *Cong. Globe*, 39th Cong., 1st sess., appendix, p. 129. The President's speech of 22 February, to which most historians ascribe the beginning of the struggle, was not judicious, but the version of it generally quoted is the garbled one of the Radical press.

choose between a Radical Republican and a copperhead Democrat. Johnson did not manage his campaign well. He was incapable of advocating a policy of tolerance in a tolerant manner, and his 'swing around the circle', a stumping tour of the Middle West, became an undignified contest of vituperation. Instead of appealing to the memory of Lincoln, and to the finer popular instincts, he called names and rattled the dry bones of State rights. The Radicals, on the other hand, were remarkable political generals. Concealing their intention to force negro suffrage on the South (since the Middle West was still anti-negro) they made 'patriotism' the single issue. Reiterated tales of Southern defiance and atrocity; race riots at Memphis and New Orleans for which Southern leaders were in no way responsible, bewildered Northern opinion. 'Jefferson Davis is in the casemate at Fortress Monroe, but Andrew Johnson is doing his work,' declared Sumner.

'Witness Memphis, witness New Orleans. Who can doubt that the President is the author of these tragedies? Charles IX of France was not more completely the author of the massacre of St. Bartholomew than Andrew Johnson is the author of these recent massacres now crying out for judgement. . . . Next to Jefferson Davis stands Andrew Johnson as [the Republic's] worst enemy.'¹

Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the Northern people returned a sufficient majority to override the Presidential vetoes.

Johnson has been criticized for not then bowing to 'the will of the people', and advising the Southern state governments to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a first step, not as a final condition of restoring State rights to the South. They had no intention of receiving Southern representatives until negro suffrage had been established, and the land of ex-rebels confiscated: until Northern supremacy had been written

¹ Sumner, *Works*, xi. 27-8 (Speech of 1 October 1866).

into the Constitution. So Johnson nailed his colours to the mast, and defied Congress to do its worst.

6. *Reconstruction in Effect*

The new Congress met on 7 March 1867, in a vindictive, almost a revolutionary temper. By the Tenure of Office Act¹ an old custom of the Constitution was overridden by requiring the advice and consent of the Senate for all removals from office. On the same day was passed Stevens's first Reconstruction Act,² sweeping away the existing governments in all the ex-Confederate States save Tennessee, dividing them into military districts subject to military commanders who must take their orders from General Grant, not from the President, and offering restitution of their rights only on the condition of instituting, under military auspices, new governments based on negro suffrage.

The President had no choice but to enforce this and subsequent Reconstruction Acts, palpably unconstitutional as they were. The State of Mississippi asked the Supreme Court for an injunction restraining him; but the Supreme Court, remembering the Dred Scott case, refused to accept jurisdiction. In March 1867 military rule replaced in the South the civil governments that had been operating for over a year. The Majors-General then enrolled a new electorate, consisting of all the negroes and a few whites.³ This electorate chose in every Southern State a 'black and tan' constitutional convention, which drafted a new State constitution, enfranchising the blacks and disfranchising

¹ 2 March 1867, Macdonald, *D. S. B.*, p. 504. See above, i. 108.

² *Ibid.*, p. 500.

³ To the classes originally proscribed under Johnson's proclamation of May 1865 were added all who had held federal, state, or local office before 1861—even coroners, constables, notaries public, and sextons of cemeteries—and who had afterwards entered the Confederate service, or given aid and comfort to the rebellion. Fleming, *Doc. Hist.*, i. 407-19.

the ex-Confederates. By the summer of 1868 reconstructed governments had been set up in eight of the Southern States; the other two followed shortly. Congress formally readmitted them to the Union, seated their elected congressmen and senators, and withdrew the army as soon as their supremacy appeared to be reasonably secure.¹

In every reconstructed state government there was a Radical-Republican majority, composed of negroes and their white leaders. These last were composed of two classes: the 'carpet-baggers'—Northerners who went South after the war, largely for the purposes of political profit—and the 'scalawags' or Southern white renegades. The native Southerners who had the franchise organized themselves in a Conservative or Democratic party,² and made a tardy and futile effort to swing the votes of their former slaves. In a few instances they succeeded. Respectable black Democrats were conspicuous among the honest men in the reconstructed governments; but the great mass of the negro vote was won for the Republicans. Officials of the Freedmen's Bureau and a secret, oath-bound organization known as the Union League saw to that.

The resulting state administrations offered the most grotesque travesty of representative government that has ever existed in an English-speaking country. For a period varying from two to nine years the Southern States were governed by majorities composed of lately emancipated slaves, led by carpet-baggers and scalawags. A certain amount of good legislation was passed, especially in the field of education; but corruption was

¹ In Alabama and Mississippi the new constitutions were rejected by the electorate; but Congress nevertheless recognized them and used the military to set up governments under them.

² The name Conservative was chosen in order to unite the old Whigs and Unionists who would not co-operate with their fellows in misfortune under the Democratic label; but to all intents and purposes the Southern Conservatives were a wing of the national Democratic party.

the outstanding feature. South Carolina, the most extreme instance, had a carpet-bag governor, a negro state treasurer and secretary, and a legislature of 155 members, of whom 144 were Radicals, 98 were blacks, and only 22 could read and write. The Radical majority, whose members paid an aggregate annual tax of \$340.00, increased the property tax until it amounted to confiscation, stripped the state treasury, issued bonds until they could float no more, and sold charters to corporations. Under the head of legislative supplies members were furnished at the public expense with such articles as champagne, Westphalia hams, oval library tables with carved legs, Brussels carpets, gold watches, carriages, and ornamental cuspidores.

Something might be said for these governments if they had really done anything for the negro ; but the money voted for his schools and land was largely stolen by scalawags, his social and economic status was in no way improved, and his political equality ended with the restoration of white rule. In the end the negroes had nothing better to show for their day of power than the plunder that their more fortunate fellows managed to carry off from the state capitols.

8. *Rule at Washington*

The Radical Northern leaders, not content with establishing the ascendancy of their party in the South, aimed ultimately at establishing a centralized, parliamentary government for the Union. The majority of Congress, not the Supreme Court, was to be the ultimate judge of the powers of Congress ; and the President a mere figurehead. An opening move in this game was the Tenure of Office Act, which made it impossible for the President to control his administration. The next game was to dispose of Johnson by impeachment, when Ben Wade, president *pro tem.* of the Senate, would succeed to his office and title.

Johnson countered in August 1867, by first requesting and then ordering Secretary Stanton to resign, which he had a right to do even under the Tenure of Office Act.¹ Stanton barricaded himself in the War Department. The House of Representatives then impeached the President before the Senate, 'for high crimes and misdemeanours,' as the Constitution provides. Ten of the eleven articles of impeachment simply rang the changes on the removal of Stanton, the other consisted of garbled newspaper reports from the President's speeches. A monstrous charge preferred by G. S. Boutwell, to the effect that Johnson was an accomplice in the murder of Lincoln, was not included.

Altogether the impeachment of Johnson was one of the most disgraceful affairs in the history of the Federal Government, and barely failed to suspend the federal system. The Radicals would have succeeded in their object but for Chief Justice Chase, who insisted upon legal procedure, and for seven Republican Senators, who voted for acquittal (16 May 1868). As it was, the Radicals lacked but one of the necessary two-thirds majority to convict. One more affirmative vote, and Ben Wade would have been installed in the White House, the Chief Justice would next have been removed by impeachment, and Radicals would have triumphed over the Constitution as completely as over the South.

When the trial took place, Johnson had less than one year to serve ; and the Republican national nominating convention met shortly after his acquittal. There was no longer any effective opposition to the Radicals within party ranks, and the reconstructed States gave them faithful delegates. General Grant, who had been brought into the Radical camp through the influence

¹ The Act limited the irremovable term of Cabinet officials to the term of the President by whom they were appointed ; Stanton had been appointed by Lincoln.

of Rawlins, was nominated by acclamation. The Democrats, regarding Johnson as too heavy a burden, made finance the principal plank of their platform, and nominated Horatio Seymour, the war governor of New York. Grant was easily elected.

9. *Restoration of White Rule*

Postponing the general history of Grant's administrations to another chapter, let us here follow the episode of reconstruction to its close.

Thaddeus Stevens had the good sense to see that political equality would avail the negroes little, so long as the whites owned the land. His death in 1868 cost Radicalism its fighting edge, and his programme of confiscation was not carried out. Thenceforth, reconstruction was placed on the defensive. Of several attempts to hold ground already won, most notable was the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1870, forbidding the States to deny any one the vote 'on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude'. In the end this proved a mere paper guarantee. Even before Grant's election the white South prepared to recover its supremacy by the only means open to it: a combination of tomfoolery and terror.

Adopting the methods of the Radicals who had organized the negro vote, white Southerners played upon the blacks' timidity and superstition, and made life uncomfortable for 'carpet-baggers'. The latter, for instance, were apt to find themselves bystanders in a shooting affray, 'accidental' targets for the bullets of the participants. The negroes were dealt with largely by secret societies. Of these the most famous, though not the most powerful, was the Ku Klux Klan. It began with a social κύκλος of young men in Tennessee, who discovered that their initiation garb of sheets and pillow-cases made them authentic spirits from

another world to the blacks. Realizing the political possibilities, they formed other κύκλοι, which in 1867 organized as the 'Invisible Empire of the South'.¹ During the next three years this and other secret orders policed unruly and criminal negroes in the country districts, and delivered spectral warnings against using the ballot, thus paralysing Radical power at its source. Later the Ku Klux disguise became a cloak for crime and oppression, when the order was formally disbanded.²

The answer of the Radicals to the Ku Klux was renewed military occupation of evacuated districts, the unseating of Democratic state administrations on the ground of fraud, and a new crop of supervisory laws. Some of these laws were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, others became a dead letter; and in spite of the efforts of President Grant and Congress the Southern whites gradually resumed control over their own States.³ Northern opinion, tired of the attempt to force Radical rule on the South, acquiesced.

When Rutherford B. Hayes was inaugurated President (4 March 1877), the carpet-bag régime had been overthrown in every Southern State save South Carolina and Louisiana, where it was upheld by federal bayonets. By frankly terrorist methods the whites in South Carolina had, the previous autumn, elected General Wade Hampton governor, and returned a Democratic majority to the legislature. A Republican returning board merely cancelled the ballots, filled vacancies arbitrarily, and with the help of federal

¹ William G. Brown, *The Lower South* (1902), chapter iv.

² The like-named organization that has arisen since the Great War is not the old one revived, and has different objects.

³ In Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia in 1869-71; in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas in 1874-5; and in the others in 1876-7. Defection of the 'scalawags' from the 'carpet-baggers', who were getting the lion's share of the spoils, and disgust of the more respectable negroes at their pretended friends, had much to do with the collapse.

troops excluded the Democrats from the State Capitol at Columbia. The newly elected Democratic members then hired a hall, organized their own House, and with Speaker, clerks, and serjeants-at-arms forced their way into the representatives' chamber where the Radicals were sitting. During three days and three nights the rival Houses sat side by side, every man armed to the teeth, and ready to shoot if the rival serjeant-at-arms laid hands on one of his colleagues. At the end of that time the Democrats withdrew, leaving the 'carpet-bag' Governor Chamberlain and his black legislature in possession of the State House; but the people of South Carolina obeyed the other government, which Governor Hampton administered with the aid of voluntary contributions from a room over a shop.

President Hayes broke this deadlock on 10 April 1877, by withdrawing the federal troops from Columbia, when the Democrats peaceably took possession.¹ Two weeks later, when the troops evacuated New Orleans, white rule was completely restored to the South. The principle of self-government was vindicated, and the world was given another striking proof that government without consent is impossible long to maintain.

Within less than twenty years the animosities between North and South were forgotten, and the last political disabilities were removed from ex-Confederates by Act of Congress. But reconstruction left deep scars upon the South. Politics were forced into an unnatural racial groove. Even to this day the 'solid

¹ A quarter of a century later, Governor Chamberlain confessed that 'there was no permanent possibility of securing good government in South Carolina through Republican influences. . . . The vast preponderance of ignorance and incapacity in that party, aside from downright dishonesty, made it impossible. . . . The elements put in combination by the reconstruction scheme of Stevens and Sumner were irretrievably bad, and could never have resulted, except temporarily, or in desperate moments, in government fit to be endured.' Rhodes, *U.S.* (1906 ed.), vii. 287.

South ' votes for Democratic candidates on whatever political issue.¹ Race relations were poisoned, as the annual though diminishing crop of lynchings attests. Negroes were retarded at least a generation in their progress towards responsible citizenship ; white men exhausted their energy in efforts to keep the negroes down. Southern society remained static, immune to modern movements of education and social regeneration, and in the twentieth century was almost as unprepared to meet the industrial invasion as England had been a century before.

¹ Tennessee, in 1920, was the first ex-Confederate State to be carried by any but a Democratic presidential candidate since 1876. For several years white supremacy in the Southern States was maintained largely by ' discouraging ' the negroes from voting. In the nineties, when the radical agrarian movement in the Democratic party began to reach out for coloured voters, the freedmen were disfranchised by various expedients in which the Supreme Court refused to see a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. The best-known device is the so-called ' grandfather clause ', disfranchising all illiterates except those whose ancestors had voted before 1860 ; the most effective is the requirement that voters show their ability to expound the state constitution to the satisfaction of white registration officers.

LVII

EXPANSION AND DEVELOPMENT

1870-1900

I. *The Railway Key*

DURING the generation that followed the Civil War, American society in the broader sense underwent profound changes, reflecting the economic transformations that began to take place during the war. The second industrial revolution, an expansion and extension of the first, was marked by the application of machine power, in constantly increasing units, to new processes and in new regions.

Again, transport was the key. There were 35,000 miles of steam railway in the United States in 1865. During the next eight years as many more were constructed. In the years 1874-87 some 80,000 additional miles of track were laid, and in 1900, with just under 200,000 miles in operation, the United States had a greater railway mileage than the whole of Europe.¹

Railway expansion closely interacted with Western migration, agriculture, the iron and steel industry, and finance. Its most spectacular achievements were trans-continental. The Union Pacific, begun in 1865, pushed westerly through Nebraska and Wyoming Territory, near the line of the old Oregon and Mormon trails, and across the Wasatch Range of the Rockies into the Great Salt basin. In the meantime, the Central Pacific rushed eastward from Sacramento to meet it

¹ *Statistical Abstract of U.S.* (1918), p. 318. Among the inventions which diminished the discomforts of long-distance travel, and made possible the increase in the size of goods wagons and the length of trains, were the Pullman sleeping car (1864), the safety coupler, and the Westinghouse air brake (1868). In 1902 Europe had 4.64 miles of railway to every 10,000 inhabitants; the United States 26 miles.

over the difficult grades of the Sierras and the arid valleys of Nevada. The lurid details of their race have lost nothing in the telling by Zane Grey, and have been distorted out of resemblance to the truth by the cinema. One regrets to record that the motive for this feverish haste was the greed of each group of promoters to obtain the lion's share of federal bounties and land grants. When the two joined rails with a golden spike near the Great Salt Lake, on 10 May 1869, the Union Pacific was regarded as the winner; but the Central Pacific promoters had made enough to enable them to buy the state government of California.

Congress in the meantime had granted charters to three other lines: (1) the Northern Pacific—from Lake Superior across Minnesota, through the Bad Lands of Dakota, up the Valley of the Yellowstone, across the continental divide at Bozeman to the head-waters of the Missouri, and by an intricate route through the Rockies to the Columbia River and Portland; (2) the Southern Pacific—from New Orleans across Texas to the Rio Grande, across the Llanos Estacados to El Paso, and through the territory of the Gadsden Purchase to Los Angeles, up the San Joaquin Valley to San Francisco; (3) the Santa Fé—from Atchison, Kansas, up the Arkansas River to Trinidad, Colorado, across the Raton spur of the Rockies to Santa Fé and Albuquerque, through the country of the Apache and the Navajo parallel to the Grand Cañon of the Colorado, and across the Mojave desert to San Bernardino and San Diego. All three were aided by enormous government land grants—twenty square miles to every mile of track—and by 1884, after numerous bankruptcies and reorganizations, all three had reached the coast, and the Canadian Pacific linked Montreal with British Columbia.

These transcontinental lines were promoted largely with a view to profit from construction and manipulation of securities. The Federal Government en-

couraged them in order to connect the Atlantic and the Mississippi with the Pacific Coast. But the peopling of the vast intervening region proved to be their most valuable function. In this respect they performed a work comparable with that of the Virginia Company of 1612 and the Ohio Company of 1785.

At the end of the Civil War the Great Plains west of eastern Kansas and Nebraska, the High Plains, and the Rocky Mountain region were practically unpeopled, save for mining towns in Colorado and Nevada and the Mormon settlements in Utah. Mail coaches of the Overland Stage Line required at least five days to transport passengers and mails from the Missouri River to Denver, where flour was sold for twenty cents a pound, and potatoes fifteen dollars a bushel; yet so great was the cost of labour and of getting in smelting machinery, that the lower-grade silver ore extracted in Nevada was freighted by wagon to San Francisco, and thence transported round the Horn to Swansea.¹ Pre-war pioneers had been confined to subsistence farming until the railway connected them with markets; but the transcontinental railways pushed out into the plains far in advance of settlers, advertised for immigrants in the Eastern States and Europe, transported them at wholesale rates to the prairie railhead, and sold them land.² Thousands of navvies became farm-hands, obtained a free homestead of 160 acres from the Federal Government, and saved their wages to buy chilled-steel ploughs and stout Percherons. The termini and eastern junction points of these lines—places like Omaha, opposite the old Council Bluffs of the Indians, Kansas City, hard by the old jumping-off place for the Oregon

¹ Samuel Bowles, *Across the Continent* (1866), pp. 18, 51, 65, 151.

² 15,000 of the German Mennonites whose ancestors had colonized the Crimea and the Caucasus under Catherine II were transferred to Kansas in 1874, through the efforts of the land and immigration department of the Santa Fé railroad.

trail, Duluth, the 'Zenith City of the Unsalted Seas', Oakland on San Francisco Bay, Portland in Oregon, Seattle and Tacoma in Washington—places that had been mere villages or non-existent before the Civil War, became in thirty years metropolitan cities.

Railroading was the biggest business of a big era, and the railway builders were of the metal that in Europe made great conquerors. The new North-West was the domain of James J. Hill, and the Great Northern Railway his individual path of empire. St. Paul was a small town on the edge of the frontier when he emigrated thither from eastern Canada just before the Civil War, and Minneapolis a mere village at the St. Anthony falls of the Mississippi. Such importance as they had was due to their position at the end of a trail from the Red River of the North, which connected Winnipeg with the outside world. Long trains of two-wheeled ox-carts in summer, or of dog-sleds in winter, transported the peltry and supplies in forty or fifty days' time. In the winter of 1870 Donald A. Smith, resident governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, started south from Winnipeg and James J. Hill north from St. Paul, both in dog-sleds. They met on the prairie and made camp in a storm; and from that meeting sprang the Canadian Pacific and Great Northern railways.

In the panic of 1873 a little Minnesota railway with an ambitious name, the St. Paul and Pacific, went bankrupt. Hill watched it as a prairie wolf watches a weakening buffalo, and in 1878, in association with the future Lord Strathcona and the future Lord Mount Stephen, wrested it from the Dutch bondholders by a mere flotation of new securities.

The day of land-grants and federal subsidies was past, and Hill saw that the Great Northern Railway, as he renamed his purchase, could reach the Pacific only by developing the country as it progressed. He first

made connexion with Winnipeg by the Red River Valley, then, anticipating the diversion of Winnipeg traffic by the Canadian Pacific, struck almost due west across the Dakota plains, sending out branches to people the region and carry its wheat to market. In the summer of 1887 he made a record stride, 643 miles of grading, bridging, and plate-laying from Minot, North Dakota, to the Great Falls of the Missouri, at the rate of 3.25 miles per working day.¹ Two years later the Rockies yielded their last secret, the Marias pass, to a young engineer named John F. Stevens.² In 1893 the trains of the Great Northern reached tide water at Tacoma, Washington. Ten years more, and Hill had acquired partial control of the Northern Pacific Railroad, had purchased joint control of a railway connecting their eastern termini with Chicago, and was running his own fleets of steamships from Duluth to Buffalo, and from Seattle to Japan and China.

The Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Union Pacific (which sent a tap-root North-westerly) were responsible for the opening of the great 'Inland Empire' between the Cascades and the Rockies, and for an astounding development of the entire North-West. This once isolated Oregon country, with its rich and varied natural resources, magnificent scenery, and thriving seaports, has become as distinct and self-conscious a section of the Union as New England. The three States of this region—Washington, Oregon, and Idaho—increased their population from 282,000 in 1880 to 763,000 in 1890, and 2,140,000 in 1910, while California, which contained only half a million people when the golden spike was driven in 1869, kept pace with them. The population of Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas, starting at the same level in 1870, in-

¹ Pyle, *Life of James F. Hill*, i. 397.

² Mr. Stevens had the singular fortune to witness in 1925 the dedication of his own statue at this point on the continental divide.

creased sixfold in two decades ; Utah and Colorado, where there was a great mining boom in the seventies, rose from 125,000 to 370,000 in the same period ; Oklahoma and the Indian Territory, where not a white man was enrolled in 1880, had over a million and a half pale-faces in 1910 ; and Texas, with the aid of a network of railways doubled its population of 1,500,000 between 1880 and 1900. By 1890 the last serious Indian outbreak had been suppressed, and the remaining redskins confined to reservations ; the last great area of public lands, in Oklahoma, had been thrown open to settlement ; and the frontier of white colonization had faded out into cattle ranches and wheat farms.

This 'disappearance of the frontier' was shortly hailed by a great American historian as the close of a movement that began in 1607 ;¹ and the Spanish-American War of 1898 was interpreted as the beginning of a new phase of extra-continental imperialism. After the lapse of thirty-seven years it is difficult to discern any break in the rhythm of American life in the year 1890. The colonization of the Great West had not then been completed ; and in areas covering thousands of square miles it had not yet begun. The westward movement of population continued. Even in 1927 there is still free government land to be had for the asking. Even outside the national parks and forest reserves there are areas of virgin wilderness in the Rocky Mountains, the Sierra Nevada, and the high plains. There has, to be sure, been a gradual assimilation of the West to Eastern modes of living and thinking : but that too had been going on since the seventeenth century. Barely two generations separate the male vigour of Bret Harte's Far West from the insipid society portrayed by Sinclair Lewis ; and even to-day there is a marked difference between East and West. The transcontinental

¹ F. J. Turner, in 1893, reprinted in his *Frontier in American History* (1921), p. 1.

tourist, as his train leaves the settled farmsteads of Dakota or Kansas for the broad sweep of the high plains, will look in vain for buffalo or mounted Indian ; but even he has the feeling of a land still young to the white man's tread.

Railway penetration of the far North-West, improved agricultural machinery, the handling of grain in carload lots, transshipment to lake or ocean steamers by grain elevators, and a new milling process which ground the northern spring wheat into superfine flour—all these factors combined to move the centre of wheat production north and west from Illinois and Iowa into Minnesota, the Dakotas, Montana, Oregon, and the Canadian North-West. In this new 'wheat-belt' the 'bonanza' wheat-farms, veritable factories for wheat production, were well established by 1890. The wheat crop increased from 152 to 612 million bushels between 1866 and 1891.¹ With the low prices that prevailed after the panic of 1873 this meant disaster to English wheat-growers and ruin to their more vulnerable competitors in the Eastern States. England's wheat acreage fell off one-half between 1860 and 1916 ; but even then England had more acres under wheat than New England and the Middle States combined ; and as much as the old South.² The silo, enabling dairy farmers to turn maize into milk, saved eastern farming from ruin ; but enormous areas within a few hours of the great industrial centres on the Atlantic coast have reverted to forest since 1870.

Wool production remained almost constant in this period, and cotton, owing to the dislocation of Southern society, did not reattain its high pre-war figure until 1878. As the 'corn-belt' extended itself into

¹ *Statistical Abstract*, 1918, p. 811 ; 1924, p. 608. For the years 1916-24 the crop averaged over 1,000 million bushels.

² Mrs. Knowles, *Industrial Revolutions*, p. 372. *XIIIth Census Abstract*, p. 381.

Kansas and Nebraska, the maize crop, already 868 million bushels in 1866, passed 2,000 million bushels in 1891.¹ The greater part of the maize was converted into meat, cured at thousands of local bacon factories and at the great packing plants in Chicago; but a revolution in meat production was completed by 1880.

2. *Cattle and Cowboy*

Hitherto all the world had obtained its fresh meat from local butchers; cattle could be exported only in the form of salted provisions, or on the hoof. In 1866 a chance discovery proved that beesves could winter on the Great Plains as well as the buffalo, and come out fat and sleek in the spring. The plains of Texas were already overstocked with hundreds of thousands of long-horned cattle, whose hides alone were marketable. Crossed by imported Hereford bulls, the Texan cows produced good beef cattle; government land provided a 'range' of free pasturage from central Texas north to Wyoming, Montana, and Canada. In 1866 the Union Pacific Railway reached a convenient shipping point for live cattle in central Nebraska; and the refrigerator car,² invented in 1868 and in common use by 1875, made it possible to sell dressed beef, slaughtered at Chicago or Kansas City, in the great Eastern centres of population. These factors, with the invention of artificial ice and a tinning machine, brought even the English market within reach of the Far West. Local butchers who were unwilling to become mere retailers of Western beef had their throats cut by the great packing houses. By that time all the English-speaking

¹ *Statistical Abstract*, 1918, p. 812. The crops of 1919-23 averaged 3,000 million bushels.

² Adapted to the carriage of citrous fruits in the eighties, the refrigerator car made possible the orange and lemon groves of Florida and California. Nowadays the 'fruit growers' express' brings a constant supply of green vegetables and strawberries to Northern cities in the dead of winter.

peoples had acquired an appetite for chilled beef, and would not be deterred by rising prices.

It was this new industry of fattening cattle on the Great Plains that produced the last phase of the Wild West, and the highest and most picturesque development of the ancient art of cattle-droving. Easterners and Englishmen of a sporting and speculative type flocked into the industry, established their head-quarters anywhere from the Rio Grande to the Canadian border, and in the absence of law managed their affairs through a *de facto* commonwealth, the Wyoming Stock Growers' Association.¹ Texan borderers who learned their horsemanship and 'cow-punching' from the Mexican *vaqueiros* were the first and the best 'bucaroos' or cowboys. Every spring they rounded up the herds in designated areas, all the way from central Texas to Wyoming and Dakota, identified their owners' cattle by the brands, and branded the calves, dividing up *pro rata* the strays or 'mavericks'. The breeding cattle were then set free for another year, while the likely three- and four-year-olds were conducted on the 'long drive'—often several hundred miles long—to the nearest 'cow town' on a railway, whence cattle-buyers shipped them to the stockyards at Chicago or Kansas City. Each 'outfit' of cowboys attended its owner's herd on the drive, protecting it from wolves and cattle-rustlers, sending scouts ahead to locate the best grazing. The cowboy developed his own lingo and folk-lore. His high-horned Mexican saddle, lariat (*la reata*), broad-brimmed sombrero, high-heeled boots, and shaggy *chaparejos* were perfectly adapted to his work. His jangling spurs with their enormous rowels were not too severe for his bronco—vicious little mustang of Spanish origin, hardy as a donkey and fleet as an Arab.² The clownish posturing of film heroes

¹ L. Pelzer, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xiii. 30-49.

² The 'cayuse' was a heavier breed of wild horse, also of Spanish descent, from the well-watered coastal plain of Oregon.

has obscured the authentic cowboy : spare of frame and pithy in speech, reserved and courteous as the true gentleman that he was, yet with the eternal horseman's swagger : alert with the sort of courage needed to fight Indians and bad men, to break broncos and rope steers, or to deal with stampedes and prairie fires : enduring and uncomplaining, asking no better end than to die with his boots on. Finest of our frontier types, he flourished for a brief score of years, and faded into legend with the passing of the open range.

By 1885 the range had become too heavily pastured to support the long drive, and was beginning to be criss-crossed by railways, and by wire fences of homesteads. Then came the terrible winter of 1886-7, when countless thousands of cattle perished in the open. Cattle owners began to stake out homestead claims in the names of their 'outfit', and to fence off vast areas to which they had no claim. Almost in a moment the cattle ranch replaced the open range. Cowboy costume and tradition died hard ; but the 'cattleman' or ranch employee, penned in behind wire, knowing not the joys and dangers of the long drive, was a clipped eagle.

3. *Iron and Steel*

In one of the many astonishing columns in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, it appears that the tonnage of vessels passing through the 'Soo' canal¹ between Lakes Superior and Huron was roughly 100,000 in 1860, 500,000 in 1869, and 25,000,000 in 1901. Wheat and iron ore formed the bulk of these increasing burthens. The one we have traced ; the other came from new ore-fields of Michigan and Minnesota, for which Sir Henry Bessemer's process of smelting was perfectly adapted. The combination gave America cheap steel, an absolutely essential factor in her railway expansion and industrial development. These

¹ The common pronunciation of Sault Sainte Marie.

ore-fields on Lake Superior are hundreds of miles distant from coal deposits, but cheap lake and railway transport brought the two together. Ore and coal met in the smelters of Chicago, where the first American steel rails were rolled in 1865, or in Cleveland, Toledo, Ashtabula, or Milwaukee. Much of the ore was transported to Pittsburg, centre of the northern Appalachian coal-fields, where native labour, revolting against the twelve-hour shifts of the iron-masters, was replaced by sturdy Slavs. In the eighteen-eighties the iron and coal beds of the southern Appalachians began to be exploited, and Birmingham, Alabama, became a Southern rival to Pittsburg and Cleveland.

At the close of the Civil War American production of pig iron was hardly one-fifth that of Great Britain. In 1887 the United States had the largest output of any country; in 1900 it was on the point of passing that of Great Britain and Germany combined.¹ Steel production, first appearing in the census figures in 1867 with twenty thousand tons, passed the British output with six million tons in 1895, and reached ten millions before 1900.²

4. *Industrial Expansion*

In world economy the United States was still, in 1879, a country of extractive industries; in 1900 it had become one of the greater manufacturing nations of the world. Yet the value of farm products still exceeded those of industry, and the immense home market still precluded serious competition with England and Germany in Europe and the Far East.³ In 1869 there were

¹ Taussig, *Some Aspects of the Tariff Question*, p. 117.

² *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 1918, p. 814. But the value of exports of iron and steel and manufactures thereof from the United States was less than one-quarter that from the United Kingdom in the period 1895-9. *Parliamentary Papers*, 1909, cii. 79. (Census of Production, 1907.)

³ British exports of manufactures rose from an annual average of £210 millions in 1870-4 to £200 millions in 1895-9. Corresponding

two million wage-earners in factories and domestic industries, producing goods to the value of 3,385 million dollars; in 1899 there were 4.7 million wage-earners in factories alone, producing goods to the value of 11,407 million dollars.¹

For New England and the Middle States, these figures meant the end of small water-power factories, and the concentration of large corporation-owned units in manufacturing cities such as Fall River, Bridgeport, Paterson, Scranton, Troy, and Schenectady. Sherwood Anderson, in his novel *Poor White*, has described what the process meant for the Middle West:

‘In the days before the coming of industry, before the time of the mad awakening, the towns of the Middle West were sleepy places devoted to the practice of the old trades, to agriculture and merchandising. In the morning the men of the towns went forth to work in the fields or to the practice of the trade of carpentry, horse-shoeing, wagon making, harness repairing, and the making of shoes and clothing. They read books and believed in a God born in the brains of men who came out of a civilization much like their own. On the farms and in the houses in the towns the men and women worked together toward the same ends in life. They lived in small frame houses set on the plains like boxes, but very substantially built. The carpenter who built a farmer’s house differentiated it from the barn by putting what he called scroll work up under the eaves and by building at the front a porch with carved posts. After one of the poor little houses had been lived in for a long time, after children had been born and men had died, after men and women had suffered and had moments of joy together in the tiny rooms under the low roofs, a subtle change took place. The houses became almost beautiful in their old humanness. Each of the houses began vaguely to shadow forth the personality of the people who lived within its walls. . . . A sense of quiet growth awoke in sleeping minds. It was the time for art and beauty to awake in the land.

figures for the United States are £19 millions and £62 millions. *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 59, 64, 65.

¹ *Census of Manufactures*, 1914, pp. 17-18.

'Instead the giant, Industry, awoke. Boys, who in the schools had read of Lincoln, walking for miles through the forest to borrow his first book . . . began to read in the newspapers and magazines of men who by developing their faculty for getting and keeping money had become suddenly and overwhelmingly rich. Hired writers called these men great, and there was no maturity of mind in the people with which to combat the force of the statement, often repeated. . . .

'Out through the coal and iron regions of Pennsylvania, into Ohio and Indiana, and on westward into the States bordering on the Mississippi River, industry crept. . . .

'A vast energy seemed to come out of the breast of the earth and infect the people. Thousands of the most energetic men of the middle States wore themselves out in forming companies, and when the companies failed, immediately formed others. In the fast-growing towns, men who were engaged in organizing companies representing a capital of millions lived in houses thrown hurriedly together by carpenters who, before the time of the great awakening, were engaged in building barns. It was a time of hideous architecture, a time when thought and learning paused. Without music, without poetry, without beauty in their lives or impulses, a whole people, full of the native energy and strength of lives lived in a new land, rushed pell-mell into a new age.'

Youngstown, O., was the second iron and steel city in the United States in 1909; and Arizona the second State in copper smelting. Akron, O., was producing almost forty per cent in value of the country's rubber goods; and the Twin Cities of Minnesota, St. Paul and Minneapolis, had almost a monopoly of superfine flour. St. Louis was pushing Massachusetts hard in boots and shoes. Detroit was easily first in motor-cars; Moline, Illinois, in agricultural machinery;¹ and Chicago in half a century rose from a fur-trading post to a straggling, sprawling city, second only in population and in manufactures to New York.

¹ *Census of Manufactures*, 1914, pp. 265-9.

5. *The Trusts*

This immense development was neither steady nor orderly. Over-production of goods and raw materials, over-capitalization of railways, and feverish speculation in all sorts of corporate enterprise, brought financial panics in 1873 and 1893. During the hard times that followed, labour expressed its dissatisfaction by strikes of unparalleled violence, and the farmers sought solution for their troubles in political panaceas of the usual stupidity. It was a period of cut-throat competition, in which the big fish swallowed the little fish, and then tried to eat one another. Competing railways cut freight rates between important points, in the hope of obtaining the lion's share of business, until dividends ceased and railway securities became a drug in the market. The downward trend of prices from 1865 to 1895, specially marked after 1873, put a premium on labour-saving machinery, on new processes of manufacture, and on greater units for mass production. Pooling—'gentlemen's agreements' between rival producers to maintain prices and divide business, or even to pro-rate profits—was characteristic of the period after 1872. But on the whole it was found so difficult to maintain these rudimentary monopolies that a 'gentleman's agreement' came to be defined as one that was certain to be violated. About 1880 pools were superseded by 'trusts', a form of combination in which the affiliated companies hand over their securities and their power to a board of trustees. John D. Rockefeller organized the first and most successful, the Standard Oil Trust, in 1879. A large measure of his success was due to improvements, economies, and original methods of marketing; his monopoly was secured by methods that were condemned by the tolerant business ethics of the day, and pronounced criminal by the courts. By playing competing railways one against another, the

Standard Oil Trust obtained rebates from their published freight rates, and even forced them to pay over to the Standard rebates from its competitors' freight bills! If competing oil companies managed to stagger along under such handicaps, they were 'frozen out' by cutting prices in their selling territory until the Standard Oil Trust had all the business.

The trust as a method of combination was outlawed by most of the States in the early eighties; but the holding company, a corporation owning the shares of other corporations, proved a legal and more efficient financial device. In popular usage, however, the term 'trust' was applied to combinations of whatever structure, provided that they had sufficient power to dictate prices. Such were the 'trusts' which became the targets of popular indignation in the early twentieth century.

6. *Big Business and Politics*

It was not until the late eighties that the American public began to demand regulation of trusts; and the problem of regulation was greatly complicated by a federal form of government. The States, not the Federal Government, charter corporations;¹ and a corporation chartered by one State has a right to do business in every other.² In its ordinary operations the average corporation comes in contact only with state and municipal governments. A railway company, for instance, obtained all its privileges from the States,³ and was taxed only by them. Lighting and water companies

¹ An exception was made of the transcontinental railways, which were built largely across federal territory.

² Hence corporations wishing to do business in States which have strict Companies Acts seek and obtain incorporation in States such as Maine and New Jersey, where the laws as to issuing stock, accountability of directors, and the like, are lax.

³ Except certain transcontinental lines, which received federal charters and subsidies.

and street railways depended for their very existence on municipalities. Hence the corrupt alliance that was cemented after the Civil War between politics and business. Plain bribery was often practised with municipal councils, which gave away for nothing franchises worth millions, while their cities remained unpaved, ill lit, and inadequately policed.¹

Greatest in power, and most notorious for their abuse of it, were the great railway corporations. The power of an American transcontinental railway over its exclusive territory was nearly absolute, for until the age of motor-cars the people of the Far West had no alternate means of transport. Such railways could make an industry or ruin a community by merely juggling with the freight rates. The funds at their disposal, often created by financial manipulation and stock-watering, were so colossal as to overshadow state governments. Railway builders and promoters, who generally managed to maintain control of the properties they had helped to create, had the point of view of feudal chieftains. They had replaced the buffalo and the Indian by cattle and husbandmen: ignorant and jealous boors, who must be coerced and bribed into doing right if milder methods would not serve. Railroading in their opinion was a business wholly private in its nature, no more a fit subject for government regulation than a tailor's shop. They were unable to recognize any public interest distinct from their private interest. In many, possibly in most, instances the despotism was benevolent, and if a few men became multimillionaires, their subjects also prospered; but Collis P. Huntington, Leland Stanford, and their associates, who built the Central Pacific and controlled the Southern Pacific, were indifferent to all save considerations of private gain. By distributing free

¹ The most extreme instance is the Tweed ring in New York City, of which the classic account is F. J. Goodnow's, in the 1888 editions of Bryce's *American Commonwealth*.

passes to state representatives, paying their campaign expenses, and downright bribery, they prevented a just taxation of their properties, and evaded all regulation. By discriminating in freight charges between localities, articles, and individuals, they terrorized merchants, farmers, and communities 'until matters had reached such a pass, that no man dared engage in any business in which transportation largely entered without first . . . obtaining the permission of a railroad manager'.¹ Through the press, the professions, and the pulpit they wielded a power over public opinion comparable to that of the slave-owners over the old South. The same methods were imitated by the Eastern and Middle Western railways so far as they dared. In New Hampshire as in California, the 'railroad lobby', ensconced in an office near the State capitol, acted as a chamber of initiative and revision; and few could succeed in politics unless by grace of the railway overlord.²

These exactions and abuses of power were tolerated by the American people with what Europeans deemed a remarkable patience, so imbued were they with *laissez-faire* doctrine, so proud of progress, improvement, and development, and so averse from increasing the power of government. In 1887 came the first attempt of the Federal Government to regulate railways and break up 'trusts'. Congress, by virtue of its power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States and with the Indian tribes', passed the first Inter-state Commerce Act, declaring 'unreasonable' rates, pooling, and other unfair practices to be illegal. Enforcement was vested in the first modern administrative board of the American Government, the Inter-state Commerce Commission. Administrative regulations

¹ *Report of the U.S. Pacific Railway Commission* (1887), i. 141.

² Winston Churchill's *Coniston* (1906) and Frank Norris's *Octopus* (1901) accurately portray the social and political effects of railway domination in these two States.

were, however, so foreign to the American conception of government that the federal courts insisted on their right to review orders of the Inter-state Commerce Commission, and emasculated the Act by denying the Commission's power to fix rates. So the railways continued to charge 'all the traffic would bear'. Equally futile was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which declared illegal any monopoly or combination in restraint of inter-state trade. When the Supreme Court (1894) held that the purchase by the Sugar Trust of a controlling interest in 98 per cent of the sugar-refining business of the country was not a violation of the law because not an act of inter-state commerce, the Anti-Trust Act became a dead letter. Roosevelt, the first president to enforce the law, admitted it was wrong in principle, a hopeless effort to restore the economic conditions of 1850, a futile attempt to remedy by more individualism the evils that were the result of unfettered individualism.

'There had been', he writes, summing up this period, 'a riot of individualistic materialism, under which complete freedom for the individual . . . turned out in practice to mean perfect freedom for the strong to wrong the weak. . . . The power of the mighty industrial overlords had increased with giant strides, while the methods of controlling them . . . through the Government remained archaic and therefore practically impotent.'¹

¹ *Autobiography* (1913), pp. 462-3.

LVIII

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

1870-1900

I. *The Rise of Organized Labour*

ORGANIZED labour passed through phases of bewildering complexity before it won the power to meet organized capital on equal terms. There was little continuity of personnel with the ante-bellum period: wage-earners of the forties had largely become farmers, shop-keepers, and petty capitalists by the seventies. Their places were taken by farmers' sons, discharged soldiers lured by the attractions of urban life, and a new wave of immigrants, European rather than British.¹ Ignorant of what had been tried before, the American labour leaders passed through the same cycle of experiment as in the thirties and forties. There were national trade unions and local trades' unions, efforts to escape from the established order through co-operation, to ameliorate it by devices like the single tax, to break it down with socialism, political labour parties,² and attempts to form one big union. Yet in spite of European dilution, the ideas of Marx, Lassalle,

¹ Annual immigration passed 300,000 in 1866, 400,000 in 1872, declined to 138,000 in 1878, and rose to 789,000 in 1882, the highest figure for the nineteenth century. The proportion of British and Irish immigrants fell from 45 per cent in the years 1861-70 to 18 per cent in 1891-1900; that of Russians and South Europeans rose in the same period from 1.1 to 50 per cent. 86 per cent of the foreign-born in 1900 were in the states north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. Table in T. S. Adams and H. Sumner, *Labor Problems* (1914 ed.), p. 73.

² The Greenback Party, most important of the political labour movements, was compound of the classic frontier inflationism with Lassalle's Gotha platform in 1875. Founded in 1867, it attracted to its leadership a few political hacks like Ben Butler, and included in its ranks a part of the discontented farmers. After achieving a few minor though futile successes in some of the States, it faded out into Populism in 1890.

and Bakunin exerted less influence than did those of Owen, Cabet, and Fourier in the forties.

Apart from murderous activities in the Pennsylvania coal-fields by the 'Molly Maguires', a secret organization of Irish miners, American labour was quiescent until the hard times that followed the panic of 1873. Serious conflict came in 1877, when the four Eastern trunk lines¹ jauntily announced a wage-cut of ten per cent, the second since the panic. Without organization, the railway employees struck, and with the support of a huge army of unemployed, hungry and desperate, the strike flared up into something like a rebellion. During one week in July traffic was entirely suspended on the trunk lines, and every large industrial centre was in a turmoil. In Pittsburg, Martinsburg, and Chicago there were pitched battles between militia and the mob, and order could only be restored by federal troops. American complacency received a shock, but the reported presence of German socialists and French communards led to the easy conclusion that imported agitators were alone responsible. Few Americans realized that their country had reached a stage of industrial evolution which created a labour problem, or that the 'Great Strike of '77' would be only the first of a long series of battles between labour and capital.

When good times and full employment were restored in 1879, the labour movement developed into a contest for leadership between organizations representing labour unionism, craft unionism, and socialism. The Order of the Knights of Labor (founded 1869), native-American in leadership and largely in personnel, was an attempt to unite labour into one big union, under centralized control. Its professed object was not to increase wages, but to escape from the wage system through producers' co-operation, popular education, and the union of all

¹ A common term for the railways that connect Chicago and St. Louis with New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.

workers by hand or brain. Terence V. Powderly, the Pennsylvania machinist who became the Grand Master in 1878, was an idealist who disliked the tactics of combative unionism ; but it was the fate of the Order to become powerful, not through co-operation,¹ but by winning a great railway strike in the South-west, in 1884. Capital then met labour on equal terms, for the first time in America, when the great financier, Jay Gould, conferred with the Knights' executive board, and conceded their demands. The Knights helped to push the Chinese Exclusion Act ² through Congress in 1882, and were largely responsible for an Act of 1885 forbidding the importation of contract labour.

Parallel with the rise of the Knights of Labor, non-political trade unions of skilled workers grew and multiplied, as did other unions affiliated with Marx's International, and with the ' Black International '. Knights of Labor, trade unions, and socialist unions simultaneously struck for the eight-hour day in 1886, when the country was prosperous and business was booming. The spectacular event of this ' great upheaval ' was the Haymarket bomb explosion in Chicago, followed by judicial murder of four suspects ; but a struggle for leadership of the American labour movement was more significant.³ As champions of the unskilled, the Knights at that time attained a membership of about 700,000 as compared

¹ Mr. Perlman, discussing the recurrent failures of the co-operative movement in his *History of Trade Unionism in the U.S.*, concludes that the competitive business world offered such glittering prizes to workmen with an aptitude for management that they could not be retained in the service of co-operation.

² The impulse for this law came largely from the Pacific States, threatened by free importation of coolie labour ; but Eastern sentiment was also aroused when a foolish boot manufacturer broke a strike in Massachusetts with Chinese workmen from California.

³ Political labourism flared up the same year in Henry George's contest for the mayoralty of New York City. He polled more votes than young Theodore Roosevelt, but was beaten by the Tammany candidate.

with 250,000 in the national trade unions. Powderly, however, so mismanaged matters that the Knights lost their grip ; and their place in the van of the movement was usurped by an organization of skilled workers on craft lines, the American Federation of Labor.

2. *Gompers and the A. F. of L.*

It is significant that the A. F. of L., distinctively American as the B. T. U. C. is British, issued from the brain of a foreign-born worker in the polyglot section of New York. In the late sixties a bullet-headed young fellow named Sam Gompers, a British subject of mixed Hebrew and Flemish ancestry, was working in a highly insanitary cigar-making shop in the lower East Side, and speaking at the meetings of a local cigar-makers' union. Cigar-making was then a sociable handicraft. The men talked or read aloud while they worked, and both shop and union included German and Hungarian immigrants who could discuss socialism or positivism with equal facility. Gompers, as he rose in the councils of his fellow workers, learned to concentrate on the economic struggle, and to fight shy of intellectuals who would ride union labour to some private Utopia. He determined to divorce unionism from politics, which dissipated its energy, and from radicalism, which only served to arouse the fear of the public and the fury of the police. In the hard times of the seventies he experienced cold and hunger, the futility of charity, and the cowardice of politicians. At all times he had reason to bewail the lack of discipline in the labour movement. By 1881 he and other local labour leaders had thought their way through to a national federation of craft-unions, economic in purpose, evolutionary in method, and contending for the immediate objects of shorter hours and better wages. Five years later the A. F. of L. was born, and as the Knights of Labor declined it became the fighting spearhead of the American labour movement.

There is a close analogy between the A. F. of L. and the Federal Government. Each national union ¹ in the Federation has complete power to contract with or strike against employers within its own jurisdiction. The Federation decides matters of jurisdiction, prevents (sometimes by ruthless methods) the establishment of rival unions in the same trade, and endeavours to keep the front of labour solid by salaried organizers and a labour press. The Federation accepts the capitalist system ; it is a purely economic organization of wage-earners, for the business of collective bargaining. State federations, cutting transversely the national unions, were created within the A. F. of L. in order to obtain labour legislation by a process of bargaining with political leaders.

The American public was too thoroughly imbued with *laissez-faire* ideas to take kindly to legislative regulation ; the first labour law to be adequately enforced was the Massachusetts Ten-hour Act of 1874, for women and children in factories. It was easy enough to get such laws passed, but a more difficult matter to provide proper administrative machinery for their enforcement, and most difficult to prevent the courts from declaring them unconstitutional. A case in point was the New York Act of 1883 prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses, which Gompers persuaded young Roosevelt to sponsor, and Governor Cleveland to sign. It was intended as an entering wedge to break up the sweating system, a rapidly growing menace. On a test case the constitutionality of the law was brought before the highest state court of New York, which found against it on the ground that it interfered with the profitable use of real estate, without any compensating

¹ Several of the constituent unions of the A. F. of L. are called ' international ' because they embrace locals in Canada or Mexico. It is in fact a North American, not a United States organization, and an important bond between the two Republics and the Dominion.

public advantage. 'It cannot be perceived how the cigar-maker is to be improved in his health or his morals by forcing him from his home and its hallowed associations and beneficent influences to ply his trade elsewhere,' declared the court. Roosevelt, who had personally inspected these one-room 'homes' where whole families and their lodgers ate, slept, and made cigars together, then began to revise his conception of justice;¹ and Gompers renewed the fight against the sweat-shop.

It is forbidden in most state constitutions, and in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, to deprive citizens of property without due process of law. As no reform can be effected without depriving some one of something that he may deem to be a property right, the American courts early invented the doctrine of a superior 'police power'—the reserved right of a State to protect the people's health, safety, and welfare. This police power had been held to justify even confiscatory reforms, such as the prohibition of lotteries, or of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors; but when labour and factory laws appeared on the statute books, judges began to draw the line. Corporations, securing the best lawyers, found it easy to convince courts that such laws were not a proper and reasonable exercise of the police power; and to point out conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment, or other clauses of the Federal Constitution. Where such a conflict could not be discovered, judges in the eighties began to postulate a theoretical liberty of contract, 'the right of a person to sell his labour upon such terms as he deems proper'.² Others pored deeply over old English law reports, in the hope of construing con-

¹ J. B. Bishop, *Roosevelt*, i. 30-1.

² Justice Harlan, in *Adair v. U.S.* (1908), quoted by Roscoe Pound, in J. R. Commons, *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems*, revised ed., p. 579. This theory first appears in American law in 1886, and is first discussed in Herbert Spencer's *Justice* (1891).

spiracy out of labour unions. A Pennsylvania statute forbidding payment of miners in truck orders was judicially nullified in a decision declaring such a law 'degrading and insulting to the labourer', and 'subversive of his rights as citizen'. An Illinois court declared unconstitutional a statute limiting the hours of labour for women in sweat-shops, on the ground that they had the same liberty of contract as men. In 1905 the Supreme Court of the United States took a similar view of a New York statute prescribing the hours of labour in bakeries. If, declared the court in effect, long hours of bakers could be shown to affect the quality of bread, something might be said for the regulation under the police power; but bakers were sufficiently intelligent to make their own labour contracts in their own interest.¹ Thus *laissez-faire* as a social concept reached complete logical development in American courts, just as it was breaking down as a social structure before modern industrialism.

These were some of the many difficulties that the A. F. of L. encountered in its early years. Despite the loss of the great Homestead strike against the Carnegie Steel Company in 1892 (during which the pacific Andrew loudly bawled for troops), the A. F. of L. weathered the hard times of 1893-7, and turned the century with a membership of over half a million.² It has never ceased to be a fighting organization. Each national union has had to struggle for recognition, higher wages, the closed shop, and the forty-four hour week. The Federation has carried on the battle for restricted immigration, and for a square deal from the

¹ These particular decisions have since been reversed by more enlightened judges; but any new form of social legislation, such as minimum wage laws, that seems unwise to American business men, still has to fight for its life in American courts.

² Perlman, p. 163. Increased to about 2 million in 1913 and 3½ million in 1925.

courts ; and almost yearly it has had to contend with socialists and other dissentients within its own ranks. Yet Gompers always managed to keep the Federation true to its first principles of structure and policy. Dealing as they did with a body of labour divided by race and constantly diluted by immigration, the American unions could not attain such power as their British contemporaries. In several States their influence is still negligible, and conditions of women- and child-labour are still disgraceful. Yet American labour is the best paid in the world, and unions of skilled workers have helped to raise the wages and status of unskilled and unorganized workers. Gompers through the A. F. of L. accomplished more than any other American, native-born or naturalized, to raise the average material standards of American life ; to fulfil the old ballad he had sung as a boy to the cigar-makers of Spitalfields :

To the west, to the west, to the land of the free
Where mighty Missouri rolls down to the sea ;
Where a man is a man if he 's willing to toil,
And the humblest may gather the fruits of the soil.
Where children are blessings and he who hath most
Has aid for his fortune and riches to boast.
Where the young may exult and the aged may rest,
Away, far away, to the land of the west.

3. *Cultural Gleams*

For all the corruption and pitiful politics of this era, it was on the whole a robust, fearless, generous age, full of the old-time gusto and joy of living, giving large scope even in corporate form to individual energy and material creation : an age to which Americans of to-day with their better-ordered and more secure lives look back rather wistfully. But of all eras in American history it was most barren in art, letters, and spiritual forces.

In religious history there is little to record save the growth of Roman Catholicism with the reproduction of Catholic immigrants, and the rise of Christian Science: a new American form of Protestantism that grasped a great truth, and in its light justified the new middle class, just as Calvinism appealed to the middle class of the sixteenth century.

The enormous increase in the population of cities led to much building but little architecture. City houses resembled so many books on a shelf, when they were not French château misconceptions or Queen Anne abortions. Millionaires disfigured countryside and seashore with sprawling 'cottages' of palatial size. Public buildings, until the close of the era, were best when they imitated European models, and worst when their architects attempted improvements. It was sufficient to erect a top-heavy dome over a neo-classic façade, as in Grant's tomb, and the Chicago Exposition buildings of 1893, to persuade Americans that they were heirs to the glory that was Greece.¹ In the meantime cheap structural steel, rising land values, and the gregarious habits of American business men produced the 'skyscraper', so called when the first fifteen-story building was erected in Chicago (1891). The few architects who were invited to design curtain walls for these steel skeletons made a poor fist of it, but gradually moulded their art to the new medium; and by 1910 the skylines of New York and Chicago showed imposing dignity and genuine beauty. Interior decoration was at least no worse than that of contemporary Europe, and there was nothing vulgar in the landscape architecture

¹ The Chicago 'World's Fair' of 1893 was, if nothing else, a superb gesture of the middle-western emporium for better distinction than that of the stock-yards; and although it directed public taste into many a false channel, its results may be seen in the private collections of wealthy Chicagoans, now falling to the Art Institute, and in the Poetry Magazine of Harriet Monroe, official odist of the Fair, which became the organ of the New Poetry movement in 1912.

that Frederick Law Olmstead was allowed to design for the new city parks. A few scholarly critics like Charles Eliot Norton were quietly creating new artistic values that their pupils applied in the next generation. Many Americans began to feel a craving for the beautiful, but most regarded beauty as something extrinsic, imported. Civil War profiteers, bankers, and railway kings invaded Europe and captured 'old masters', but few of them had the good taste of J. Pierpont Morgan, Isabella Stewart Gardner, and Martin A. Ryerson. Early bequests to the public museums of fine arts that began to spring up in the seventies were apt to prove embarrassing. American artists like Hunt, La Farge, and Whistler obtained in Europe an education that made them blind to the raw colours and crude shapes of the American continent. American sculptors like French and Saint Gaudens were somewhat more robust.

Emerson, Lowell, Longfellow, and Holmes lived to a ripe old age, but the Civil War seemed to have burnt out all that was original in their genius; and they left no successors to carry on in the New England tradition. Grope as we may in the chaos of that time, Francis Parkman, the James brothers, Mark Twain, and William Dean Howells were the only great and well-known figures in creative prose. Minor singers such as Eugene Field, Sidney Lanier, and James Whitcomb Riley kept a spark of poetry alive; Emily Dickinson wrote only for her friends. An American drama was not yet created. Even the older poets of our own time, Edwin Arlington Robinson, Edgar Lee Masters, Amy Lowell, Robert Frost, born between 1869 and 1875, did not reach their stride until the twentieth century was almost a decade old.

In the domain of letters it was the field of organized education that profited by the peculiar temper and energy of this period. Free primary schools followed the frontier west, and penetrated the South. Tuskegee

and Hampton Institute proved an inestimable benefit to the coloured race. Adult night schools and 'settlements', of which Jane Addams's Hull House at Chicago was the pioneer, helped to educate immigrants in American ways, and in some degree to protect them from the rougher sort of exploitation. The free public high school reached the height of its prestige in the Northern and Western States, for it was not until the eighties that men of wealth, seeking privilege for their sons, began new foundations like the public schools of England. Several women's colleges were founded between 1861 and 1880, and the great western state universities became co-educational. An era of great captains of industry naturally produced great university presidents: Charles W. Eliot of Harvard, Daniel Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins, William R. Harper of Chicago. Under their guidance and the financial patronage of millionaires, simple colleges of arts and sciences blossomed out into congeries of professional schools; and new subjects were added to the curricula of undergraduates. Johns Hopkins University (1876), the Columbia School of Political Science (1880), and the Graduate Schools of other Universities made it possible for American scholars to obtain a complete technical training in their own country. Public libraries grew and multiplied, and were rendered more accessible by card catalogues, and by librarians trained to serve the public rather than to conserve books.

4. *Joining and other Sport*

Despite his racial heterogeneity the average American was becoming urban in his environment, and uniform in his appearance, manners, and thought. There were compensations: human dignity owes much to the Hebrew reorganizers of the garment trades, who wiped out class distinctions in dress. Regional distinctions in cooking began to disappear under a nation-wide distri-

bution of tinned and other prepared foods, which provided the average American with a far more varied and (after the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act) more healthful diet than his forbears. Advertising had not yet exalted mendacity to the status of a profession, but with psychology as handmaid it helped to build the great department stores of New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, with such variety of wares and luxury in appointments that travelling Americans were no longer dazzled by the splendours of Bond Street and the Magasins du Louvre.

As the working day was shortened, and the number of indoor occupations increased, the average American began to show an interest in outdoor sport, which the mere business of living had afforded to his rural and frontier forbears. Organized games began in the colleges, and were taken up successively by all classes of the population. The first national professional baseball league was organized in 1876, and the first intercollegiate association for track athletics the same year. Twenty years later America won the first Olympic Games. Rugby football, introduced into the United States about 1875, diverged from the English game as college strategists invented new formations, and altered the rules to fit. Lawn tennis was taken up as soon as it was invented in England ; golf, the derision of stalwart citizens when introduced in the nineties, has become more popular even than in Scotland. Summer vacations, the privilege of the few in 1870 and not greatly valued by them, had reached the clerks by 1900. Thousands of people whose parents had left the forests, the mountains, and the sea in search of more easy living returned to them for pleasure. State, municipal, and private enterprise vied in establishing recreation parks, public bathing places, and summer resorts.

The American ' joiner ' was a creation of this period.

A reflex desire for distinction in a country of growing uniformity, a human craving for fellowship among urban masses who missed their old village and neighbourhood associations, drew the descendants of stern anti-masons into secret societies and fraternal orders. Freemasons and Oddfellows, both of English origin, proved too exclusive to contain would-be members; the Elks, Red Men, Royal Arcanum, Moose, and so forth, were founded between 1868 and 1888. The Catholic Church, wisely embracing a movement that it could not exclude, created the Knights of Columbus for its increasing membership; even the Southern freedmen had their United Order of African Ladies and Gentlemen, and Brothers and Sisters of Pleasure and Prosperity. This, the first form of the joining movement, brought people of different classes together; the second, based on race and ancestry, kept them apart. The Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution, Colonial Dames, Mayflower Descendants, Daughters of the Confederacy, and the like, were essentially a drawing together of the older American stock against their polyglot competitors. Much they have done to preserve historical landmarks, records, and traditions; too often have they interpreted these traditions in a narrow and provincial spirit.

Such, in barest outline, were some of the outstanding movements and tendencies that brought a new order in American life. In 1860 the average American was a yeoman farmer; since 1900 he has been an employee. In 1865 only certain parts of New England and the Middle States had been industrialized, American technique in general was inferior to that of Great Britain, and labour combination was making a fresh start. By 1900 industry had captured the Middle West and crossed the Mississippi; agriculture, itself transformed, had conquered the Great Plains; the United States had become the greatest iron- and steel-producing

country in the world ; handicrafts and domestic industries had been more completely crushed out than in Great Britain ; national trade unions had given labour a new dignity and a greater share of production ; combinations of terrifying dimensions were dominating the business and even the political world. Feverish development and ruthless competition, conducted in a framework of pioneer individualistic *mores*, almost wholly unregulated by government or law, made this age the most lawless and picturesque that America has ever known.

LIX

THE REPUBLICAN DYNASTY

1866-90

1. *President Grant and the Alabama Claims*

IT would have been well for Grant's reputation had he retired from public life after the great gesture at Appomattox. With less equipment for the Presidency than any predecessor or successor, his temperament was unfitted for high political command. Before the Civil War he had seldom taken the trouble to vote, and the army was not a good school of politics. Although a leader of men, he was not a good judge of men, and the very simplicity which had carried him through the intrigues of the Civil War exposed him to the wiles of politicians whose loyalty to himself he mistook for devotion to the public weal. The death of the faithful Rawlins, in 1869, left him with no intimate adviser; and his choice of Cabinet members fell, with one or two exceptions, on mediocrities. Of the new and complex forces that were shaping the United States anew, he was completely unaware.

Foreign affairs, where Grant's innate sense of justice was enforced by a competent Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, show his administrations (1869 to 1877) in their fairest light. There was much to be done. Seward, by letting Napoleon III withdraw peacefully from Mexico (1865)¹ and by purchasing Alaska from Russia (1867), had eliminated two nations from the American continent; but Earl Russell's peremptory refusal to submit the *Alabama* claims to arbitration prevented any settlement with Great Britain. Postponement of these claims was dangerous. There was a deep feeling of resentment in America that was certain to flare up

¹ W. A. Duniway in *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1902*, i. 315-28.

into war if not satisfied through law. One strong bond, the Canadian reciprocity treaty of 1854, expired in 1866.¹

During the war Canada had furnished an asylum for Confederate plotters, and a base for Confederate raids on Vermont and New York.² In time of peace the Fenians, or Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, took similar liberties in the United States. Two rival Irish Republics were organized in New York City, each with its president, cabinet, and general staff in glittering uniforms of green and gold. Each planned to seize Canada with Irish veterans of the Union army, and hold it as hostage for Irish freedom. Why not pay back England in her own coin, and let the Fenians liquidate the *Alabama* claims?

In 1866 each Irish Republic of New York attempted to execute this plan. In April the first 'invasion' was promptly nipped by federal authorities at Eastport, Maine. But the ensuing howl from the Irish vote, with Congressional elections only six months away, frightened President Johnson and his Cabinet. Before the Attorney-General and the Secretaries of War and of the Navy could decide who should take the onus of stopping him, 'General' John O'Neil got fifteen hundred armed Irishmen across the Niagara River. The next day (2 June 1866) the Canadian militia gave battle, and fled; but the Fenians fled farthest—to New York state, where they were promptly arrested, and as promptly released.³

¹ It is not true that this treaty was denounced out of spite for Canadian sympathy with the South, or that the American protected interests were entirely responsible. E. Stanwood, in *Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc.*, xlvii. 147-62.

² J. W. Headley, *Confederate Operations in Canada and New York*.

³ John A. Macdonald, *Troublous Times in Canada* (Toronto, 1910), *Counter Case of Great Britain . . . at Geneva*, 1871, part iii; *Diary of Gideon Welles*, see 'Fenians' in index. There was also a raid over the Vermont frontier in 1870, stampeded by American militia after one casualty. General O'Neil for this exploit was given six months in a United States jail.

Ridiculous as they were, these Fenian forays caused Canada much trouble and expense, for which she was never reimbursed by the United States. Yet good came of them in the end ; for the fear and distrust that they aroused impelled the Canadian federation movement to its consummation in 1867.

Seward's persistent advocacy of the *Alabama* claims was finally rewarded in the last months of Johnson's administration by the so-called Clarendon convention for their adjudication. But nothing that Johnson or Seward did could then find favour with the Republican party. In April 1869 the Senate rejected this convention as insufficient, after Sumner had charged Britain with responsibility for half the total cost of the war : a mere \$2,125,000,000. Sumner's speech shocked his English friends, who so faithfully had sustained the Union cause ; nor were they much comforted by his explanation that the cession of Canada would be an acceptable form of payment.¹

A Caribbean question eliminated Sumner. President Grant persuaded himself that American annexation of the Dominican Republic, by virtue of a treaty which his private secretary had obtained by dubious methods, would fulfil 'manifest destiny'. Sumner opposed this treaty ; Grant accused him of having promised support ; Sumner denied it in a bitter, vituperative speech. The treaty failed of ratification, as did another of like tenor, although properly negotiated ; and in March 1871 the Senate removed Sumner from its Committee on Foreign Relations.

¹ Sumner loved England, and with characteristic lack of imagination failed to perceive that the tone as well as the substance of this speech stimulated Anglophobia. Both he and Seward adhered to the old doctrine of Franklin that there could never be peace and friendship between the United States and Britain while Canada was British. Lord Ashburton and Gladstone at one time shared the same idea. *Abfuit omen*—Canada has become the principal bond of friendship between the countries.

In the meantime, the Canadian Sir John Rose staged with Hamilton Fish a diplomatic play of wooing and yielding that threw dust in the eyes of extremists on both sides. The covenant thus secretly arrived at was the famous Treaty of Washington (8 May 1871). It provided for submission to arbitration of boundary disputes, the fisheries question, and the *Alabama* claims, it determined rules of neutrality to govern the arbitral tribunal, and contained an expression of regret for the escape of the *Alabama*—a friendly gesture for which Americans had long been waiting.

In presenting their case to the arbitral tribunal at Geneva (December 1871), the United States claimed compensation not only for actual damage inflicted by the Confederate cruisers, but for the numerous transfers of registry occasioned by fear of capture. Hamilton Fish had no intention of pressing these 'indirect claims', which he was only anxious to be rid of; but English opinion was deeply stirred by their presentation. An ill-tempered press discussion ensued.¹ Gladstone would have withdrawn from the arbitration on that issue had not Charles Francis Adams, the American member, proposed that the Geneva tribunal should rule out the indirect claims in advance. This was done, and the arbitration proceeded smoothly to its conclusion: an award of \$15,500,000 for depredations committed by the *Alabama*, *Florida*, and *Shenandoah* (14 September 1872).

¹ The question of indirect claims is an interesting one of American and British psychology. The American commissioners who concluded the Treaty of Washington believed the indirect claims were unjustified, but wished to have them disposed of by the Geneva tribunal. Otherwise they would be brought up periodically by Anglophobes. The British commissioners would admit no direct reference to indirect claims, knowing that their inclusion would wreck the treaty in England. Consequently the language of the treaty was so framed that indirect claims were neither expressly admitted nor expressly excluded. The English press denounced their presentation as a 'Yankee trick'; the American press retorted on 'British hypocrisy'.

Although the United States were thereby vindicated, the greater victory was for arbitration and peace. No threat of force affected the issue, for American ironclads had lost their primacy by 1871. Never before had questions involving such touchy matters of national honour been submitted to a mere majority vote of an international tribunal ; and the good grace with which England as a whole accepted the verdict smoothed out the ill-tempered dissenting opinion of Sir Alexander Cockburn. Of other persons involved, Charles Francis Adams never forgot that he was judge, not advocate. Ulysses S. Grant, by his unwavering support of peaceful methods, showed a quality not unusual in statesmen who know war at first hand ; and in a later message to the Arbitration Union of Birmingham the soldier President confessed his guiding principle : ‘ Nothing would afford me greater happiness than to know that, as I believe will be the case, at some future day, the nations of the earth will agree upon some sort of congress which will take cognizance of international questions of difficulty, and whose decisions will be as binding as the decisions of our Supreme Court are upon us. It is a dream of mine that some such solution may be.’¹

2. *Scandal and Stagnation*

Questions of finance were important in the post-war administrations. The desire of debt-ridden farmers for cheap money was the only obstacle to deflating the dollar. Grant set his face sternly against inflation shortly after the panic of 1873, vetoing a popular bill providing eighteen millions more in paper currency. Congress, at his instance, passed an Act in January 1875 requiring the Treasury to redeem outstanding greenbacks in gold four years thence. The dollar then returned to par.²

In his dealings with individuals, Grant was not so

¹ Coolidge, *Life of Grant*, p. 311.

² The Silver Demonetization Act of 1873—subsequently called the

fortunate. Weak cabinet appointments, intimacy with New York financiers of bad reputation, failure to obtain any substantial reduction in the war tariff, the San Domingo episode, and the accumulating evidence of failure in radical reconstruction, created opposition to his re-election within the Republican party. A Liberal Republican convention met in May 1872, erected a strong platform of reform, but with incredible fatuity nominated Horace Greeley for the Presidency. The Democrats endorsed the nomination, and faithfully voted for the old abolitionist; but Grant was easily re-elected.

During his second term Grant's administration was smirched with scandals. The *Crédit Mobilier* affair¹ came out; maladministration and corruption were exposed in several executive departments. The Democrats won the congressional elections of 1874, and the new Congress plied the muck-rake in earnest. It was proved that whisky distillers had been defrauding the government of millions, with the collusion of treasury officials and the President's private secretary. Despite Grant's honest zeal to 'let no guilty man escape', most of them did. The post office and the interior and navy departments were found to be honeycombed with corruption, which had stopped just short of the Presidency.

Republican defeat seemed certain in 1876, when the Democrats nominated for the Presidency an upright and able statesman, Governor Tilden of New York, and

'Crime of 1873' by bimetallists—was not a measure of deflation, but an Act to convert ambiguities of coinage, and received little attention at the time. The silver dollar in 1873 contained more than a gold dollar's worth of bullion.

¹ The *Crédit Mobilier* was a construction company, organized by the promoters of the Union Pacific Railway in order corruptly to divert the profits of construction to themselves. Fearing lest Congress would interpose, the directors placed large blocks of stock 'where they will do the most good', i.e. in the hands of congressmen.

the Republicans rode into the fray on a 'dark horse', Governor Hayes of Ohio. But the Republicans diverted public attention from live issues by 'waving the bloody shirt' of rebellion,¹ and carried most of the Northern and Western States. After the ballots were counted it was seen that the balance hung on three Southern States and Oregon, from which came two sets of conflicting returns. Congress referred the disputed returns to an electoral commission, which by a strict party vote awarded the four States to Hayes; and on 2 March 1877, two days before the end of Grant's term, the Senate declared Hayes elected by a majority of one vote.

Now that the war issue was dead, American national politics became a mere contest for power between the two parties, like a struggle for traffic between two rival railways. There was no clearly defined issue between them, and their leaders evinced no understanding of the vital forces that were transforming the country.

Rutherford B. Hayes was an elderly lawyer and ex-governor of Ohio, who for his steady adherence to pre-war standards of honesty was called 'Granny Hayes' by the party chieftains. The first and most important act of his administration was the recall of the federal troops from the South.² Tilden could have done no more. In order to complete the reconciliation, Hayes appointed an ex-Confederate to his Cabinet.³ Republicans who had been stirred by 'bloody-shirt' oratory were disgusted; but they soon found that Hayes was determined to rule as well as govern. He removed some of Grant's most offensive appointees, and with the aid of John Sherman, his able Secretary of the Treasury, 'kept

¹ i. e. appealing to war passions. The phrase came from an incident in a race riot in the South, which Blaine used in one of his speeches.

² See Chapter LVI.

³ He first proposed to make General Joseph E. Johnston his Secretary of War. William Tecumseh Sherman, then the ranking general of the United States Army, was ready to take orders from his conquered adversary, but advised Hayes that most of the old soldiers would resent it.

the country in the path of financial safety and honour despite bitter opposition and clamorous abuse.' ¹ The Bland-Allison Silver Bill of 1878, providing for the purchase and coinage of at least two million dollars' worth of bullion a month, was passed over the President's veto; but even he did not suspect what a Pandora's box of inflation it would prove. ²

As the election of 1880 approached, the 'stalwart' Republicans who had been supporters of Grant's throne proposed the General for a third term. He was willing, but the Republican nominating convention was not; and another 'dark horse' from Ohio, General James A. Garfield, obtained the nomination. The campaign was fought largely on personalities and trumped-up issues. Garfield was an educated gentleman with a good military record and long experience in Congress; but his party made a greater virtue of his log-cabin birth, and early exploits as a canal bargee. The Democrats, to confirm their loyalty, nominated General Winfield Scott Hancock, who carried the solid South, but little else.

3. *Glimmerings of Reform*

Four months after his inauguration, while still struggling with questions of patronage, Garfield was shot by a disappointed office-seeker. After a gallant struggle for life, he died on 19 September 1881. The Vice-President, Chester A. Arthur, was a prominent lawyer and spoilsman of New York. Handsome and affable, married to a charming woman of the world, he gave Washington its only 'smart' administration between those of Buchanan and Roosevelt. Unexpectedly he became something of a reformer as well. The manner of Garfield's death gave popular sanction to what the Civil Service Reform League had been advocating for years.

¹ Rhodes, *U.S.* (1919), viii. 99.

² Table of depreciation of silver in Dewey, *Financial History* (1909), p. 406.

Every President since Polk complained of the demands that patronage made on his time, energy, and judgement. Scandal had followed scandal in the civil service ; yet the spoils system had been extended even to charwomen in the public offices. Rotation in office was never complete, and a large residuum of trained servants was left undisturbed ; but in general the federal service had become permeated with a class of men who were strongly tempted to anticipate future removal by present corruption. Federal officials were regularly assessed for campaign contributions, and were expected to spend much of their spare time in political activity. From the President's point of view, the system was no simple matter of turning out the vanquished and putting in the victors. There were usually several applicants for every vacancy, representing different factions of the party. If the congressional delegation from a State could agree upon the federal appointments within that State, the President generally took their advice ; but often they disagreed, and by a mis-called 'senatorial courtesy' the Upper House would reject a nomination to which the senators from the nominee's State objected. Minor appointments were generally the gift of congressmen, but the big plums had to be fairly evenly distributed among faithful States. The Tenure of Office Act, passed to limit President Johnson's power of removal, was still in force, and was not repealed until 1886. Congress, since the Civil War, had so largely eaten into the presidential prerogative that the chief executive was by way of becoming a mere *président de la République*. This tendency was exposed by a book entitled *Congressional Government*, published in 1885 by young Dr. Woodrow Wilson, who later did much to correct the tendency.

The Pendleton Act of 1883 created a Civil Service Commission to administer a new set of rules, which required appointments to be made as a result of open

competitive examination. By the law, these rules were applied only to some 14,000 positions, about twelve per cent of the total ; but the President was empowered to extend them to other parts of the service, at his discretion. Of Arthur's successors, Presidents Cleveland, Roosevelt, and Wilson made large additions to the merit lists, and by 1915 ' the United States civil service was on a merit basis except for 10,690 presidential appointees'.¹ At the same time the States were passing civil service laws of their own. It would be idle to pretend that civil service reform has fulfilled the expectations of its advocates. The emoluments are not sufficiently high, or talent at such a premium as to attract university graduates and other able men from business and the professions. There has, however, been a great improvement in morale and efficiency ; and it was fortunate indeed that the merit principle was adopted before the twentieth century, when administrative expansion greatly increased the need of honest and expert service.

James Bryce, at this period, found reformers fighting corruption and boss rule in all the States that he visited ; but beyond this civil service reform, and the Australian ballot, they accomplished little until the next century. Organized wealth and professional politicians had too strong an interest in keeping things as they were. Periodicals like the *Nation* and the *Forum*, of which Walter H. Page became editor in 1890, did much to arouse public opinion, and to prepare it for the glad day when a reformer of the 1880 vintage, Theodore Roosevelt, became President of the United States.

4. *The Mugwump Election*

Arthur's placid administration ended in the most exciting presidential campaign since the Civil War, although the only real issue was possession of the government. In 1884 the Republicans nominated James G.

¹ Rhodes, *U.S.*, viii. 167.

Blaine, a man of fascinating personality, long in public life and a leader in party councils. Of all politicians between Henry Clay and Roosevelt, Blaine had the most devoted personal following. To them he was the 'plumed knight', but to the most upright and intelligent Republicans, who were sick of the prevailing corruption, he was a simple grafter. The principal charge against him was the prostitution of the Speakership to personal gain; in that connexion he had never been able to explain the missive to a certain Mulligan, with the damning postscript 'Burn this letter'.¹ As Secretary of State for a few months under Garfield and Arthur, he had attempted to mediate peace between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, but his diplomatic appointees merely antagonized Chile without preventing her occupation of Tacna and Arica. Incidentally, this War of the Pacific awakened the United States to the decrepitude of her navy.² Twenty years after the building of the *Monitor* it was inferior to the navy of every principal European country, and to that of Chile. After long discussion, Congress authorized on 5 August 1882 the construction of 'two steam cruising vessels of war . . . to be constructed of steel of domestic manufacture . . . said vessels to be provided with full sail power and full steam power'. These were the *Chicago* and the *Boston*, which entered active service in 1887, and began a new era in American naval history.³

Blaine's nomination was more than conscientious Republicans could swallow. Under the lead of Carl Schurz and George William Curtis the reform wing of the

¹ The 'plumed knight' is ably defended in Stanwood's *Life of Blaine*, but Rhodes, *U.S.*, vii. 194, sifts the charges with his accustomed thoroughness, and leaves no possible doubt of Blaine's guilt.

² " "I don't think I should like America,"—"I suppose because we have no ruins and no curiosities," said Virginia, satirically.—"No ruins! no curiosities!" answered the Ghost; "You have your navy and your manners." "—Oscar Wilde, *The Canterville Ghost*.

³ John D. Long, *The New American Navy*, i. 38.

party 'bolted' from the convention, proposed to support any decent nomination the Democrats might make, and proudly assumed the name 'mugwump' which was given them in derision.¹ As 'bolting' is the great offence in American political ethics, few of the Mugwumps managed to resume a public career; younger delegates like H. C. Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, who supported Blaine while admitting the worst about him, had their reward. The Democrats nominated Grover Cleveland, a self-made man who as governor of New York had distinguished himself for firmness and integrity, to the disgust of Tammany Hall. 'We love him for the enemies he has made,' said a prominent Mugwump. As the campaign proceeded it became noisy and nasty. Cleveland's supporters were taken aback by his admitting possession of an illegitimate child; but as one of them concluded philosophically, 'We should elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office which he is so admirably qualified to fill, and remand Mr. Blaine to the private life which he is so eminently fitted to adorn.' Democratic torch-light processions paraded the streets, shouting :

Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine,
The continental liar from the State of Maine,
Burn this letter !

To which Republican processions retorted :

Ma ! Ma ! Where 's my pa ?
Gone to the White House.
Ha ! Ha ! Ha !

Blaine had a strong following among Irish-Americans, which he lost at the eleventh hour through the tactless remark of a clerical supporter. As spokesman for a visiting delegation, a hapless parson named Burchard described the Democracy as the party of 'rum, Romanism,

¹ 'Mugwump' is simply a synonym for 'bigwig', coined for the occasion by the New York *Sun*.

and rebellion'. Blaine neglected to rebuke this insult to the faith of his Celtic friends; Cleveland carried New York by a plurality of 1,047 in a vote of over one million; and New York's electoral vote gave him the Presidency.

5. *Cleveland and Harrison*

For a person of such generous bulk, Grover Cleveland was remarkably austere, unbending, and ungenial. Elected at a period when subservience to the popular will was supposed to be the first political virtue, this President remained inflexible in the right, as he saw it; and made slight departure from his pre-conceived ideas upon any subject.

Shortly after Cleveland's inauguration (5 March 1885) arose the question of patronage. Deserving Democrats, deprived of the sweets of office for twenty-five years, demanded as clean a sweep as the law would allow—eighty-eight per cent clean; virtuous Mugwumps insisted on no sweep at all. The President did as he thought best. Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act (3 March 1887), which left the President free again to remove incumbents without permission of the Senate; and by the end of his term Cleveland had replaced nearly all the post-masters, and about half the other officials. The Democrats were not satisfied, and the Mugwumps were not pleased.

Cleveland stirred up the old soldiers by appointing General Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, C.S.A., Secretary of the Interior; by proposing to return to their States the captured Confederate battle-flags,¹ and by vetoing private pension bills through which deserters and others with dubious army records endeavoured to get on the swollen pension roll. There was a roar of protest from cattle-ranchers when the President nullified their illegal leases of grass lands from the Indians.

¹ There was no opposition when Roosevelt did so, in 1905.

He endeavoured, without success, to stop the 'free coinage' of silver under the Bland-Allison Act. In 1887 he urged Congress to reduce the tariff, although warned not to touch that explosive subject. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the Dawes Act of 1886, granting citizenship and allotting lands in severalty to the members of such Indian tribes as desired the privilege, were useful points of departure. But on the whole it was a negative administration.

Cleveland was renominated by the Democrats without enthusiasm in 1888. The Republicans bent most of their efforts to discrediting him with the Irish vote, and succeeded in getting the British Minister, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. A naturalized Anglo-American inquired by letter how he should vote in order to serve the mother country. Sir Lionel advised him to vote for the Democrats. Two weeks before the election his letter was published. The Republicans carried New York State by 14,000, and again New York was decisive.

Benjamin Harrison, grandson of the hero of Tippecanoe, was simply another Ohio lawyer who made a dignified figurehead in the Presidency (1889 to 1893). James G. Blaine became his Secretary of State. With the autocratic Reed as Speaker of the House, and a majority in both Houses,¹ the way was clear for constructive legislation. But the Republican party wanted little legislation that was not a raid on the Treasury or a hold-up of the consumer. The soldier vote was rewarded by a new pension bill, similar to one that Cleveland had vetoed, and which doubled the pension roll in four years. In return for their support of a new

¹ Substantially increased in the Senate by the admission of four new States, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, by the 'Omnibus Act' of 22 February 1889. To these were added Wyoming and Idaho in 1890. All six States were then Republican in politics. New Mexico was kept waiting because settled from the South.

tariff bill, the Senators from the Far West, where silver mining interests were strong, obtained the Sherman Silver-purchase Act (1890), increasing the monthly coinage of that metal by 125 per cent. Manufacturers who had contributed liberally to the Republican campaign fund were rewarded by an upward revision of the tariff. This McKinley tariff¹ of 1890 extended the protective principle by higher duties, and more of them. It reached out for the farmers' vote with protective schedules upon products of agriculture, duties which proved completely ineffective in the forthcoming agricultural depression. The new tariff on hides was 'a slap in the face of the South Americans', wrote Secretary Blaine; it rendered abortive the Pan-American Congress that he had summoned to Washington. The new tariff on fruits and vegetables depressed important industries in Canada, whose overtures for renewal of reciprocity were at the same time peremptorily rejected. Canada then adopted the principle of imperial preference. The tariff on manufactures occasioned so sharp a rise in prices as to bring a complete overturn in the congressional elections of 1890. Only 88 Republicans were returned to the new House, as against 235 Democrats; and the Republican majority in the Senate was reduced to eight unstable votes from the Far West. Even rock-ribbed Republican States like Michigan and Massachusetts went Democratic. There was more to this verdict, however, than revulsion from the tariff, or disgust at Republican chicanery and corruption. It registered a deep-lying unrest that was presently to break forth into a movement that carried Bryan to prominence, Roosevelt to achievement, and Wilson to apotheosis.

¹ So called from William McKinley, the chairman of the House Committee of Ways and Means, from which all tariff and revenue bills are reported.

BOLD CLEVELAND AGAIN

1890-7

I. *Populism and Panic*

IN 1890 American politics lost their steady beat, and began to dip and flutter in an effort to maintain equilibrium among strange currents of thought that issued from the caverns of discontent.

Almost a generation had passed since the Civil War. The older Republicans had come to revere their 'Grand Old Party' only less than the Union and the flag; to regard their leaders as the beloved generals of a victorious army. It was difficult for the leaders to believe that anything was amiss. The Ohio and Middle Western men, average and representative of the party, had grown up with the country. Their experience of life had been utterly different from that of any European statesman. They had seen the frontier of log-cabins and stumpy clearings replaced by frame houses and great barns, well-tilled farms, and sleek cattle. The railway, the telegraph, the sewing machine, oil and gas lighting, and a hundred new comforts and conveniences had come within reach of all but the poorest during their lifetime. Towns with banks, libraries, high schools, mansions, and 'opera houses' had sprung up where once as barefooted boys they had hunted the squirrel and the wild cat; and the market towns of their youth had grown into great manufacturing cities. As young men they had taken part in the crusade for the Union, and returned to further progress, development, and expansion. If discontented workmen and poverty-stricken farmers sometimes intruded into the picture, were not foreign agitators, and the inexorable law of supply and demand, the explanation? How could there be

anything wrong with a government which had wrought such miraculous changes for the better, or with a Grand Old Party which had saved the nation from disunion?

Yet the quarter-century of exploitation had its suffering victims, who felt that something was radically wrong, and were groping for a remedy. Kansas, in 1888, began to suffer the effects of deflation after a great land boom.¹ Virgin prairie land, and peak prices of wheat and maize in 1881, had induced an excessive construction of railways, largely financed locally, and an over-settlement of the comparatively arid western part of the State. Small towns and cities indulged in lavish expenditure, and their citizens speculated wildly in building lots. The new farms were largely created on credit; there was one mortgage, on the average, to every other adult in the State. After several years of excessive rainfall there came in 1887 a summer so dry that the crops in western Kansas withered. During the next four years one-half the people who had entered that new El Dorado trekked eastward again; on their wagon covers one could read humorous mottoes such as 'In God we trusted, in Kansas we busted.' The rest made a desperate struggle to retain their homes; but with toppling prices of corn, the interest alone consumed most of their yield. Some of the 'boom towns' were moved boldly out into the prairie, leaving the mortgagors to foreclose on cellar holes.

Only the contrast with the late boom made the plight of Kansas seem worse than that of other agricultural regions. In an Eastern State a survey of seven hundred representative farms discovered an average annual yield of \$167. In the Middle West farmers were glad to exchange places with immigrant factory hands, who at least had their dollar a day; for manufacturing prospered without affording the farmer his promised home market. In the South cotton growers

¹ R. C. Miller, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xi. 469-89.

struggled on from year to year against a falling market and the improvidence of negro tenants.

'The American farmer is steadily losing ground,' wrote a keen observer in 1890. 'His burdens are heavier every year and his gains are more meagre; he is beginning to fear that he may be sinking into a servile condition. . . . Whatever he can do by social combinations or by united political action, to remove the disabilities under which he is suffering, he intends to do at once and with all his might.'¹

Already the farmers had an instrument for revolt in the Farmers' Alliances, sectional in scope and originally fraternal and economic in purpose. The Southern Farmers' Alliance began as a co-operative movement, and gradually took the form of a political faction within the Democratic party for the overthrow of the old planter oligarchy that had resumed power when the federal troops were withdrawn. 'Pitchfork Ben' Tillman, champion of the poor whites, won the governorship of South Carolina in 1890 from Wade Hampton, pushed a long list of reforms through the state legislature, and created a political machine that endures to this day. The North-western Alliance organized a party of its own for the elections of 1890, which in abolitionist Kansas became a political crusade. Mary Lease, the 'Kansas Pythoness', went about advising the Kansas farmers to 'raise less corn and more hell'; Jerry Simpson, the sockless Socrates of the prairie, defeated his silk-stockinged opponent for Congress; William A. Peffer, champion whisker-grower of the North-West, was elected to the United States Senate.

Two years later a convention of some fifteen hundred delegates representing the Farmers' Alliances, the Knights of Labor, and several minor groups,² founded

¹ Washington Gladden, 'The Embattled Farmers', in *Forum*, x. 315.

² One of these was the Nationalist Party, founded by the disciples of Edward Bellamy, in the hope of creating the Socialist Utopia depicted in his *Looking Backward* (1888).

the People's or Populist Party. Their platform, drafted by the trenchant pen of Ignatius Donnelly (Minnesota politician, discoverer of the lost Atlantis and champion of the Baconian theory), opened with a terrific indictment of the existing order.¹ The 'planks' included the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, produce sub-treasuries where farmers could deposit the yield of their farms against treasury notes,² government ownership of railways, telegraphs, and telephones, a graduated income tax, postal savings banks, restriction of immigration, the eight-hour day for wage-earners, popular election of United States Senators, the Australian ballot, and the initiative and referendum. A cry of horror at such 'socialistic' proposals greeted them in the Eastern press; yet all but the first three were adopted within the next generation through the instrumentality of the older parties. General Weaver, a former 'Greenbacker' of Iowa, was nominated as Populist candidate for the Presidency. He polled over a million votes, and carried four States; but Cleveland, again the Democratic candidate, carried seven Northern States with the solid South, and obtained a heavy majority in the electoral college.

2. *The President and the Panic*

American society appeared to be dissolving, but the same old Grover Cleveland, a little stouter and more set in his ideas, was inaugurated President on 4 March 1893. A large proportion of his vote came from suffering farmers who looked to the Democracy for relief

¹ Including such phrases as 'The railroad corporations will either own the people or the people must own the railroads', and 'From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires'.

² This interesting revival of the land bank and produce bank schemes of colonial days, and of demands made at the time of Shays's Rebellion, was adopted from the Farmers' Alliances.

rather than to the inexperienced Populists. Cold comfort they obtained from the inaugural address! The situation, as the President saw it, demanded 'prompt and conservative precaution' to protect a 'sound and stable currency'.

The administration was not three months old when a series of bank failures and industrial collapses inaugurated the panic of 1893. The Treasury's gold reserve was depleted by an excess of imports, and by liquidation of American securities in London, after the 'Baring panic' of 1890. It was subject to a steady drain (*a*) by the monthly purchase of useless silver required by the Silver-purchase Act of 1890, and (*b*) by the redemption of greenbacks which by law were promptly reissued, and formed a sort of endless chain for conveying gold to Europe. Cleveland summoned a special session of Congress, to repeal the mischievous law. In so doing he flew in the face of his supporters, who demanded the directly opposite policy of inflating the currency with 'free silver' at the coinage ratio.¹ Cleveland's discreet manipulation of the patronage provided enough Democratic votes at this special session to help the Republicans repeal their own Silver-purchase Act at the request of a Democratic President and a bimetallist Secretary of the Treasury! Business and finance breathed more freely, but the farmers cried out betrayal, and when Cleveland later broke the 'endless chain' by a gold loan from Morgan and the Rothschilds, the yokels were convinced that their President had sold out to Wall Street.

Cleveland's brusque and dictatorial methods of dealing with Congress did not help the Democratic party

¹ At that ratio—sixteen ounces of silver to one of gold—the silver dollar would only have contained 57 cents in bullion, after the closure of the mints of British India (26 June 1893) had depressed the price. William J. Bryan, then in Congress, asserted that free silver would raise bullion to its coinage value of one dollar in gold.

to redeem its pledge of tariff reduction. Vested interests had been built up under Republican protection, and Democratic senators from the East were no less averse from free trade than their Republican colleagues. The resulting Wilson tariff of 1894 took off a slice here and a shaving there, 'but the essentially protective character remained'.¹ Cleveland denounced the bill as smacking of 'party perfidy and party dishonour'; but allowed it to become law without his signature. The best feature of the Act, a two per cent tax on incomes above \$4,000, was declared unconstitutional by a five-to-four decision of the Supreme Court, which fifteen years earlier had passed favourably and unanimously upon the war income tax. As it happened to be known that the odd judge had changed his mind at the eleventh hour, this decision seemed a further proof to the farmers that they had no voice in their government.²

The Wilson tariff went into effect during the worst period of industrial depression since the seventies—worst than any that the United States has since experienced. Prices and wages struck rock-bottom, and there seemed to be no market for anything. It was a period of soup-kitchens, ragged armies of the unemployed, fervid soap-box oratory, desperate strikes. What was wrong with the United States, that it had to suffer these recurrent crises? The Democratic tariff, said the Republicans; gold, said the Populists; capitalism, said the Socialists; the immutable laws of trade, said the economists; the wrath of God, said the ministers. But Grover Cleveland, like Br'er Rabbit, 'ain't sayin' nuffin'.

¹ F. W. Taussig, *Tariff History* (1907), p. 317. It was named after William L. Wilson, chairman of the House Committee of Ways and Means.

² It was this decision (*Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.*) that made it necessary to adopt the Sixteenth Amendment (1913) before a federal income tax could be legally enacted.

3. *The Pullman Strike*

Chicago was the plague-spot of the depression, for the army of floating labour attracted by the Exposition of 1893 could not be absorbed. In the spring of 1894 the employees in the Pullman car works struck against a wage cut that left them no margin over their rents in the Pullman 'model village'. The American Railway Union, a craft union outside the A. F. of L., supported the strike by refusing to handle Pullman cars. The General Managers' Association, an extra-legal combination representing the twenty-four railways entering Chicago, refused to arbitrate, and prepared for a trial of strength. Suggestions reached Cleveland that the fast mail trains, to which Pullman cars were usually attached, were being held up; but the obstruction came about through measures that Cleveland's attorney-general, Richard Olney, adopted to prevent it. On 1 July he appointed special counsel for the United States a prominent railway attorney named Edwin Walker, at whose suggestion the Federal Circuit Court at Chicago served on the officers of the American Railway Union a 'blanket injunction' against obstructing the railways and holding up the mails (2 July). Hooligans promptly ditched a mail train, and took possession of strategic points in the switching yards. Walker as promptly called for federal troops. Cleveland declared he would use every dollar in the Treasury and every soldier in the army if necessary to deliver a single post-card in Chicago. On 4 July he ordered a regiment of regulars to the city. Violence increased against the railways and the strike breakers. Governor John P. Altgeld of Illinois, honest and fearless as the President, protested against this gratuitous interference of the Federal Government,¹ and asked immediate with-

¹ The charge then made and often repeated, that Altgeld refused to protect law and order, is without foundation. He sent militia to every

drawal of its forces. If, as he wrote Cleveland, the President might at discretion order federal troops to do what he would, the Federal Government had ceased to be a government of law. Eugene V. Debs, president of the striking union, defied the injunction, was arrested, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment for contempt of court. Gompers and the executive board of the A. F. of L. advised the American Railway Union that it was beaten, and by early August the strike was completely broken.

The dramatic events of this Pullman strike raised weighty questions of law; and placed the Federal Government in direct antagonism to union labour. The President, it is now clear, simply saw the issue of law and order, and had no desire to help the railways crush a strike; but through appointing a railway lawyer special counsel of the government, he played into the hands of those who wanted federal troops to break a strike, and not state militia to preserve order. Governor Altgeld had no desire to help the strikers; but his stout protest against a doubtful assumption of federal authority placed him in the position of a rebel.¹ Debs was merely trying to help the Pullman employees by boycotting the company; but the movement got out of his hands, and became something like a labour insurrection. The Supreme Court of the United

point in the State where the State authorities called for it, and had an ample force ready to use at Chicago when necessary. The point is that there was no unusual disorder—for Chicago—until the injunction was issued. The federal authorities, instead of relying on state forces in the first instance, called for regulars.

¹ Altgeld had already invited the hatred of American business men by pardoning the men imprisoned for presumed participation in the Haymarket bomb outrage of 1886. It is now certain that the men were innocent; but Altgeld was denounced as an aider and abettor of anarchy. He had also helped Jane Addams's efforts to obtain legal regulation of factories. He has received tardy justice in Waldo R. Browne's biography (New York: Huebsch, 1924), and in the poems of Vachel Lindsay.

States, to which Debs appealed against his sentence, upheld the government, declaring that even in the absence of statutory law it had a dormant power to brush away obstacles to interstate commerce—an implied power that would have made Hamilton and Marshall gasp. A new and potent weapon, the injunction, was legalized for use against strikers ;¹ Cleveland became a hero and idol of American business men ; Debs received the Socialist nomination for the Presidency ; Altgeld was hounded from public life.²

4. *Venezuela*

Cleveland was a peace-loving president, who believed that the manifest destiny of American expansion had been fulfilled. During Harrison's administration the American settlers in the Hawaiian Islands had upset the native dynasty, and concluded at Washington a treaty of annexation to the United States. Having discovered that the American Minister at Honolulu had taken an active part in these proceedings, Cleveland withdrew the treaty from the Senate, and let the new Hawaiian Republic shift for itself. Towards the Cuban insurrection that broke out in 1895 his attitude was neutral and circumspect. Nevertheless it fell to him to make a most vigorous assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, and to risk war with Great Britain.

It was over a long-standing boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela. Lord Salisbury

¹ The virtue of the injunction is that any one who disobeys can be condemned without jury trial for contempt of court. If inter-state commerce was threatened with interruption by a strike, it was only necessary for the employers to obtain an injunction from a federal court to break it. The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1916 forbade further use of this weapon.

² Professor McElroy gives a clear and impartial account of the Pullman strike in his *Grover Cleveland*, ii, chapter v. An indispensable source is Carroll D. Wright *et al.*, *Report on the Chicago Strike by the U.S. Strike Commission* (Washington, 1895).

refused to submit the question to international arbitration, because of the Venezuelan Government's absurd pretension to well over half of the British colony, which, as he said, 'belonged to the Throne of England long before the Republic of Venezuela came into existence'. In a message of 17 December 1895 President Cleveland informed Congress of Lord Salisbury's refusal, proposed to determine the disputed line himself, and declared that in his opinion any attempt of Great Britain to assert jurisdiction beyond that line should be resisted by every means in the nation's power. Panic ensued in Wall Street, dismay in England, and an outburst of jingoism in the United States. Richard Olney's note of 20 July, published with the message,¹ included a definition of the Monroe Doctrine that alarmed Latin America, insulted Canada, and challenged England:

'To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.' 'Distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient.'

No facts of the controversy could justify these extreme claims and provocative language. Cleveland's character and Olney's were such as to stifle any suspicion of playing to the gallery. Probably Palmerston and British Honduras² were at the back of their minds, as the partition of Africa was certainly to the fore. They feared that Salisbury was procrastinating, and that Venezuela, if further put off, would declare a war, in which the United States must participate. Seventeen years later Olney explained his language on the ground 'that in English eyes the United States was then so completely a negligible quantity that it was believed only words the equivalent of blows would be really effective'.

¹ Olney had been appointed Secretary of State on 10 June 1895.

² See above, pp. 112-14.

Actually, it was only a very keen desire for American friendship that induced the Salisbury government to let this challenge lie. Of the Royal Navy's preponderance there was no doubt on either side. But England was beginning to find 'splendid isolation' a bit precarious, and the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger (3 January 1896) brought her feeling of insecurity into dramatic relief. On 25 January Joseph Chamberlain declared that war between the two nations would be an absurdity as well as a crime, and two weeks later Salisbury made a conciliatory statement in the Lords. After much secret diplomacy at London and Washington, a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Venezuela (12 November 1896) submitting the boundary question to an arbitral tribunal, to be governed by the rule that 'adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title'.¹ Thus Cleveland and Olney secured their principle that the whole territory in dispute should be subject to arbitration; and Salisbury secured his, that the British title to *de facto* possessions should not be questioned. The tribunal, which included the Chief Justices of Great Britain and the United States, gave a unanimous decision in 1899, substantially along the line of the British claim. Thus the last dangerous Anglo-American controversy² passed under the bridge—but mutual understanding was still far distant.

¹ James, *Olney*, p. 252. The treaty was negotiated by Olney, but the American party to it was Venezuela, in order to save the treaty, as Cleveland said, 'from the risk of customary disfigurement at the hands of the United States Senate'.

² An exception to this statement might be made of the Alaska boundary controversy (1903), which in many respects paralleled that of Venezuela. Canada challenged the rightfulness of a long-established boundary. President Roosevelt at first declined to submit a prescriptive right to arbitration; and in referring the question to a tribunal composed of three United States citizens, two Canadians, and the Lord Chief Justice of England, he warned the British Government that he would not

5. *Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan*

The party in power is always blamed for hard times. The Populists increased their vote fifty per cent at the Congressional elections of 1894, and the Republicans won back their majority in the House. So certain were they of victory in 1896, as to boast that a Republican rag-doll could be elected President—a boast that Mark Hanna made a prophecy.

Marcus Alonzo Hanna was the last great representative figure of the Ohio dynasty. A big business man satiated with wealth but avid of power, naturally intelligent though contemptuous of learning, personally upright but tolerant of corruption, Mark Hanna believed ardently in the mission of the Republican party to promote business activity, whence prosperity would percolate to farmers and wage-earners. Since 1890 he had been grooming for the Presidency his friend William McKinley, whom he rescued from bankruptcy in the hard times of 1893. Other Republicans like Speaker Reed and Levi P. Morton were more able, experienced, and popular; but the Ohio tradition and Ohio management prevailed. 'Bill McKinley, author of the McKinley Bill, advance agent of prosperity,' was nominated on the first ballot, 18 June 1896. The convention pointed with pride to Republican achievement, viewed with horror the 'calamitous consequences' of Democratic control, and came out somewhat equivocally for solid gold currency.

Three weeks later, when the Democratic convention met at Chicago, it became evident that Populism had permeated that party. Instead of converting the Democracy, Cleveland had alienated it by every act of his administration. While he was striving for sound money the Populist panacea of 'free silver' had become an

respect an award in favour of Canada. The tribunal decided, four to two, in favour of the United States.

oriflamme to the discontented. Clever agents of the Western silver miners showed that the depreciation of silver had tallied with that of farm products. Corn-belt economists concluded that gold was the cause of the hard times, and free silver the solution for all their troubles. To argue that bimetallism was a world problem, that unlimited coinage of silver by the United States would avail nothing while the mints of Europe and India were closed to it, merely invited the retort that America must declare her financial independence of London. Some wanted free coinage of silver in order to bring it back to par, others looked for cheap money to pay their mortgages ; but all wanted free silver.

William Jennings Bryan, a thirty-six-year-old congressman from Nebraska, carried the Democratic convention off its feet by a speech advocating free silver, famous for its peroration, ' You shall not press down upon the brow of labour this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.' He obtained the presidential nomination, the convention declared emphatically for free silver, and the campaign was fought on that issue. Gold Democrats bolted one way, Silver Republicans the other ; Populists came over to Bryan. Apart from the solid South and the silver mining interests, it was a clean-cut radical-conservative contest, with the first real issue in thirty years. And the new cause had an ideal leader in the ' boy orator of the Platte ' :

Prairie avenger, mountain lion,

Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan,

Gigantic troubadour, speaking like a siege gun,

Smashing Plymouth Rock with its boulders from the West.¹

Radical only on the coinage issue, strictly orthodox in matters of morality and religion, Bryan was an honest, emotional crusader for humanity, with the forensic fervour, political shrewdness, and intellectual limita-

¹ Vachel Lindsay, *Collected Poems* (Macmillan, 1925), p. 99.

tions that would have made him a great statesman in the age of Clay and Jackson.¹ His object was to reform government and curb privilege, not to reconstruct society; but McKinley stressed the 'danger to our institutions' in the Democratic platform. Bryan did not 'propose to transfer the rewards of industry to the lap of indolence', but his victory would, in effect, transfer power from the Middle West and North-East to the Far West and the South. In all the hundreds of speeches delivered during his 'whirlwind tour' of thirteen thousand miles there was no appeal to class hatred; but his followers were full of it, and 'Pitchfork' Tillman of South Carolina called upon the people to throw off their bondage to a money power more insolent than the slave power. American business, fearing for its privileges,² acted as if the Hun were at the gates. The *New York Tribune* denounced 'the wretched, rattle-pated boy, posing in vapid vanity and mouthing resounding rottenness'. Mark Hanna assessed metropolitan banks, insurance companies, and railway corporations for colossal campaign contributions.³ Employees were ordered to vote for McKinley on pain of dismissal, and their fears aroused by the prospect of receiving wages in depreciated dollars. On Wall Street there was even talk of an Eastern secession, if Bryan should win. Never before or since has there been so stirring a campaign, or such heavy balloting in propor-

¹ As late as 1913, when a friend urged on him the need of expert guidance in drafting the Federal Reserve Act, Bryan answered, 'Any one with a good heart can write a good finance bill.'

² It is now clear that what the average business man feared in 1896 was not free silver, but the sort of thing that Roosevelt did: government regulation, and curbing of privilege. Free-silver Republicans who stood by the party remained in good odour, for they were sound in the main; and there were enough of them in the Senate to prevent the enactment of a Gold Standard Act until 1900.

³ The silver mining interests were equally generous subsidizers of the Democrats, according to their ability.

tion to the population. Bryan carried the late Confederacy and most of the Far West ; but the heavy electoral votes of the populous East and Middle West gave McKinley an emphatic victory.

Equilibrium was restored. Nothing had ever been the matter with the Grand Old Party. Now for high protection, plenty, and prosperity. Actually, the election of a Democratic administration could have served no useful purpose. They were not prepared, nor the country ripe, for measures to bring financial giants under control. Free silver, if adopted, would have prolonged uncertainty and placed the United States in a sullen isolation. Yet Bryan's campaign had a significance quite independent of any question as to the soundness of its first principle. It was at once the last protest of the old agrarian order against industrialism, and the first attempt of the new order to clean house. Bryan was the bridge between Jackson and Roosevelt.

LXI

THE SPANISH WAR AND IMPERIALISM

1897-1917

1. *McKinley yields*

WILLIAM McKinley, a kindly soul in a spineless body, was inaugurated President on 4 March 1897. Mark Hanna refused a cabinet position, lest he should appear to be paid for his trouble; but obtained a vacant seat in the Senate. The President promptly summoned a special session of Congress to raise the tariff. In a somewhat chastened spirit, the leaders of Congress proposed to set up more moderate schedules than those of 1890; but by the time every member had secured his pet interest, the Dingley tariff of 1897 was the highest protective tariff that had yet been enacted. Already the trough of the long depression had been passed, and business recovered confidence with government in the hands of its friends. Yet so blatant were the monopoly-securing features of the Dingley tariff that the Republican party was badly in need of a new issue to divert popular attention.

Spain furnished the diversion. Her efforts to suppress the Cuban insurrection were as unsuccessful as they were revolting. American sympathy was stirred by the plight of insurgents in concentration camps, and by atrocities enlarged upon by the yellow journals of Hearst and his sensational competitors. More than once Congress pressed the executive to recognize at least the belligerency of Cuba; but both Cleveland and McKinley refused. In October 1897 the new Spanish ministry of Sagasta proposed to abandon the concentration policy, recalled its cruel proconsul, and promised some measure of home rule. It appeared that the crisis had passed; but on 15 February 1898 the United

States battleship *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbour. That started a clamour for war; and when a naval court of inquiry reported (28 March) that the cause was an external explosion by a submarine mine,¹ 'Remember the Maine!' went from lip to lip. The next day McKinley sent to Madrid what turned out to be his ultimatum, suggesting an immediate armistice, the break-up of concentration camps, and American mediation between Spain and Cuba. Spain's formal reply was unsatisfactory; but the Sagasta government, anxious to avoid war with the United States, moved towards peace with a celerity unusual at Madrid. Orders were given revoking the concentration policy, and on 9 April the Governor-General of Cuba was instructed to grant an armistice to the insurgents. The next day the American Minister cabled from Madrid that if nothing were done to humiliate Spain he hoped to obtain a settlement of the Cuban question on the basis of autonomy, or independence, or cession to the United States.

Any President with a backbone would have seized this opportunity for an honourable solution. McKinley, a veteran of 1861, was averse from war. Mark Hanna, Wall Street, big business, and a majority of the Republican Senators backed him up. With such support McKinley needed less firmness than Grant had shown in the *Alabama* case, or than Cleveland in the Venezuela crisis, to preserve peace. But Congress, the press, and the country were clamouring for war, and McKinley became obsessed with the notion that if he did not give

¹ This finding was confirmed by a careful examination of the wreck, in 1911, by a board of American army and navy officers. Although it is still a mystery who set and fired the mine, it is difficult to conceive what interest any Spaniard might have had in doing it. In view of the story that the *Maine* was sent to Havana to make trouble, it is perhaps well to state that the Secretary of the Navy gave the order only after consultation with, and approval from, the Spanish Minister at Washington. L. S. Mayo, *America of Yesterday*, pp. 154-5.

way, the Republican party would be broken. After much prayer and hesitation, he decided to yield.¹

On 11 April 1898 the President sent Congress a long-winded review of the situation, making only a casual and incomplete reference to the reassuring dispatch just received from Madrid. He concluded: 'The issue is now with the Congress. . . . I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. . . . I await your action.' That action, of course, was war.

2. *Exit Spain*

Light-heartedly the United States entered upon a war that brought quick returns in glory, but new and heavy responsibilities. It was emphatically a popular war, although no one anticipated a quick or easy victory. It was imperialist in result, but not in motive. No important business interests were looking forward to the exploitation of Cuba, or had even heard of the Philippines. American feelings had simply been aroused by the Cuban struggle for independence, and outraged by the destruction of the *Maine*. In declaring war, Congress also declared 'that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people'.

¹ Rhodes, *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*, p. 57. Roosevelt wrote in a private letter, 'The blood of the murdered men of the *Maine* calls not for indemnity but for the full measure of atonement, which can only come by driving the Spaniard from the New World.' McKinley, in an interview a year later, recorded 'his conviction that, if he had been left alone, he could have concluded an arrangement with the Spanish Government under which the Spanish troops would have withdrawn from Cuba without a war. . . . But for the inflamed state of public opinion, and the fact that Congress could no longer be held in check, a peaceful solution might have been had.' H. S. Pritchett, in *North American Review*, clxxxix. 400.

No one who lived through them will forget those gay days of 1898. With what generous ardour the young men rushed to the colours to free Cuba, while the bands crashed out the chords of Sousa's 'Stars and Stripes Forever'! And what a comfortable feeling of unity the country obtained at last, when Democrats vied in patriotism with Republicans, when the South proved equally ardent for the fight, and Joe Wheeler, the gallant cavalry leader of the Confederacy, became actual commander of the United States Army in Cuba.¹ It was more close and personal to Americans than the Great War; it was their own little show for independence, fair play, and hip-hurrah democracy, against all that was tyrannical, treacherous, and fetid in the Old World. How they enjoyed the discomfiture of Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, and how they appreciated the hearty goodwill of England! Every ship of the smart little navy from the powerful *Oregon*, steaming at full speed round the Horn to be in time for the big fight, to the absurd 'dynamite cruiser' *Vesuvius*, was known by picture and reputation to every American boy. And what heroes the war correspondents created—Hobson who sunk the *Merrimac*, Lieutenant Rowan who delivered the message to Garcia, Commodore Dewey ('You may fire when ready, Gridley'), blaspheming Bob Evans of the *Iowa*, Captain Philip of the *Texas* ('Don't cheer, boys, the poor fellows are dying!'), and Teddy Roosevelt with his horseless Rough Riders. It was not a war of waiting and endurance, of fruitless loss and hope deferred. On the first day of May, one week after the declaration, Dewey steams into Manila Bay with the Pacific Squadron, and without losing a single man reduces the Spanish fleet to old junk. The Fifth Army Corps safely lands in

¹ Bryan at once placed his services at the disposition of the President, and was commissioned colonel of a regiment of Nebraska volunteers, but was not allowed to reach the front.

Cuba, and wins three battles in quick succession. Admiral Cervera's fleet issues from Santiago Bay, and in a few hours' running fight is completely smashed, with the loss of a single American sailor. Ten weeks' fighting, and the United States had wrested an empire from Spain.

Prince Bismarck is said to have remarked, just before his death, that there was a special providence for drunkards, fools, and the United States of America. On paper Spain was a formidable power. If the United States had more battleships, she had more armoured cruisers and torpedo craft. Spain already had almost 200,000 troops in Cuba. The American regular army was probably the best in the world, but included less than 28,000 officers and men, scattered in small detachments from the Yukon to Key West. So weak were the harbour defences of the Atlantic coast, and so apprehensive were the people of bombardment, that the North Atlantic fleet was divided: the one half blockading Havana, and the other, reassuringly called the 'Flying Squadron', stationed at Hampton Roads. Against any other nation such strategy might have been disastrous. But the Spanish navy was inconceivably neglected, ill-armed, and untrained;¹ whilst the United States navy—an entirely new creation of the last fifteen years—was smart, disciplined, and efficient. Secretary Long of the Navy was honest and intelligent; and when his energetic assistant-secretary Roosevelt left to lead the Rough Riders, his place on the board of naval strategy was taken by Captain Mahan.

In a military sense the United States was entirely unprepared. An elderly jobbing politician was at the head of the War Department. There were enough

¹ Vividly brought out in the pathetic letters of Admiral Cervera, translated by the U.S. Naval Intelligence. *A Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies* (Washington, 1899).

Krag rifles for the regulars, but the 150,000 volunteers¹ received Springfields and black powder. There was no khaki cloth in the country, and thousands of troops fought a summer campaign in Cuba, clothed in the heavy blue uniform of winter garrison duty. Volunteers neglected even such principles of camp sanitation as were laid down in Deuteronomy, and for every one of the 289 men killed or mortally wounded in battle, thirteen died of disease. Transporting eighteen thousand men to Cuba caused more confusion than conveying two million men to France twenty years later. Yet the little expeditionary force was allowed to land on the beach without opposition (20–25 June), and the Captain-General of Cuba, with six weeks' warning, almost 200,000 men in the Island, and 13,000 in the city of Santiago, was able to concentrate only 1,700 on the battle-fields of El Caney and San Juan, against 15,000 Americans. These 1,700 Spaniards, well armed and entrenched, gave an excellent account of themselves, and helped to promote Roosevelt from a colonelcy to the Presidency: but on 3 July Cervera's battle fleet steamed forth from Santiago Bay to death and destruction. There never was such a Fourth of July in America as that Monday in 1898 when the news came through. Santiago surrendered on the 15th. Except for a military promenade in Porto Rico,² the war was over.

Spain asked for terms of peace; McKinley dictated them on 30 July—immediate evacuation and definite relinquishment of Cuba, cession of Porto Rico, and an island in the Ladrones, occupation of the city, harbour, and bay of Manila. Spain signed a preliminary peace to that effect on 12 August, sadly protesting: 'This demand [for Porto Rico] strips us of the very last

¹ The President insisted on calling to the colours more than twice as many men as the Army wanted, or had facilities to train and equip.

² See Mr. Dooley on 'Gin'ral Miles' Gran' Picnic an' Moonlight Excursion in Porther Ricky'.

memory of a glorious past, and expels us . . . from the Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud deeds of our ancestors.' ¹

3. *The Little Brown Brother*

In the formal peace negotiations at Paris, which began on 1 October 1898, the only serious question was the disposition of the Philippines. If they had been contented under Spanish rule, there would have been no question of annexing them. An insurrection had just been partially suppressed when the Spanish War broke out. José Rizal, one of the noblest and certainly the most scholarly of nationalist leaders of his day, was executed in 1896.² His successor, Emilio Aguinaldo, was more or less encouraged by Commodore Dewey to return from exile after the battle of Manila Bay; and when the Americans had assaulted and captured the city (13 August) the *insurrectos* organized the 'Visayan Republic' in the province of Luzon. The obvious thing to do was to turn the Philippines over to the Filipinos, as Cuba to the Cubans. But Dewey cabled that the 'republic' represented only a faction, and was unable to keep order within its nominal sphere. To restore the islands to Spain would be cowardly; yet few Americans wished to take up the white man's burden. On the other hand, Germany's obvious desire to obtain compensation in that quarter inclined Americans to stay.³ Perhaps it would be well for the United States to obtain a base in the Far East, now that China seemed to be on the point of breaking up; and clearly one must take all the Philippines or none. McKinley hesitated long and prayerfully, but finally concluded to

¹ Chadwick, *Spanish War*, ii. 438.

² C. E. Russell, *The Hero of the Filipinos* (Century Co., 1923).

³ L. B. Shippee, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxx. 754-77, discusses the German policy towards the Spanish-American War, as revealed in *Die Grosse Politik*, xv.

fulfil manifest destiny. 'There was nothing left for us to do,' he told his Methodist brethren, 'but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them.'¹ Spain was induced to part with the archipelago for twenty million dollars, and on 10 December 1898 the Treaty of Paris was signed. Most Americans acquiesced,² but a vigorous minority of conscientious objectors led by Senator Hoar believed it a monstrous perversion of American destiny to conquer and rule an oriental country. The necessary two-thirds majority for ratification was obtained only after Bryan had urged the Democratic Senators to assent, and Senator Lodge had pointed out the disgrace involved in repudiating what the President, through his envoys, had concluded in Paris.

The annexation of extra-continental territory already thickly populated by alien peoples created a new problem in American politics and government. The petty islands and guano rocks that had already been annexed had never raised, as Porto Rico and the Philippines did, the embarrassing question whether the Constitution followed the flag. Opinions of the Supreme Court in the 'Insular Cases' left their status very muddled; but eventually, as in the British Empire, a theory was evolved from practice. Insular possessions are dependencies of, but not part of, the United States, or included in its customs barriers unless by special act of Congress. Thus the Republican party was able to eat its cake and have it: to indulge in territorial expansion, yet maintain the tariff wall against such insular products as sugar and tobacco, as foreign. Inhabitants of the dependencies

¹ C. S. Olcott, *McKinley*, ii. III.

² 'I know what I'd do if I was Mack,' said Mr. Hennessy, 'I'd hist a flag over the Ph'lippeens, an' I'd take in th' whole lot iv thim.'

'An' yet,' said Mr. Dooley, 'tis not more thin two months since ye larned whether they were islands or canned goods.'—*Mr. Dooley in War and Peace*.

are American nationals, not citizens of the United States, unless expressly granted that status by the United States. Organic acts of Congress are the constitutions of the Philippines and Porto Rico ; only such parts of the Federal Constitution apply as are included in these organic acts, or found applicable by the Federal Judiciary. President and Congress, although limited in power within the United States, are absolute and sovereign over American dependencies.¹ The parallel with the old British Empire is suggestive ; and the government at Washington, like that of England, has been reluctant to admit the existence of an empire. No colonial office has been established or colonial secretary appointed. Porto Rico and the Philippines are administered by a bureau of insular affairs of the War Department ; the smaller islands by the Navy Department.

The Filipinos, or most of them, had been good Catholics for three centuries, and did not wish to be 'uplifted' and civilized ; but when Aguinaldo's troops disregarded the command of an American sentry to halt (4 February 1899) the United States army undertook to 'civilize them with a Krag'. Before the Philippine Insurrection was stamped out, it had cost the United States as many lives as the Spanish War, and more scandals : for a war between white soldiers and semi-civilized men of colour is something worse than what Sherman said it was. Military government was succeeded in 1901 by a civil Philippine Commission, appointed by the President. William H. Taft was chairman of the Commission and Governor-General of the Islands.

American rule in the Philippines has been compared with that of Great Britain in India, with disparagement

¹ i. e. in practice. The theory, as stated by Chief Justice Taft in *Balzac v. Porto Rico* (1922), is that the Constitution is in force wherever the sovereign power of the United States is exerted, and fundamental civil rights follow the flag ; but certain provisions of the Constitution 'are not always and everywhere applicable'.

to the latter that is unfair ; for the Americans had the simpler problem. The insular population in 1900 was about seven million, of which only four per cent were Mohammedans, and five per cent wild pagan tribes. Christian Filipinos, the ' little brown brothers ' ¹ who comprised eighty-five per cent of the total, were a fairly homogeneous group, law-abiding, naturally intelligent, western in their ideals and civilization. Their sense of justice and administration was oriental, but caste distinctions were lacking ; their thirst for education was keen, and Tammany Hall could teach them little in the way of politics. Under American rule they made a remarkable advance in education, well-being, and self-government. Through Mr. Taft's diplomacy at Rome, the United States acquired title to vast areas of agricultural land from the religious orders, which had leased them on oppressive terms ; and sold them on easy terms in small holdings to the peasants. ' Uncle Sam ' provided the Islands with honest, intelligent, sympathetic administrators such as Taft, Cameron Forbes, and Hugh L. Scott ; with schools, sanitation, good roads, a well-trained native constabulary, a representative assembly (1907), and baseball.² Civilization has penetrated to parts of the interior where the Spaniards never ventured. Remote forest glades where savage tribes once met in deadly combat are now the scene of baseball games between their respective sons ; and the jungle resounds to cries of ' Strike him out ! ' and ' Attaboy ! '

¹ This phrase of the kindly Governor Taft gave rise to a line very popular in the U.S. Army, ' He may be a brother of big Bill Taft, but he ain't no friend of mine.'

² The number of pupils attending school rose from five thousand in 1898 to over one million in 1920, the infantile death-rate in Manila declined from 80 to 20 per cent between 1904 and 1920. All but 300 of the teachers in 1920 were native. Although the entire cost of civil administration has been defrayed by the Islanders, their per capita taxation, in 1920, was only \$2.50, and their per capita debt, \$1.81.

4. *Minor Pickings*

Because her people have never desired independence, Porto Rico has been less of a political problem than the Philippines ; but a more serious social problem. The island was handicapped by a decrepit and unsatisfactory system of law and local government, and is still densely overcrowded with over a million inhabitants of Spanish blood, mostly landless *jibaros* (peasants) enervated by hookworm and discouraged by the fluctuations of the sugar industry. Civil government, first granted by the Foraker Act of 1900, was of the old crown-colony type : an elective assembly, with an executive council appointed by the President acting as upper house. Political parties quickly developed, the American Governors were unable to keep neutral, and deadlocks came over the budget. Another organic Act (1917) granted American citizenship and a semi-responsible government. There has been the usual advance in education, but the authorities are still wrestling with problems of rural congestion that can only be solved by emigration. It is not impossible that Porto Rico may eventually become a State of the Union.

Training in self-government rather than material progress is the real justification of American rule over dependencies. Every sound colonial administration does things for the people ; the United States has encouraged its dependants to do things for themselves, and has taught them to look to the Declaration of Independence as the source of political theory. If the implications of such teaching are ignored by the teacher, the Spanish War will have been fought in vain.

Few persons in Europe expected the United States to relinquish its sovereignty over Cuba ; and only in a formal and legal sense has it done so. Until 1902 the Island was ruled by the United States army, with General Leonard Wood as military governor. The

outstanding feature of this military régime was the remarkable clean-up of Havana under the direction of Major William C. Gorgas,¹ which cut the average annual death-rate in half. Then, in 1900, came one of the worst yellow-fever epidemics in years. A commission of four army surgeons under Dr. Walter Reed was appointed to investigate the cause. Working on the theory advanced by a Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Finlay, they proved that the pest was transmitted by the *stegomyia* mosquito; and two of them, Dr. James Carroll and Dr. Jesse W. Lazear, proved it with their lives.² Major Gorgas then declared war on the mosquitoes; and in 1901 there was not a single case of yellow fever in Havana. One of the greatest scourges of the tropics was at last under control.

A Cuban constitutional convention met in 1900, and after discreet pressure was induced to grant the United States certain coaling stations, and to recognize the right of the United States to intervene 'for the preservation of Cuban independence', or merely to preserve order.³ This right was exercised in 1906, upon demand of the President of Cuba. A provisional government was established under United States authority, a new election was held, and the island was evacuated a second time in 1909. Since then American exhortations, enforced by an occasional battalion of marines, have prevented the pungent politics of Cuba from breaking out into revolution. Owing to the many investments of American capital in sugar plantations, Cuba is an economic dependency of the United States; but it enjoys the international status of a sovereign

¹ Son of the head of the Confederate Bureau of Ordnance.

² It will be remembered that Sir Ronald Ross discovered in 1899 that malaria was exclusively transmitted by mosquitoes.

³ These provisions, known as the 'Platt Amendment' when originally passed by the U.S. Congress, were incorporated in the first treaty between the United States and the Republic of Cuba, and in the Cuban Constitution.

state, and a somewhat tutored and precarious political independence.¹

As neither Cuba nor Porto Rico afforded a first-class harbour for a naval base, negotiations were renewed with Denmark in 1898 for the purchase of St. Thomas. In 1867 the United States Senate had rejected a similar treaty, after Christian IX had bidden his West Indian subjects an affectionate farewell. This time, it was the Danish Rigsdag that did the rejecting (1902). During the Great War rumours of possible German purchase impelled the State Department to increase its former offer fivefold. That was accepted, and in 1917 the Danish West Indies became the Virgin Islands of the United States. They have since remained a political appanage of the Navy Department. Guam, an island of the Ladrones acquired from Spain in 1898, and Tutuila, the American share of a triple partition of the Samoan group in 1899, have the same status.

Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, desired by the dominant American group and by the diminishing natives as well, was consummated by joint resolution of House and Senate on 7 July 1898. An organic Act of 1900 conferred American citizenship on all subjects of the former kingdom, and the full status of a Territory of the United States, eligible for statehood, on the Islands.²

¹ General Enoch H. Crowder, judge advocate-general U.S.A. during the Great War, has been special commissioner and U.S. ambassador to Cuba since 1919; it is understood that his position somewhat resembles that of Lord Cromer in Egypt.

² The government is of the form usual in Territories of the United States, except that, as in the case of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the Governor may make appropriations *ex proprio vigore* for current expenses of government in case the territorial legislature refuses to do so. A similar provision in the charters of the Thirteen Colonies might have changed the course of history.

5. *The Open Door*

It was feared by many Americans and assumed by most Europeans that these annexations of the year 1898 were only a beginning; that the United States was destined to become a great colonial power. Imperialism in the Roman sense did not, however, make any permanent appeal to the American people, and even the word remains one of reproach. The political control of islands densely populated with inhabitants of foreign tongue and alien race was a very different matter from the traditional expansion into sparsely inhabited regions capable of full fellowship in the Union. During Roosevelt's administration, and largely as a means of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, the United States began to assume a financial responsibility for Caribbean republics that in several instances has led to intervention; but it has not yet attempted to compete with Europe for colonies, or spheres of exclusive influence in weak and backward countries. On the contrary, it was John Hay, McKinley's Secretary of State, who proclaimed, if he did not originate, the policy of the open door to China.

Trade with China in 1898 was an important item in American foreign commerce, although no longer conducted by American ships. The United States had long since obtained the usual extra-territorial privileges in China, and had even dictated to Korea, at the cannon's mouth, a treaty of amity and commerce (1871);¹ but had taken no part in the game of carving up China into foreign concessions, protectorates, and spheres of influence. In 1899, when this process was fast nearing completion, John Hay requested from the Powers a declaration of the 'open door' policy: that each in her respective sphere would maintain the Chinese customs

¹ Admiral S. Schroeder, *A Half Century of Naval Service* (1922), pp. 47-55.

tariff, and levy equal harbour dues and railway rates on the ships and merchandise of all nations.¹ All the Great Powers but Russia expressed their approval, but only Great Britain formally agreed. In June 1900 the Boxer rebellion broke out. The United States took part in the joint expeditionary force to relieve the legations at Peking; but in order to limit the objective, Hay addressed a circular note to the Powers (3 July 1900), declaring it the policy of the United States 'to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity . . . and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire'. The Powers promptly concurred, and it is claimed by Hay's admirers that this second 'open door' note prevented the further partition of China.² Hay's efforts did not prevent China being saddled with an outrageous indemnity after the rebellion was suppressed; but the United States returned almost half her share (\$111,000,000) to the Chinese Government, which established therewith a fund for sending Chinese students to American schools and colleges.

Indirectly, then, the Spanish war made the United States a power in the Far East and in world politics. Her new role was accentuated by her leading part in the Hague Conference of 1899. The tradition of isolation might continue, and entangling alliances be refused; yet America without knowing it or wanting it had become a world power.

¹ *Foreign Relations of the U.S. for 1899*, pp. 131-3, 142.

² It is, however, difficult to escape the conclusion of Tyler Dennett, the principal authority on American diplomacy in the Orient, that 'the doctrine of the Open Door after 1899 was an academic phrase to which Europe consented for the sake of placating America. For ten years it existed as a phrase to conjure with but not to be defined. . . . The American Government mistook a phrase and a promise for an event.' *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (1925), p. 319.

LXII

THE REIGN OF ROOSEVELT¹

1901-9

I. *Theodore Roosevelt*

FOR the Presidential contest of 1900 McKinley and Bryan were renominated by their respective parties. The Democrats again demanded free silver, but prosperity had blunted their arguments, and the 'full dinner pail' emblem of proletarian affluence was a potent electioneering slogan for the Republicans. 'Imperialism' was the leading issue. Bryan proposed to wind up America's oriental adventure by handing over the Philippines to the Filipinos; McKinley insisted that his country should shoulder the white man's burden for an indefinite period. Mark Hanna managed the campaign with his usual efficiency, and took the stump with Roosevelt, whose reluctant candidacy for the Vice-Presidency strengthened his running-mate. McKinley and Roosevelt were elected by a heavy majority. The Republican party had a clear mandate to preserve the new American Empire.

On 6 September 1901, six months after his second inauguration, McKinley was shot by an anarchist.² Eight days later his gentle spirit took flight; and Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United States.

Roosevelt at forty-three was the youngest by several years in the line of Presidents; yet none had been better equipped to administer the office. Building on

¹ I am much indebted to Prof. Albert Bushnell Hart, Mr. James Morgan, Hon. Robert P. Bass, and especially Hon. Charles G. Washburn, for suggestions and emendations regarding this period; but they are not responsible for my conclusions.

² His assassination, following hard on that of the King of Italy, was the occasion of a law forbidding the entrance of anarchists to the United States.

a broad paternal inheritance of wealth, culture, and public service, he had already become eminent as a naturalist, a man of letters, a soldier, and a statesman. Elected Governor of New York in 1898 on his return from war, he had struck corruption in that State with such vigour that in self-defence Senator Platt and the machine politicians had boomed him for Vice-President. Roosevelt accepted the nomination to that high but inconspicuous office for the political oblivion that it usually meant, and was on the point of reading law with the Chief Justice, in preparation for a professional career, when the fatal shot made him President. No American was more national in his interests or universal in his friendships. University men and the well-to-do in the Eastern States regarded him as one of themselves. He had identified himself with the West by ranching in the Bad Lands of Dakota, and leading the Rough Riders. The South remembered that his uncles had been warriors in the lost cause; and people everywhere loved him as a red-blooded, democratic American whose every action showed good sportsmanship and dynamic vitality. With the heart of a boy, and the instincts of a man of action, Roosevelt had the brain of a statesman. He was the only President since the Civil War who understood what had happened to the country in the last thirty years, and the only American with the temperament and equipment to grapple with problems that were crying for solution.

2. *The Growth of Consolidation*

The 'trust problem' was the popular name for the first object of Roosevelt's righteous zeal. The depression of the early nineties drove railway and manufacturing companies into various forms of combination, in order to eliminate competition and maintain prices. In 1897, just as prosperity was reviving, the Supreme Court found one of these organizations, the Trans-

Missouri Traffic Association, invalid under the Sherman Anti-Trust law, in a decision so sweeping that practically every pool or association, whether reasonable or unreasonable, became liable to criminal prosecution as a combination in restraint of trade. Big business, in consequence, abandoned combination for consolidation. A group of bankers would organize a 'trust' or super-corporation for the control, let us say, of the match industry. Having persuaded the financiers who had large interests in the leading match companies, the new match trust would buy them out, issuing its own preferred stock in exchange for that of the constituent companies, assuming their bonded indebtedness. A large quantity of common stock would be issued in anticipation of increased earnings, and perhaps 'unloaded' by the banker-promoters on the public. The world had never seen such an easy method of making something out of nothing. Tobacco, agricultural machinery, tin cans, salt, sugar, dressed meat, and a score of basic products were consolidated in corporations with power to crush all competition; and in many cases to mulct the public, by increased cost of service and commodities, in order to pay dividends on a vastly increased capitalization.

In most cases the merger of competing or complementary industries marked a technical advance. 'Trust' methods, however suitable for industries such as meat-packing and motor-cars, were also extended to others which were not, such as cotton-spinning and piano-making; and the economies of mass production were not often shared with labourer or consumer. The United States Steel Corporation, formed in 1901, combined the already swollen corporations of Frick, Carnegie, and others in a 'trust' capitalized at \$1,400,000,000, of which nearly one-seventh was issued to promoters for their services. Prices were maintained, although ten to twelve per cent was being earned on the real

capitalization, and the wages of the steel workers were kept down by importing cheap labour from southern and eastern Europe. The great insurance companies of New York, instead of reducing premiums to their policy holders, paid salaries of \$100,000 or more to chief executives who were often mere figureheads, used their profits recklessly to form industrial consolidations, and corruptly to influence legislation. J. Pierpont Morgan endeavoured to unite all the steam and electric railways and steamship lines of New England under one management, and succeeded in leaving the transport system of that region a financial wreck. E. H. Harriman purchased the bankrupt Union Pacific Railway in 1893 with reserve funds of the Illinois Central system that he controlled, and made it one of the best railways in the country; but other lines that he absorbed were sucked dry and cast aside, after their stock-holders had been ruined.

The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had not been invoked against these practices, either by the Cleveland or the McKinley administrations. The public suspected corrupt collusion, and labour threatened to leave the guidance of Gompers for some revolutionary dispensation. Much the same thing was going on in England and in Europe, but not to such an extent. The American theatre was so vast, and American resources so boundless, that financial or industrial consolidations found greater materials to work with. American financiers and industrialists were more sanguine and audacious than their transatlantic contemporaries; and the American Government was decentralized, constantly changing in personnel, lacking organic strength and administrative traditions. It is hardly too much to say that the future of American democracy was imperilled when Roosevelt took from the bewildered Bryan Democrats the torch of reform.

3. *The Progressive Era*

Not that Roosevelt applied the torch, as Bryan might have done. He had the common sense to see that the problem was complicated and difficult. Bryan and the Populist wing of the Democrats proposed to 'bust the trusts' and re-establish an obsolete régime of individual competition. The socialists had an opposite formula. Roosevelt, and after him Taft and Wilson, were liberal conservatives. They accepted the new industrial order, but wished to probe its excrescences, and bring it under a régime of regulation, wholesome alike for business and for the public. The word 'constructive' was constantly on their lips, and reckless agitators shared with Tories and complacent corruptionists the weight of their abuse. The violent dissensions between these three men, the sharp contradictions in their characters, and the fact that they used two different parties as an instrument, should not blind us to the fundamental unity of their administrations. Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson were successive leaders of what Americans call the progressive movement: the adaptation of American government to the changes already wrought in American society. The process was by no means complete when America entered the Great War; and peace brought new problems with a restoration of the Ohio dynasty. But we shall clarify much political confusion if provisionally we regard the period 1901-17 as a unit, and for want of a better term, call it the Progressive Era.¹

Roosevelt proceeded with caution and circumspection. He had not come into power as an opposition leader, but was president 'by act of God', and titular

¹ Perhaps the era should be extended to 1921, in order to include prohibition (18th Amendment), woman suffrage (19th Amendment), and the new immigration policy; but it is doubtful whether these would have been adopted but for the Great War.

head of the party of big business. Although popular disaffection to the ruling order was widespread, the election of 1900 appeared to most Republican leaders a mandate to let business alone; to 'stand pat', as Mark Hanna said in poker slang.¹ Roosevelt knew that no one of the four Vice-Presidents who had succeeded to the Presidency had obtained the party nomination at the next election, and that two of them, Tyler and Johnson, had been read out of their party.

Roosevelt was, however, quite right in estimating that the conscience of the people was aroused, and their temper ripe for action. The reform movement had broadened down from university men, social workers, and 'high-brow' periodicals to the popular magazines, and to a new group of publicists, such as Ida Tarbell, Upton Sinclair, and Lincoln Steffens, whom Roosevelt in a moment of irritation termed the 'muck-rakers'. Coincident with his administration came a municipal reform movement that did away with the grosser forms of corruption in most of the smaller cities, and all of the larger ones save Chicago and Philadelphia; that greatly improved the honesty and efficiency of municipal government, while broadening its social activities. State governors like Robert M. LaFollette, a man of Roosevelt's age and Lincoln's background who wrested Wisconsin from corporate control between 1900 and 1904, were restoring former standards of civic virtue, and attempting to consolidate the rule of honest men by new political devices: the popular primary, initiative and referendum. Social legislation such as Employers' Liability Acts, factory inspection, limitation of hours, and amelioration of labour conditions, with (what was really new) administrative boards competent to enforce them, became the rule rather than the exception in the Northern, Middle, and Western States. Intra-state public service corporations, such as water,

¹ Croly, *Mark Hanna*, pp. 417-19.

lighting, power and tramway companies, were at last brought under effective supervision, and in some instances socialized. Protest against this extension of governmental power was stout, and has not yet ceased ; but in every industrialized State the logic of the situation compelled conservatives to yield their prejudices ; and adverse decisions of the Courts were very generally overridden by amendments to the state constitutions. The whole fabric of state and municipal government was more radically altered in this progressive era than in the preceding century ;¹ and, following the example of Roosevelt, the increasing participation of public-spirited people in state administration brought a wholesome change in the tone and standards of public service.

4. 'My Policies'

Roosevelt inherited from McKinley, who was a good judge of men, an unusually able Cabinet,² which with one or two exceptions was willing to follow the new President. According to Roosevelt's conception of the Presidency, 'it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded, unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws'.³ Shortly there came a strike in the an-

¹ There is an excellent description and criticism of these recent developments in the administration of the States in W. B. Munro, *Government of the U.S.* (1919), chapter xxxi. F. C. Howe, *Wisconsin : an Experiment in Democracy* (1912) is a somewhat ecstatic description of the model State from a progressive point of view.

² State Department : John Hay, succeeded by Elihu Root in 1905 ; Treasury : L. G. Gage (L. M. Shaw, 1902) ; War : Elihu Root (W. H. Taft, 1904) ; Navy : J. D. Long (W. H. Moody, 1902-4 ; Charles Jerome Bonaparte—a grandson of the King of Westphalia—1905-7) ; Interior : E. A. Hitchcock (James R. Garfield, son of the President, 1907) ; Attorney-General : Philander C. Knox (Moody, 1904, and Bonaparte, 1907) ; Commerce and Labour (established in 1903) : G. B. Cortelyou (Oscar Straus, first Hebrew to receive a cabinet appointment, 1907).

³ *Autobiography* (1913), p. 389.

thracite coal-fields of Pennsylvania, from which the people of the Eastern States obtained their domestic fuel. Roosevelt summoned a conference of mine owners and leaders of the miners' union. The latter offered to arbitrate their grievances; the owners refused, and urged the President to break the strike with the army, as Cleveland might have done. Roosevelt merely published the results of the conference, when public indignation compelled the owners to submit to arbitration by a presidential commission. This episode not only strengthened his popularity: it taught him to use public opinion as a whip for recalcitrant Congressmen no less than for captains of industry.

So lively and 'strenuous' was Roosevelt in comparison with his predecessors that many wrongly assumed that he was radical, reckless, and impulsive. On the contrary, he was always willing to compromise on a half-measure in the hope of obtaining more later, and to co-operate with House and Senate. In his first annual message (3 December 1901) he announced a policy with regard to trusts and corporations: enforce the existing laws, obtain full power for the Federal Government to inspect and regulate corporations engaged in inter-state business. The first rested with him, the second with Congress. Until he could obtain legislation strengthening the Inter-state Commerce Commission, the young President found plenty of work to do in cleansing his government of the unsavoury garbage that had accumulated since the Civil War.

Frauds in the post office department were uncovered and punished. Upton Sinclair's *Jungle* drew popular as well as presidential attention to disgusting conditions in the Chicago stockyards. A government investigation substantiated his lurid charges, and Dr. H. W. Wiley, a chemist in the Department of Agriculture, proved by experiment the deleterious effect of preservatives and

colouring matter in tinned foods. The interests affected fought tooth and nail against 'socialistic' interference with the sacred maxim *caveat emptor*, but Congress strengthened the federal meat inspection service, and passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act (1906), which gave the consumers of American products better protection than the laws of any other country then afforded.

Roosevelt's love of nature and knowledge of the West gave him a sentimental interest in the preservation of the forests, and 'conservation' became one of his leading policies. It was high time to put some brake on the greedy and wasteful destruction of natural resources that was encouraged by existing laws. The West, keen as ever for rapid 'development', disliked this programme. Taking advantage of an earlier law which his predecessors had largely ignored, Roosevelt set aside almost 150 million acres of unsold government timber land as national forest reserve, and on the suggestion of Senator LaFollette withdrew from public entry some 85 millions more in Alaska and the North-West, pending a study of their mineral resources by the United States geological survey. The discovery of a gigantic system of fraud by which timber companies and ranchers were looting and devastating the public preserve enabled the President to obtain authority for transferring the national forests to the Department of Agriculture, whose forest bureau, under the far-sighted Gifford Pinchot, administered them on scientific principles. Conservation was sweetened for the West by federal projects of irrigation. A new federal reclamation service, of which R. H. Newell was the guiding spirit, added a million and a quarter acres to the arable land of the United States by 1915. Five national parks were created in Roosevelt's administration, together with two national game preserves and fifty-one wild bird refuges.

In 1902 President Roosevelt decided to challenge

another form of combination, the holding company, which was outside the scope of the decision on the Trans-Missouri case. His attorney-general, Philander C. Knox, entered suit against the Northern Securities Company, a consolidation of the Hill-Morgan and Harriman interests that controlled four out of the six transcontinental railways. By a narrow margin the Supreme Court decided for the government, thereby stopping a process of consolidation that Harriman proposed to continue until every important railway in the country came under his control; and it proved that magnates were not immune from the law.

The trusts, however, needed regulation more than dissolution; and Roosevelt was unable to get any legislation from Congress in the right direction. Bills initiated by his supporters in the House died in the Senate. A large part of the metropolitan press attacked his very moderate programme as socialistic and subversive of the common weal, and himself as a reckless demagogue. The President, however, was steadily growing in popularity. Merely by being himself—greeting professors and pugilists with equal warmth, and discussing their hobbies with the same genuine interest, teaching his boys to ride and shoot, leading perspiring major-generals on a point-to-point ride, praising the good, the true, and the beautiful,¹ and denouncing the base, the false, and the ugly, preaching in hundreds of short addresses all over the country, with vigorous gesture and incisive utterance, the gospel of civic virtue and intelligent democracy—Roosevelt became an institution

¹ Roosevelt's taste was considerably in advance of the average. It was by his personal direction that Saint Gaudens designed a new gold coinage, and that the most artistic postage-stamps in the history of American philately were produced by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. He also appointed a commission of artists to advise the government as to the plans and positions of new public buildings at Washington, which grew visibly in beauty and distinction during his administration.

in the headlines. Even the journals most opposed to his policies were forced to advertise them willy-nilly in their news columns. When the election of 1904 came round, the 'Old Guard', as the more recalcitrant Republicans began to be called, would have preferred to nominate Mark Hanna; but 'Uncle Mark' died, and Roosevelt was nominated for the Presidency by acclamation. The Democrats, hoping to attract the disgruntled reactionaries, put up a conservative New York judge, Alton B. Parker. Roosevelt was easily elected, and on 4 March 1905 began a new term with a clear mandate for his policies.

5. *Trust and Railway Regulation (1903-20)*

'I see no promise of any immediate and complete solution of all the problems we group together when we speak of the trust question,'¹ confessed Roosevelt at the beginning of his second administration. The authority he asked for giving the Federal Government plenary power to regulate all corporations engaged in inter-state business was not forthcoming. Big business was further discredited by the panic of 1907, and by the discovery that the Sugar Trust had swindled the government out of four million dollars in customs duties by false weights. Irritated by the continued attacks upon him as the destroyer of business and author of the panic, Roosevelt retorted in a pungent message attributing the panic 'to the speculative folly and flagrant dishonesty of a few men of great wealth', describing the current malpractices, and concluding: 'Our laws have failed in enforcing the performance of duty by the man of property toward the man who works for him, by the corporation toward the investor, the wage-earner and the general public.'

Consequently, the President could do little else than direct prosecutions under the Sherman Act of 1890.

¹ R. M. LaFollette (ed.), *The Making of America*, ii. 457.

Such prosecutions were frequent, and in notable instances successful; but they simply punished the grosser mischief after it had been committed, and did not always do that. Unscrambling the eggs proved to be a delicate and often impossible operation. Roosevelt was forced to conclude that the mere size and power of a combination did not render it illegal; there were 'good trusts', such as the International Harvester Company, which traded fairly and passed on their economies to consumers; and there were bad trusts controlled by 'malefactors of great wealth'. That was practically what the Supreme Court decided in the Standard Oil case of 1911: that only those acts or agreements of a monopolistic nature unduly or 'unreasonably' affecting inter-state commerce were to be construed as acts or agreements in restraint of trade, under the Anti-Trust Act. This 'rule of reason' became the guiding rule of decision, notably in the case of 1920 against the United States Steel Corporation, a consolidation from which the monopoly feature was absent. Subsequent prosecutions have been based not on mere size and power, but on unfair and illegal use of power. President Wilson obtained from Congress the sort of legislation that Roosevelt demanded in vain: the Clayton Anti-Trust Act proscribing certain specified trade practices, and the Federal Trade Commission, an administrative agency clothed with police power to enforce the law.

In the realm of railway regulation much was accomplished under Roosevelt. Rebates from published freight rates were forbidden by an Act of 1903, but more scandals and disclosures were required before government could obtain control over the rates themselves. The Hepburn Act of 1906 made regulation for the first time possible, and extended the field of it from inter-state railways to steamship, express, and sleeping-car companies (further enlarged in 1910 by telephone and

telegraph companies). It authorized the Inter-state Commerce Commission, upon complaint, to determine and prescribe maximum rates, and order conformity therewith after thirty days. Owing to respect for the ancient principle of judicial review, appeals had to be admitted to federal courts; but the burden of proof was now on the carrier, not the Commission. Free passes were prohibited for other than railway employees, and by indirection the railways were forced to disgorge most of the steamship lines and coal mines with which they had been wont to stifle competition. Most useful of all provisions in the Hepburn Act was the requirement placed on all common carriers to file annual accounts by a standardized system, and the power given the Commission to settle disputes between railways and shippers. Yet, as Senator LaFollette contended, the Hepburn Act did not go to the heart of the matter, for it gave the Commission no power to discover the value of transport properties and the cost of service, by which alone it could determine rates that were reasonable *per se*.

In 1910, following a sharp rise in railway rates, the Commission was empowered to suspend any increase until and unless the reasonableness thereof were ascertained. A new Commerce Court, established to hear appeals from the Inter-state Commerce Commission, nullified so much of the Commission's work that Congress abolished it in 1914. Finally, as a result of governmental experience in operating railways during the Great War, Congress passed in 1920 a comprehensive Transportation Act, placing almost the entire initiative and burden of rate-making on the Inter-state Commerce Commission, with a view to securing the stockholders a 'fair return' on their property, and the public just rates on freight shipments and passenger traffic. Further, the Commission was given complete jurisdiction over the financing operations of the railways, in

order to protect the investing public and the stockholders. In 1917 even the Supreme Court went so far as to declare 'It is not far from true—it may be it is entirely true, as said by the Commission—that "there can be nothing private or confidential in the activities and expenditures of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce"'.¹ A Railway Labour Board was established to enforce earlier enactments of the Wilson administration about the wages and hours of railway employees, and to settle disputes. Under plenary government regulation the necessity for artificial competition has ended; and railways are now authorized and encouraged to combine with a view to economical operation, as Roosevelt had recommended in his annual message of 1908.

It would be rash to assume that the trust and the railway problems have been solved; but at least they have been removed from the political arena to administrative tribunals. Law and statesmanship cannot claim full credit for this happy consummation. With the immense growth of population and wealth since 1914, some 'trusts' have cracked of their own weight; and unexpected competition has arisen both for them and for the railways. Oil now competes with coal, both as a domestic fuel and for transport; new oil fields have been exploited, and new rivals to the Standard created; and electricity, developed by water-power and harnessed to thousands of new household appliances and machines, pushed both oil and coal very hard. Henry Ford has become the richest man in the world without employing a penny of Wall Street capital, and has placed his motor-cars within reach of the majority of wage-earners.²

¹ *Smith v. Interstate Com. Comm.*, 245 *U.S. Reports*, 43.

² The motor-car industry started later in the United States than in Europe, and in 1905 there were more motor-cars in use in England than in the United States. In 1925 there were enough to seat with some crowding the entire population of 115,000,000.

Even more significant is the changed mutual attitude of business and public. The old generation of self-made pioneers, frenzied financiers, and feudal chieftains has passed away; with few exceptions the present generation of bankers, managers, and entrepreneurs accepts the ethics of the 'square deal', and submits with good grace to a reasonable and intelligent government regulation. 'Service' has replaced 'efficiency' as the watchword. Big corporations, instead of showing the public 'where they get off', court public favour, and not only by advertising. In place of surly underlings, arrogant bosses, and magnates unapproachable as the Dalai Lama, one finds deferential employees, courteous captains, and chatty, suave commanders. The public, flattered by these attentions, and interested in corporate prosperity by widely distributed stock-holding,¹ is inclined to regard unrepentant muck-rakers as agents of Moscow. In times of glut in agricultural products, the voice of the farmer is again heard in protest. And there is at all times a great mass of unorganized common labourers—negroes, Mexicans, and unassimilated Slavs—that has not yet been heard from.

¹ The number of stockholders in corporations in the United States increased from 4.4 to 14.4 million, 1900-23.

LXIII

THE BIG STICK

1903-9

I. *Panama*

‘THERE is an old adage that says, “Speak softly, and carry a big stick, and you will go far.”’ This quotation from one of the President’s earlier speeches provided cartoonists with another Rooseveltian attribute that proved most appropriate for his foreign policy. Not that the ‘big stick’ was used to incite war. It was Roosevelt who gave the Hague Tribunal its first case,¹ who instructed his delegation at the second Hague Conference to work for the restriction of naval armaments, who was responsible for the return of the Boxer indemnity, who smoothed over a dangerous controversy with Japan, and who won the Nobel peace prize for successful mediation between Russia and Japan.

Roosevelt inherited from McKinley a Secretary of State, John Hay, whose experience as ambassador in London made him eager to meet the new British policy of friendship half-way. And that friendship persisted, despite the alarm over the invasion of England by American boots and shoes, steel rails and cottons.² There is no truth in the oft-repeated story of a secret Anglo-American alliance, but there was in effect, during the entire Progressive Era, an Anglo-American understanding. Downing Street freely conceded to Washington a free hand in the New World; and in

¹ The Pious Fund dispute with Mexico. L. Renault, *Un premier litige devant la Cour d'Arbitrage de la Haye*. (Paris, 1903.)

² Cf. W. T. Stead, *The Americanization of the World* (London, 1902). This economic invasion was merely a temporary dumping of surplus products during a glut in the home market. The United States then had no proper organization for foreign trade, and obtained none until after the Great War.

return the State Department, under Hay, Root, Knox, and Bryan, refrained from any act or expression that would unfavourably affect British interests, or impair the integrity of the Empire. The entente, if we may so call it, was consummated by the appointment of James Bryce to the Washington embassy in 1907.

A first-fruit of this understanding was the Panama canal. The voyage of the U.S.S. *Oregon* round the Horn in 1898 touched the popular imagination; and new responsibilities in the Caribbean and the Pacific made the construction and operation of an inter-oceanic canal a vital American interest. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty stood in the way, but not the government of Lord Salisbury. John Hay negotiated with Sir Julian Pauncefote in 1899 a treaty that the Senate, much to his chagrin, rejected for its prohibition against fortifying the canal, and its invitation of international guarantee. With the informal aid of Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a new Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed on 18 November 1901, and promptly ratified by the Senate. This treaty gave the United States a free hand to construct and control the canal, subject only to the Suez rules of 1888, which merely forbade discrimination against foreign vessels.

For some years the relative merits of the Panama and Nicaragua routes had been pressed upon Congress by rival interests: the old French company, which wanted to sell its concession on the Isthmus, and a syndicate which had purchased a concession from the Republic of Nicaragua. The latter, being American, was more powerful; but the Panama group made headway by retaining a prominent New York lawyer who tactfully contributed \$60,000 to the Republican campaign fund, and enlisted the powerful support of Senator Hanna. By the Spooner Act of 28 June 1902, Congress authorized the President to acquire the French concession for

\$40,000,000 if the Colombian Republic would cede a strip of land across the Isthmus of Panama, within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms. On 22 January 1903 Secretary Hay induced the Colombian chargé at Washington to sign a treaty granting the United States a hundred-year lease of a ten-mile wide canal zone, for the lump sum of \$10,000,000 and an annual rental of \$100,000.

The Colombian Government procrastinated about ratifying this treaty—as other governments have been known to do—in spite of a truculent warning from Hay that something dreadful would happen in case of amendment or rejection. We need not take too seriously the constitutional scruples of the Colombian Government, since after the dreadful thing did happen the President offered to summon a congress with ‘new and friendly members’ and rush the treaty through. Nor need we give much weight to Roosevelt’s argument that Colombia placed him in a dilemma, of which the other horn was the inferior Nicaragua route.¹ The real obstacle to ratification was the forty millions coming to the French company from the United States. That company had no right to sell its concession without the permission of Colombia, for which permission the Colombian Government proposed to charge ten millions, which the French company did not wish to give. There is no good evidence that Colombia attempted to ‘hold up’ the United States for a higher price than the treaty provided, although its chargé at Washington had not obtained the conditions required by his instructions.

In July 1903 there was held at New York an informal meeting of Panama business men, agents of the French company, and United States army officers, to discuss

¹ The President was required by the Spooner Act to turn to Nicaragua only if unable to obtain a canal zone from Colombia ‘within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms’. Text in Willis F. Johnson, *Four Centuries of the Panama Canal* (1906), p. 401.

and plan a way out: the secession of the State of Panama from the Republic of Colombia. Without making any promise, or receiving any of the plotters, Roosevelt and Hay let their intentions become so notorious that Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the French company's agent at New York, advised the revolutionary junta at Panama to proceed in perfect assurance of American assistance. On 19 October three United States war vessels were ordered to the probable scene of hostilities, and on 2 November their commanders were instructed to occupy the Panama railway if a revolution broke out, and to prevent any Colombian force from landing troops within fifty miles of Panama. The acting Secretary of State cabled the United States consul at Panama, 3 November 1903, 'Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed.' The consul replied that afternoon, 'No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night'; and a few hours later, 'Uprising occurred to-night 6; no bloodshed. Government will be organized to-night.' The Colombian admiral on station was bribed to steam away, and the United States warships prevented troops being landed by the Colombian Government to restore authority on its own soil. On 4 November the Panama Declaration of Independence was read in the Plaza; on the 6th Secretary Hay recognized the Republic of Panama, which by cable appointed Mr. Bunau-Varilla its plenipotentiary at Washington. With him, twelve days later, Hay concluded a treaty by which the Canal Zone was leased in perpetuity to the United States.

As Roosevelt afterwards declared in a speech, 'I took the Canal Zone.' Considering the circumstances, one would wish that he had not defended himself by citing a treaty of 1846 with Colombia, in which she guaranteed to the United States the right of transit, and in return was guaranteed her 'right of sovereignty and property over the said territory'. It would also have been better

taste on Mr. Roosevelt's part to have refrained from hurling opprobrious epithets at fellow citizens who questioned the righteousness of his action. After all, the only difference at stake was a few million dollars more or less to the French stockholders ; and there was no very pressing hurry for the canal to be built. Colombia was struck by the big stick, but all Latin America trembled. Subsequently, in 1921, the United States paid \$25,000,000 to quiet Colombia ; it would have been better to have paid a tithe of this sum before November 1903.¹

Roosevelt was never scrupulous as to methods if a great end was in view, and he was most anxious to secure the Panama canal as a permanent monument to his administration. Over eager to 'make the dirt fly', he made some ill-considered appointments to the first Canal Zone Commission. The dirt would have flown to little purpose if Roosevelt had not appointed Colonel Goethals chief engineer and autocrat of the Canal Zone in 1907. Open to commercial traffic in August 1914, and formally completed six years later, the Panama Canal was a triumph for American engineering and organization. No less remarkable was the sanitary work of Colonel Gorgas, made possible by the discoveries of Ronald Ross and Walter Reed, which gave one of the world's greatest pest-holes a lower death-rate than any American city ; and the policing of Colonel Goethals, which converted the spot described by Froude as a 'hideous dungheap of moral and physical abomination' into a community of happy and healthy workers by hand and brain.²

¹ *Foreign Relations of the U.S.*, 1902, 1903, 1904 ; *The Story of Panama* (Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs, Washington, 1913) ; Ph. Bunau-Varilla, *Panama* (Paris, Plon-Nourrit ; and London, Constable, 1913).

² G. W. Goethals, *Government of the Canal Zone* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1915) ; Farnham Bishop, *Panama Past and Present* (1916).

2. *The Roosevelt Monroe Doctrine*

In the meantime a mighty potentate had heeded the menace of the big stick. Great Britain, Germany, and Italy established a formal blockade of Venezuela in December 1902, in order to enforce the collection of debts which Castro, the Venezuelan dictator, had no intention of paying. Roosevelt had already declared in his annual message of 1901 that the Monroe Doctrine did not guarantee any American nation against punishment for misconduct, 'provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power'. He believed, however, that Germany was the leader in this enterprise, and that her punishment of Venezuela would take that form. She declined to have the question arbitrated, and refused to deny herself the possibility of occupying Venezuelan territory 'temporarily'. The United States navy was in excellent condition, for the popularity it had won during the Spanish War had protected it from the usual post-war neglect. Roosevelt assembled Admiral Dewey's battle-fleet near Porto Rico, 'for manœuvres.' The German ambassador at Washington repeated his government's refusal. Roosevelt gave the imperial government a few days to change its mind. Before they had elapsed, he informed the ambassador that if no reply were received within twenty-four hours, Admiral Dewey would be ordered to the coast of Venezuela. Within twenty-four hours came a cable from the Kaiser, not only consenting to submit the question to arbitration, but requesting the President to be the arbitrator (22 December 1902). Roosevelt renounced this opportunity for glory, and referred the Kaiser to the Hague Tribunal, which settled the question satisfactorily.¹ In his annual message he described this outcome as a triumph for arbitration ;

¹ W. R. Thayer, *John Hay*, ii. 269-95 ; J. B. Bishop, *Roosevelt*, i. 221-9.

twelve years elapsed before the public knew why arbitration had triumphed.

The Venezuelan affair of 1902 showed that the United States could no longer avoid responsibility for equatorial America, if she wished to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt added a new gloss to the Doctrine in 1904—clear to the world, as it was offensive to what O. Henry called the ‘banana-stand republics’ of Central America.

‘If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society . . . may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases . . . to the exercise of an international police power.’

Within a year Roosevelt had an opportunity of applying this principle. At the request of the Dominican Republic, then threatened with forcible debt-collecting, the President placed an American receiver-general in charge of her revenue. At first the American staff merely controlled the custom-houses, sequestering a portion of the receipts for service of debt, but leaving the people to their own devices and revolutions. Under President Wilson this status was extended into a military occupation and protectorate, which was not concluded until 1924.

3. *World Politics*

For the first time the United States had a President whom the rulers of Europe looked upon as one of themselves, and who could play their game with their weapons. Roosevelt, more typically American than any President since Lincoln, also loved like Edward VII to inject his personality into world politics. The most conspicuous instance of this was his mediation in the Russo-Japanese War. Secretary Hay was then in his last illness, and the

President negotiated directly with premiers and crowned heads. No one but he could have brought the two belligerents together at that time, or broken the deadlock from which the Treaty of Portsmouth emerged; but not every one will admit the wisdom of that treaty. Roosevelt preserved for the time being the integrity of China; but only by serving notice on France and Germany that his country would join Japan if either power assisted Russia in the partition of the Celestial Empire. It is difficult to find any difference between this sort of thing and the system of secret treaties and secret diplomacy that Roosevelt, like other Americans, professed to abhor. He played the game with amateur audacity and professional skill, sounding out every step in advance; but if something had gone wrong the American people would have found themselves morally committed by their President to a fighting membership in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. For Roosevelt was not a bluffer. He always acted on the frontier maxim, 'Never draw unless you mean to shoot.' He got the drop on the cattle-thieves, and earned his Nobel peace prize, but the Peace of Portsmouth placed Japan in a position in Manchuria that brought her several times to the verge of war with the United States. If the door held open by John Hay swung to shortly after his death, it was because President Roosevelt's policy 'could not be continued except at the expense of the Constitution of the United States'.¹

By the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Roosevelt established for his country a right that she did not want, to be consulted in world politics. Again, in the Moroccan question of 1905-6, he quietly intervened to preserve peace with justice. The Convention of Algeciras was in part Roosevelt's work. What might not have happened, if he had been President in July 1914?

¹ Tyler Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 335.

Only fifty years old in 1908, and at the height of power and popularity, Roosevelt could have been re-nominated if he had only said the word. But he had declared in 1904 that 'under no circumstances' would he be a candidate to succeed himself; and in deference to the third-term tradition he contented himself with nominating his successor, William H. Taft.¹ To him, on 4 March 1909, Roosevelt handed over a government that had grown rapidly in prestige and power during the last seven years: a government that was by way of becoming once more a servant of the people. The entire civil service had been stimulated by Roosevelt's vitality, no less than by the knowledge that efficiency and intelligence would be recognized and rewarded. The whole tone and temper of public life had changed for the better, and the popular interest in public affairs had never been more keen or intelligent. Yet in one respect Roosevelt had failed as a leader. He inspired loyalty to himself, rather than to his ideals and policies.² With the conceit of a strong man he had forced and fascinated men of other beliefs to his and the public service, while neglecting to build up a progressive staff within the Republican party. It would never be quite the same old party again; but the Old Guard drew a sigh of relief when Roosevelt took ship to Africa.

¹ It is probable that Mr. Taft would have been nominated without Roosevelt's aid, although hardly so without the pecuniary assistance of his family. Bryan, for a third and last time the Democratic candidate, carried only the solid South, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Nevada: but his popular vote was a million more than that of Parker in 1904, and 43 per cent of the total.

² Even many of Roosevelt's friends and followers who have constituted themselves special guardians of the Roosevelt tradition tend to muffle the radical aspects of Roosevelt's career. His name is now generally evoked on behalf of an aggressive and selfish foreign policy that he would have been the first to denounce.

LXIV

THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION

1909-13

1. *Ineptitude and Insurgency*

STRONG-WILLED Presidents of the United States have generally managed to nominate their successors ; and if Roosevelt, unlike Jefferson and Jackson, did not bequeath the office to his Secretary of State, it was because the Secretary of War was more ' available '. William Howard Taft had no less experience in public affairs than Elihu Root. He had been an excellent judge, Governor of the Philippines, and diplomatist. The President loved him as a brother, and believed him the ideal person to carry out his policies. Many progressives indeed welcomed the change ; for Roosevelt's excessive use of opprobrious adjectives had become tiresome, as his voluminous messages were tedious ; and the last year of his administration was consumed in frenzied futility.¹ ' Big Bill ' Taft, it was hoped, would apply the emollient of his humour and good nature to the wheels of legislation.

If Roosevelt appeared to be more progressive than he really was, and Taft less, at heart they both were much the same. Taft wished to clinch the Roosevelt policies, but in his own fashion. Roosevelt was primarily a man of action, Taft essentially a man of deliberation. As a constitutional lawyer he could not share Roosevelt's view that the President could do anything not forbidden by law ; rather he could do only those things for which he had legal authority.² Roosevelt gave the Presidency

¹ As soon as the Republican leaders in Congress learned that Roosevelt would retire in 1909, they ignored alike his recommendations and his threats.

² The difference between Jackson and Buchanan, in their attitude towards nullification and secession, was of the same nature as the difference between Roosevelt and Taft.

an organic connexion with Congress ; under Taft the relationship became formal, almost diplomatic, and the initiative passed to House and Senate leaders who thought reform had gone far enough, if not too far.

Roosevelt went to Africa in March 1909, as much to avoid embarrassing the new President by his presence as for the pleasure of big game hunting. They parted with warm expressions of trust and affection. Yet Roosevelt returned fifteen months later to find the Republican party divided, the progressive programme halted ; and in fifteen months more the two old friends were exchanging bitter reproaches before the public.

That this happened was partly Mr. Taft's fault, but mostly his misfortune. The Republican platform of 1908 contained a pledge to revise the tariff : a problem that Roosevelt left alone, fearing lest it should prove a red herring across the trail of the trusts. Yet many believed the high Dingley tariff of 1897 to be the nursing mother of trusts. Revision was popularly understood as reduction. President Taft proposed in his inaugural address that the new tariff should afford merely a protection equal to the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad ; and that any consequent deficiency in the revenue be made up by a graduated inheritance tax. In order to shorten the uncertainty of business men, he summoned a special session of Congress for tariff legislation. Instead of attempting to draft a 'scientific' tariff (if there be such a thing), the two ways and means committees held hearings from interested manufacturers, and rushed through with little discussion the Payne-Aldrich bill, which raised duties on more than six hundred articles, and lowered them on a very few. Possibly it was the best tariff that could have been obtained without prolonged and impartial investigation. Certainly it failed to meet the expectations of those who wanted reduction. Mr. Taft was much disturbed. The more progressive Republicans voted

against the bill, and urged him to veto it as a violation of party pledges. Instead, he signed the Payne-Aldrich tariff, and shortly after pronounced it to be 'the best the country ever had'.

Mr. Taft allowed all but two of Roosevelt's cabinet to resign, and appointed men of different metal. James R. Garfield, Roosevelt's lieutenant in the conservation policy, was replaced in the Interior Department by R. A. Ballinger, who was presently charged by Gifford Pinchot, the chief forester, with letting the Guggenheimer interests obtain reserved coal lands in Alaska. The President referred this quarrel in his official family to the House of Representatives, which exonerated Ballinger; and thus placed himself in a dilemma of which he chose the horn of dismissing Pinchot. Yet Mr. Taft was a friend to conservation. He was the first President to withdraw oil lands from public sale. He asked for and obtained from Congress the authority to reserve the coal lands which Roosevelt had exerted *ex proprio vigore*, and set up the Bureau of Mines as guardian of the nation's mineral resources. Pinchot was replaced by the head of the Yale School of Forestry, and his policy was continued by the purchase of great timbered tracts in the Appalachians.

The progressive Republicans in Senate and House, led by LaFollette of Wisconsin, Beveridge of Indiana, and Norris of Nebraska, began to suspect Taft of playing traitor to the Roosevelt policies. Their first attack was directed against 'Uncle Joe' Cannon, Speaker of the House since 1903, 'a hard, narrow old Boeotian,' (according to Roosevelt) who controlled a well-oiled legislative mill which rejected progressive grist. In March 1910 progressive Republicans of the House joined with the Democratic minority to curb the Speaker's powers. Having effected this revolution in procedure, they became known as 'insurgents' within the Republican ranks. In January 1911 they and the

Senate progressives formed the National Progressive Republican League, in the hope of wresting control of the party from the Old Guard. Through his failure to oppose Cannon, Taft's prestige was involved in his defeat. The progressive cause gained, but legislative efficiency lost. Authority was needed to enforce party discipline in a body so unwieldy and fluctuating as the House of Representatives, and the Speaker's whip in due course was transferred to the floor leader.

So much for Mr. Taft's mistakes. His great misfortune was to be President in a period when the cost of living was rising rapidly, to keep pace with the increased world supply of gold. Railway rates were also going up. Hard-pressed wage-earners and small-salaried men blamed the tariff and the trusts. Big corporations had multiplied many-fold; it was natural to conclude that Republican regulation of trusts and railways was mere humbug. In the mid-term election of 1910 the Democrats won a majority in the House, and very much narrowed the Republican majority in the Senate. Democratic governors were elected in several North-eastern States such as New Jersey, where Dr. Woodrow Wilson, late president of Princeton University, made his first step towards a larger presidency. The torch of progress was passing from the Republicans; would the Democrats have the sense to grasp it?

2. Canadian Reciprocity and Dollar Diplomacy

With a lawyer in the White House and in the Department of State, American diplomacy returned to its traditional channels. By an exchange of notes in 1908, Japan and the United States agreed to support the independence and integrity of China, and the open door. Japan nevertheless, supported by the Triple Entente, began to consolidate her position in Manchuria. Secretary Knox attempted to meet this situation by proposing in 1909 to neutralize the Manchurian

railways. He had not felt out the Powers, as Roosevelt would have done, and his plan was rejected somewhat contemptuously by Russia and Japan.¹ Unseen hands were closing the open door.

A comparison of Roosevelt's and Taft's policy in Central America recalls the old adage that some persons can make off with a horse, whilst others cannot look over the stable wall. Secretary Knox signed treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras similar to Roosevelt's with San Domingo, underwriting American loans by an American guarantee against revolution and default. The Knox treaties were rejected by the Senate, and his policy both there and in the Far East was called 'dollar diplomacy'. Marines to clip coupons for Wall Street, forsooth! In 1911 President Taft, a warm friend to international peace, concluded treaties with both England and France for the arbitration of all disputes, including those involving 'national honour'. Their ratification would have been a fitting celebration of the centenary of Ghent. The German-American press and the professional Irish-Americans broke out into shrieks of dissent. A presidential election was coming, and the Senate rejected the treaties.

Again it was Mr. Taft's misfortune, not his fault, that tariff reciprocity with Canada failed. In November 1910 three United States Commissioners concluded with two members of the Dominion Parliament a reciprocity agreement to be adopted by identical legislative Acts. The agreement provided free trade in primary food products, which would naturally flow from Canada southward, and a large reduction on manufactures, which would obviously go the other way. It was a sincere and statesmanlike effort by Mr. Taft to cement friendly relations; but bad politics. The Insurgents, representing for the most part agrarian States, were

¹ Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, pp. 315-17; *Foreign Relations of the U.S.*, 1910, p. 236.

able to argue that reciprocity was a good bargain for the trusts, which would gain a new market and free raw materials at the farmer's expense. Republican and Democratic votes pushed the bill through Congress. In the debate Champ Clark, the new Democratic speaker, said, 'I am for it because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions clear to the North Pole.' Mr. Clark awoke the next day to find himself notorious. His words may have been a joke, as he feebly explained; more likely they were spoken for buncombe; certainly they expressed no current American sentiment. But they roused the fighting spirit of Canadian loyalty, were repeated in Parliament, and awoke to loud entreaty Mr. Kipling's lyre. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was forced to appeal to the country. Canadian manufacturers, who feared to lose the protected home market they had so carefully built up, financed the Conservative opposition; and in September 1911 reciprocity went down to defeat with Sir Wilfrid.

3. *Progress in Legislation*

Taft's administration will stand the test of progress. During his term much regulatory legislation was enacted. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 strengthened the Inter-state Commerce Commission on one side, while weakening it on another.¹ The Department of Commerce and Labor, established at Roosevelt's instance in 1903, was wisely divided. A postal savings-bank and a parcels-post service—reforms long overdue, much wanted by the people, but opposed by certain interests—were established by law (1910, 1912). Alaska, peevish and discontented since the collapse of the Klondike gold bubble, at last obtained full territorial government (1913). New Mexico and Arizona, last of the continental Territories save Alaska, became the forty-seventh

¹ See above, p. 436.

and forty-eighth States of the Union (1912).¹ Significant of the rapidly expanding envelope of law was the amendment of the Federal Constitution. As James Bryce pointed out, the difficulties of this process were such that the Constitution had not been amended since 1802, excepting 'in the course of a revolutionary movement which had dislocated the Union itself'.² The Fifteenth or income-tax amendment, and the Seventeenth Amendment transferring the election of United States Senators from state legislatures to the people, were adopted by Congress in 1909-10 and ratified by the requisite number of States in 1913. The one was required to override a decision of the Supreme Court; the other made the Senate responsive to the popular will, without impairing its extensive powers.

4. *Roosevelt's Return*

Theodore Roosevelt, after enjoying good hunting in Africa and a triumphal progress through Europe, returned to New York in June 1910. Greeted with an hysterical enthusiasm that somewhat dismayed him, he insisted on settling down at Sagamore Hill to pursue his many non-political interests. The *Outlook* made him associate editor, and afforded him an organ. But the role of sage was not congenial to Mr. Roosevelt, and the public would not be denied the delight of seeing and hearing their hero. Before the summer was over, he

¹ Taft again unnecessarily compromised himself with the Progressives by refusing to certify the admission of Arizona until it expunged from its constitution a provision for the popular recall of judges. Once admitted as a State, Arizona promptly restored the device. The State of Oklahoma, including the Territory of the same name and the Indian Territory, was admitted in 1907.

² *American Commonwealth* (1888 ed.), i. 487. The process required a two-thirds vote of both houses and ratification by three-fourths of the States; an alternative process initiated by the States has never been successfully employed. For the great number of proposed amendments that failed of adoption, see *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1896*, ii.

was making public addresses in the West, which showed unmistakably that shooting lions and dining with crowned heads had not dulled his 'fighting edge' for progress. His ideas, clarified and systematized as the 'New Nationalism', included not only the old Roosevelt policies of honesty in government and regulation of big business, but the relatively new conception of social justice—the reconstruction of society by political action.¹ This principle involved some very vigorous and wholly justified criticism of recent Supreme Court decisions, which had nullified social legislation in the States. That autumn, at the request of Governor Hughes of New York, he actively promoted the adoption of direct primaries in that State.

Conservative Republicans shuddered at the 'New Nationalism', and feared a breach with President Taft. Roosevelt visited his old friend at the temporary summer capital, continued a friendly correspondence for several months, and refrained from public criticism of his administration. Yet the two men were being pulled apart. Insurgents and displaced Progressives like Pinchot were continually telling Roosevelt that the President had surrendered to the Old Guard, and entreating him to be a candidate in 1912. Mr. Taft, on the other hand, was surrounded by friends and relatives whose advice resembled that of the Princess of Wales to George III: 'George, be a King!'

After the Democratic victories of 1910, and the Republicans' loss of the House, it was clear that Taft could not succeed himself. Senator LaFollette, who had an excellent record as a reforming state governor, put himself forward in 1911 as Insurgent candidate for

¹ 'I stand for the square deal. . . . I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity and of reward for equally good service.' Osawatomic speech of 31 August 1910.

the Republican nomination, on obtaining Roosevelt's assurance that he would not enter the contest.¹ LaFollette, however, had few admirers outside the Mississippi Valley, and his apparent physical and mental collapse during a speech on 2 February 1912 deflated his 'boom'.

Roosevelt had declared in 1904 that 'under no circumstances' would he again be a candidate for the Presidency. Taft was entitled to his support as his own choice, his friend, and at least a would-be progressive. To oppose Taft would impeach his own judgement. As late as 20 December 1911 Roosevelt wrote to Franklin K. Lane :

'I do not want to be President again, I am not a candidate, I have not the slightest idea of becoming a candidate. . . . From the personal standpoint I should view the nomination to the Presidency as a real and serious misfortune.'

But even then he was weakening. On the 29th he wrote to another friend :

'I have been immensely worried and puzzled over the Presidential business. I am really not thinking of myself at all now, but as to what is right to do. Taft is utterly hopeless. . . . He has shown himself an entirely unfit President, and he merely discredits the Republican Party.'

On 10 February 1912 the Republican governors of seven States signed a letter to Roosevelt, urging him to announce his candidacy. A few days later President Taft publicly denounced persons who supported the 'New Nationalism' as destructive radicals, 'political emotionalists', and 'neurotics'. These words touched Roosevelt on the raw, since a rumour that he was losing his reason was being circulated. They were exactly the sort of challenge to dissolve his lingering doubts, and arouse a violent spirit of combat. 'My hat is in the ring,' he announced on 21 February.

¹ LaFollette, *Autobiography* (1913), pp. 503-9.

² J. B. Bishop, *Roosevelt*, ii. 313.

Later in the same day he delivered an address advocating the initiative, the referendum, and the popular recall of judicial decisions : doctrines which alienated thousands of Republican voters, revealed a new streak of doctrinaire radicalism in Roosevelt, and made his nomination extremely unlikely.¹

LaFollette stayed in the fight, and the three-cornered contest for the Republican nomination became unseemly and bitter. Taft accused Roosevelt of appealing to class hatred ; Roosevelt accused Taft of biting the hand that fed him ; and many other things were said that would better have been left unsaid. Thirteen of the States chose their delegates to the party conventions by the new method of popular primaries, and 73 per cent of these delegates were instructed to vote for Roosevelt. But it was doubtful whether he had obtained a majority of the whole Republican convention. The Southern districts, Republican rotten boroughs, returned a solid block of Taft delegates who represented little more than the federal office-holders in their districts. By electing Elihu Root temporary chairman, the conservatives obtained control of the convention machinery, and awarded practically all the contested seats to Taft men.² Roosevelt, on the ground that his legitimate majority had been stolen, instructed his dele-

¹ The judicial nullification of social legislation was indeed serious, but the Supreme Court turned a corner in 1910 by sustaining a minimum wage law of Oregon, and Roosevelt's remedy was worse than the disease, a quack medicine like free silver.

² This question of the contested delegates is so enmeshed in precedent and party technique as to be almost insoluble for the layman. It is asserted on the one hand that the same 'steam roller' methods were used by Roosevelt in 1904 and 1908 ; on the other that there was no precedent for the action taken by Mr. Root. It seems on the whole probable that even if all the contests had been fairly decided, Roosevelt would not have had a majority ; but that if Roosevelt had allowed his avowed delegates to vote, they would have won enough Taft votes to get the nomination. As one member told the writer, the negro delegates were 'straining on the leash' to vote for Roosevelt.

gates to take no further part in the proceedings ; and Taft was renominated by a strong majority (June 1912).

Roosevelt and his followers at once took steps to found a new party. Local organizations were rapidly formed, and on 5 August 1912 the first Progressive party convention met at Chicago, amid scenes of febrile enthusiasm that recalled the Populist, and the early days of the Republican party. 'We stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord,' announced Roosevelt to his enraptured followers, who nominated him by acclamation. Another *mot* of the beloved leader, 'I am feeling like a bull moose,' gave the new party an appropriate symbol, beside the Republican elephant and the Democratic donkey.

The formation of the Progressive party was a mistake from every point of view—save that of the Democratic party. Roosevelt's secession with his following lost many good men their political careers, and ended all chance of liberalizing the Republican party in that generation ; for although the Progressives eventually returned to the fold, it was under circumstances that made them a tail to the conservative kite. The true progressive strategy of the moment was that of LaFollette—to remain in the party, let the Old Guard lead it to defeat, and wait for 1916. Roosevelt's mistake was so colossal, irreparable, and so contrary to his long-settled principles of loyalty to friends and party, that one naturally asks whether an appetite for power were not his moving force. Egoism was there, and Roosevelt's instinct was always for action ; but personal ambition in the ordinary sense of the word was absent. Roosevelt, with an erring judgement that his friends are loath to admit, simply believed that he was needed to save the country, and that the country wanted saving.

The Progressives hoped that they would break the solid South ; but Roosevelt had invited Booker Washington to dinner at the White House. And the South had a candidate of her own.

WOODROW WILSON

1912-17

I. *The Professor in Politics*

THE young men of the South who lived through the dark days of reconstruction without allowing the bitterness of it to enter their souls came out clean as tempered steel. Such men were Basil Gildersleeve, Walter H. Page, and Thomas Woodrow Wilson. The year after Taft entered Yale, and the year before Roosevelt entered Harvard, Woodrow Wilson, son and grandson of Scots Presbyterian ministers, came up to Princeton.¹ At the Hasty Pudding Club of Harvard, 'Teddy' would become so excited in debate as to lose the power of articulation. 'Tommy' was remembered at Whig Hall, Princeton, for having lost an interclub debating contest rather than defend protection against free trade. Before graduating from Harvard, Roosevelt wrote his first book, *The Naval History of the War of 1812*, which sounded the note of preparedness for war on which his life closed. In his last year at Princeton, Wilson published an article exposing the irresponsibility of congressional government, which he did so much to remedy. Roosevelt entered public life in 1881; Wilson, after a brief and unprofitable practice of law, took his doctorate at Johns Hopkins, and began a quiet career of teaching and scholarship. In 1890, the year after Roosevelt was appointed to the Civil Service Commission, Wilson obtained a chair of political science at Princeton; and in 1902, the year after Roosevelt became President of the United States, Wilson was chosen president of Princeton University.

¹ Wilson was born in 1856, Taft in 1857, Roosevelt in 1858. They graduated respectively in 1879, 1878, and 1880. Wilson dropped his first name when he became an author.

While Roosevelt fought political privilege in the nation, Wilson contended with social privilege at Princeton. Originally an austere Presbyterian college, Princeton had become a haven of the well-to-do, where young bloods monopolized the amenities of university life. Wilson attempted, too rigidly and arbitrarily, to assort the undergraduates in quadrangular groups. Andrew F. West, a classical scholar of equal determination, spoiled the symmetry of his scheme; and in 1910 Wilson stepped out of the academic cloister.

As a scholar, publicist, and leader in education, Wilson enjoyed a national reputation; but active politics were considered a closed sphere to professors. George Harvey, editor of *Harper's Weekly*, in search of an honest Democratic candidate for the Presidency, mentioned Woodrow Wilson in 1906. The suggestion was greeted with jeers; but the professor took it to heart. In 1910 the Democrats of New Jersey—an amorphous State, half bedroom to New York and half to Philadelphia, controlled by corporations attracted by the laxity of its laws—wished to ‘start something’ with a new sort of candidate. They had long been out of power, and their none too savoury reputation might be sweetened by a scholar. At George Harvey’s suggestion the bosses nominated Wilson, and the people elected him governor. Chosen for the job of window-dressing, Wilson proceeded to clean up the shop. Harvey dropped him as an ingrate, but a silent politician from Texas named Colonel House took him up, and Wilson became a leading candidate for the presidential nomination in 1912.

2. *The Election of 1912*

The Democratic party had changed singularly little since Andrew Jackson’s time. It was composed of an emotional and somewhat radical western wing, represented by Bryan, Irish-Americans of the industrial

States, who wanted power and office, and the solid South, including almost every white man in the late Confederacy, with its new Western colonies of Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona. Only tradition and the hope of victory held these sections together, but the issues of liquor and religion that almost split the party in 1924 had not yet arisen; and the rural Tories of the South had much sympathy with rebels against the Northern industrial bosses. In only one election since the Civil War had the party polled less than forty-three per cent of the total vote cast for President; but it wanted leadership. Cleveland's victories had proved barren, Bryan had thrice failed, and the majority leaders in Congress were elderly and timid. When the Democratic national convention met (June 1912), the majority of delegates were pledged for Champ Clark of Missouri, the candidate of Tammany Hall and of William Randolph Hearst. Mr. Underwood of Alabama represented the 'Bourbons' (as the Old Guard of this party was called); Governor Wilson the progressive wing. W. J. Bryan, still a power in his party, required all his art and eloquence to drive the money-changers from the temple, and to throw the nomination to Woodrow Wilson.

The Presidential election, then, became a three-cornered contest between Taft, Roosevelt, and Wilson; but really between the two last, as rival bidders for the popular feeling against privilege. It was a year of social unrest. A new syndicalist movement, the Industrial Workers of the World, had arisen in 1905, had organized the migratory harvest hands of the West, and was contesting the skilled-worker field with the A. F. of L. The I. W. W. took charge of a great strike in the polyglot textile city of Lawrence, Massachusetts, and displayed to the shocked middle classes red banners with lawless and godless mottoes.¹ Thus the campaign

¹ Incidentally the Lawrence strike brought out the fact that the

was fought with revolution looming as alternative to reform ; and in that year the Socialist Party, under E. V. Debs, reached high tide. Samuel Gompers, analysing the Progressive platform as mere eye-wash for Caesarism, advised the members of the A. F. of L. to vote for Wilson.

Taft and the Republicans accepted the ultra-conservative role now thrust upon them, and preached checks and balances and protection of minorities as the essence of freedom. There was little to choose between the Democratic and Progressive platforms. The latter, as Roosevelt said, 'represented the first effort on a large scale to translate abstract formulas of economic and social justice into concrete American nationalism.'¹ Both denounced the Payne-Aldrich tariff, but the Democratic platform had the cleaner-cut tariff plank. With the Roosevelt doctrine of regulation the Democrats substantially agreed. Wilson's 'New Freedom', a counterblast to Roosevelt's 'New Nationalism', was composed of the same ingredients. Their method of campaigning, however, had no more in common than their personalities. Roosevelt's tone was that of a fighting parson ; Wilson already showed some glint of the spiritual quality of Lincoln. Roosevelt, with biblical imagery and voice like a shrilling fife, stirred men to wrath, to combat, and to antique virtue ; Wilson, serene and confident, lifted men out of themselves by phrases that sang in their hearts, to a vision of a better world. It was the Old Testament against the New ; and the New won.

Wilson polled only forty-two per cent of the vote, but won an overwhelming majority in the electoral college. Roosevelt, with twenty-seven per cent of the

woollen industry, which enjoyed the highest measure of protection by the Payne-Aldrich tariff, was paying starvation wages. The strike was a spontaneous outbreak of desperate men, captured and controlled by Syndicalist leaders.

¹ Roosevelt, *Works* (Memorial ed.), xix. 565.

vote, carried six States. Taft with twenty-three per cent carried only Utah and Vermont.

Progressives thought of 1856, and were confident of triumph in 1916. The Grand Old Party, as they saw it, had gone the way of the Whigs—killed by a great moral issue that it would not face. Another bland Buchanan was in the White House. But the Old Guard neither died nor surrendered. The Progressives were little more than a candidate and his following; certainly not an organic party. They elected only 18 members to Congress, where the Republicans had 127 members and remained the opposition. And Woodrow Wilson, instead of playing the part of Buchanan, welded his party into a fit instrument of his great purpose 'to square every process of our national life again with the standards we so proudly set up at the beginning and have always carried at our hearts'.¹

3. *Legislative Achievement*

Few even of the new President's friends expected more than a respectable presidency. Wilson lacked the common touch, and loved humanity in the abstract rather than people in particular. Unlike Roosevelt, he could not descend into the market-place or emulate the prize-ring; throughout his eight years of office he was always aloof, and often alone. His humour and warm affections appeared only to a few intimate friends. The obstinacy that had been his undoing in the academic world was not likely to be a useful virtue in the Presidency, if Cleveland's career were a fair test. And no President since Jefferson had been able to turn an intellectual equipment to public service. 'Wilson is clean, strong, high-minded and cold-blooded,' wrote the warm-hearted man who became his Secretary of the Interior; but he was also a Southerner, likely to be ineffective in performance, and to take refuge from facts in generali-

¹ First inaugural address.

ties. Loving the quiet places of life, his term was placed in an era of fierce contention ; without Lincoln's power to express himself in words of one syllable, he was certain to be misunderstood.

Colonel E. M. House elected himself *l'éminence grise* of the Wilson administration. The Cabinet was selected by him, as most cabinets have been by some one, in order to reunite a party considerably torn by the contest for nomination. Bryan for Secretary of State, ensuring the support of his immense following for the administration, appeared to be a master-stroke until there was work for him to do. William G. McAdoo, Wilson's campaign manager and future son-in-law, became a great Secretary of the Treasury. L. M. Garrison, as Secretary of War, proved too warlike for his chief, and was dropped after three years. Franklin K. Lane, Canadian by birth and Californian by residence, proved an ideal Secretary of the Interior to reconcile the Far West with conservation. The others were nonentities. It was not a strong group. The majority were Southerners, as by the rule of seniority were most of the chairmen of House and Senate committees. New England, for perhaps the first time in American history, was not represented in the Cabinet, although Massachusetts, for the first time since 1804,¹ had voted with Virginia.

When Congress met on 7 April 1913, President Wilson revived a practice abandoned by Jefferson, of addressing both Houses in person. A slight thing in itself, this act caught popular approval. It restored the President's initiative in law-making, and established a relation between the 'two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue' in the best sort of way. For Wilson's power over men left him when he stepped off the rostrum ; unlike Roosevelt, he could not persuade or browbeat a recalcitrant congressman in private conversation.

Congress had been summoned to special session, as in

¹ Excepting 1820, when there was but one presidential candidate.

1909, to revise the tariff, but the result was very different from that of 1909. The Underwood tariff of 3 October 1913 was the lowest since the Civil War. Judged by British standards it was still a protective tariff, but more than one hundred materials and articles were placed on the free list. Unfortunately it never had a proper test. The European war so deranged American economic life as to bring a business depression in the winter of 1914-15 which was followed by artificial prosperity. A graduated federal tax on incomes, constitutional since the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment (1913), was appended to the Underwood tariff bill.

The greatest measure of Wilson's first year was the Federal Reserve Act of 23 December 1913, which entirely reconstructed the national banking and currency system. The existing system, inelastic and obsolete, had contributed largely to the panic of 1907; but the Republicans had been unable to remedy matters. A great central bank would have been the ideal substitute; but the tradition of Jackson's contest with 'the monster' was still strong in the Democratic party, and a federal investigation had uncovered the existence of a so-called money trust, controlled by a handful of New York financiers. By the Federal Reserve Act the country was divided into twelve districts, each with a Federal Reserve bank: a private corporation empowered to issue banknotes against commercial paper and other liquid assets. A Federal Reserve Board, appointed by the President and connected with the Treasury Department, controls the rate of discount and superintends the Federal Reserve banks, which in turn are articulated with such local banks as wish to become members of the system.¹ That the Democratic party with its rural constituencies could have passed the most important piece of financial legislation since Hamilton was no less

¹ E. W. Kammerer, *The A.B.C. of the Federal Reserve System* (3rd ed., 1919).

remarkable than the persistency with which President Wilson kept Congress to its task, even refusing a Christmas recess until the bill was ready for his signature.

The Federal Trade Commission and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914¹ enacted the repeated recommendations of President Roosevelt—who refused to admit the connexion, or to discover any good qualities in the Wilson administration. The Clayton Act included what Mr. Gompers called ‘labour’s charter of freedom’: a section declaring that labour unions could never be considered unlawful combinations *per se*; that strikes, boycotting, and picketing were not, as such, violations of federal law; and that the injunction could no longer be used by federal courts in labour disputes, unless to prevent irreparable injury. Although these provisions were largely declaratory of existing practice, they relieved the mind of labour from fear lest the incidents of the Pullman strike of 1894 should be repeated. They did not, like the British Act of 1906, relieve unions from corporate responsibility for damage caused by their members.

This list by no means exhausts the reform and social legislation initiated by Wilson and enacted by the Democratic Congress. A rural credits law, a Workmen’s Compensation Act for the federal civil service, and a law excluding from inter-state commerce the products of child labour were passed in 1916.² The LaFollette Seamen’s Act of 1915 did much for the sailors’ well-being, and abolished the crime of desertion in the

¹ See above, p. 435.

² The last was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, as was a second law passed in 1918, laying special taxes on factories employing children under 14; although earlier Acts excluding articles such as lottery tickets and oleomargarine from inter-state commerce had been validated. Congress in 1924 initiated a child-labour amendment to override these decisions; but in the reaction against federal interference with personal liberty through the prohibition amendment, it failed of ratification.

American merchant marine ; but did not as its advocates predicted restore American supremacy at sea—nor, for that matter, did the United States Shipping Board, created in 1916. All in all, the Democratic party made a splendid record of intelligent leadership and harmonious co-operation. They had proved that progress and statesmanship were not the monopoly of the Republicans ; that the progressive movement, which the Populists had begun and Roosevelt made popular, transcended party lines.

4. *Neighbours and Dependencies*

Since 1900 it had been an article of Democratic faith that the Philippine Islands should be given their independence at the earliest practicable moment. Congress accordingly passed the Jones Act (1916) giving the Islands dominion status, and promising absolute independence in the near future. Francis Burton Harrison, the Governor-General appointed by President Wilson, so construed his own powers that they became merely nominal. The civil service was ' Filipinized ' to a point where efficiency suffered and corruption entered. A commission consisting of W. Cameron Forbes (Roosevelt's Governor-General) and General Wood (Roosevelt's favourite officer), appointed by President Harding in 1921, reported that the insular government was demoralized and the people unfit to defend themselves or to govern justly the Moslem minority. General Wood was appointed Governor with enhanced authority, independence was indefinitely postponed, and the nationalist movement became more intense and bitter. Fortunately, the islands have not yet provided a field for corporate exploitation ; but if present plans for huge rubber plantations are carried out, independence is not likely to arrive by mutual consent.

President Wilson, in 1913, was not interested in foreign affairs ; and Mr. Bryan used the State Depart-

ment mainly to promote compulsory arbitration treaties. In a speech of 17 October 1913 the President declared to the somewhat doubting ears of Latin America that the United States would never add a foot to its territory by conquest ; but in practice he continued in the Caribbean the 'dollar diplomacy' of Taft and Knox. Hayti, in the throes of a revolution, was occupied in 1915 by United States marines, and after the lapse of ten years remains a colonial appanage of the Navy Department. Nicaragua became a financial protectorate like the Dominican Republic, which, at the same time, was advanced to the status of an occupied republic. On the other hand, Wilson renounced American participation in the three-power loan to China, which Knox had arranged.

Mexico gave the administration a much more serious problem. In 1911 Porfirio Diaz, the dictator of Mexico for thirty-five years, resigned as the result of a revolutionary movement that he could no longer suppress. Unlike most American revolutions, this upheaval in Mexico was not political, but social. Diaz had given his country order at the expense of every sort of liberty. The national domain of 135 million acres was cut up into latifundia (*haciendas*), or used to augment the already swollen estates of less than one thousand great land-owners (*haciendados*). At the same time Diaz pursued a policy resembling the enclosures of eighteenth-century England, expropriating and allotting in severalty the communal lands of the Indian villages. The new owners were able to exact forced labour from the landless peons by keeping them in perpetual debt for food and supplies. Education remained in the hands of the Church. The Mexican Government was more autocratic than that of Russia, the ruling class more concentrated and powerful, the condition of the people worse. Foreign mining and other interests, to which Diaz gave generous concessions and ensured order, naturally supported his régime.

The revolution of 1910-11 was conducted by a small doctrinaire middle class under Francisco I. Madero, but supported by the peons in the hope of recovering their communal lands. Madero was installed as constitutional president in 1911, but neither kept order nor satisfied the aspirations of the landless. A counter-revolution of the *hacendados* displaced him by assassination in February 1913, and installed Victoriana Huerta as President. Although unable to exert his authority over the greater part of the country, which was fast falling into anarchy, Huerta was promptly recognized by Great Britain and most of the Powers. Strong pressure was exerted on President Wilson by American business interests to do the same. The average American and European could see no other outcome but a restoration of the same autocracy which was responsible for the very conditions repugnant to his sense of property and order. President Wilson refused to be moved. The situation also threatened to becloud Anglo-American relations, for the controversy over Panama Canal tolls was on, and the United States Government had reason to believe that the British Ambassador at Mexico, a strong supporter of Huerta, represented British oil interests as well as the Foreign Office. Colonel House first met Sir Edward Grey in July 1913, in order to talk this matter over. At a series of private and informal conferences in Washington between Colonel House, Sir William Tyrrell, and the President, the latter agreed to press Congress to repeal the exemption of American ships from canal tolls, in return for the Foreign Office withdrawing support from Huerta. This agreement—quietly concluded over the heads of the State Department and the British Embassy—was carried out; and from that date the Foreign Office has followed American lead in Mexican affairs.¹

¹ Charles Seymour, *Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (1926), i. 191-306. Equality of tolls in the Panama Canal, which plain language of the

Huerta brought matters to a head early in 1914 by refusing to make proper reparation for an insult to the American flag. In April the President sent a force of marines to Vera Cruz, which they took with slight loss. Almost every one expected that a second war with Mexico was about to begin. It did not begin, because Wilson desired no Mexican territory, and wished to help the Mexican people to find themselves. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile proposed a joint mediation, which the President and Huerta accepted. Huerta stood out stiffly against the terms of the mediation ; but unable to obtain arms or credit from the United States or from an otherwise-occupied Europe, he was practically starved out of office.

During the six years that followed Mexico occasionally broke out into peace. Fundamentally, the trouble was that the underlying force of the revolution—the land hunger of the peasants—was unable to find a leader with the honesty to adopt fundamental reforms and the strength to preserve order. Civil war in Mexico, however, is not so serious a matter as in more civilized countries. President Wilson adopted a policy of ‘watchful waiting’, while endeavouring without success to create Pan-American machinery for dealing with the situation. The State Department advised all United States citizens to withdraw from the country, but many who remained to protect their property suffered at the hands of revolutionists and bandits. In 1916 the repeated raids of the bandit Villa across the Texan border forced the President’s hand. The regular army and national guard were mobilized along the Rio Grande, and an expeditionary force under General John J. Pershing was sent in pursuit of Villa, who made good his escape. The cost was well worth the practice it afforded to the army ; but failure to bring results dis-

Hay-Pauncefote treaty required, was urged by the President on 5 March 1919, and restored by Act of Congress on 15 June.

credited the policy of watchful waiting. Armed intervention or even annexation would have been popular in the United States, and with the Mexican upper classes; but President Wilson again refused to take advantage of Mexican weakness and distraction. Probably no other nation but the United States, and no other President but Wilson, would so long and patiently have tolerated such conditions in a neighbouring country.¹

Wilson's achievements during his first term were indeed remarkable. The professor had become leader of a party refractory to leadership, and converted it from State-rights tradition to enlightened nationalism. In three years he had convinced the average citizen that the Federal Government was at last his servant; and had captured the loyalty of 'forward-looking' men and women. The Democratic party, completely under his spell, renominated him by acclamation in 1916; but he had a stout fight to wage against the reunited Republican party. His internal reforms, excepting the Federal Reserve Act, were unpalatable to big business; and to many citizens his foreign policy appeared feeble, procrastinating, and pusillanimous.

¹ Briefly to resume the Mexican question up to 1926: Venustiano Carranza, who controlled the government at Mexico City from the fall of Huerta to May 1920, promulgated agrarian reforms, and (in 1917) a new constitution with stringent decrees in religious matters, and against foreign concessions, that he did not dare carry out. He was recognized as *de facto* President in 1915, and became constitutional President in 1917. In 1920 Alvaro Obregon captured the government and was elected President. The diplomatic slate was wiped clean by treaties between the United States and Mexico in 1923. Another rebellion was suppressed that year; and in 1924 Plutarco E. Calles peacefully succeeded to the Presidency. The following year the Mexican Congress passed retroactive and confiscatory land-laws that raised a new dispute with the United States Government, as well as anti-clerical legislation that agitated the Roman Catholics of the United States.

5. *The War and the Election of 1916*

All these problems and embarrassments paled before the issues presented to the United States by the European war. To give these issues the extended treatment that their importance deserves would be outside the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that the war divided American opinion into three antagonistic groups : pro-ally, pro-German, and neutral, which traversed political party lines. President Wilson sympathized from the first with the Allied cause, but believed that the interest of the United States and of the world required his country to remain neutral, in order to come forth in due time as peacemaker. However, the form of neutrality that his administration observed was distinctly benevolent to the Allies ; and Secretary Bryan resigned after the sinking of the *Lusitania* (7 May 1915) rather than lend himself to protests against the German submarine policy that might have to be made good by war. This policy enraged the pro-Germans, from whose publications we would gather that the President took his orders from Downing Street ; whilst the long literary duel in which the President engaged with the German Government, and his reluctance to prepare for war, enraged those who believed the cause of England, France, and Russia to be the cause of liberty and humanity. The Republican party was pro-ally in leadership, but dared not avow it for fear of losing the German-American vote. Consequently, in 1916, the Republicans attempted to carry water on both shoulders ; while the Democrats defended the President's neutrality policy.

By 1916 the Progressive party was moribund. Like the Populists and other minor parties, it helped to convert the American people from *laissez-faire* to social politics, and passed out of existence because a major party appropriated its principles. Roosevelt, uneasy outside the G.O.P., began to endorse Republicans for

office in 1914. Those members of the party who were really progressive in domestic matters gradually came over to the support of Wilson, leaving behind the more ardent pro-allies, the idolizers of 'Teddy', and what he called the 'lunatic fringe' of extreme radicals. Roosevelt himself became increasingly absorbed in the European war, which he regarded as the one outstanding issue in the election of 1916. A Progressive convention was summoned at the same time and to the same place as the Republican convention. There was hope that the Republican convention would nominate Roosevelt, when the Progressives would come back to the fold; but the Republicans wished to punish Roosevelt for his secession, and feared the effect of his vigorous support of the Allies on German-American voters. Accordingly Charles Evans Hughes, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,¹ was placed in nomination; and Roosevelt dismissed the last Progressive convention with the advice to follow him back into the Grand Old Party.

By adding together the Republican and Progressive vote of 1912, Justice Hughes appeared certain of victory. All the well-known political portents—the September election in Maine, the trend in New York, the betting odds of ten to seven—indicated a Republican victory; and when the returns on 8 November showed that Mr. Hughes had carried New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, his election was taken for granted. But the Far West was not yet heard from; and the electoral vote of the Far West had grown with its population. Mr. Hughes had made several errors during an electioneering tour of California. He lost that State by less than 1,300 votes; and its electoral vote was just sufficient to give a majority in the electoral college to Wilson.

'He kept us out of war,' was the popular Democratic slogan of 1916; but since the beginning of the year President and Congress had been quietly preparing for

¹ Since Secretary of State under Presidents Harding and Coolidge.

war. The National Defence Act proved insufficient, except in its provision of summer training camps for officers; but the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916 would by 1924 have given the United States the largest navy in the world, if not limited by the Washington conference of 1922.

President Wilson's 'peace without victory' address on 22 January 1917 was his last effort to bring the war to an end by diplomacy. Ten days later the German Government withdrew its pledges, and announced unrestricted submarine warfare. On 3 February the German Ambassador at Washington was given his passport. On the 26th the President asked Congress for authority to arm merchant vessels, proposing to adopt a system of armed neutrality similar to that of the Federalists against France in 1798. The bill was held up over the adjournment on 4 March by a Senate filibuster of seven Republicans and five Democrats. On 13 March occurred the Russian Revolution, removing, in Mr. Wilson's opinion, the last taint of autocracy from the Allied cause. Addressing the newly elected Congress on 2 April 1917, the President declared:

'With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be, in fact, nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.'

In the small hours of Good Friday morning, 6 April 1917, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring war on the German Empire.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE following select bibliography is intended as a guide to the literature of American history since 1783. For the average reader, the most interesting works have been preferred, provided they are sound. For students, books containing bibliographies or foot-notes that will open up the literature of the subject are included, and some of the more important and available sources. The names of publishers have been added to the titles of recent books for the convenience of librarians and others who may wish to make a collection of the best works on American history.¹

All American publishers mentioned are of New York, unless another place is given.

I. GENERAL

I. HISTORIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

Edward Channing, *History of the United States* (Macmillan, 6 vols., 1905-25) is the best work from a single pen covering the entire field, and is founded on a lifetime's research. Written mainly for students and teachers, it is original in treatment, objective in point of view, sparing of interpretation, and economical in style; with excellent critical and bibliographical apparatus. Volume I begins with the voyages of the Northmen, volume VI concludes the Civil War; two more are forthcoming.

Albert Bushnell Hart (ed.), *The American Nation: A History*. (27 vols., Harpers, 1904-8, and a supplementary vol., 1918). A co-operative history, presenting the results of the first generation of American scientific historiography in a compact and readable form. Excellent bibliographies and maps, which are omitted from later editions. The best individual volumes will be noticed below.

Allen Johnson (ed.), *The Chronicles of America* (50 vols., Yale Univ. Press, 1918-20). Written for the general public, in small volumes of thirty to sixty thousand words each, this series is eminently readable;

¹ All books printed in the United States may be obtained from the publisher's London branch, or if he have none, directly from him. The Oxford University Press is British agent for the University Presses of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton; J. S. King & Co., for the publications of Columbia University. For out-of-print books on American history, I can recommend Goodspeed's, 2 Park Street, Boston, Mass. U.S. Government documents can be obtained only from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C., or from the appropriate government department.

but the volumes are of very unequal value as history. The best will be mentioned under their appropriate period.

John B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War* (8 vols., Appleton, 1883-1913) is a valuable collection of facts and records, largely from contemporary newspapers, giving a moving picture of the American people in their social and economic, rather than their political relationship; but not easy to read consecutively.

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c. *Special Phases*. The 'Contributions to American Economic History' published by the Carnegie Institute of Washington, although disappointingly inadequate, are still best in their respective fields: E. R. Johnson *et al.*, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the U.S.* (2 vols. 1922), B. H. Meyer *et al.*, *History of Transportation in*

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d. *Statistics.* The volumes of the decennial censuses of the United States are supplied only to libraries, by the Census Bureau, Washington. The current *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, *Abstract of the Census of Manufactures*, and the *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census*, are most useful compendia, and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C.

e. *Periodicals.* *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1886-) and *American Economic Review* (Evanston, Ill., 1911-) are the principal journals of economic history.

3. FOREIGN RELATIONS.

There is no comprehensive history of American Foreign Policy. C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy* (new ed., Henry Holt, 1924) is the best handbook. The best collection of treaties is W. M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties . . . between the U.S. and other Powers, 1778-1909* (2 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910, and a third volume covering the period 1910-23). The documentary history of foreign relations may be found in the following compilations: *Diplomatic Correspondence of the U.S., 1783-1789* (7 vols., Washington, 1833-4, and 3 vol. edition, 1837); *State Papers and Publick Documents of the U.S. [1789-1818]* (12 vols., Boston: T. B. Wait, 1815-19), usually cited as 'Wait's State Papers'; *American State Papers, Foreign Relations [1789-1828]* (6 vols., folio, Washington, 1832-59). From 1828 to 1860 the published papers on foreign relations must be sought in the general series of Congressional documents. From 1861 to 1914, inclusive, the government published an annual volume or volumes analogous to the British and Foreign State Papers, under the titles *Papers relating to Foreign Affairs* (1861-9, generally bound under title *Diplomatic Correspondence*), and *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S.* (1870-1916). Important extracts from these collections, and from Department of State MSS., are published with valuable notes in J. Bassett Moore, *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the U.S. has been a party* (6 vols., Washington, 1898), and *Digest of International Law* (8 vols., Washington, 1906).

4. TRAVEL.

Contemporary publications of 1763-1846 are listed in the *Cambridge History of American Literature*, i. 468-90 (see § 17c, below), and in Channing's *Guide* (see § 8). Cf. J. L. Mesick, *The English Traveller in America, 1785-1835* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1922); A. Nevins, *American Social Life as seen by British Travellers* (Henry Holt, 1923). Some of the more rare and important works of western travel are reprinted, with valuable notes by R. G. Thwaites, in *Early Western Travels* (32 vols., Cleveland: A. H. Clark Co., 1904-7).

5. GOVERNMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY.

Lord Bryce's classic *American Commonwealth*, best in the early unrevised edition of 1888, is an incomparable description of the Federal and State Governments during that decade. The following generation brought many changes, which are well described in W. B. Munro, *Government of the U.S.*, and *Government of American Cities* (rev. eds., Macmillan, 1926); A. N. Holcomb, *State Government in the U.S.* (Macmillan, 1926); H. G. James, *Local Government in the U.S.* (Appleton, 1921). A brief constitutional history of the United States is much wanted; Charles Warren, *The Supreme Court in U.S. History* (3 vols., Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1922, revised ed., 2 vols., 1926) is a good substitute for the period to 1888. It should be supplemented by E. Wambaugh, *Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1914), and Allen Johnson, *Readings in American Constitutional History, 1776-1876* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912). *The American Political Science Review* (Univ. of Michigan, or London: P. S. King & Son, 1907-) and the *Political Science Quarterly* (Columbia Univ., 1886-) are indispensable to the student of American government. See also part v of Commons's *Trade Unionism* (§ 2b).

6. HISTORICAL PERIODICALS AND PUBLICATIONS OF HISTORICAL SOCIETIES.

The *American Historical Review* (1895-) is the best guide to American new historical literature, and contains important articles and documents. The annual *Reports* of the American Historical Association (1889-, overlapped by 5 vols. of *Papers*, 1886-91) include many other articles, monographs, and source material. They are sent with the *Review* to members of the American Historical Association (Washington, D.C.). Former *Reports* may be had from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington. The best of the regional historical quarterlies is the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (1915-), organ of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association (Lincoln, Neb.), whose *Proceedings* (1907-) are also important. The *Proceedings* (1791-) and *Collections*

(1792-) of the *Massachusetts Historical Society* are the best of the many state series.

7. SOURCE COLLECTIONS.

S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents on the American Revolution and Formation of the Federal Constitution* (Clarendon Press, 1923) is in a sense introductory to this work. William Macdonald, *Documentary Source Book of American History, 1606-1926* (Macmillan, 1926) is a compendium of the same editor's *Select Charters, 1606-1775* (1899), *Select Documents, 1776-1861* (1897), and *Select Statutes, 1861-98* (1903); and would be a most useful companion to this work. The *Old South Leaflets* (222 numbers, published by the Old South Association, Boston, at five cents each) contain source material in pamphlet form. In A. B. Hart, *American History told by Contemporaries* (4 vols., Macmillan, 1897-1901) the selections are made from an illustrative rather than a documentary purpose. For collections of State papers, &c., see § 3 and the bibliographies in § 8.

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Channing, Hart, and Turner, *Guide to the Study and Reading of American History* (Boston: Ginn, 1912) is the best comprehensive and classified bibliography. For works that have appeared since, see G. G. Griffin's annual *Writings on American History* (volumes for 1906-8 published by Macmillan; for 1912-17 by the Yale Univ. Press; subsequent ones appear as supplements to the *Reports* of the American Historical Association). These include periodical articles as well as books, and are mildly critical. The Historical Association (of London) has issued in leaflet form an excellent *Short Bibliography of American History* by C. R. Fish and W. Notestein.

9. GEOGRAPHY AND ETHNOLOGY.

Isaiah Bowman, *Forest Physiography* (N.Y., J. Wiley; London, Chapman & Hall, 1911) is the best descriptive geography of the United States; A. P. Brigham, *Geographic Influences in American History* (Ginn, 1903), and E. C. Semple, *American History and its Geographic Conditions* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; and London, Constable, 1913) are the standard works on that subject; Miss Semple's is rather doctrinaire. Dr. C. O. Paullin is preparing an *Atlas of American Historical Geography* for the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Until that appears, the best historical maps are those in *The American Nation* (§ 1), but not in all editions.

C. Wissler, *The American Indian* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1922) is the best single work on the aborigines of both Americas, and has a good bibliography. Livingston Farrand's volume ii of *The American*

Nation will satisfy most readers. F. W. Hodge (ed.), *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology bulletin 30, 2 vols., Washington, 1907) is an excellent encyclopaedia of Indians.

The system of physiographic divisions that I have attempted to follow is that devised by a committee of the Association of American Geographers, and described in the *Annals* of the Association, vi. 19-98 (1916). It is illustrated by a map in the same volume, and adopted in A. A. Lobeck's *Physiographic Diagram of the U.S.* (Chicago: A. J. Nystrom Co., 1921), on a scale of 1-3,000,000. The best wall map to illustrate the territorial development of the United States is the 'Land Office Map' published by, and obtainable from, the Land Office of the U.S., Department of the Interior, Washington.

Books on the part played by different European races in United States History are generally tendentious and unbalanced.

II. BY PERIODS

10. THE UNITED STATES IN 1790 (chapters i-iii).

A Century of Population Growth, 1790-1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909) tabulates the results of the Census of 1790, with maps and useful descriptive matter. Among the more useful contemporary works are Jedediah Morse, *American Geography* (Boston, 1789; the best edition is that of London, 1794); Jefferson's *Notes on Virginia* (London, 1782, and in all editions of his collected works); Thomas Anburey, *Travels through the Interior Parts of America in 1776-81* (2 vols., London, 1789; and Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922); Francis Baily, *Journal of a Tour in Unsettled Parts of North America in 1796 and 1797* (London, 1856); *The Cazenove Journal, 1794* (Haverford College, Pa., 1922); Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Voyage aux États-Unis* (Yale Univ. Press, 1913); Marquis de Chastellux, *Travels in North America in 1780-2* (2 vols., London, 1787); La Rochefoucauld de Liancourt, *Travels through the U.S., 1795-7* (2 vols., London, 1799); C. F. Volney, *View of the Climate and Soil of the U.S.A.* (London, 1804). The three last are translated from the French. For other works, see bibliography in § 4; but the reader should be warned against romantic travellers such as Jonathan Carver, Bartram, Chateaubriand, St. John de Crèveœur, and land-jobbers such as Brissot and Imlay.

11. FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE WESTERN QUESTION, 1782-95 (chapters iv, v).

a. *General*. Theodore Roosevelt's *Winning of the West* (4 vols., Putnam, 1889, and in his collected works), written in a high tone of red-blooded morality, ignores the land-jobbing phase of the movement

and neglects the South-West. S. F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty* (Macmillan, 1923) is an exhaustive and impartial examination of Anglo-American relations, beginning with this period. His bibliography lists all the important monographs and printed sources. Bernard Fay, *L'Esprit Revolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis à la fin du XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Champion, 1925) is largely a history of cultural relations, treating diplomacy incidentally. A companion *Bibliographie critique des ouvrages français relatifs aux États-Unis* contains a documentary appendix.

b. *Anglo-American Commerce*. Channing, *United States*, iii, chapter xiii, has an excellent description, with a bibliography of the pamphlet war that followed Lord Sheffield's *Observations on the Commerce of the American States* (London, 1783). The important *Report of the Lords of Trade* in 1791 is printed in *Collection of Interesting and Important Papers and Reports on Navigation and Trade* (London: Society of Shipowners, 1807). An abridgement of it, edited by W. C. Ford, was printed at Washington in 1888. Important articles on the Navigation Acts by J. H. Clapham in *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, xxv. 480, 687, and D. O. McGovney in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, ix. 725-34 should not be overlooked. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *Life of Shelburne* (2 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1912) and the biographies and works of Adams, Jay, Morris, and Jefferson (see below, § 13b and c) should be added.

c. *The Loyalists after the War*. A. C. Flick, *Loyalism in New York* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1901) and, to some extent, C. H. Van Tyne, *Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Macmillan, 1902) deal with this phase of the loyalist movement. The leading authority, however, is Prof. W. H. Siebert, a complete set of whose articles (especially in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, vols. i, ii, vii; *Ohio State Univ. Bulletin*, vols. xvii, xviii, xxi, xxiv, xxvi; *Transactions Royal Soc. Canada*, vols. vii-x, &c.) may be found in the American History Library, Oxford. A. McF. Davis, *The Confiscation of John Chandler's Estate* (Boston, 1903) is a documentary history of a single case; and S. E. Morison, 'The Property of Harrison Gray', in *Publ. Colonial Soc. of Mass.*, xiv. 320-50, shows methods of recovery. Many cases of individual injustice are recorded in *Hist. MSS. Comm. Reports*, *Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst.*, iv, and in H. E. Egerton's introduction to D. P. Coke's *Notes on The Royal Commission on the Loyalists* (Oxford: printed for the Roxburghe Club, 1915).

d. *The South-West, 1780-95* (also chapter xiii). Important articles and documents will be found in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, vii. 706; viii. 78; ix. 490, 533, 748; xix. 794; *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, iii. 462; xii. 155; *Proceedings Miss. Val. Hist. Assoc.*, x. 260. A. P. Whitaker, *Spanish-American Frontier* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1927); S. F. Bemis, *Pinckney's Treaty* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1926) are both preparing works on this period in Spanish-Indian-American relations.

12. THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND CONSTITUTION (chapter vi).

R. L. Schuyler, *The Constitution of the United States* (Macmillan, 1923), written for an English public, is an accurate, well-balanced, and objective account of the whole constitutional movement, upon which eminent Americans have an unfortunate tendency to write trashy books. John Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History 1783-9* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1888; London: Macmillan, 1894) is an unreliable classic; Allan Nevins, *The American States 1775-89* (Macmillan, 1924) presents useful material in a rather undigested form. C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (Macmillan, 1913) upsets the traditional view. Max Farrand, *The Framing of the Constitution* (Yale Univ. Press, 1913) is the best detailed account of the Federal Convention. Mr. Farrand edited the *Records of the Federal Convention* (3 vols., *ibid.*, 1911), containing all the surviving notes of debates and other source material. J. B. Scott (ed.), *Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1920) is the best edition of Madison's notes, and the same editor's *The U.S.A., a Study in International Organization* (*ibid.*) is a most suggestive compilation. A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall* (Houghton Mifflin, 1916), vol. i, contains a lively account of the struggle for ratification in the state conventions, whose proceedings are printed in full in *Elliot's Debates* (5 vols., Washington, 1836-45; and Philadelphia: Lippincott, n.d.), and selected in S. E. Morison, *S. and D.* (see § 7). See also § 5.

13. THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (chapters vii-xvi).

a. *General.* Claude G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; and London: Constable, 1925) is a vivacious but somewhat inaccurate history of the period. Beveridge's *Marshall* (see § 12) is also a history of the times. Of the general histories (§ 1), Channing's vol. iv and McMaster's i and ii may be supplemented by Richard Hildreth, *History of the U.S.A., 1788-1821* (revised ed., 3 vols., 1875), detailed but frankly prejudiced.

b. *Biographies.* We are still awaiting 'definitive' biographies of Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson. Worthington C. Ford's *Washington* (2 vols., in Goupil's editions de luxe, 1900) may be supplemented by P. L. Ford, *The True George Washington* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1897), an excellent character sketch, and P. L. Haworth, *George Washington: Farmer* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1915). Hamilton and Jefferson have suffered not only from each other's biographers, but from the zeal of their own. Readers of Senator Lodge's artistic *Alexander Hamilton* in the 'American Statesmen' series (revised ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1898) should remember that the author was a lifelong opponent of almost everything dear to Jefferson. A. McL.

Hamilton, *Intimate Life of Alex. Hamilton* (Scribner's, 1910) is an excellent personal study. W. G. Sumner's *Hamilton* (N.Y., 1890) is the most comprehending biography of him, written by an economist who as a dogmatic free-trader could not be quite fair. W. S. Culbertson, *Hamilton: An Essay* (Yale Univ. Press, 1911) is also useful on the economic side. Both the books through which Hamilton has been introduced to the British public are highly misleading and inaccurate. H. S. Randall, *Life of Thomas Jefferson* (3 vols., N.Y., 1858) is a classic partisan biography. D. S. Muzzey, *Jefferson* (Scribner's, 1918) is sound and fair, but inadequate. Francis W. Hirst, *Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson* (Macmillan, 1926) is brilliant but partisan. Gaillard Hunt, *Life of James Madison* (N.Y., 1902) is sound and adequate.

c. *Writings of Statesmen* of this period, especially their letters, are in general more useful than the biographies. The best editions, however, are out of print. W. C. Ford, *Writings of Washington* (14 vols., Putnam, 1889) is the most complete for him; but Jared Sparks's old 12-volume edition (Boston, 1838), though marred by over-zealous editing, will be found adequate for most readers. H. C. Lodge, *Works of Hamilton* (9 vols., Putnam, 1885-6, and 12 vols., Putnam, 1904); P. L. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson* (10 vols., Putnam, 1892-9), and Gaillard Hunt, *Writings of Madison* (9 vols., Putnam, 1900-10) are to be preferred for these three statesmen; but the old 'Congress' editions of *Jefferson* (9 vols., 1853), *Hamilton* (7 vols., 1850), and *Madison* (4 vols., 1865) are not to be despised. There is also a 'National Edition' of Jefferson in 20 volumes, edited by A. C. Lipscomb, and a number of subscription editions which should be avoided. J. G. Hamilton (ed.), *The Best Letters of Jefferson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1926) is a good selection. C. F. Adams (ed.), *Works of John Adams with a Life* (9 vols., 1856) is the only edition of Adams's writings. The *Works of Fisher Ames* (2 vols., 1854)¹ are important for Federalist ideas, as are those of John Taylor for the Republicans. The last have never been reprinted, but are well summarized by C. A. Beard, with other material that sustains his thesis, in his *Econ. Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (Macmillan, 1915). Some interesting letters of Taylor, with a sketch of his life by W. E. Dodd, are printed in the *John P. Branch Historical Papers*, ii (Ashland, Virginia: Randolph-Macon College, 1908).

d. *Organization of the Federal Government* (chapter vii). R. V. Harlow, *History of Legislative Methods before 1825* (Yale Univ. Press, 1917), H. B. Learned, *The President's Cabinet* (*ibid.*, 1912), and G. Hunt, *The Department of State* (*ibid.*, 1914). The *Journal of William Maclay* (N.Y., 1890) gives an intimate picture of the process, by an anti-federalist senator.

¹ A selection of Ames's writings was published from hortatory motives at London in 1835 by Henry Ewbank, under the title, *The Influences of Democracy on Liberty, Property and the Happiness of Society*.

e. *Foreign Relations* (chapters x-xvi) are so interwoven with the history of this period that most of the above works may be consulted with profit. See also § 11. The *Correspondence of French Ministers to the U.S., 1791-7*; of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815, and *Letters of William Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, 1797-1803*, are printed in the *Reports* of the American Historical Association for 1903 (vol. ii), 1912, and 1913 (vol. ii) respectively; other correspondence in the *Reports* for 1896 (i), 1897 (ii), and 1898. W. R. Manning, *Nootka Sound Controversy*, and W. S. Robertson, *Miranda*, are in the *Reports* for 1904 and 1907, i. The Carnegie Institution is now preparing to print the correspondence of the British ministers at Philadelphia. The dispatches of Rufus King, American Minister to Great Britain 1796-1803, are in C. R. King, *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King* (6 vols., Putnam, 1894-1900). A. C. Morris, *Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris* (2 vols., 1888); H. P. Johnston, *Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay* (4 vols., Putnam, 1890-3), the *Writings of J. Q. Adams*, vols. i, ii (§ 15a), and the *Reports* of the Canadian Archives for 1889-91 and 1894 contain additional material.

f. *The North-West* (chapters xii, xiii). R. G. Thwaites, *Daniel Boone* (Appleton, 1902), C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country* (vol. i of *Centennial History of Illinois*, Springfield, 1920), and M. M. Quaife, *Chicago and the Old Northwest* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1913) are the best accounts of the government and settlement of the North-West; as P. J. Treat, *National Land System, 1785-1820* (E. B. Treat Co., 1910) is of that subject. Of source material, besides the documents noted in (e) there are the *American State Papers, Indian Affairs* (2 vols., Washington, 1832-4) and *Public Lands* (8 vols., Washington, 1832-61).

14. JEFFERSON'S AND MADISON'S ADMINISTRATIONS. 1801-17 (chapters xvii-xxiii).

a. *General*. Most of the works mentioned in the previous section are useful for this period as well; but the pre-eminent authority is Henry Adams, *History of the United States . . . 1801-17* (9 vols., Scribner's, 1889-91, reprinted 1921). Henry Adams has the best style of any historian who has treated this period, and his work has been superseded on very few points. His attitude towards Jefferson is detached and mildly ironical; his descriptive chapters in the first and the last volumes are incomparable. Henry Adams's *Life of Gallatin* (Philadelphia, 1879) is one of the best Republican biographies. Captain A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812* (2 vols, Boston: Little, Brown; and London: Sampson Low, 1905) is indispensable for the diplomacy and naval warfare of the period; but was written to prove a thesis, and to influence naval policy. For the social and political background of Washington, G. Hunt (ed.), *First Forty Years of Wash-*

ington Society portrayed by the family letters of Mrs. Samuel H. Smith (N.Y. : Scribner's; and London : T. F. Unwin, 1906), and E. S. Brown (ed.), *William Plumer's Memorandum, 1803-7* (Macmillan, 1923) are excellent.

b. *Louisiana Purchase, and Conspiracies* (chapters xviii, xix). Henry Adams's and Channing's histories are adequate; the latter has a good bibliography. I. J. Cox, *The West Florida Controversy* (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press, 1918) is exhaustive. The principal documents for the Federalist plot of 1804 are printed in H. Adams (ed.), *Documents relating to New England Federalism* (Boston, 1877). The Hamilton-Burr duel is best described in Allan McL. Hamilton's biography (§ 13b). S. H. Wandell and M. Minnegerode, *Aaron Burr* (2 vols., Putnam, 1925) is the best life of that gentleman, whose conspiracy is adequately dealt with only in W. F. McCaleb, *Burr Conspiracy* (N.Y., 1903). Beveridge's *Marshall* (§ 12) is good for the case of *Marbury v. Madison*, and the Chase impeachment. For the general question of judicial review, see C. A. Beard, *Supreme Court and the Constitution* (Macmillan, 1912), E. S. Corwin, *Judicial Review* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1914), and C. Warren, *Supreme Court* (§ 5).

c. *Corsairs and Neutral Rights* (chapters xviii, xx, xxi). The Tripolitan War is described in great detail in G. W. Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1905), and with greater skill in E. Dupuy, *Américains et Barbaresques* (Paris : Roger & Chernoviz, 1910). There are convenient summaries of the Orders in Council, French Decrees, and American Retaliatory Acts in Channing's *U.S.*, vol. iv. F. E. Melvin, *Napoleon's Navigation System* (Appleton, 1919) is an important monograph from the school of Prof. W. E. Lingelbach (see *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xix, 257-81). S. E. Morison, *Maritime Hist. of Mass.* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin; and London : Heinemann, 1923) describes the actual trading at this period.

d. *War of 1812* (chapter xxii). Henry Adams, Mahan (see § 14a), J. W. Fortescue's *History of the British Army* (Macmillan, 1899-1923), and C. P. Lucas, *Canadian War of 1812* (Clarendon Press, 1906) are the principal authorities. William Wood (ed.), *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812* (3 vols., Toronto : Champlain Society, 1920-5) is invaluable. For the West, the Indians, and the origin of the war, see L. M. Hacker, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, x, 365 (1924) and M. M. Quaife, *Chicago and the Old Northwest* (§ 13, f).

e. *Peace of Ghent and Hartford Convention* (chapter xxiii). C. E. Hill, *Leading American Treaties* (Macmillan, 1922) and *The Diary of James Gallatin, Peace Maker* (Scribner's, 1916) are pleasant introductions. F. A. Updike, *Diplomacy of the War of 1812* (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press, 1915) is the principal monograph. Important documents are in Wellington's *Supplementary Despatches*, vol. ix;

Castlereagh's *Correspondence*, vol. x; J. Q. Adams's *Writings*, vol. v, and *Memoirs*, vols. ii, iii (see § 15a), Gallatin's *Writings*, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1879), the *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xi. 88, xx. 108, *Historical MSS. Comm. Reports*, Bathurst MSS. (1923), *Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc.*, xlv. 308, xlviii. 138. The Hartford Convention is treated exhaustively in H. Adams, *Documents* (§ 14b), S. E. Morison, *Life of H. G. Otis* (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), and F. M. Anderson, in *Proceedings Miss. Val. Hist. Assoc.*, vi. 176-88.

15. 'ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS.' ADMINISTRATIONS OF MONROE AND J. Q. ADAMS, 1815-29 (chapters xxiv-xxvii).

a. *General*. F. J. Turner, *Rise of the New West* (American Nation, xiv) is the best single volume covering this period. Selections from Adams's diary, published as the *Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, 1795-1848* (12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874-7), W. C. Ford (ed.), *Writings of J. Q. Adams* (7 vols., Macmillan, 1913-17), and S. M. Hamilton (ed.), *Writings of Monroe* (7 vols., Putnam, 1898-1903) are important sources. Carl Schurz, *Henry Clay* (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1887) is one of the best American biographies. The different editions of Henry Clay's *Works* contain little more than speeches.

b. *Anglo-American Relations* (chapter xxv). W. A. Dunning, *The British Empire and the U.S. [1814-1914]* (Scribner's, and London: Allen & Unwin, 1914), writes from sound knowledge and with good humour. C. K. Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-22* (London: Bell, 1925) is rather perfunctory in his treatment of Anglo-American policy. H. Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-7* (*ibid.*) is more ample and discriminating. C. H. Levermore, *Disarmament on the Great Lakes* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1914), F. L. Benns, *American Struggle for British West-India Carrying Trade, 1815-30* (Indiana Univ. Studies, Bloomington, 1923), and W. E. B. DuBois, *Suppression of African Slave Trade* (3rd ed., Harv. Univ. Press, 1916) are indispensable monographs. There is a useful study of the Canadian boundary in the appendix to C. P. Lucas, *History of Canada, 1763-1812* (Clarendon Press, 1909). Richard Rush published a volume of extracts from his diary, with sundry reminiscences for the years 1817-18, as *A Resident at the Court of London* (London, 1833); the American edition is called *Memoranda of a Residence*. . . (Philadelphia, 1833). A continuation for the period 1819-25 is called *A Residence at the Court of London, second series* (2 vols., London, 1845); the American edition is again called *Memoranda of a Residence* (Philadelphia, 1845). A second edition of the 'second series', in one volume, is called *The Court of London from 1819 to 1825* (London, 1873).

c. *The Monroe Doctrine* (chapter xxvi). The above-mentioned

works of Webster, Temperley, J. Q. Adams, and Rush are indispensable. A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine, an Interpretation* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1916), D. Y. Thomas, *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine* (Macmillan, 1923), A. Alvarez, *The Monroe Doctrine* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1924), with a valuable documentary appendix, including the most important interpretations by American statesmen, and Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine* (Harv. Univ. Press, 1927), are the best general works. References to important articles in historical periodicals, too numerous to mention here, and to the printed sources, will be found in the foot-notes of Channing, *U.S.*, v. 343-50, and S. E. Morison, 'Origin of the Monroe Doctrine', *Revue des Sciences Politiques*, xlvii. 52 (also in *Economica*, i. 27). W. S. Robertson, *Rise of the Spanish-American Republics, as told in the lives of their Liberators* (Appleton, 1918) and *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States* (Oxford University Press, 1923) are the best works in English on those subjects; and their bibliographies list the many important studies in French and Spanish touching the Monroe Doctrine. F. A. Golder, *Russian Expansion on the Pacific 1641-1850* (Cleveland: A. H. Clark, 1914) and the works on Oregon and California listed below deal with the Pacific aspect of the question. For the Anglo-American rivalry in Mexico, the Cuban question, and the Panama Congress, see W. R. Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the U.S. and Mexico* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1916); J. M. Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations* (*ibid.*, 1899); J. H. Smith, 'Poinsett's career in Mexico', *Proceedings Amer. Antiq. Soc.*, n.s., xxiv. 77-92 (1914). These three works are, however, written largely from American sources, and should be checked by dispatches and letters from British agents in Latin America, some of which are printed in the *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, vii. 304, 500 (1902).

16. POLITICS FROM JACKSON TO POLK, 1829-44 (chapters xxviii, xxix, xxxv).

a. *General*. J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson* (2nd ed., Macmillan, 1916) is the only biography based on the Jackson MSS., and an excellent political history of the period. James Parton, *Life of Jackson* (3 vols., N.Y., 1861) is colourful, and well worth reading. C. G. Bowers, *Party Battles of the Jackson Period* (Houghton Mifflin, 1922) is lively but rather inaccurate. A. C. Cole, *Whig Party in the South* (Washington: Amer. Hist. Assoc., 1913) is a valuable and suggestive study. Gaillard Hunt, *John C. Calhoun* (Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs, 1908) is the best life of the Carolinian; the two-volume one by W. M. Meigs (Neale, 1917) is more detailed, but partisan; the essay by W. E. Dodd in his *Statesmen of the Old South* (Macmillan, 1911) is most helpful. Calhoun's formal *Works* (R. K. Crallé, ed.) were published in 6 vols. at

Columbia, S.C., and New York, 1851-63; a selection from his correspondence is printed in the *Report of the Amer. Hist. Assoc.* for 1899, ii. The *Report* for 1918, ii, contains the *Autobiography of Martin Van Buren* (really a diffuse and rambling memoir, written in 1854). E. M. Shepard, *Van Buren*, C. Schurz, *Henry Clay* (2 vols.), and H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster* (American Statesmen series, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1883-8) are still the best biographies of these statesmen. C. H. Van Tyne has edited the *Letters of Webster* (McClure, Phillips Co., 1902) which are not included his *Writings* (18 vols., Boston: Little, Brown, 1903). The only biography of President Tyler is incorporated in L. G. Tyler, *Letters and Times of the Tylers* (3 vols., Richmond: Whittet & Shepperson, 1884). *The First Forty Years of Washington Society* (§ 14a) and Josiah Quincy, *Figures of the Past* (Boston, 1883) describe Washington in the Jackson era; and [Charles A. Davis] *The Letters of J. Downing, Major* (N.Y., 1834) are political satire, in Yankee dialect.

b. *Political conditions and constitutional changes* (chapter xxxv). M. Ostrogorskii, *Democracy and the Party System in the U.S.* (Macmillan, 1910), Jesse Macy, *Political Parties* (*ibid.*, 1909), F. W. Dallinger, *Nominations for Elective Office* (Longmans, 1897), C. R. Fish, *Civil Service and Patronage* (*ibid.*, 1905), W. E. Dodd, *Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1910), and J. H. Dougherty, *Constitutional History of New York* (Neale, 1915).

c. *Nullification and Indian Removal* (chapters xxviii, xxix). D. F. Houston, *Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina* (Harv. and Oxford Univ. Presses, 1896) is still the best work on that subject, although many additional details are given in C. S. Boucher, *Nullification Controversy in S. C.* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1916), U. B. Phillips, 'Georgia and State Rights', in *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc.* for 1901, ii, contains much useful information on nullification and Indian removal in that State. F. L. Paxson, *Frontier* (§ 7a), chapter xxxi, summarizes the whole movement, with a bibliography. The best account of the Black Hawk War is by T. C. Pease, in *The Centennial History of Illinois*, ii (Springfield, Ill., 1918). There are good maps of these Indian wars and cessions in *The American Nation* (§ 1), vols. xiv, xv.

d. *B.U.S. and Public Land* (chapters xxviii, xxix). R. C. H. Catteall, *Second Bank of the U.S.* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1903) is a standard work. R. C. McGrane, *Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle, 1807-44* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919), R. G. Wellington, *Political Influence of the Public Lands, 1828-42* (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1914), and G. M. Stephenson, *Political History of the Public Lands, 1840-62* (Boston: R. G. Badger, 1917) are most valuable monographs; and there is some useful source material in A. C. McLaughlin (ed.), *Source Problems in U.S. History* (Harper, 1918).

17. THE NORTHERN STATES, 1820-50 (chapters xxx-xxxii).

a. *General*. A large part of Channing's *U.S.*, vol. v, and of McMaster's *U.S.*, vols. v-vii (see § 1) is devoted to the subjects treated in these chapters; and the former has excellent bibliographies. John Macgregor, *Progress of America* (2 vols., London, 1847) is an excellent conspectus and statistical abstract by an English free-trader who was a skilled observer of foreign countries. Harriet Martineau, *Society in America* (3 vols., London, 1837, and later editions) and A. B. Benson (ed.), *America of the Fifties: Letters of Fredrika Bremer* (American-Scandinavian Foundation, and Oxford Univ. Press, 1924, a selection from her *Homes of the New World*, 2 vols., N.Y., 1853) contain penetrating observation on American life by two gifted women. See also § 7. J. Fenimore Cooper, *The American Democrat* (Cooperstown, 1838) contains valuable comments by an American man of letters just returned from Europe. For economic topics, see § 2c.

b. *The Early Labour Movement* (chapter xxxi). This period is treated exhaustively in Commons, *History of Labour*, vol. i, and *Documentary History* (§ 2b), vols. v-viii. Edith Abbott, *Women in Industry* (Appleton, 1924) and Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840-60* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924) are fresh and interesting studies from a wider range of material. Kingsbury (ed.), *Labor Laws and their Enforcement* (Longmans, 1911). W. R. Waterman, *Frances Wright* (Columbia Univ. Studies, vol. cxv, 1924) is a good biography; G. B. Lockwood, *New Harmony Movement* (Appleton, 1905) contains the best account of Robert Owen in America, and Morris Hillquit's *Socialism* (§ 2b, above) of the early communistic experiments.

c. *Literature and Transcendentalism* (chapter xxxii). R. W. Emerson's *Journals* (10 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin; and London: Constable, 1909-14) are as important for the intellectual life of America at this period as J. Q. Adams's *Memoirs* for the political, and some of Emerson's addresses and lectures, such as 'Nature', the 'Divinity School Address', 'The American Scholar', and 'Life and Letters in New England' (vols. i and x of the centenary edition of his works) may be called original documents of the transcendental movement. Bliss Perry's vol. xxxiv in the *Chronicles of America* (§ 1) is a good introduction to American literature; W. P. Trent *et al.* (eds.), [*The Cambridge*] *History of American Literature* (4 vols., Putnam's, and Cambridge Univ. Press, 1917-21) is the most comprehensive work on that subject: but Barrett Wendell, *Literary History of America* (Scribner's, and T. F. Unwin, 1901) is in some respects better for the New England group. John Macy, *The Spirit of American Literature* (Boni & Liveright, 1913) is stimulating and original. Katherine Anthony, *Margaret Fuller* (Harcourt, Brace Co.; and London: Cape, 1920) is perhaps the best transcendental biography. For the Uni-

tarian and Universalist movement, see W. E. Channing's *Works* (a good one-volume edition is published by Amer. Unit. Assoc., Boston), J. W. Chadwick, *W. E. Channing* (Houghton Mifflin, 1903), and J. H. Allen and R. Eddy's volume x in the American Church History Series (Scribner's, 1903). For the Humanitarian movement, see Channing *U.S.*, v, chapter vi; D. L. Dix, *Memorial* (1843), *Old South Leaflets* (§ 7), vi, no. 148, and L. E. Richards (ed.), *Letters and Journals of S. G. Howe*, vol. ii (Boston: Dana & Estes; London: John Lane, 1909). E. P. Cubberley, *History of Education* (Houghton Mifflin, 1920).

d. *Abolition* (chapter xxxii). A. B. Hart, *Slavery and Abolition* (vol. xvi of 'The American Nation') is a balanced narrative, with an excellent bibliography. Of many lives of Garrison, the one by his sons (4 vols., Houghton Mifflin, 1885-9) is monumental; J. J. Chapman's (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1921) is exhilarating, but not quite history; Lindsay Swift's (Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs Co., 1911) is brief and judicious. C. F. Adams, *J. Q. Adams* (American Statesmen Series) gives a good account of the fight against the 'gag' rule.

18. THE SOUTHERN STATES, AND SLAVERY, 1820-50 (chapters xxxiii, xxxiv).

Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (Appleton, 1918) is a very readable work, based on long research and intimate knowledge, treating the plantation aspect of Southern society. Although somewhat defensive in tone, and largely neglecting the non-slaveholding whites, this book supersedes all earlier studies of the plantation system (such as J. E. Cairnes, *The Slave Power*, London, 1862) with the exception of M. B. Hammond, *The Cotton Industry* (Publications of American Economic Association, 1897, useful information and statistics). Mr. Phillips has also edited the source material on plantation and frontier in Commons, *Documentary History* (§ 2, above) and written the *Life of Robert Toombs* (Macmillan, 1913), one of the best biographies of a planter statesman. W. E. Dodd, *Cotton Kingdom* (vol. xxvii of the 'Chronicles of America') is a brilliant essay, specially useful for the Southern intellectual movement; cf. F. P. Gaines, *The Southern Plantation, a Study in the Development and the Accuracy of a Tradition* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1924). J. D. Wade, *Augustus B. Longstreet* (Macmillan, 1924) is a study of the interesting society of middle Georgia. For other Southern biographies see §§ 16a, 22a. Of the many books of travel in the South, F. L. Olmsted, *The Seaboard Slave States* (1856, and 2 vols., Putnams, 1904), *Journey in the Back Country* (1860, and *ibid.*), and *Texas Journey* (1857) record the careful observations of a northern farmer, who has justly been compared with Arthur Young (B. Mitchell, *F. L. Olmsted*, Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, ser. xlii, 1924). J. D. B. DeBow, *Industrial Resources of the*

Southern and Western States (4 vols., 1852-3) is a useful compendium of information and propaganda. Susan D. Smedes, *Memorials of a Southern Planter* (1887) gives a picture of the planter at his best.

19. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1837-42 (chapter xxxvi).

Lieut.-Col. D. A. Mills, 'British Diplomacy and Canada', *United Empire*, ii. 684-712 (1911) is the best account of the North-Eastern boundary controversy, and is accompanied by excellent maps, two of which are reproduced in Channing, *U.S.*, v. 537-9. There is an important article by E. D. Adams on Lord Ashburton in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xvii. 764-82. J. B. McMaster, *U.S.*, vol. vi, and W. Kingsford, *History of Canada*, vol. x, contain details of the border incidents.

20. OREGON AND THE FAR WEST (chapter xxxvii).

a. *General*. K. Coman, *Economic Beginnings of the Far West* (2 vols., Macmillan, 1912), C. Goodwin, *The Trans-Mississippi West* (Appleton, 1922), and J. C. Bell, Jr., *Opening a Highway to the Pacific, 1838-46* (Columbia Univ. Studies, xcvi, 1924) are good general works. H. M. Chittenden, *The American Fur Trade of the Far West* (3 vols., N.Y., Francis P. Harper, 1902) is the best work on that subject, and includes the best map of the Far West in 1840.

b. *Oregon, the Great Plains, and the Rockies*. Francis Parkman, *The Oregon Trail* (Boston, 1849, and countless later editions) ¹ is the classic description of the Great Plains and their Indians, but contains nothing on the actual settlement of Oregon, of which the best compendium is Joseph Schafer, *History of the Pacific Northwest* (revised ed., Macmillan, 1921). George Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the North American Indians* (2 vols., New York and London, 1841, and folio of plates from the author's paintings; many later editions) was famous in its time, and deserves better knowledge now. Important contemporary narratives of exploration, fur trading, and emigrant trains, by Edwin James (of the Long expedition, 1823), J. B. Wyeth (1833), Edmund Flagg (1838), J. K. Townsend (1839), Fr. P. J. de Smet (1843), Prince Maximilian of Wied (1843), Lord Palmer (1847), and Alexander Ross (1849) ² are reprinted in Thwaites, *Early Western Travels* (§ 4, above). To these may be added H. C. Dale (ed.), *The Ashley-Smith Explorations . . . 1822-9* (Cleveland: Clark, 1918), and much valuable material in the *Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society* (Portland, 1900-) and the *Washington Historical Quarterly* (Seattle, 1906-).

c. *The Mormons*. M. R. Werner, *Life of Brigham Young* (Harcourt Brace, 1925) is entertaining, and not unduly inaccurate. W. A. Linn, *The Story of the Mormons* (Macmillan, 1902) is the standard account. Dr. L. P. Powell (Woodbridge Riley in the first edition) reviews the Book

¹ The earliest editions are entitled *The California and Oregon Trail, or Prairie and Rocky Mountain Life*.

² Dates of the original editions.

of Mormon in the *Cambridge History of American Literature*, iv, chapter xxviii. C. A. Brough, *Irrigation in Utah* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1898) and Geo. Thomas, *The Development of Institutions under Irrigation* (Macmillan, 1920) are valuable accounts of the early social and economic history of Utah. Bibliography in Channing, *U.S.*, v. 240, 487.

21. TEXAS AND THE MEXICAN WAR (chapters xxxviii, xxxix).

a. *General and Controversial*. N. W. Stephenson, *Texas and the Mexican War* ('Chronicles of America', xxiv) is a brief, well-written, and judicious summary, based on the latest research. The old-fashioned orthodox 'slave conspiracy' theory is most effectively presented in Hermann von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States*, vol. ii (Chicago, 1876-92). G. P. Garrison ploughed new ground in his *Texas* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1903) and vol. xvii of 'The American Nation'. E. I. McCormac, *James K. Polk* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1922) is an honest, unprejudiced, and comprehensive biography. J. S. Reeves, *American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1907) and E. D. Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas* (*ibid.*, 1910) are important monographs, the one based largely on the State Department and the other on the Foreign Office Archives. Justin H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas* (Baker & Taylor, 1911) and *The War with Mexico* (2 vols., Macmillan, 1919) are the most comprehensive works on either subject, based on the archives of Great Britain, France, Mexico, Texas, and the United States. But they must be used with caution. The author is deductive in his reasoning, and, to quote N. W. Stephenson, 'as artful in his silences as he is effective in his utterances'. G. L. Rives, *The U.S. and Mexico* (2 vols., Scribner's, 1913) is more impartial, but less useful. Prof. Eugene C. Barker, who knows more about early Texas than any one else, and has preserved a judicial temper in the environment of Austin, has not yet written the book his admirers expect, but has scattered important articles during the last twenty-five years throughout the *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.* (esp. i. 1; v. 20; x. 14; xi. 1), the *Amer. Hist. Rev.* (esp. xii. 788), the *Reports* of the Amer. Hist. Assoc. (esp. for 1911, i. 217), the *Quarterly of the Texas State Hist. Assoc.* (Austin, 1899-1912) and its successor, the *Southwestern Hist. Quarterly* (*ibid.*, 1913-). There is no good military history of the war; some good monographs are in *Papers Milit. Hist. Soc. Mass.*, xiii (Boston, 1913).

b. *California before 1848*. Of two introductory works, I. B. Richman, *California under Spain and Mexico* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911) is the better written, and C. E. Chapman, *History of California, the Spanish Period* (Macmillan, 1921) the better documented. C. E. Chapman, 'The Literature of California History', in *Southwestern Hist. Quarterly*, xxii. 318-52, is a good bibliography.

c. *Sources*. Madame Calderon de la Barca's *Life in Mexico* (1843, and many later editions) is the classic contemporary description. The indispensable *Diary of James K. Polk* (M. M. Quaife, ed., 4 vols., Chicago: McClurg Co., 1910) is unfortunately hard to come by. Good soldiers' views of the war are given in U. S. Grant, *Memoirs* (§ 23c), and E. K. Smith, *To Mexico with Scott* (Harv. Univ. Press, 1917). *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas* is printed in the *Report of the Amer. Hist. Assoc.* for 1907, ii; and 1908, ii; the *Austin Papers* in the *Report* for 1919, ii. The portentous 34 volumes of H. H. Bancroft, *The Pacific States of North America* (San Francisco, 1882-90) are largely compilations of source material. The *Archivo Histórico Diplomático Mexicano*, no. 15 (Mexico: Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1925) contains some important documents on the Texan neutrality scheme, with an introduction by Señor de la Peña y Reyes giving a symposium of Mexican opinions on the origin of the war.

22. FROM THE WILMOT PROVISIO TO THE ELECTION OF 1860 (chapters xl-xliii).

a. *General*. James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to . . . 1877* (7 vols., Harper and Macmillan, 1893-1906; reissued, with an eighth volume on the period 1877-96, by Macmillan, 1919) is the best history of the Civil War period in all its aspects; but the two first volumes, covering the fifties, have to some extent been superseded by the results of intensive study of that period during the last generation. Channing's *United States*, vi, is a good corrective to Rhodes, and a guide to the latest writings. For the biographies and works of Calhoun, Clay, Webster, and Polk, see §§ 16a, 21. Frederick Bancroft has written the best *Life of William H. Seward* (2 vols., Harper, 1900), whose *Works* (G. E. Baker, ed.) consume 5 vols. (Houghton Mifflin, 1884). Carl Sandburg, *Lincoln, the Prairie Years* (2 vols., Harcourt Brace Co., 1926) is an artistic and accurate description of the background from which Lincoln emerged. For other biographies of Lincoln, see § 23c. Allen Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas* (1908) is the best book on the 'Little Giant'—there are many bad ones. Phillips's *Toombs* (§ 18, above) and L. Pendleton, *A. H. Stephens* (Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs, 1908) are good biographies of Southern Whigs. Indispensable sources are the *Correspondence of Toombs*, *Stephens and Cobb*, and the *Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter* in the *Reports of the Amer. Hist. Assoc.* for 1911, ii, and 1916, ii. A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South* (§ 16a), and R. F. Nichols, *The Democratic Machine, 1850-4* (Columbia Univ. Studies, cxi, 1923) give the political detail and manœuvring. C. S. Boucher, 'That Aggressive Slavocracy', *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, viii. 13-79, is a gallant defence of Southern

policy. E. D. Fite, *The Presidential Campaign of 1860* (1911) is comprehensive.

b. *California and the Gold Rush*. R. G. Cleland, *History of California, the American Period* (Macmillan, 1922), M. F. Williams, *Hist. of the San Francisco Vigilance Committee* (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1921), O. T. Howe, *Argonauts of '49* (Harv. Univ. Press, 1923). Josiah Royce, *California* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1886) is a philosophical study of the episode.

c. *Foreign Relations* (chapter xli). M. W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915* (Washington: Amer. Hist. Assoc., 1917) is the capital work, based on British and American archives. There is a fresh study of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in John Bigelow, *Breaches of Anglo-American Treaties* (N.Y.: Sturgis & Walton, 1917). J. W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1903) is a standard and popular work, by an American diplomatist with much experience of the Far East. Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (Macmillan, 1922) is the best account of early trading and treaty relations with China and Japan. P. J. Treat, *Japan and the U.S., 1853-1921* (Houghton Mifflin, 1921) is comprehensive and interesting. Townsend Harris's journal is printed in W. E. Griffis, *Townsend Harris* (*ibid.*, 1895). Extracts from Commodore Perry's *Narrative* (Washington, 1856) are reprinted in *Old South Leaflets* (§ 7), vii, no. 151, and W. E. Griffis, *M. C. Perry* (Houghton Mifflin, 1890). Inazo Nitobe, *Intercourse between the U.S. and Japan* (Johns Hopkins Studies, 1891) gives the other side. The Canadian reciprocity negotiations may be studied in C. G. Tansill, *Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies, ser. xl, Baltimore, 1922) and C. D. Allin, *et al.*, *Annexation, Preferential Trade, and Reciprocity* (Toronto, 1912). Laurence Oliphant's genial account of the negotiations is in his *Episodes of a Life of Adventure* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1887). Rhodes, *United States*, i. 516-50, has a full account of the Cuban episode.

d. *Merchant Marine* (chapter xli). J. R. Spears, *American Merchant Marine* (Macmillan, 1910) is the best handbook. Arthur C. Clark, *The Clipper Ship Era* (Putnam, 1911), by an American merchant captain with an historical sense, is classic. Basil Lubbock, *The Colonial Clippers* (Glasgow: J. Brown & Son, 1921) contains additional material on the Australian Black-ballers. S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; and London: Heinemann, 1923) has chapters on the fishermen and whalers as well.

e. *The Kansas-Nebraska Act* (chapters xlii, xliii). The Lincoln-Douglas debates, which are the most interesting thing you can read on the subject, are printed in Lincoln's *Complete Works* (Century Co., 1894), and in several separate editions (e. g. Putnam's, 1913). William Macdonald, *Doc. Source Book*, pp. 397-405, gives a documentary

history of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and Rhodes, *United States*, a good summary of the debates ; but Mr. Rhodes's view of the genesis of the Act has been traversed by F. H. Hodder in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, ix. 10, xii. 3 ; by P. O. Ray in *Report of Amer. Hist. Assoc.* for 1914, p. 261, and *Repeal of the Missouri Compromise* (Cleveland : Clark, 1909) ; and by H. A. Trexler, *Slavery in Missouri* (Johns Hopkins Studies, ser. xxxii, Baltimore, 1914). Most accounts of the struggle for Kansas are grossly partisan ; Channing, *United States*, vi. 148-79, is an exception, and has a good bibliography. T. H. Gladstone, *Kansas* (London and N.Y., 1857) is an honest contemporary narrative.

f. *Dred Scott and John Brown* (chapter xliii). The opinions in the Dred Scott case are published at length in the *U.S. Reports* (sometimes cited as *Howard's Reports*), xix. 393 ; extracts are in all collections of constitutional cases, and a lengthy discussion in C. Warren, *Supreme Court*. The articles by E. D. Corwin and H. T. Cotterall in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xvii. 52, and xxx. 56 are indispensable. O. G. Villard, *John Brown* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910) is the best biography ; W. E. B. DuBois, *John Brown* (Philadelphia : G. W. Jacobs, 1909) is by a noted coloured author.

23. THE CIVIL WAR (chapters xliv-lv).

a. *The best brief works*. Channing, *United States*, vol. vi (1925) is the latest and best single volume on the Civil War period, and has excellent bibliographies. His candid account of the civil and economic history of the decade is a valuable antidote for the somewhat heroic view of the Civil War that one naturally gets by reading only the military history. More brief and equally brilliant are the two volumes (xxix, xxx) by N. W. Stephenson in the *Chronicles of America* (§ 1). James Ford Rhodes has compressed several volumes of his *History of the United States* (§ 22a) into a one-volume *History of the Civil War* (Macmillan, 1921) with excellent maps. Lieut.-Col. T. A. Dodge, U.S.A., *Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War* (revised edition, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1897, 348 pp.) is a military history remarkable for accuracy, clarity, and conciseness.

b. *Military and Naval Histories*. Lieut. W. B. Wood and Major J. E. Edmonds, *History of the Civil War of the United States* (N.Y. : Putnam ; London : Methuen, 1905, 538 pp.) is a well-balanced narrative written by British officers for British readers, but too much based on secondary material. John C. Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War* (2 vols., Putnam, 1898) is probably the best so far as it goes, which is only through the campaigns of 1862, and has admirable maps. Two supplementary volumes by Col. W. R. Livermore (Putnam, 1913) cover the campaigns of 1863. *The Campaigns of the Civil War* (12 vols., Scribner's, 1881-3, with supplementary *Statistical Record*, 1901), mostly

by Union veterans, is comprehensive, though irregular in merit. Comte de Paris, *Histoire de la Guerre Civile en Amérique* (7 vols., Paris, 1874-90), translated as *The Civil War in America* (4 vols., Philadelphia 1875-88), is particularly useful for the Peninsular Campaign; G. C. Eggleston, *The Confederate War* (2 vols., Sturgis & Walton 1911) is the best military history by a Southerner. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols., Century Co., 1887, often cited by the binder's title *Century War Book*) is well illustrated, and includes contributions from surviving Confederate officers: it must be read with caution, like all post-war historical work by participants. The *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts* (Boston, 1881-) and the *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Richmond, 1876-) include much material of the same sort, and some papers of great scientific value. J. T. Scharf, *History of the Confederate Navy* (2nd ed., Albany, 1894) and D. D. Porter, *Naval History of the Civil War* (New York, Sherman Publ. Co., 1886) are mere compilations. Admiral Mahan's *Farragut* (Great Commanders series, Appleton, 1892) and *The Gulf and Inland Waters* (Scribner's, 1883); Mrs. M. V. Dahlgren, *Memoir of John A. Dahlgren* (Boston, 1882), the *Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus V. Fox, 1861-5* (3 vols., N.Y.: Naval Records Society, 1918-) are the most important volumes that have yet appeared on the naval history, which is much in need of rewriting. Of the numerous special works, Major John Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville* (Yale Univ. Press, 1910) is a model of what a military monograph should be. No military history deserves serious consideration unless the author has used the remarkably complete *War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (130 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880 to 1901), and *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies* (*ibid.*, 30 vols., 1894 to 1922). T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War* (Houghton Mifflin, 1900) is an authoritative compilation of vital statistics from the records.

Gamaliel Bradford, *Union Portraits* (Houghton Mifflin and Constable, 1916) and *Confederate Portraits* (*ibid.*, 1914) contain clever character sketches of leading generals and statesmen on both sides.

c. *Biographical Literature*. The printed works relating to Lincoln already run to several thousand titles. J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln* (10 vols., Century Co., 1890) is largely a history of the Civil War by strong Union partisans. N. W. Stephenson, *Lincoln* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922; London: Hutchinson's, 1924) and Lord Charnwood, *Lincoln* (N.Y.: Henry Holt; and London: Constable, 1917) are the two best one-volume lives. Alonzo Rothschild, *Lincoln, Master of Men* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1906) is a useful study of his relations with generals and cabinet ministers; W. E. Barton, *Life of Lincoln* (2 vols., Bobbs-Merrill, 1925) is worth reading. Nicolay and

Hay (eds.), *Abraham Lincoln's Complete Works* (2 vols., Century Co., 1894, reprinted 1920) is the handiest edition of Lincoln's writings. New and extensive editions of 'Complete Works' appear almost yearly, but the above contains all the state papers and important letters. A. B. Hart (ed.), *Selected Writings of Lincoln* (Living Literature series, N.Y.; and Liverpool: Gregg Co., 1920) is the best volume of selections.

Mrs. V. J. Davis, *Memoirs of Jefferson Davis* (2 vols., N.Y.: Belford Co., 1890) is sentimental, but contains some revealing letters. Of several brief biographies, H. J. Eckenrode, *Jefferson Davis* (Macmillan, 1923) is a brilliant piece of work, somewhat marred by the author's conception of Davis as a conquering Nordic; W. E. Dodd, *Davis* (Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs, 1907) has not that defect. Davis's own *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (2 vols., Appleton, 1881) and A. H. Stephens, *War between the States* (2 vols., Chicago, 1868) are both *mémoires justificatives*. Dunbar Rowland (ed.), *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist* (10 vols., Jackson, Miss., 1923) is the title of Davis's collected writings; only vols. v and vi are of much value for the Civil War.

Sentimentalism characterizes most of the lives of Lee. General Sir Frederick Maurice, *Lee the Soldier* (Houghton Mifflin Co., and Constable, 1925) is an exception, but does not cut deeply. *Recollections and Letters of General R. E. Lee*, by his son and namesake (Doubleday, Page Co., 1924) is an intimate personal study. D. S. Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches to Davis* (Putnam, 1915) contains a valuable criticism of Lee's campaigns by the editor.

Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson* (2 vols., Longmans, 1898, and several later editions), with literary and artistic qualities of the highest order, has exerted a deep and salutary influence on British arms; and for Jackson's valley campaigns there is nothing better. But on the Peninsular Campaign he is inaccurate, the causes of the war are too much simplified, and the general impression, on readers who know nothing else of the Civil War, is misleading. There is no other biography of Jackson worth mentioning in the same breath. L. A. Coolidge, *U. S. Grant* (Houghton Mifflin, 1922) is the best biography of that general, whose *Personal Memoirs* (2 vols., N.Y., 1885) are a classic of military reminiscence. It should be supplemented by the intimate letters in J. C. Cramer, *Letters of U. S. Grant to his Father, &c.* (Putnam, 1912), and for his campaigns, the following works are indispensable: Gen. Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant* (Century Co., 1897); James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (2 vols., Appleton, 1912); and *Life of John A. Rawlins* (Neale, 1916).

General McClellan stands self-revealed in *McClellan's Own Story* (N.Y., 1887); General Sherman, in the *Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman* (2 vols., in one, N.Y., 1891), and R. S. Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters, 1837 to 1891* (Scribner's, 1894).

Valuable political biographies are A. B. Hart, *Salmon P. Chase* (Houghton Mifflin, 1899), J. A. Woodburn, *Thaddeus Stevens* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1913), G. H. Haynes, *Charles Sumner* (Philadelphia: G. W. Jacobs Co., 1909), Pierce Butler, *Judah P. Benjamin* (*ibid.*, 1907); L. Pendleton, *Alexander H. Stephens* (*ibid.*, 1908).

d. *Memoirs and Autobiographies*, other than those listed under (c). Gen. E. P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate; a Critical Narrative* (Scribner's, 1907) is by a participant, who has corrected battle-field impressions by the official records. Gen. J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations* (1874) and Gen. James Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox* (Lippincott, 1896) are defensive and controversial. E. A. Moore, *A Cannoneer under Stonewall Jackson* (N.Y.: Neale Publ. Co., 1907) and Gen. Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction* (1879); Gen. G. H. Gordon, *Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain* (1883); and Col. Theodore Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters, 1863-5* (Boston: Mass. Hist. Soc., 1922) give vivid pictures of campaigning. The last, by a much-travelled and sophisticated Bostonian, has considerable literary merit. Raphael Semmes, *Memoirs of Service Afloat* (1869) is by the captain of the *Alabama*; J. M. Morgan, *Recollections of a Rebel Reefer* (Houghton Mifflin, 1917) is more entertaining. The so-called *Diary of Gideon Welles* (3 vols., *ibid.*, 1911) is really a post-war memoir (see *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxx. 547) giving a vivid though often distorted picture of Lincoln's Cabinet. Charles A. Dana, *Recollections of the Civil War* (Appleton, 1898) is by the Assistant Secretary of War who accompanied Grant, and gives an intimate view of military events by an intelligent civilian.

e. *Foreign Relations*. Frederick Bancroft, *W. H. Seward* (2 vols., 1900) is the best life of the American Secretary of State. Brougham Villiers and W. H. Chesson, *Anglo-American Relations, 1861-5* (T. F. Unwin, 1919), an excellent little work, is by no means superseded by E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (2 vols., Longmans, 1925), which should be supplemented by *The Education of Henry Adams* (Houghton Mifflin, 1918), *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-5* (2 vols., *ibid.*, 1920), and C. F. Adams, *Charles Francis Adams* (*ibid.*, 1900). As the French foreign archives for this period are still closed, the views of French relations in John Bigelow's *France and the Confederate Navy* (1888) and *Retrospect of an Active Life* (5 vols., N.Y.: Baker & Taylor, 1909) and W. R. West, *Contemporary French Opinion of the Civil War* (Johns Hopkins Studies, series xlii, Baltimore, 1924) are necessarily incomplete. J. M. Callahan, *Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* (1901) is a well-rounded monograph. M. L. Bonham, *British Consuls in the Confederacy* (Columbia Univ. Studies, 1911) and J. D. Bulloch, *Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe* (2 vols., 1884) contain much 'inside stuff'. Printed documents

of the period will be found in the *British and Foreign State Papers* and the annual *U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, Papers relating to Foreign Affairs* (see § 3); the volumes for 1862 and 1863 are reprinted in *Parliamentary Papers, 1862, lxii, and 1863, lxxii*. Correspondence on the Trent affair will be found in the *Official Records* (§ 23b), 2nd series, ii. 1076-1206; Confederate diplomatic correspondence has been published in *Official Records of the Navies*, 2nd series, vol. iii, and J. D. Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* (Nashville, 1905).

f. *North and South during the War* (chapter li). E. D. Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War* (Macmillan, 1910). J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America* (Yale Univ. Press, 1913) is an account of Confederate economics and finance. Contemporary reports of debates in the Confederate Congress are in course of publication in the *Southern Hist. Soc. Papers*, beginning with no. 44 (1923). G. C. Eggleston, *A Rebel's Recollections* (1875), Mary B. Chesnut, *A Diary from Dixie* (N.Y. 1905), Eliza Frances Andrews, *A War-Time Diary of a Georgia Girl* (Appleton, 1908), John S. Wise, *The End of an Era* (Boston, 1899), and J. B. Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary* (Philadelphia, 1866) afford pictures of Southern life in war time. A. B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* (Macmillan, 1924) is a revelation on both those subjects, and one of the first products of the new realistic school of Southern historians. For the Union draft, the articles by F. A. Shannon, in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.*, xii. 51-71, 523-49 are indispensable. The all-important source is the Report of the Provost-Marshal-General, James B. Fry, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Ho. Exec. Docs., iv, part i, also printed without some of the important tables, in *Official Records*, 3rd series, v, 599-786. It includes the report of 30 April 1864 by Brigadier-General John S. Preston, head of the Confederate Bureau of Conscription. Interesting correspondence regarding the draft may be found *ibid.*, iv. 598-611.

Of the numerous books of travel, W. H. Russell, *My Diary North and South* (London, 1863) is by *The Times's* best war correspondent (for bibliography of his other books and articles on the war, see Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 307); Edward Dicey, *Six Months in the Federal States* (2 vols., London, 1863), Anthony Trollope, *North America* (1862, and 3 vols., Tauchnitz ed.), Lieut.-Col. A. J. Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States* (London, 1863, 1864), and [Catherine C. Hopley], *Life in the South by a Blockaded British Subject* (2 vols., London, 1863) are by accurate English observers.

24. RECONSTRUCTION (chapter lvi).

W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, Political and Economic* ('American Nation', vol. xxii), by an impartial Northern scholar, is still the best

general history of the subject and the period. W. L. Fleming, *The Sequel of Appomattox* ('Chronicles of America', vol. xxxii), by an equally impartial Southern scholar, is confined to reconstruction. Dr. Fleming has also edited the *Documentary History of Reconstruction* (2 vols., Cleveland: A. H. Clark, 1906), containing a wide range of source material, and written one of the best monographs on reconstruction in an individual State: *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (2nd ed., Clark, 1911). The radical and congressional side is best presented in James G. Blaine's *Twenty Years in Congress* (2 vols., 1884); J. A. Woodburn's *Life of Thaddeus Stevens* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1913); the *Diary of Gideon Welles* (see § 23d); and E. L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner* (4 vols., Boston, 1877-93); the negro point of view by W. E. B. DuBois in *The Souls of Black Folk* (Chicago; McClurg, 1903) and *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xv. 781-99; and in Alrutheus Ambush Taylor's *The Negro in South Carolina during Reconstruction* (Washington: Assoc. for Negro History, 1924). This last should be checked by J. S. Reynolds, *Reconstruction in South Carolina* (Columbia: State Co., 1905). From the numerous works of reminiscence, travel, and description the following stand out: Mrs. M. L. Avary, *Dixie after the War* (Doubleday, Page Co., 1906); Booker T. Washington, *Up from Slavery* (*ibid.*, 1902); Whitelaw Reid, *After the War* (Cincinnati, 1866); and J. S. Pike, *The Prostrate State: South Carolina under Negro Government* (1874).

25. THE PERIOD 1869-1900 (chapters lvii-lxi).

a. *General*. A. M. Schlesinger, *Political and Social History of the U.S., 1829-1925* (Macmillan, 1925), F. L. Paxson, *Recent Hist. of the U.S. [1877-1920]* (Houghton Mifflin, 1921), and C. R. Lingley, *Since the Civil War* (Century Co., 1921) are college text-books covering the period in some detail, with considerable attention to social changes. E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the U.S. since the Civil War* (5 vols., Macmillan, 1917-) is in the McMaster manner.

b. *Political* (chapters lix, lx). J. F. Rhodes, *Hist. of the U.S. from Hayes to McKinley* (Macmillan, 1919; also published as vol. viii of his *History of the U.S.*); and *McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations* (*ibid.*, 1922) are not quite up to the standard of his earlier volumes, but have the added value of personal contact with events. L. A. Coolidge, *U. S. Grant* (Houghton Mifflin, 1917) and Herbert Croly, *M. A. Hanna* (Macmillan, 1912) are the two best political biographies of the period. The standard biographies of the Presidents are T. W. Williams, *Rutherford B. Hayes* (2 vols., Houghton Mifflin, 1914); Theodore C. Smith, *James A. Garfield* (2 vols., Yale Univ. Press, 1925); Robert McElroy, *Grover Cleveland* (2 vols., Harper's, 1923), and C. S. Olcott, *William McKinley* (2 vols., Houghton Mifflin, 1916). Bryce's *American Commonwealth* (3 or 2 vols., Macmillan, 1888) is a classic description of

American government and politics at this time ; the revised editions are less valuable. C. R. Fish, *Civil Service and Patronage* (Harv. Hist. Studies, xi) is the standard work on civil service reform.

The political aspects of agrarian unrest, Free Silver, &c., are described in F. E. Haynes, *Third Party Movements since the Civil War* (Iowa City : the State Hist. Society, 1916) and, briefly, in his *Social Politics* (see § 2b) ; the economic and social aspects in S. J. Buck's *The Agrarian Crusade* ('Chronicles of America', vol. xlv), and in greater detail in his *Granger Movement* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1913) ; the financial aspects in Dewey, *Financial History* (§ 2c above).

c. *Railway History* (chapters lvii, lxii). The most interesting works for the general reader are biographies such as J. G. Pyle, *James F. Hill* (2 vols., Doubleday, Page Co, 1917), G. Kennan, *E. H. Harriman* (2 vols., Houghton Mifflin, 1922), C. Hovey, *Life Story of J. P. Morgan* (Sturgis & Walton ; and London : Heinemann, 1912), which resemble in tone and reliability the official biographies of crowned heads. H. G. Pearson, *An American Railroad Builder, J. M. Forbes* (Houghton Mifflin, 1911) is detached and compendious. W. Z. Ripley, *Railway Problems* (revised ed., Ginn, 1913) is a collection of source extracts that includes such classics as C. F. Adams's *Chapters of Erie* and the Minnesota Rate Case. W. Z. Ripley, *Railroads : Rates and Regulations* (new ed., Longmans, 1920) and *Railroads ; Finance and Organization* (Longmans, 1920) are standard treatises, including much historical matter ; L. F. Loree, *Railroad Freight Transportation* (Appleton, 1922) is by a practical railroad man. Nelson Trotter, *History of the Union Pacific* (Ronald Press, 1923), Stuart Daggett, *Chapters on the History of the Southern Pacific* (*ibid.*, 1922), G. D. Bradley, *Story of the Santa Fé*, (Boston : Badger, 1920) are competent and impartial histories of individual railways. C. E. Russell, *Stories of the Great Railroads* (Chicago ; Kerr, 1912), a work of the 'muck-raking' type, gives the seamy side of their history, for which the *Report of the U.S. Pacific Railway Commission of 1887* (5 vols., 50th Cong., 1st sess., ex. doc. 51) furnishes abundant illustration. L. H. Haney, *Congressional History of Railways, 1850-87* (Bulletin of Univ. of Wisconsin, no. 342, Madison, 1910) is the standard work on land-grants.

d. *Social and Economic Evolution* (chapters lvii, lviii). Van Metre's *Economic History of the U.S.* and Selig Perlman's *Trade Unionism* are the most useful guides to economic and labour history. See also § 17b. R. A. Clemen, *The American Livestock and Meat* (N.Y. : Ronald Press, 1923) is a careful study ; P. A. Rollins, *The Cowboy* (Scribner's, 1922) and H. Hagedorn, *Roosevelt in the Bad Lands* (Houghton Mifflin, 1921) are works of the highest interest and value. Of the many personal narratives of life on the cattle range, Granville Stuart, *Forty Years on the Frontier* (2 vols., Cleveland : Clark, 1925) is

one of the best. F. W. Taussig, *Some Aspects of the Tariff Question* (Harvard Economic Studies, vol. xii, Harv. Univ. Press, 1915) includes a penetrating study of the growth of manufacturing industries, the history of which is described in greater detail in C. W. Wright, *Wool Growing and the Tariff*, M. T. Copeland, *The Cotton Manufacturing Industry*, Eliot Jones, *The Anthracite Coal Combination* (vols. v, viii, and xi of the same series), and A. H. Cole, *The Amer. Wool Manufacture* (2 vols., *ibid.*, 1926). Ida M. Tarbell, *Hist. of the Standard Oil Co.* (2 vols., N.Y., 1904) is a rare classic of American economic history. W. Z. Ripley (ed.), *Trusts, Pools, and Corporations* and T. N. Carver, *Selected Readings in Rural Economics* (Ginn, 1916) are useful source collections. For the evolution of American law, see articles by Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and T. R. Powell in J. R. Commons (ed.), *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems* (2nd ed., Ginn, 1921). For intellectual and social movements, see Schlesinger's *United States*; C. F. Thwing, *Hist. of Education in the U.S. since the Civil War* (Houghton Mifflin, 1910) and F. L. Pattee, *Hist. of American Literature since 1870* (Century Co., 1915) are standard. Thomas Beer, *The Mauve Decade* (N.Y.: Knopf, 1926) is a highly impressionistic but shrewd description of the nineties.

e. *Foreign Affairs* (chapters lix-lxi). J. F. Rhodes, *United States*, vols. vi-vii, and his later volumes (§ b, above), are ample and trustworthy on foreign affairs. The best history of the *Alabama* claims and the Geneva arbitration is in J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations* (§ 3, above), i, chapter xiv; additional material will be found in biographies of the statesmen concerned, and in the *Cambridge Hist. of Br. For. Pol.*, iii, 54-71. The treaty and award are in Malloy's *Treaties* (§ 3), i, 700-22; the *plaidoyers* and other records are collected in *Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington* (5 vols., Washington, 1872). For the Venezuela affair, see G. C. Edmundson's article in *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, 4th ser., vi (1923), Henry James, *Richard Olney* (Houghton Mifflin, 1923), and the documents in A. Alvarez, *Monroe Doctrine* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1924), pp. 59-91. Events leading up to the Spanish-American War are described in some detail in F. E. Chadwick, *Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy* (Scribner's, 1909). The annual *Foreign Relations of the U.S.* (§ 3, above) are supplemented by *Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900* (Washington, 1901). B. A. Reuter, *Anglo-American Relations during the Spanish-American War* (Macmillan 1924) is largely a study of public opinion.

f. *Spanish-American War* (chapter lxi). Colonel H. H. Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba* (3 vols., Chicago: McClurg, 1907) is the definitive account of the principal military and naval campaigns. Admiral F. F. Chadwick, *Relations of the U.S. and Spain: The War* (2 vols., Scribner's, 1911) is more comprehensive, and has a bibliography

of the published records. John D. Long, *The New American Navy* (2 vols., N.Y.: Outlook Co., 1903) is authoritative, and includes a useful history of the rise of the new navy. H. C. Lodge, *The War with Spain* (Harper's 1899) is wildly inaccurate in spots, but reproduces the flavour and enthusiasm of the time; H. W. Wilson, *The Downfall of Spain* (London: Sampson Low, 1900) is adequate. The most interesting personal accounts are Roosevelt's *Rough Riders* (Scribner's, 1899, and in his collected works)—the book that Mr. Dooley called 'All Alone in Cuba' and John Bigelow, *Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign* (Harper's, 1899).

g. *Dependencies* (chapters lxi, lxxv). Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present* (Macmillan, 1921) is a balanced account of the islands and their administration to 1913, written by a member of the first Philippine Commission. José S. Reyes, *Legislative History of America's Economic Policy toward the Philippines* (Columbia University Studies, cvi, 1923) develops that phase with great detail. Moorfield Storey and M. P. Lichauco, *The Conquest of the Philippines by the U.S., 1898-1925* (Putnam's, 1926) presents the nationalist and anti-imperialist point of view; Katherine Mayo, *Isles of Fear* (Harcourt Brace Co.; London: Faber & Gwyer, 1925) is an impressionistic attack on the work of Governor F. B. Harrison, whose apologia is entitled *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence, a Narrative of Seven Years* (Century Co., 1922). Valuable sources of information are the annual *Reports of the Governor-General*, published by the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, especially the one for 1921, containing the report of the Wood-Forbes commission. Similar reports of the Governor of Porto Rico perform a like service for that island, of which the latest history and description during the American occupation is Knowlton Mixer, *Porto Rico* (Macmillan, 1926). The only connected account of the American economic penetration of Cuba, San Domingo, &c., is Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy* (N.Y.: Huebsch, 1925).

26. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1901-17 (chapters lxii-lxxv).

a. The general histories mentioned in § 25a cover this period more or less. John Moody, *Masters of Capital* ('Chronicles of America', xli) is an excellent summary of big business development since 1901. See also § 25c. *Theodore Roosevelt, an Autobiography* (Macmillan, 1913) is the best single volume on that President and his administration; *The Letters of Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge* (2 vols., Scribner's, 1925) are equally revealing; *The New Nationalism* (Outlook Co., 1911) gives the best summary of his political ideas. Of Roosevelt's biographers J. B. Bishop alone has had access to the private papers; his *Roosevelt and his Time* (2 vols., Scribner's, 1920) hardly measures up to the

opportunity. Lord Charnwood, *Roosevelt* (London: Constable; and Boston: Atlantic Monthly, 1923) is the best of the detached views; C. G. Washburn, *Roosevelt, the Logic of his Career* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916) the best intimate view that has appeared. Tyler Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (Doubleday, Page Co., 1925) is an exhaustive and fascinating study. Of the numerous editions of Roosevelt's works, the Memorial edition (24 vols., Scribner's, 1916-24) is the most comprehensive; there is a good volume of selections in 'Macmillan's pocket classics' (1920).

LaFollette's Autobiography (Madison: La Follette Co., 1913; and N.Y.: New Republic Co., 1920) is an indispensable personal source, but, like Roosevelt's autobiography, must be used with caution.

b. *Woodrow Wilson*. Three short biographies deal with Wilson's early career and first term as President: W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his Work* (Doubleday, Page Co., 1920) is by an historian; R. E. Annin, *Woodrow Wilson: a Character Study* (Dodd, Mead Co., 1924) by a Princeton professor; James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson* (Century Co., 1926) by a New Jersey journalist; all three had some personal contact with the President. J. P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I knew him* (Doubleday, Page Co., 1921) is by his private secretary. R. S. Baker (ed.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (6 vols., Harper's, 1926-) is in course of publication; Albert Shaw (ed.), *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (2 vols., Review of Reviews Co., 1924) is a handy compilation. *The Letters of Franklin K. Lane* (Houghton Mifflin, 1922) are a delightful running commentary by Wilson's Secretary of the Interior. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour* (2 vols., *ibid.*, 1926) leave the President little part in his first administration. J. Fred Rippey, *The United States and Mexico* (Knopf, 1926) and C. W. Hackett, *The Mexican Revolution and the U.S., 1910-1926* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1926) cover that subject effectively.

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